# FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

1981–1988 VOLUME IV

# SOVIET UNION, JANUARY 1983–MARCH 1985



DEPARTMENT OF STATE WASHINGTON

#### Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981-1988

**Volume IV** 

## Soviet Union, January 1983-1985

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U.S. Department of State

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Office of the Historian Foreign Service Institute U.S. Department of State February 2021

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#### **About the Series**

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the U.S. Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the U.S. Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or

deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

#### Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume were located at the Department of State in Washington and the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by

the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1981–1989, which were stored in electronic and microfilm formats, will eventually be transferred to the National Archives. Once these files are declassified and processed, they will be accessible. All of the Department's decentralized office files from this period that the National Archives deems worthy of permanent preservation will also eventually be transferred to the National Archives where they will be available for use after declassification and processing.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes in this subseries is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Reagan Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Reagan Library include some of the most significant foreign affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Some of the research for volumes in this subseries was done in Reagan Library record collections scanned for the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) project. This project, which is administered by the National Archives and Records Administration's Office of Presidential Libraries, was designed to coordinate the declassification of still-classified

records held in various Presidential libraries. As a result of the way in which records were scanned for the RAC, the editors of the *Foreign Relations* series were not always able to determine whether attachments to a given document were in fact attached to the paper copy of the document in the Reagan Library file. In such cases, some editors of the *Foreign Relations* volumes have indicated this ambiguity by stating that the attachments were "Not found attached."

#### Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to time in Washington, DC. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chiefs of the Declassification and Publishing Divisions. The original document is reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original document are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of

abbreviations and terms is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld after declassification review have been accounted for and are listed in their chronological place with headings, source notes, and the number of pages not declassified.

All brackets that appear in the original document are so identified in the footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document and its original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

### Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the *Foreign Relations* statute, monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation of the series and declassification of records. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

#### Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2015

and was completed in 2019, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 13 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 20 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of the Reagan administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, January 1983–March 1985.

Kathleen B. Rasmussen, Ph.D. General Editor Adam M. Howard, Ph.D. The Historian Foreign Service Institute February 2021

#### **Preface**

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of the administration of Ronald Reagan. This volume documents U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. Due to the importance of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Reagan administration, the Reagan subseries includes an extensive examination of U.S. bilateral relations with the Soviet Union in four volumes: Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, Volume III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983 ; Volume IV, Soviet Union, January 1983-March 1985; Volume V, Soviet Union, March 1985-October 1986 ; and Volume VI, Soviet Union, October 1986-January 1989. In conjunction with these volumes, several other volumes in the subseries will provide the reader with a fuller understanding of how U.S.-Soviet relations impacted the global character of the Cold War and U.S. strategy during the Reagan era. For documentation on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms control negotiations, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, Volume XI, START I., and Volume XII, INF, 1984-1988 Foreign Relations, 1977-1980, Volume V, European Security, 1977-1983, documents the NATO dual-track decision and TNF/INF negotiations through 1983. Documentation dealing with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear testing, chemical and biological weapons, and space arms control, including anti-satellite systems, will be published in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XL, Global Issues I. The development of the Strategic Defense Initiative and ABM-related issues and other strategic considerations are addressed in Foreign Relations, 19811988, Volume XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984, and Volume XLIV, Parts 1 and 2, National Security Policy, 1985–1988. For selected documentation on the human rights situation in the Soviet Union, see *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, Volume XLI, Global Issues II a.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume IV

This volume documents the development of the Reagan administration's policies toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. With Reagan's signature of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75 on January 17, 1983, the administration's approaches and policies toward the Soviet Union were codified in a specific fourpart agenda: arms control, human rights, regional issues, and bilateral relations. This volume examines the efforts of administration officials, namely Secretary of State George Shultz, President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and later Robert McFarlane, and NSC Staff member Jack Matlock, to implement the four-part agenda in dealing with the Soviet Union. The documentation demonstrates how administration officials developed policies related to the four-part agenda, mainly in the National Security Council (NSC) and Department of State, and then promoted these various tracks during meetings between Shultz, and on occasion Reagan, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko in various fora. Although no high-level meeting took place between Reagan and either Soviet General Secretaries Yuri Andropov or Konstantin Chernenko during their short tenures, the documents provide a window into how the Reagan administration viewed the Soviet leadership and formulated policies to deal with whomever was in charge.

The volume also documents the bureaucratic struggle Shultz faced against the NSC in implementing the four-part agenda laid out by NSDD 75 and in gaining access to President Reagan. After some wrangling, by June 1983 an understanding emerged between Shultz and Clark, which allowed Shultz regular weekly meetings with Reagan. When Jack Matlock joined the NSC Staff as primary adviser on the Soviet Union, Shultz gained a like-minded ally in approaches to dealing with the USSR. While some administration officials, such as Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, consistently argued that negotiating with the Soviet Union seemed futile, Shultz, Matlock, and others pushed President Reagan to see the value in keeping lines of communication open with the Soviets. Even during tragic events, such as the Soviet downing of the KAL 007 airliner in September 1983, Shultz kept his meeting with Gromyko a few days later in Madrid and used this as an opportunity to admonish the Foreign Minister for this inexplicable act and the inability of the Soviet Union to admit fault on the international stage.

The volume documents several Cold War flashpoints during the contentious months of 1983. The announcement in March 1983 of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) caused concern for the Soviet Union because it shifted the strategic balance from the theory of mutually assured destruction toward a defensive nuclear posture. Aside from the downing of the KAL airliner, the Euromissiles crisis came to a head with U.S. deployments of INF missiles to several NATO allies in late November 1983. While the bulk of the documentation dealing with these negotiations is covered in two other volumes, the scheduled deployments permeated all other aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations in 1983. The volume also presents selective documentation related to the 1983 Soviet "War Scare" and the November 1983 NATO nuclear exercise, Able Archer (see Appendix A).

The volume attempts to demonstrate that even with these challenges, Shultz and others pressed to keep moving ahead with the four-part agenda and promote greater dialogue in U.S.-Soviet relations.

After the Soviet walkout of the INF negotiations in Geneva in late 1983, the administration focused throughout 1984 on developing a framework to restart arms control negotiations; the documents in this volume demonstrate the difficulties involved in opening new talks with the Soviet Union. Reagan's SDI program continued to cause problems. The Soviets believed SDI would "militarize space," and therefore the debates over how SDI would be dealt with during negotiations were a major point of contention during this period. When Shultz and Gromyko met in January 1985, they finally reached an agreement on a new round of umbrella negotiations. The Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), scheduled to begin in Geneva in March 1985, would have three tracks, START, INF, and Defense and Space. The documents in the volume trace how various positions from the Department of State, NSC, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency impacted the decision to move forward with the three arms control tracks. While the other parts of the fourpart agenda remained in play during this period and were discussed in bilateral meetings, restarting arms control talks seemed to trump the other areas of concern. Little did the U.S. or Soviet negotiators know that on the eve of these new NST negotiations, Chernenko would die, and a younger, more ambitious Soviet leader would emerge and dramatically change the course of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of officials at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California, especially Lisa Jones and Cate Sewell. A special thanks to the Central Intelligence Agency staff for providing access and assistance with Reagan Library materials scanned for the Remote Archive Capture project, and to the History Staff of the CIA's Center for the Study of Intelligence for arranging full access to CIA records. The editor wishes to acknowledge the staff at Information Programs and Services at the Department of State for facilitating access to Department of State records and coordinating the review of this volume within the Department. Sandy Meagher was helpful in providing access to Department of Defense materials. The editor extends thanks to the family and executor of the Estate of former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger for granting Department of State historians access to the personal papers of Secretary Weinberger deposited at the Library of Congress. Additional thanks are due to officials of the Library of Congress Manuscript Division for facilitating that access.

Elizabeth C. Charles collected, selected, and annotated the documentation for this volume under the supervision of David Geyer, Chief of the Europe Division, and Adam Howard, then General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. The volume was reviewed by David Geyer and then Historian Stephen Randolph. Kerry Hite and Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Coordination Division. Kerry Hite also performed the copy and technical editing under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division.

Elizabeth C. Charles, Ph.D. Historian

#### Sources

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1981–1988, Volume IV, Soviet Union January 1983–March 1985

The White House Staff and Office Files at the Reagan Library provide a key source of documentation on highlevel decision-making toward the Soviet Union from January 1983 to March 1985. The Executive Secretariat files, a subset of this collection, include the National Security Council (NSC) and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) Meeting Files; National Security Decision Directives (NSDD); the Head of State File; and the USSR Country File. Other relevant Staff and Office File collections include the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate: USSR Files; Director of Soviet Affairs Jack Matlock Files; and files of President's Assistants for National Security Affairs William Clark and Robert "Bud" McFarlane. Key collections of other members of the NSC Staff are the files of John Lenczowski, Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer, which focus on various aspects of policy development, arms control, and negotiations with the Soviet Union. In some instances, NSC records related to NSDDs and NSC and NSPG meetings have remained in the institutional files of the NSC in Washington. The text of the declassified NSDDs are available on the Reagan Presidential Library website.

The Department of State records most vital for this volume are in the following Executive Secretariat S/S Lot Files: Lot 91D257: Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum; Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989; Lot 92D630: Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989; Lot 93D188:

Memorandum of Conversations, 1981–1990; Lot 94D92: NODIS and EXDIS Secretariat Memorandums, 1985; and Lot 96D262: Special Handling Restrictions Memos, 1979–1983. The files of Lawrence Eagleburger in Lot 84D204 and Kenneth Dam in Lot 85D308, as well as the Policy Planning Staff Memoranda in Lot 89D149 and files of the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, in Lot 91D231 provide an excellent insight into high-level decision-making in the Department. The Central Foreign Policy File of the Department includes cable traffic between the Embassy in Moscow and Washington, as well as other related cables.

In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

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#### **Department of State**

Central Foreign Policy File

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland

Lot 03D256: EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas J. Simons, Jr.

Lot 03D314: EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files

Lot 84D204: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Lawrence Eagleburger Files, 1967–1984

Lot 85D308: Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files

Lot 89D149: S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff

Lot 89D250: A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill

Lot 90D137: Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989

Lot 91D231: Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Office of Soviet Affairs, 1978–1989

Lot 91D257: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Top Secret/Secret Sensitive Memorandum

Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989

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#### Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, California

Intelligence Directorate

**NSC** Records

White House Staff and Office Files

Frank Carlucci Files

William Clark Files

Kenneth deGraffenreid Files

Files of the Executive Secretariat, National Security

Council

Agency File

Cable File

Country File: Europe and Soviet Union

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Meeting File

National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) File

National Security Planning Group (NSPG) File

National Security Study Directives (NSSD) File

System Files, System II Intelligence File

System Files, System IV Intelligence File

Subject File

Files of the European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Political Affairs Directorate, National Security Council

Files of the Situation Room, White House

Donald Fortier Files

Fred Ikle Files

Intelligence Directorate, NSC Records, 1981-1989

Sven Kraemer Files

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John Lenczowski Files

Robert Lilac Files

Robert Linhard Files

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Robert McFarlane Files

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John Poindexter Files

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Papers of Charles Hill

Papers of George Shultz

President's Daily Diary

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**Manuscript Division** 

Papers of Caspar W. Weinberger

#### **National Security Council**

Carter Intelligence Files

**Institutional Files** 

# Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

RG 330, Records of the Department of Defense

FRC 330-85-0023: 1983 Official Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-86-0048: 1984 Official Files (Top Secret) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense

FRC 330-87-0023: 1984 Official Files (Secret and below) of the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense

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#### Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile

ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

ALCM, air-launched cruise missile

ASAP, as soon as possible

ASAT, anti-satellite

ASBM, air-to-surface ballistic missile

ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations

ASW, anti-submarine warfare

AWAC, Airborne Warning and Control

BMD, Ballistic Missile Defense

**BW**, biological weapon

C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State

CA, covert action

CAB, Civil Aviation Board

CBI, Caribbean Basin Initiative

CBM, Confidence-Building Measures

CC, Central Committee

CD, Conference on Disarmament

CDE, Conference on Disarmament in Europe

CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

CI, Counterintelligence

CIA, Central Intelligence Agency

CINCSAC, Commander in Chief, Strategic Air Command

CJCS, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

CM, cruise missile

**CODEL,** Congressional Delegation

COM, Chief of Mission

**CP,** Communist Party

CPPG, Crisis Pre-Planning Group

CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union

**CSCE,** Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban

CW, chemical weapon

**D,** Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; Democrat

DAO, Defense Attaché Office

DATT, Defense Attaché

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

**DDI,** Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

**DDO,** Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency

**DIA,** Defense Intelligence Agency

**DIRNSA,** Director of the National Security Agency

DOD, Department of Defense

**DST,** Defense and Space Talks

EC, European Community

**EconOff**, Economics Officer

EE, Eastern Europe

EEC, European Economic Community

EmbOff, Embassy Officer

**EOB,** Executive Office Building (houses the Vice President's Office)

**ERW**, enhanced radiation weapon

EST, Eastern Standard Time

**EUR,** Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; after September 15, 1983, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs

**EUR/SOV,** Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State

Exdis, Exclusive Distribution

FAA, Federal Aviation Administration

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FBS, forward-based systems

**FCO,** Foreign and Commonwealth Office (United Kingdom)

FM, Foreign Minister

ForMin, Foreign Ministry; Foreign Minister

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany

**G-7,** Group of 7, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, United States

GDR, German Democratic Republic

GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile

GOJ, Government of Japan

GPS, George P. Shultz

**GRU**, Soviet military intelligence agency

**HA,** Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State

**HPSCI,** House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

**HUMINT**, human intelligence

**I&W**, Indications and Warning

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

IG, Interagency Group

**IMEMO,** Institute of World Economy and International Relations

IMF, International Monetary Fund

INF, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State

IOC, International Olympic Committee

JCC, Joint Commercial Commission

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff

JMC, Joint Military Commission

KAL, Korean Airlines

KGB, Committee for State Security in the Soviet Union

L, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State

LANDSAT, Land-Use Satellite

Limdis, Limited Distribution

LRINF, Long-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

LTA, Long-Term Agreement on grain

MAD, mutual assured destruction

MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions

**memcon**, memorandum of conversation

MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MFN, most favored nation

MIRV, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle

MOU, Memorandum of Understanding

**MX or M-X,** missile experimental (intercontinental ballistic missile)

NAC, North Atlantic Council

NAM, Non-Aligned Movement

NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

**Niact**, Night Action

NID, National Intelligence Daily

**Nocontract**, Not Releasable to Contractors

**Nodis**, No Distribution

Noforn, No Foreign Dissemination

NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command

**NPT,** Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA, National Security Agency

NSPG, National Security Planning Group

NSC, National Security Council

**NSDD**, National Security Decision Directive

NSSD, National Security Study Directive

**NST,** Nuclear and Space Talks

NTM, National Technical Means

NUF, non-use of force

OAS, Organization of American States

**OBE**, overtaken by events

**OECD,** Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

Orcon, Originator Controlled

OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense

**OVP,** Office of the Vice President

**P,** Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

P-II, Pershing II missile

PDB, President's Daily Brief

PFIAB, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

**PM,** Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNE or PNET, Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

**POLAD**, Political Adviser

PolCouns, Political Counselor

Poloff, Political Officer

PRC, Policy Review Committee

**PROFs notes,** internal White House and NSC electronic messages

R, Republican

**R&D**, research and development

reftel, Reference Telegram

RFE, Radio Free Europe

RL, Radio Liberty

RR, Ronald Reagan

RW, radiological weapons

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State

S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**S/S-O,** Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

**S/S-S,** Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State

S&T, Science and Technology

**SACG,** Senior Arms Control Group

SACPG, Senior Arms Control Policy Group

**SALT,** Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

**SCC,** Special Coordinating Committee; Standing Consultative Commission

**SCG,** Special Consultative Group (NATO)

SDI, Strategic Defense Initiative

**Secto,** series indicator for telegrams sent from the Secretary of State while away from Washington

septel, separate telegram

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

SIG, Senior Interagency Group

SIG/I, Senior Interagency Group on Intelligence

**SIG-IEP,** Senior Interagency Group-International Economic Policy

**SLCM**, surface-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; sea-launched cruise missile

**SNDV**, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle

**SNIE**, Special National Intelligence Estimate

**Specat,** Special Category

**SRINF,** Short-Range Intermediate Nuclear Forces

**START,** Strategic Arms Reduction Talks; Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

TASS, official Soviet news agency

TNF, Theater Nuclear Forces

**Tosec,** series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State while away from Washington

TTBT, Threshold Test Ban Treaty

UK, United Kingdom

UN, United Nations

UNGA, United Nations General Assembly

US, United States

USA, United States of America; United States Army

USAF, United States Air Force

USAFSB, United States Army Field Station Berlin

**USCINCEUR,** United States Commander in Chief, European Command

USDel, United States Delegation

**USDOC**, Department of Commerce

USG, United States Government

**USIA**, United States Information Agency

USN, United States Navy

**USNMR SHAPE,** United States National Military Representative, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe

USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

**USTR,** United States Trade Representative

VOA, Voice of America

VP, Vice President

WH, White House

WHSR, White House Situation Room

WP, Warsaw Pact

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

#### **Persons**

- **Abrahamson, James A.,** Lieutenant General, USAF; Director, Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
- **Abramowitz, Morton I. (Mort),** U.S. Representative to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations from March 1983; Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from February 1, 1985
- **Abrams, Elliott,** Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs until July 1985
- **Adelman, Kenneth L. (Ken),** Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from April 1983
- **Akhromeyev, Sergei F.,** Marshal of the Soviet Union and Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces from September 1984
- **Allen, Richard V.,** President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until January 1982
- **Andreas, Dwayne,** Assistant Secretary of Commerce for International Trade Policy; U.S. Co-Chairman of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC)
- **Andropov, Yuri,** General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from November 12, 1982, until February 9, 1984
- **Arbatov, Georgii,** Director, Institute for U.S. and Canada Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
- **Armacost, Michael,** Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from May 1984
- **Azrael, Jeremy,** member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from 1984 until 1985
- **Babrak Karmal,** President of Afghanistan from December 1979
- **Bailey, Norman,** Director, Planning and Evaluation, National Security Council, from April 1981 until 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director,

- International Economic Affairs Directorate, from June 1983 until October 1983; thereafter, consultant to the National Security Council Staff
- **Baker, James A., III (Jim),** White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President until February 1, 1985; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury
- Baldrige, H. Malcolm, Jr., (Mac), Secretary of Commerce
- **Baraz, Robert,** Director, Office of Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- **Barker, Robert,** Deputy Assistant Director, Bureau of Verification and Intelligence, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1983 until 1986; Head of the U.S. Delegation to the U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Experts Meetings
- **Bessmertnykh, Aleksandr A.,** Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy in the United States, to March 1983; thereafter Chief of the U.S.A. Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs from March 1983
- **Bishop, Maurice,** Prime Minister of Grenada until October 19, 1983
- **Block, John R. (Jack),** Secretary of Agriculture **Bosworth, Stephen W.,** Chairman, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from January 3, 1983, until April 7, 1984
- **Bova, Michele,** Director, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, from 1984
- **Boverie, Richard,** Major General, USAF; National Security Council Staff
- **Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry),** Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until March 27, 1983
- **Brezhnev, Leonid,** General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until his death on November 10, 1982

- **Brock, William E., III,** U.S. Trade Representative from 1981 to 1985
- Burt, Richard (Rick), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs-designate from May 10, 1982, until February 17, 1983; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (European and Canadian Affairs from September 15, 1983), from February 18, 1983, until July 18, 1985
- Bush, George H.W., Vice President of the United States Byrd, Robert, W., Senator, (D-West Virginia), Senate Minority Leader
- Carter, James Earl (Jimmy), President of the United States from January 20, 1977, to January 20, 1981
- Casey, William J. (Bill), Director of Central Intelligence from January 28, 1981
- **Chain, John T., Jr.,** General, USAF; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from July 1, 1984, until June 14, 1985
- **Chernenko, Konstantin,** General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from February 1984 until March 1985
- Clark, William P. (Judge), President's Assistant for National Security Affairs from February 1982 until November 1983; Secretary of the Interior from November 1983 until February 1985
- Cobb, Tyrus (Ty), Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Cooper, Henry F. (Hank), Deputy Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- **Courtney, William H.,** Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State
- Craxi, Bettino, Prime Minister of Italy from August 1983

- **Crocker, Chester,** Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
- Dam, Kenneth W. (Ken), Deputy Secretary of State from September 23, 1982, until June 15, 1985
- **Deaver, Michael K.,** Deputy White House Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to the President until 1985
- **deGraffenreid, Kenneth E.,** Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- **Dobriansky, Paula J.,** Deputy Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; thereafter Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate
- **Dobrynin, Anatoly,** Soviet Ambassador to the United States
- **Dolan, Anthony R. (Tony),** Speechwriter, White House Office of Speechwriting until 1985
- **Dunkerley, Craig,** Office of Security and Political Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- **Eagleburger, Lawrence (Larry),** Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 1982 until May 1984; Career Ambassador from April 1984
- **Ermarth, Fritz W.,** National Intelligence Officer for USSR, Central Intelligence Agency, and member, National Intelligence Council Staff, from 1984
- **Foley, Thomas,** member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Washington); House Democratic Whip
- Fortier, Donald R. (Don), Director, Western Europe and NATO, National Security Council Staff, from September 1982 until June 1983; Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Political-Military Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Policy Development from December 1983

- Gandhi, Rajiv, Indian Prime Minister
- **Garthoff, Douglas F.,** Policy Assistant for Soviet Affairs, Department of Defense
- Gates, Robert (Bob), Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from January 1982 until April 1986; also, Chairman, National Intelligence Council, from September 1983
- **Genscher, Hans-Dietrich,** Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany
- **George, Clair E.,** Director of the Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, from July 1983 until July 1984; Deputy Director of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, from July 1984
- **George, Douglas (Doug),** Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, from June 1982
- Glitman, Maynard W. (Mike), Negotiator for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- Goodby, James E., Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) from 1983 until 1985
- **Gorbachev, Mikhail S.,** General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from March 1985
- Gordievskiy, Oleg, Colonel, Committee on State Security (KGB), USSR; secret agent for British Security Service from 1974 until his defection to the United Kingdom in 1985
- **Grechko, Andrey A.,** Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense from 1967 until 1976
- **Gregg, Donald P.,** Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs

- **Grinevsky, Oleg A.,** Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe from 1983 until 1986
- Grobel, Olaf, Director, Office of Theater Military Policy,
  Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
  Gromyko, Andrei, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
  Hartman, Arthur A., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
  Union
- **Hill, M. Charles,** Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from March 28, 1983, until January 1, 1985; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Secretary
- **Horowitz, Larry,** Executive Assistant to Senator Edward M. Kennedy
- **Howe, Sir Geoffrey,** British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs from June 1983
- **Howe, Jonathan T.,** Rear Admiral, USN; Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until July 1, 1984
- Iklé, Fred C., Under Secretary of Defense for PolicyIsakov, Viktor, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy in Washington
- **Kamman, Curtis, W.,** Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until August 1985
- Kampelman, Max, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe until 1983; head of U.S. human rights mission to Europe in 1984; head of the Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva; Negotiator for Defense and Space Talks, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- **Keel, Alton B. (Al),** Associate Director, Office of Management and Budget
- **Kelly, John H.,** Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

- Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts) Kennedy, Richard T., Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Nonproliferation Policy and Nuclear Energy Affairs from 1983
- **Keyes, Alan,** staff member, National Security Council in 1983
- **Keyworth, George A., II,** Science Advisor to the President; Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President
- **Kimmitt, Robert M.,** Executive Secretary and General Counsel, National Security Council Staff, from 1983
- **Kirkpatrick, Jeane J.,** U.S. Representative to the United Nations until April 1985
- **Kohl, Helmut,** Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
- **Korniyenko, Georgii,** Soviet First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
- **Kraemer, Sven,** Director, Arms Control, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- **Kvitsinskiy, Yuliy A.,** Head of the Soviet delegation to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations in Geneva until December 1983; Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva from March 1985
- Lehman, Ronald F., II (Ron), Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until January 1986; Deputy Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- **Lenczowski, John,** Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- **Levine, Richard,** Deputy Director, Defense Programs, Defense Policy Directorate, National Security Council

- Staff
- Lilac, Robert, Director, Political-Military Affairs
  Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983
  until 1984
- **Linhard, Robert E. (Bob),** Colonel, USAF; Director, Defense Programs and Arms Control Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- Marshall, Andrew, Director, Office of Net Assessment, Department of Defense
- Matlock, Jack F., Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- McFarlane, Robert C. (Bud), Colonel, USMC (Ret.); Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1982 until October 1983; Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985
- **McKinley, Brunson,** Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State until 1985
- McMahon, John N., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence from 1982
- Meese, Edwin, III (Ed), Counselor to the President until February 1985; U.S. Attorney General from February 1985
- Mitterrand, Francois, President of France
- Montgomery, Hugh, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
- Moreau, Arthur S., Admiral, USN; Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1983 until 1985
- **Mulroney, Martin Brian,** Prime Minister of Canada from September 17, 1984
- Murphy, Richard, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
- Nakasone Yasuhiro, Prime Minister of Japan from November 27, 1982

- Nitze, Paul, Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator, Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Negotiations, until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985
- **Ogarkov, Nikolai V.,** Marshal, Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, until September 1984
- O'Neill, Thomas P., Jr., (Tip), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts); Speaker of the House
- Palme, Olof, Prime Minister of Sweden from October 1982
- Palmer, Robie M.H. (Mark), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
- **Parris, Mark R.,** Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- **Pascoe, Boris L. (Lynn),** Deputy Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- **Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier,** Secretary-General of the United Nations from January 1, 1982
- **Perle, Richard,** Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy
- **Pipes, Richard,** Senior Director, East European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council Staff, until December 1982
- **Platt, Nicholas,** Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from January 7, 1985
- **Poindexter, John M.,** Rear Admiral, USN; Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs until October 1983; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from October 1983 until December 1985
- **Powell, Colin L.,** Major General, USA; Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

- Qadhafi, Muammar, President of Libya
- Raymond, Walter, Jr., Senior Director, Intelligence Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1982 until 1983; Senior Director, International Communications and Information Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983
- **Reagan, Ronald,** President of the United States **Regan, Donald T. (Don),** Secretary of the Treasury until February 1985; White House Chief of Staff from February 1985
- **Robinson, Roger,** Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1983 until 1984; Senior Director, International Economic Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984 until 1985
- Robison, Olin C., President of Middlebury College Rodman, Peter, member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State until 1984; Chairman, Policy Planning Council, from April 9, 1984
- Rostow, Eugene V. (Gene), Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency until January 1983
- Rowny, Edward L., General, USA; Chief U.S. Arms Negotiator to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks until 1984; Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters from 1985
- **Sagdeyev, Roald Z.,** Director, USSR Institute of Space Research
- Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident Scowcroft, Brent, Chairman of the President's Commission on Strategic Forces; member of the Dartmouth Group
- **Seitz, Raymond G.H.,** Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State until July 1984
- **Sestanovich, Stephen,** Director, Political-Military Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff, from 1984

- Sharansky, Natan (also Shcharansky, Anatoly), Soviet dissident and refusenik
- Shultz, George P., Secretary of State from July 1982
- Shultz, Helena (Obie), wife of George Shultz
- **Simons, Thomas W., Jr.,** Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State, from 1982 until 1985
- **Sofaer, Abraham,** Legal Adviser, Department of State **Sokolov, Oleg,** Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington
- **Sokolov, Sergei F.,** Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense, from December 1984
- **Sommer, Peter R.,** member, European and Soviet Affairs Directorate, National Security Council Staff
- **Speakes, Larry M.,** Assistant to the President and Principal Deputy Press Secretary from June 17, 1981
- **Spiers, Ronald I.,** Under Secretary of State for Management from November 23, 1983
- **Stearman, William L.,** member, National Security Council Staff
- **Taft, William H., IV.,** Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 1984
- **Thatcher, Margaret H.,** Prime Minister of the United Kingdom
- **Thayer, Paul,** Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 1984
- **Timbie, James P.,** Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State
- **Tower, John G.,** Senator (R-Texas) until January 3, 1985; Negotiator for Strategic Arms Reduction Talks in Geneva, Office of Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union, Department of State, from March 1985
- **Ustinov, Dmitri F.,** Soviet Minister of Defense until December 1984

- **Velikhov, Yevgeny P.,** Vice President, Soviet Academy of Sciences
- **Vershbow, Alexander,** Multilateral Relations Officer, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, Department of State
- **Vessey, John W., Jr.,** General, USA; Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff from June 1982
- Wallis, W. Allen, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Department of State
- Weinberger, Caspar W. (Cap), Secretary of Defense Wick, Charles Z., Director, United States Information Agency
- Wolfowitz, Paul, D., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- **Zagladin, Vadim,** Deputy Chief, International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union
- **Zimmerman, Warren,** Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, until July 1984

# **Note on U.S. Covert Actions**

In compliance with the Foreign Relations of the United States statute that requires inclusion in the Foreign Relations series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

## Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council (NSC) to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively executive branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice, but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.<sup>1</sup>

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition, and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas, and refugee liberations [sic] groups; and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations."<sup>2</sup>

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the

Department of State and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA's activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare. 4 The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the Departmental representatives originally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

## NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of NSC directives, the responsibility of the DCI for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the CIA's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth: the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.<sup>5</sup>

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve

covert action programs initiated by the CIA.<sup>6</sup> The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.<sup>7</sup>

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.<sup>8</sup>

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November,

he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs. 9

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counterinsurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who established a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging this responsibility. 10

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee. 11

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its

predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected. 12

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation that had not been reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,<sup>13</sup> which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and politically sensitive covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal

meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d' etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval. 14

## Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a finding and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security. 15

Executive Order (EO) 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group (OAG), composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities. 16

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action. President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the OAG with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG. 17 Membership of the SCC. when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG namely—the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers).

The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's

EO 11905 on United States Foreign Intelligence activities. In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC-Intelligence (SCC-I) to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in EO 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced EO 11905 and its amendments. EO 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers. 19

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the U.S. Government. A new type of document -known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential findings or Memorandum of Notification (MON). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while the Department of State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing "worldwide" finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

The Carter administration initially used MONs to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically specific operations under a previously approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MONs had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MONs subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings "in a timely fashion," but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment's provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the Committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence Committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the Committees "fully and currently informed" did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was "essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence Committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and

minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the "Gang of Eight." If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence Committees "in a timely fashion" and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice. $\frac{20}{3}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in <u>Foreign</u> <u>Relations</u>, 1945–1950, <u>Emergence of the Intelligence</u> <u>Establishment</u>, <u>Document 257</u> ₽.
- <sup>2</sup> NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed ibid., <u>Document 292</u> . .
- <sup>3</sup> Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, "Implementation of NSC-10/2," August 12, 1948, is printed ibid., Document 298 <sup>a</sup>.
- <sup>4</sup> NSC 10/5, "Scope and Pace of Covert Operations," October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 90 <sup>a</sup>.
- <sup>5</sup> William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations*, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Document 171 .
- <sup>6</sup> Leary, The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents, pp. 63, 147–148; Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence (1976), pp. 50–51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, Documents 212 and 250 ...
- <sup>7</sup> Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 82.
- <sup>9</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. X, Cuba, 1961–1962, Documents 270 and 278 a.

- 10 For text of NSAM No. 124, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1961–1963, vol. VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68 ...
  NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed in <u>Foreign</u>
  <u>Relations</u>, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, <u>Organization and</u>
  <u>Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations</u>,
  Document 56 ...
- <sup>11</sup> For text of NSAM No. 303, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. <u>Foreign Policy</u>; <u>United Nations</u>, <u>Document 204</u> <sup>□</sup>.
- <sup>12</sup> Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 56-57.
- 13 For text of NSDM 40, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1969–1976, vol. II, <u>Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy</u>, 1969–1972, <u>Document 203</u> .
- <sup>14</sup> Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, U.S. Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54–55, 57.
- 15 P.L. 93-559.
- 16 EO 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence
   Activities," Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents,
   Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.
- 17 The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the SCC. The SCCs jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, non-intelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System", January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle:*Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59–62.

- <sup>18</sup> EO 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", May 13, 1977, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719–720.
- 19 EO 12036, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities", January 24, 1978, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194–214. Since EO 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the EO to the "SCC" were effectively references to what was known in practice as SCC-I.
- <sup>20</sup> P.L. 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by P.L. 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions," Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp.1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA'S Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280-281.

# 260. Paper Prepared in the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, August 2, 1984

#### EAST-WEST RELATIONS: THE NEXT FOUR YEARS

So many variables affect East-West relations that it is difficult to do a paper of this sort. These variables include: the staying power of our economic recovery; the degree of Congressional support for big defense and covert action programs; the level of instability in critical regions like the Middle East and Central America; various imponderables on the Soviet domestic scene like Chernenko's health. So predicting the context for US-Soviet relations over the next four years is genuinely "looking through a glass darkly." That said, we have taken our best shot.

#### I. Introduction

In this administration's first four years, we have begun to establish a sounder foundation for dealing with the Soviet Union. We have moved to rebuild US economic and military strength, repair relations with key Allies and friends, and restore US confidence. Moreover, we have seized the diplomatic initiative at a time when the Soviet leadership is locked in a rigid policy matrix of its own making. But while we have been successful in gaining the respect on the part of the Soviet leadership and reinforcing its caution, our reviving strength, our policies, and sometimes, our rhetoric have had the effect of creating a new truculence in Moscow. In short, we have succeeded in halting the erosion in the balance of power, but our dialogue remains sticky on

the small issues and sterile on the big, and the Soviets are in a generally nasty mood.

The challenge over the next four years will be to sustain the momentum of Western resurgence, and to translate it into greater progress in our dialogue with the Soviets, so that we can put East-West relations on a stable footing for the long haul. "Strength" and "dialogue" are mutually reinforcing. The former may well be as difficult as the latter in the years ahead, especially if economic stringencies, allied pressures, and Congressional meddling in arms control policy-making increasingly constrain our freedom of action. Therefore, as we look for ways to move forward in our dialogue with Moscow, it is essential that we continue to give top priority to maintaining our overall strength.

In considering US policy, it is important to appreciate the Kremlin's view of its domestic and external situation. While our knowledge is far from perfect, and there are so many unpredictable variables that preclude making solid predictions, we have attempted to make informed judgments about how the next four years look from Moscow's perspective, and whether continuity or change will be the dominant feature in Soviet policies.

## II. The View From Moscow, 1985-1988

If the bulk of Leonid Brezhnev's eighteen years in office witnessed a shift in the world "correlation of forces" in Moscow's favor and the achievement of unprecedented domestic stability, his last few years and the two years since his passing have been a period in which the Soviet Union has found itself on the defensive in many parts of the international arena, and mired in a protracted and, thus far, inconclusive succession process at home.

To be sure, none of the USSR's problems have reached crisis proportions, and the leadership has shown that it is still adroit enough to exacerbate serious problems for the United States in specific areas, as well as to tweak a minirebound out of the Soviet economy. But the Soviet leadership has clearly lost some of the buoyancy with which it used to confront major challenges. Barring the sudden demise of a large number of the older men still at the top, next January it will still be an amalgam of unimaginative seniors and the younger men waiting to succeed them.

### A. Muddling through at home

Domestically, the Soviet leadership will confront two principal challenges over the next four years: modernizing the country and revitalizing itself. The response in both cases will likely be cautious and incremental, reflecting a large measure of continuity.

When Andropov entered office in November 1982, he stimulated high expectations for change. But despite a more candid recognition of the country's problems, Andropov focused his energies on consolidating power, rather than embarking on major reforms to revitalize the country's faltering economy. His rapid incapacitation, demise and replacement by an even older man, one who made few pretensions to being a promoter of reform, may have exacerbated concerns within Soviet society over whether the system is capable of renewing itself.

Yet the domestic outlook may not seem as hopeless to the top leadership as Western optimists and Soviet pessimists have forecast, and these rays of hope are important to it. On the *economic front*, Soviet GNP in 1983 and early 1984 has grown at an annual rate of about 3% (contrary to CIA estimates of 2% growth for the remainder of the decade).<sup>2</sup> The growth spurt reflects the somewhat better harvest in 1983, increased production capacity, and the effects of Andropov's labor discipline campaign. Growth could slow again, of course, particularly in the event of more bad harvests by a failure to deal with the impending decline in oil production. But looking to the 1985–88 period, growth rates appear sufficient to reinforce the view that no drastic economic reforms are necessary, and that steady growth in military spending is possible without a shift of resources from the civilian economy.

Thus we can expect a continued "muddle-through" economic strategy, with some modest expansion of the present experiments in decentralization, a continued discipline campaign, and more exhortations to greater productivity. The USSR's present favorable hard currency position is likely to continue, although the long-term outlook is less certain given the problems the Soviets face with oil, their main hard-currency earner; oil production has apparently peaked, and huge investments will be required just to maintain output at the present level.

Hence, we can expect the Soviets to remain interested in trade with the West to obtain the technology needed to modernize their economy. Although they will try to avoid becoming too dependent on the US, they will be interested in American oil and gas technology which cannot be obtained elsewhere. Even with access to Western technology, however, the USSR will continue to have problems absorbing and reproducing new techniques and equipment, and confront an ever-widening "technology gap" with the West.

What does this quick survey of Soviet economic prospects indicate about their capacity for *military spending*? Even at the present 2% annual rate of growth in military outlays, the momentum of Soviet weapons programs and the level of military R&D (twice that of the US in recent years) will enable them to keep pace with likely US and Allied spending increases. Thus, they probably will not face any unmanageable guns-versus-butter conflicts in the near term. It is possible they may even increase the rate of growth to 3% if the US sustains its present levels of annual increases and/or if the Soviet economy continues to grow at the present rate.

In any case, we can expect steady modernization in both nuclear and non-nuclear forces. In the strategic area, the Soviets are now testing several new types of ICBMs, SLBMs and cruise missiles, as well as the Blackjack bomber and modernized versions of current missile systems—all of which are likely to be deployed in the next four years. Ironically, the major trends—toward increased reliance on survivable systems (mobile ICBMs, SLBMs) and on primarily second-strike systems (bombers, cruise missiles)—are those that our START proposals have sought to encourage (albeit to a greater degree). In theater forces, we can expect a sustained Soviet build-up in SS-20s (probably surpassing 450 missiles, with close to 300 in or in range of Europe), deployment of a Soviet GLCM, and continued modernization of shorter-range ballistic systems —many of which will be billed as counters to US LRINF.

Soviet R&D in the area of strategic defense technologies will also remain active: prototype tests of lasers can be expected, but an operational Soviet space-based ABM capability is more than a decade off; the Soviets are not expected to overcome the changing threat posed by US bombers and cruise missiles, particularly those with Stealth

techniques. Soviet capabilities for conventional and chemical warfare will also continue to receive a sizeable share of investment, both in procurement and R&D, in order to preserve Soviet advantages and to keep pace with the new US technologies highlighted by Ogarkov in his May 9 interview.<sup>3</sup>

Are there offsetting *domestic political problems* which could constrain the Soviets and turn them inwards?

One of the biggest potential challenge is separatist tendencies among their *nationalities*. But while nationality problems will continue to grow (such as assimilation of the burgeoning Muslim population, rising anti-Russian sentiment in the Baltics and Ukraine), over the next four years they are unlikely to pose a major threat to the Soviet system or to affect foreign policy calculations to a significant degree.

A continuation of current repressive policies is likely with regard to *human rights* as well, and there is little likelihood of any real challenge to the regime's authority on the part of dissident groups. Soviet authorities have been successful in their efforts to cut activists off from each other and from supporters abroad, and have shown themselves willing to accept the isolation and damage to the USSR's international reputation that result. Moreover, no potential successor to Chernenko has displayed a more moderate attitude on human rights, and at least one, Romanov, has established a reputation as liberal only in his use of repression.

Perhaps the one significant potential area for change on the domestic front will be *within the leadership itself*. Since the death of Brezhnev in November 1982, the Soviet leadership has been undergoing a period of instability and change

unprecedented in the post-World War II period. At present, many observers see considerable consensus in the top leadership around a lowest common denominator seeking a breathing space to come up with solutions to tough problems. Others believe the balance of forces on the Politburo is more precarious at present, and that even relatively minor shifts could lead to wholesale changes in the top-level lineup.

What might these changes be? In the long run, of course, the Soviet Union faces the hurdle of generational turnover, when the senior members of the Politburo (Chernenko, Tikhonov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Kunayev, Grishin, Ponomarev) retire or die and are replaced by younger men who may have significant differences in outlook. Unlike the older men, the new generation will not have spent its early career surviving (or carrying out) Stalin's purges. While there appear to be substantial differences in background and outlook among the younger men now in the top leadership, on the whole we suspect that ideology will be less of a living force for them, that they will believe more in technology and cost/benefit analysis. At the same time, we suspect they will be even more susceptible to resurgent Russian nationalism, and more sensitive to slights and real or imagined challenges to Soviet "equality."

Of course, it is perfectly possible that in 1988 we may still be awaiting the formal succession of the new generation. The Old Guard can be expected to hang onto their perks and power until the last breath, and it is not impossible that Gromyko, Chernenko and Ustinov might all still be in power four years from now. If so, we can expect a perpetuation of the present delicate situation in which Chernenko leaves much of the decision-making in the foreign and defense fields to Gromyko and Ustinov, while concentrating his efforts on building personal support

among the party cadres by stifling needed personnel changes and reforms. If Chernenko remains healthy and succeeds in this consolidation, we may eventually see his personal stamp on foreign policy.

If the Old Guard does not continue in power for very long, there will be a chance for substantial changes in Soviet policies, though not necessarily to the liking of the US. The most likely candidates to succeed Chernenko are thought to be unofficial "Second Secretary" Mikhail Gorbachev and ex-Leningrad Party boss Grigoriy Romanov. The conventional wisdom is that Gorbachev is the more moderate candidate from the US viewpoint, and less insular in outlook than most of his Politburo colleagues. Romanov, in contrast, is reported to be strikingly ignorant of the internal workings of the US, and his past domestic performance gives little indication he possesses the talent or flexibility to manage an improvement in US-Soviet relations.

Given the Soviet record of leaders adopting the policies of their defeated opponents, however, it would be unwise at this point for us to set much store by these characterizations, or to divide the new men into hawks and doves. After all, Khrushchev's policies of destalinization and peaceful coexistence surprised everyone, and Romanov could turn out to be the Soviet equivalent of Richard Nixon should he inherit Chernenko's mantle.

In any of the possible scenarios, moreover, it should be recognized that the prevailing Soviet view of US policy will be one of extreme distrust, verging in some instances on paranoia, and that the road to more flexible, constructive habits in dealing with us will be long and uphill. The new "1930s generation" will resemble the departing seniors who brought them along in many essentials: basically

bureaucratic, wary of reforms and other "harebrained schemes," still—after two-thirds of a century—inclined to see themselves as a guerrilla regime facing a hostile populace and a hostile outside world, immensely proud of Soviet power, and acutely sensitive about the "equality" they believe they have earned by virtue of the USSR's attainment of strategic parity with the US.

The *role of the military* in high-level policy-making is likely to continue to remain prominent over the next few years. Transitional periods in Soviet history have always witnessed an increase in the military's influence, and since 1964 the military has had a major voice in decisions on resource allocation, as well as playing the decisive role in the formulation of Soviet positions in arms negotiations. Moreover, notwithstanding evidence of periodic disagreements between civilian and military leaders on individual issues, Soviet military leaders share the same political background and world view as their civilian cohorts.

## B. Continued Challenges on the External Scene

The foregoing suggests that continuity will be the watchword in domestic affairs over the next four years, with or without generational turnover in the top leadership. The same can be said in general terms with respect to Soviet foreign policy.

The achievements of the Brezhnev era left the Soviet Union with the military might of a superpower, and a strong desire to compete with the US on the basis of an asserted equality. The two years since Brezhnev's death have seen small improvements in some areas, but on balance the record of Soviet foreign policy has been negative. Not only

has Moscow suffered an historic policy defeat on the specific issue of INF; it has also witnessed an impressive consolidation of Western alliances on a broad range of political, economic and security questions, and an erosion of Soviet positions in several areas of the third world competition. Overall, the Soviets have been forced to reappraise their high hopes of the 1970s—that the "world correlation of forces" was making rapid progress toward irreversible Soviet advantage.

The Soviets' biggest challenge, of course, will be how to deal with the United States. Since January 1981, Moscow has seen itself up against an Administration that is, from the Soviet perspective, the most unequivocally anti-Soviet since the 1950s, unwilling on principle to accept what Moscow sees as a new historical reality: the USSR's attainment of "superpower" status and the right to pursue Soviet expansion, particularly in the Third World, while maintaining "détente"-like relations in privileged sanctuaries like Europe or bilateral ties. This perception was progressively reinforced by the Administration's defense build-up, by the push to deploy INF, by the ideological rhetoric employed by US officials, by our continuing emphasis on human rights, and by the presence in high USG positions of individuals reputed to be philosophically opposed to US-Soviet cooperation and arms control.

Moreover, from the Soviet point of view our record of backing up our commitment to correct the imbalances that emerged in the 1970s is not unimpressive. We have proven our capacity to stake out tough bargaining positions in arms control and manage pressures for unilateral concessions; to compete in regional contexts and to drive up the costs of Moscow's adventurism; to introduce US forces in support of regional security objectives, even

where there are risks of direct engagement with Soviet personnel (Lebanon); and to intervene decisively to overthrow Soviet client regimes (Grenada).

We have not always been successful, and the returns are by no means in with regard to the Mideast, Central America, essential rearmament programs and a score of other issues. Moreover, the Soviets take a long view of their competition with us, and we should not exaggerate the degree of pressure they are feeling or the degree of pessimism with which they face the future.

On balance, nevertheless, the Soviets see ample reason to remain nervous about US intentions, and wary of the President's political strength and his dexterity at seizing the diplomatic initiative from Moscow. The paranoid side of the Soviet mind probably fears that a reelected President Reagan could be even more hard-nosed in his approach to arms control talks, and more willing to compete in the developing world and to intervene militarily to defeat Soviet clients. Moreover, they are probably apprehensive that the US will use its technological edge in pursuit of military superiority. US space-based defense technologies seem to be of particular concern, since these threaten to negate the strategic advantages Moscow arduously built up over the past two decades. The Soviets may also fear that the US, in addition to expanding its global reach, will exploit technological breakthroughs in conventional forces to neutralize traditional Soviet conventional superiority in Central Europe.

If Soviet leaders are likely to feel pinched concerning the overall US-Soviet balance of power, they also cannot be especially sanguine about the *prospects on the USSR's perimeter:* 

—Political instability still bubbles beneath the surface in *Poland*, the *East Germans* are getting excessively friendly with the FRG, and economic stagnation continues to plague much of *Eastern Europe*. Moscow's continuing dilemma will be to find the proper balance between continued repression to enforce the political status quo, and tolerance of economic reforms and political liberalization to relieve underlying social tensions.

—In Western Europe, the Soviets have been seriously set back by the failure of their anti-INF campaign to block initial deployments, and they have so far been unable to revive the peace movement or to reestablish much credibility with the major allied governments. On the other hand, Moscow will continue to fuel public anxieties and attempt to exploit the attachment of European governments and publics to détente and arms control to drive wedges between the US and Europe—and will doubtless enjoy success on some issues. The Soviets' prospects for success in this respect will grow if left-wing parties who have broken with the NATO defense consensus come to power in the UK, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and/or the FRG (a real possibility over the next four years).

—In the *Far East*, the Soviets have achieved some improvements in bilateral cooperation with *China*, but these have been modest due to Soviet inflexibility on all the obstacles identified by Beijing, and the tone has recently turned harsher. At the same time, they have watched our relations with China improve, and may see expanding *Sino-US military cooperation* as the first step toward a virtual military alliance. Moreover, while *Japan* poses no serious present-day military threat, the Soviets must be apprehensive about the long-term prospects, especially as Japan's GNP is about to surpass the USSR's, and as *Sino-*

Japanese ties continue to expand. Thus far, however, Moscow shows no sign of changing its bullying tactics toward Tokyo, but rather has sharpened threats, raised historical antagonisms and rejected any discussion of the Northern Territories.

—The Soviets remain bogged down in *Afghanistan*. Their recent more aggressive tactics in the Panjsher valley did little to alter the stalemate, and the Kabul regime's authority continues to extend no further than the range of Soviet artillery. Moreover, Pakistan has remained stalwart in resisting Soviet pressures to negotiate directly with Kabul and to curtail aid to the rebels. At the same time it is important to remember that the Soviets see Afghanistan as a long-term geopolitical gain for them, and may believe time will wear down the resistance as in Soviet Turkestan in the 1920s.

The balance sheet in other regions is somewhat more favorable to the Soviets, but still likely a source of concern:

—In the *Mideast*, they do not discount our major assets, but view our setback in Lebanon as a significant gain for them. Their strategy has long been to fuel instability in order to decrease US influence, and gradually to expand their own. They have achieved some successes in their efforts to expand their ties (exchanging Ambassadors with Egypt, arms deals with Jordan and Kuwait). They may also be encouraged by Arab and European support for their proposed International Conference. But their fortunes in the region remain largely hostage to the actions of Syria and a fragmented PLO, and moderate Arab states remain unconvinced that they have a positive role to play in Mideast diplomacy.

—In the *Persian Gulf*, the Soviets are apprehensive about the possibility of US military intervention to protect the flow of oil. But they appreciate that the US has little influence with Iraq and none with Iran, whereas they have been successful in using their arms relationship with Baghdad to induce Tehran to seek better ties (viz: the recent Sadr visit to Moscow).

—In southern Africa, the Soviets have suffered a setback with US diplomatic efforts to achieve a modus vivendi between South Africa and Mozambique and Angola. But here again they may be more relaxed about our long-term prospects; moreover, they are striving to ensure that the Cubans and they remain in an MPLA-dominated Angola and that an independent Namibia will be dominated by SWAPO. In the longer term they probably nurture the hope that racial conflict in South Africa will ultimately explode in race war, and that in the interim they will benefit from continuing racial tensions.

—*Central America* now offers the Soviets an opportunity to make fairly serious trouble for the US at relatively low risk and cost. They recognize the possibility we may take fairly decisive action after the elections to defeat Soviet-backed forces in El Salvador, and perhaps even to topple the Sandinista regime. But they probably believe that the chances are better than even that Congress will prevent this. They are continuing to ship significant levels of arms—while withholding from Nicaragua the jet fighters (and Cuban troops) we have termed "unacceptable"—and clearly hope both to tie us down there and to gradually expand their beachhead on the mainland of the Western Hemisphere.

In sum, the Soviets confront a mixture of threats and opportunities on the external scene. Although a

retrenchment remains possible, it does not appear likely that the Soviet leadership will feel compelled in the next four years—either for political or economic reasons—to pull back systematically from its global commitments. The "burdens of empire" are not all that great (in fact, many of their third-world arms relationships generate sizeable hard-currency revenues), and the Soviets can be expected to continue to take advantage of whatever openings appear in order to gain influence at our expense—albeit in their characteristically cautious, low-risk fashion. At the same time, top priority will remain shoring up their power position along the Soviet periphery.

## III. US Policy toward the USSR, 1985-1988

# A. US Objectives

The objectives set forth in NSDD-75—to counter Soviet expansionism, to do what little we can to encourage greater liberalism and pluralism within the USSR, and to reach mutually beneficial agreements with the Soviets—remain valid. Sticking to them will also keep our policy approach consistent and predictable, and that in itself is an advantage after the pendulum swings of the last decade and a half. But the late 1980s will present new challenges and opportunities for US policy, both in the Soviet external environment and on the Soviet domestic scene, and we must take them into account in pursuing the overall objectives set by the President.

# B. A US Agenda, 1985-1988

The US Agenda for 1985-88 should be a balanced one, continuing our policy of handling arms control, regional,

human rights, and bilateral issues as coequal parts of one overall approach. While arms control perforce will remain of central concern, we will want to add more content in the other areas as well. It is important that we be, and be seen by the rest of the world to be, in regular and systematic contact with the Soviets on important issues across the board.

Our foregoing analysis suggests that the most likely Soviet course for the next four years is continuity, but this should not mean we forsake the tools diplomacy gives us to shape their decisions. We will want to send signals to the current and future leadership, while they are wrestling with the major problems we have outlined, that appropriate behavior on their part is in their own long-term interests. We will also want to position ourselves so that, if the next generation comes to power soon and attempts major changes, we can have some hope of influencing their direction.

We will thus want to use our own greater internal confidence as a basis for a more creative and active diplomacy toward the Soviet Union designed to achieve what we can on the merits of a particular issue and to improve our chances to effect changes in the future. We will need to refine what we believe is possible for the relationship and then work actively to bring it about. In this context, more negotiations, contacts, and exchanges can be vital tools for achieving our long-term goals.

The suggestions that follow will enable us to deal adequately with the Soviets whether they pursue continued self-isolation or serious substantive engagement with the United States. But they are designed to encourage the Soviets to choose the latter course.

#### 1. Defense and Arms Control

Substantial US and Western rearmament, with new stress on conventional weapons and greater Allied contribution to out-of-area capabilities, will remain a necessary component of any sound US policy vis-à-vis the USSR. Arms control will remain an essential complement for two reasons: as a way of slowing the Soviet build-up in certain specific areas (although we should continue to recognize that the results are likely to be modest); and, above all, because a plausible US negotiating program will continue to be the sine qua non for continued rearmament: western publics will not pay for an adequate deterrent unless they are convinced we want the lowest possible level that can be negotiated.

If during this Administration's first four years we achieved political support by advancing extraordinarily ambitious proposals, over the next four years allied and public support will hinge increasingly on whether our strategy yields results. Thus, negotiability will become a more important criterion in designing arms control proposals. Should economic recovery slow and support for defense increases decline, a convincing negotiating program will be all the more necessary.

In addition to adopting more negotiable positions, we must be increasingly prepared to take the initiative. Experience has shown that it is more difficult for the Soviet system to produce meaningful proposals of its own than to respond to US ideas. This is even more of a factor today, with the Kremlin leadership picture so uncertain, and with the Soviets determined not to validate US predictions that INF deployments would compel them to negotiate. In the past, monopolizing the initiative has worked to our advantage, as we have been able to structure the agenda around US proposals.

Maintaining a stable nuclear balance with the Soviets will continue to be the most important security issue for us in political and military terms, and hence a priority area for a US arms control initiative. Moreover, 1985–1986 will be an especially critical juncture because, without careful management on our part, we could witness the unraveling of the existing nuclear arms control regime: 1985 is the last year SALT II would have been in force and we can expect pressures—fueled by legitimate concerns over Soviet noncompliance—to abandon our "interim restraint" policy; at the same time, Soviet ABM programs and our own SDI will put increasing strains on the ABM treaty as the 1987 Treaty Review approaches.

The Soviets, despite their current intransigent stance, still view nuclear arms control as "central" to the relationship, and they will retain a genuine interest in limiting US programs, as well as a qualified willingness to limit some of their own programs in return. Negotiations will be difficult, and we must in the current situation avoid moves that would appear to reward Soviet intransigence. But ultimately a well-conceived US nuclear arms proposal, presented quietly, could succeed in providing tangible evidence to a skeptical Soviet leadership that we are prepared to address their concerns on the basis of equality, in talks involving give-and-take between serious interlocutors.

What form that initiative should take will be determined to some extent by the outcome of our current effort to engage the Soviets in "September talks" dealing with START and INF as well as ASAT. If we are successful, we may have both the forum and the signal we need to begin discussing the complex trade-offs required to achieve an agreement that meets our criteria in this field. If the Vienna talks do not come off, or if we are unsuccessful in broadening their

agenda, we will need to focus on early steps to reintroduce the topic on the bilateral agenda.

In the latter case, one possibility might be a letter from the President to Chernenko on November 7 (or January 21) setting forth a genuinely new and negotiable nuclear arms initiative. Especially if it came on the heels of a sound US ASAT proposal in Vienna, it could help open the sort of private, exploratory channel we have been suggesting to the Soviets, to no avail, over the past year. Some Soviets have, in fact, recently suggested that establishing a serious negotiating process on ASAT could serve as the "bridge" for a Soviet return to nuclear arms discussions in some forum.

Whether broached in Vienna or in private diplomatic channels, the more promising area for a US nuclear arms initiative would appear to be START rather than INF, where the sides' differences on fundamentals proved irreconcilable. However, neither the Soviets nor our Allies may find agreeable the prospect of limits on strategic forces while INF systems run free. The Soviets themselves have already laid the groundwork for merger in their START position, and thus we may want to focus attention on developing an initiative that would more closely integrate strategic and intermediate-range forces under a single "offensive nuclear arms" umbrella (perhaps extended to encompass defensive systems as well), while offering a trade-off between Soviet proposals to aggregate missiles and bombers and US proposals for special restrictions on the more destabilizing silo-based MIRVed ICBMs.

Our acceptance of the Soviet June 29 offer on ASAT and the link we established to START and INF ensure that space arms control will remain another top-priority item at least

for the near future. The public and Congress will remain fascinated; the Soviets, while they have played propaganda games with their June 29 proposal, may be genuinely interested in the longer term because of potential US technological breakthroughs in space weaponry; and the topic has multiple ramifications within our own rearmament effort. As noted, the first step is to come up with a solid ASAT position by fall.

## 2. Regional Issues

With the Soviets somewhat on the defensive, we have an opportunity to shift the global balance of power in our favor through increased and more highly concentrated efforts in third areas. We should keep up and consolidate our relationships with friends and associates on the front line of Soviet/proxy expansionism: Pakistan, ASEAN, Nicaragua's neighbors. But beyond continuing these efforts, we should also move toward a more forward and opportunistic US policy, designed not only to counter Soviet expansionism and reduce regional instabilities that hurt us, but to exploit those that hurt the Soviets and actually roll them back in some areas. Two types of new policy efforts are called for.

*First,* we should bring a new activism to US policy vis-à-vis the Soviet borderlands: Eastern Europe, the Middle East and Northeast Asia:

—In *Eastern Europe*, previous Soviet leadership transitions in 1953–56 and 1964–68 produced some latitude for local options, albeit with mixed results, and the next four years could witness both opportunities for the West and instabilities that absorb much of the East-West agenda. Firm commitment to our differentiation policy will be more

vital than ever, and we will need new, sustained efforts in two directions. First, we (like the Soviets) have fewer economic resources with which to compete in Eastern Europe, and we will have to work harder to field them. Second, for that reason, we will need to mobilize better for political competition, for ideological struggle aimed both at governments (through more frequent and intensive consultations) and at peoples (through the radios and through exchange programs of all kinds).

—In the *Middle East*, for reasons independent of the Soviet angle, we may well want to pursue a renewed US initiative in Arab-Israeli diplomacy. Moreover, the Soviets have, as noted, embarked on a diplomatic offensive of their own in the region; while their ties with Damascus militate against any major inroads with moderate forces, they could exploit a continued lack of momentum in US diplomacy to build support for their unwieldy international conference proposal. As we pursue our own initiatives, we will want to maintain a diplomatic channel with the Soviets on Middle East issues, if only to dispel any misconceptions about US intentions in the area and to minimize the risks of miscalculation in the event of renewed hostilities.

—In the *Persian Gulf*, including *Afghanistan*, there is no guarantee that the Soviets will remain as prudent as they have been recently. During the first term we bolstered our relationships with the friendly states of the area, and we should continue to do so. We should also raise the ante on the ground in Afghanistan to increase the pressure on the Soviets, promote unity among opposition forces, and provide military help as needed to our friends to protect against the possibility of greater Soviet risk-taking. And we should also continue to discuss the region in our dialogue with the Soviets—to induce caution and avoid miscalculation, as well as to make clear our readiness to

facilitate a political settlement as soon as the Soviets are ready to discuss troop withdrawal within the framework of the UN-sponsored talks.

—In Northeast Asia, sound relationships with the three area countries—China, Japan, South Korea—should provide us all the leverage we need to help the area deal adequately with both Soviet blandishments and Soviet intimidation. A consultative process with the Chinese and Japanese that covers an expanding gamut of topics could prove particularly important, but assistance to China on non-offensive weaponry, closer economic and cultural ties and careful management of the Taiwan issue are key.

Second, we should actively apply our multifaceted approach to regional issues not just where we are vulnerable, but where the Soviets are vulnerable, and where diminishing Soviet influence would further our broader objectives in the region. For example, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia may be vulnerable [less than 1 line not declassified], and this could lay the basis for displacing the Soviet/Cuban presence. India may be interested in modest steps to diminish its economic and military dependence on Moscow. And we should also be prepared to act, as in Grenada, where the Soviets are overextended and the balance is clearly in our favor: increased pressure on Nicaragua is an obvious possibility.

A forward strategy of this sort will require creativity, active diplomacy and, to the extent possible, enhanced resources in military, economic and covert-action terms; it will require close coordination with regional allies like Pakistan and ASEAN; to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation, it will also require increased consultations with the Soviets on regional issues. It will involve risks, but

the payoff—more freedom for the people involved, reduced Soviet influence—may make them worth taking.

# 3. Human Rights and Bilateral Cooperation

We must also continue our efforts on human rights and work on the day-to-day issues of our bilateral relationship. Our human rights policy stems from deeply-held values and is both morally right and essential for public support. On occasion, it also pays off in human terms for the individuals involved. The bilateral tone of our relationship is to a large extent driven by overall US-Soviet political ties. Here our emphasis should remain on creative attempts to improve and expand working-level contacts under the various bilateral agreements, to use our ties to increase our influence on the Soviet leadership and to penetrate more directly to the peoples of the Soviet Union, and ensure that a maximum level of reciprocity and correctness is maintained.

# 4. Summitry and other Symbols

Our ability to bring the Soviets toward a more responsible role in world affairs will depend not only on the substance of US initiatives in arms control, bilateral and other areas, but also on whether we can affect the psychology of the Soviet leadership. To a far greater extent than we may have appreciated, our early ideological attacks—which seemed to deny the legitimacy of the Soviet regime, and by extension, its claims to superpower status—and seemingly minor slights such as the handling of Gromyko's plane prior to the 1983 UNGA, have left scars that have not been healed by this year's more conciliatory tone.

Relatively low-cost steps—such as inviting Gromyko to the White House during his UNGA visits, encouraging high-level parliamentary exchanges in both directions (inter alia, to try to establish relations with such potential next leaders as Gorbachev and Vorotnikov), easing restrictions on social contacts with Soviet diplomats—could help to dissipate some of the Soviets' accumulated hostility toward the Administration.

But we should also rethink further our position on a summit. Simply holding a summit confers the highest form of legitimacy on a Soviet leader, and a serious US summit offer after the elections might well be received positively in Moscow. Now that we have told the Soviets the President would like to meet with Chernenko but would also like the meeting to be a good one, we should consider the idea of quietly proposing to the Soviets in November, without any publicity, that our Presidents agree to meet, say, six months into the Administration's second term, and that our dialogue in the interim be focused on preparing as full a summit agenda as possible. Indeed, a properly-handled summit offer could favorably influence the Soviet reaction to any accompanying US proposals in arms control. And, of course, proposing a summit would be hailed by our Allies, who will be getting increasingly nervous the longer the apparent stalemate in high-level US-Soviet contacts persists.

One natural opportunity for a summit next year is provided by the heads-of-state meeting in Helsinki on the tenth anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, which the Finns are promoting. Such a meeting would, of course, have to be weighed carefully, but this or other such meetings would give a clear sense that we are in close contact with the Soviets including at the highest level. Over the longer term, we should consider using a mid-1985 summit as the beginning of a series of regular, annual meetings at the highest level. This would help "demystify" the whole summit question, and over time serve to lower public and allied expectations in regards each summit meeting. By the same token, the prospect of an annual summit could help galvanize decisions on arms control and other East-West issues in the slow-moving policy-making bureaucracies both here and in Moscow.

In sum, the next four years are likely to call for new US activism on both the competition and cooperation tracks of our approach to the USSR. We should continue to rearm; and we should target Soviet vulnerabilities abroad for change to our advantage. But we will also need a more convincing arms control negotiating program. This new two-track activism can provide the basis for a somewhat better relationship with the USSR, whether under old or new leadership, recognizing that the basic relationship will remain adversarial for the foreseeable future.

No matter how fast the pace of leadership change, we should not attempt to play favorites, any more than in the recent past. We will not have the information to do so skillfully in any case, and being tagged as "the US candidate" will be the kiss of death in leadership competition. Rather, we should continue to deal with the leadership that is before us, on the basis of substantive issues, but with an awareness that there are or soon will be new men to preside over the country's fortunes into the 21st century.

The next four years will therefore be a time of continued testing for the Soviet leadership. We will not be offering the breathing space they would prefer, but by our conduct, we will be telling them that we recognize them as a superpower and expect them to act like one, responsibly.

# IV. Policy Implications

The *prerequisites* for an effective approach to Soviet affairs over the next four years are the same as the prerequisites for the restoration we have effected over the last four: steadiness and patience; continued economic recovery; steady growth and modernization of our military forces, and the will to use them; and solid alliance relationships and international friendships.

None of these factors can be taken as a given; in fact they may well be harder over the next four years than over the past four. Budget deficits and impatience with the pace of arms talks will likely lead to increased Congressional pressure on key rearmament programs; economic stringencies will also make it more likely that we will have fewer rather than greater resources with which to compete for influence in areas where the Soviets are vulnerable; the inherent tensions between the need for secrecy and Congressional oversight will continue to inhibit our ability to carry out covert action; and we very well may have to cope with renewed transatlantic strains over fiscal and technology transfer policies, and perhaps over security issues as well (particularly if the SDI or a protracted hiatus in nuclear arms talks leads to a comeback by the peace movement). Indeed, the endless challenge of managing problems such as these may make it difficult to keep relations with the Soviets near the top of the list of the Administration's priorities during a second term.

In view of the many constraints we will face, sustaining momentum on both the competitive and negotiating tracks of the US-Soviet relationship will depend on bringing about improvements in the *formulation and management* of our East-West policies:

—On the domestic front, we will need to do a better job of explaining and generating public support for the competitive aspects of our policy—building a consensus behind a realistic, well-focused program of covert action; securing the modest increments in economic and military aid needed to enable us to make inroads on the Soviet borderlands and other regions where Moscow's position can be challenged. This will require more work with Congress and, in particular, continued Presidential involvement.

—In dealing with Allies and friends, we will need not only to sustain the process of frequent and candid consultations we have established, but to devise new consultative mechanisms to deal with what is likely to be a less compartmentalized arms control agenda.

—In dealing with the rest of the world community, we should broaden our efforts to get the U.S. message across to world opinion and to strengthen democratic political institutions by improving the quality of the radios and of USIA's informational programs, and by creatively promoting democratic institutions through the National Endowment for Democracy and similar programs.

In the final analysis, our ability to build and maintain domestic and allied support for the competitive aspects of our Soviet policy will depend increasingly on our success in achieving results on the negotiating track, especially in arms control. Small steps in bilateral relations have brought us to a point where both sides have gained confidence that the other is, after all, able to negotiate

about some things; we should continue to take such steps. But they cannot of themselves carry the overall relationship much further: arms control results will be needed to keep both tracks going.

Here the biggest challenge will be to find a way of alleviating the interagency strife that has hampered the development of US positions throughout the first four years. This will require not only continued White House leadership in senior-level decision-making groups, but a stronger lead from the NSC at the middle and working levels as well.

One additional device for imposing greater discipline on the policy-making process would be to move toward the idea of annual summits noted earlier. By imposing fixed deadlines on the policy-making process, regular meetings at the highest level could help facilitate quicker decisions than have been the norm these past four years.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow and Simons; cleared by Palmer and Burt. In a covering note to Shultz on a July 25 draft of this paper, Burt wrote: "Attached is our long-awaited paper that attempts to analyze the context of East-West relations over the next four years, and sets forth a strategy for dealing with the Soviets." (Department of State, EUR Records, Records of Ambassador Thomas W. Simons, Jr., (Chrons), Lot 03D256, July-August, 1984) In an August 1 memorandum to Shultz, Rodman provided a "status report on the Looking Ahead exercise and the preparation for the August 7 meeting," noting that "EUR is doing a redraft of its paper on 'East-West Relations: The Next Four Years.' The July 25 draft, which you already

have, was subjected to the constructive critique of the Seventh Floor 'Looking Ahead' Wise Men on Tuesday. EUR will now refine the paper, which we will get to you later this week." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (08/01/1984-08/05/1984) In an August 6 memorandum to McFarlane, Sestanovich provided a summary of the paper, commenting: "This analysis may be correct, but with so few specifics it's hard to judge. If our entire policy depends on arms control (to win domestic support) and could crumble on its own, what terms will Moscow accept? And can we really combine arms control so easily with tough policies elsewhere? Maybe, but it's a much bigger challenge than EUR admits. Finally, regular summits may be possible if we make progress; they don't produce progress." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Vienna Talks 08/04/1984-08/27/1984) In an August 7 PROFs note to Matlock, Poindexter wrote: "This morning you received a Sestanovich paper that forwarded to Bud an EUR long range planning paper. Please consider that a privileged paper for your eyes only. Don't acknowledge that you have seen it. Don will be meeting with you soon on the long range planning process." (Ibid.) The paper was used for the August 7 meeting held at Shultz's residence in Palo Alto, California, to discuss "Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy." See <u>Document 262</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The estimates were not found.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 226</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In telegram 192685 to USNATO, June 29, the Department reported: "As second-ranking Party Secretary, Gorbachev (53) is the Soviet leader best positioned to succeed Chernenko. But Gorbachev's fortune could change sharply before Chernenko leaves office. Romanov now looks like Gorbachev's strongest rival for the succession, and he is accruing power in domestic and national security."

(Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840420-0678)

- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 255.
- <sup>6</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 260 €.
- <sup>7</sup> In the aftermath of the KAL shootdown in 1983, the governors of New Jersey and New York unilaterally decided not to grant landing privileges to Gromyko's plane for his attendance at the UNGA. (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph* p. 371)

# 261. Letter From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Dear Mr. President: Washington, August 3, 1984

I worry a great deal that the issue of the Vienna talks on "the militarization of outer space" could, from here on, be manipulated by the Soviets so as to help the Democrats in the campaign. So far luck has been with us. But the Soviets have laid the groundwork in their attempt to maneuver you into a position that would help Walter Mondale's campaign.<sup>2</sup>

As you know, Mondale and the Democratic platform have attacked your Strategic Defense Initiative. 4 "Mr. Reagan wants to open the heavens for warfare," they say. To be sure, Mondale also advocates reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. He wants to do this "within the framework of SALT II;" but his most dramatic difference with your arms control position does not lie in the esoteric details of SALT II, or with your START proposals. The difference that he has been stressing the most, and that could become the main theme if there are Vienna negotiations, is his opposition to what they call "Star Wars." The Democratic Platform calls for reaffirming the ban on ballistic missile defense, and for starters, a moratorium on the testing of anti-satellite weapons and of "all weapons in space." In short, the leading edge of the Mondale arms control position will be identical to the present Soviet position for the Vienna talks.

Hence, the closer we come to agreement with the Soviets on Vienna talks, the closer we move to accepting *in principle* the premises of the Mondale position. Our current pre-negotiations with Moscow are inching us towards accepting:

- —that we must "prevent" the imminent "militarization of outer space,"
- —that we must start with some moratoria on testing;
- —that banning *defenses* against ballistic missiles is at least as worthy a topic for arms talks as reducing *offensive* missiles.

If a US-Soviet joint statement for the talks accepts these premises or, if the Soviets have their way, and it does not mention that offensive missiles will be a vital part of the agenda, you would be put into a very awkward position. For example, if in a debate with Walter Mondale you defend your position on ballistic missile defense, you will be speaking up in opposition not only to the Soviet proposals, but will appear to go counter to the atmospherics of the Vienna talks. The Soviets might then walk out and blame you for the failure of the talks. If on the other hand, you move with the "spirit" of the Vienna talks by saying that we are "seriously considering" the Soviet proposal for a ban on strategic missile defenses, you will, in effect, be abandoning your beliefs and position, and be blamed for inconsistency, at best, or for having had to concede that Walter Mondale is right and that you were wrong on this fundamental issue.

I doubt that it would be possible to escape this dilemma. The media will pounce on us with relish and force us all to come down one way or the other. Thus, the Soviets could provide the Democrats with a good campaign issue. And the other side of the coin would be that you would have lost a good issue against Mondale. The American people favor ballistic missile defense. You may have seen the results of a Statewide poll in California, taken last February, where the registered voters were asked, which of five weapons they thought "most important to our national defense." These were the answers:

Cruise Missile	3.9%
B-1 Bomber	4.4
MX Missile	5.8
Nuclear submarines	14.1
"a system to defend against incoming nuclear missiles"	71.9

Similarly, a nationwide poll in April showed that three out of four Americans support the development of space-based "defensive weapons."

The Democrats have been noticing these polls, too. They have therefore toned down a bit their unqualified opposition to missile defense. After their initial almost total rejection, they now say in their platform: "If we and our allies could defend our populations effectively against a nuclear war, the Democratic Party would be the first to endorse such a scheme." But the rest of the Platform is replete with the implications that we never can develop such a defensive system. They have given up on the inventive and productive genius of America.

Incidentally, today the Strategic Defense Initiative looks more promising, and more realizeable than it did late last year, when the results of our initial studies were reported to you. The ideas then briefed to you have since been supported by further analyses of many of the key concepts, and by many and varied tests of specific components (especially the June 10th test in the Pacific of the interception of a ballistic missile warhead).

Mr. President, I would recommend strongly that you reassert your position on strategic defense. It is both good politics and very sound policy. If we stick to your compelling rationale for protecting our people rather than avenging them, the American people will understand that we should not let the Soviets talk us into banning systems that can stop missiles from killing people. I believe the American people see great merit in your holding on to your conviction, now further validated by additional tests. They know full well that if they simply want to purchase an agreement with the Soviets regardless of whether it serves our security or is verifiable, they can do so by voting for Walter Mondale.

Very respectfully,

Cap

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (7/27/1984–9/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-2-0. No classification marking; Eyes Only.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Democratic National Convention took place in San Francisco from July 16 to 19, officially nominating Walter Mondale as the Democratic candidate for President. A transcript of his acceptance speech was printed in the *New York Times*, July 20, 1984, p. A12.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> One example in the 1984 Democratic Platform included the following statement by Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner, Dr. Carl Sagan, Dr. Henry Kendall, and Admiral Noel Gayler, from

the DNC Platform committee hearing, June 12: "'Star Wars is not the path towards a less dangerous world. A direct and safe road exists: equitable and verifiable deep cuts in strategic offensive forces. We must abandon the illusion that ever more sophisticated technology can remove the perils that science and technology have created.'" ("Political Party Platforms: 1984 Democratic Party Platform," *The American Presidency Project*; University of California at Santa Barbara; accessed online)

# 262. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Palo Alto, California, August 7, 1984, 9 a.m.-5 p.m.

SUBJECT

Looking Ahead in Foreign Policy

**PARTICIPANTS** 

Secretary Shultz, Robert McFarlane (NSC), Michael Armacost (P), Charles Hill (S/S), Peter W. Rodman (S/P), John Chain (PM)

[Omitted here is the material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

2. US-Soviet/Arms Control.

### COMMENTARY:

S/P: This category includes the *Eastern European* issue: (e.g., the evolution of East Germany and the question of improving relations with individual countries). We should be clear about the criteria by which we differentiate or by which we measure the appropriateness of better relations. We cannot regard every Eastern European country as a candidate for wooing (Bulgaria is not), but in the case of East Germany we should look at the centrifugal forces that might give the East a "German problem." We should, however, carefully assess how our interests would be affected by a free-wheeling Germany in the center of Europe. Other issues in this East-West topic include arms control, geopolitical competition, and the role of negotiation generally.

P: What is our strategic choice in East-West relations? We can concentrate essentially on the geopolitical competition, looking for further means of bolstering our position,

courting weak links in the Soviet camp, building our defenses, seeking to isolate the USSR, etc. Alternatively, we can attempt major adjustments in our approach to key arms control and regional issues with a view to seeking a modus vivendi or revisiting detente. The bargaining situation has some appeal. Can detente be revisited without hyperbole? If we go this route, we will probably have to consider trading something in SDI for major Soviet reductions in offensive systems.

NSC: Arms control has to be a central element of the discourse, partly because of feelings here and partly because of the Russians' fear. We should seek a "zerobased" examination of the past 15 years and of the next 15 years in arms control: Arms control has unfortunately been a placebo/substitute for sensible strategic thinking. We need to engage the Soviets in a fundamental discussion on how we view stability, how we view the relation between offense and defense, and what's in it for them. But we cannot do so in our present bureaucratic system. The Soviets are also too suspicious. However, the Soviets might respond to an agenda of fundamentals at the first of the year. There would be value in laying out our ideas. We could send them two or three of our most knowledgeable, thoughtful people: e.g., Scowcroft, Nitze, Wohlstetter.<sup>2</sup> They would seek to reinspire an agenda of serious arms control talks. In addition we must demythologize arms control in the US, although it is better if private groups (not USG) do it. A bipartisan board is needed.

S/P: The Soviets take strategic defense seriously. They don't accept the idea that defense is immoral as do our critics.

PM: On arms control in general we must (a) Get our own house in order. Some on our side are opposed to arms

control. Top-down guidance is needed; (b) We need a wise men's group to talk to the Soviets and provide the core for a future agenda that would not separate SDI from START, (c) We must look at the Soviet and US strategic balance in the 1990's and develop a master mosaic. PM is now working on what a balance would look like that would be tolerable to both sides.

P: It's time to review all aspects of the US-Soviet relationship. Arms control should not be abstracted from other issues. It must be related to competition on geopolitical issues and our bilateral political relationship.

### **CONCLUSIONS**

- —We should focus on the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko in New York. The Secretary may be able to do nothing more than foreshadow our approach, but his instructions for that meeting will be important.
- —Linking arms control with Soviet behavior on regional issues is a dubious exercise. Any arms control agreement should stand on its own feet as advantageous for us. Swapping concessions in and out of the arms control field will not work. Our problem is how to get a sustainable relationship with them while conveying that we will respond appropriately to outrageous behavior.
- —We need to get a Presidential decision on guidance to the arms control community. The community must work from the same basic concept. The cast of characters must be changed.
- —The notion of a grand, "zero based" look is desirable, both to get our own thinking together and then to engage them in a broad conversation. This will require our best

people, who can dedicate themselves to it over 2-3 years. Possible participants would be Kampelman, Wriston, and Wohlstetter. This group might have a bipartisan advisory commission attached to it, including members of Congress. We need to focus on how such a group would tie into the Presidency and its relationship to the JCS, State, and the NSC.

- —The Eastern European issue should be examined further. Perhaps have Roz Ridgeway look at the relevant papers, come back to Washington for consultations, and lead a discussion of the issues.
- —We need to reevaluate the issue of discussions with the Soviets on regional issues: What is the concept that lies behind it? How does it relate to other things we're doing? P will coordinate.
- —We should set forth our conceptual approach clearly: McFarlane's Commonwealth Club speech and the Secretary's Rand/UCLA speech<sup>5</sup> offer special opportunities.

[Omitted here is the material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Aug. 13, Mtg. w/ the Pres. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 10. There is no other drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. This meeting took place at Shultz's residence.
- <sup>2</sup> Albert Wohlstetter was an influential expert on U.S. nuclear strategy. He and his wife, Roberta, were both awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom by Reagan in 1985 for their "great contributions to the security of the United States.' Mr. Reagan said Mr. Wohlstetter had been

- 'influential in helping to design and employ our strategic forces.'" (See his obituary, "Albert Wohlstetter, 83, Expert on U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Dies," *New York Times*, January 14, 1997, p. B8)
- <sup>3</sup> Shultz and Gromyko were scheduled to meet during the UNGA session in late September.
- <sup>4</sup> Walter B. Wriston served as Chairman of the President's Economic Policy Advisory Board and was Chairman and CEO of Citicorp.
- <sup>5</sup> In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "I was invited to address the opening of the new RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior on October 18. I used my speech to develop the larger conceptual issues that faced us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term and to make an important conceptual point: I put aside the Nixon-era concepts of 'linkage' and 'détente,' and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 487-488) The full text of the speech is in *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 209 ...

### 263. Editorial Note

On the morning of August 11, 1984, while vacationing at his ranch in California, President Ronald Reagan prepared to record his weekly Saturday radio address. During the sound check, Reagan joked: "'My fellow Americans, I am pleased to tell you I have signed legislation to outlaw Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes." According to a Washington Post article reporting on the incident, unbeknownst to the President, at least two networks had already started recording and picked up his remarks during the sound check. The President's comments were widely reported in the international media. ("Tapes Pick Up Reagan Joke About Soviets," Washington Post, August 13, 1984, page A6) In his diary, Reagan wrote: "my Sat. radio tapings. On one of them I gave the press an opening to display their irresponsibility which they did. Doing a voice level with no thought that anyone other than the few people in the room would hear I ad libbed jokingly something about the Soviets. The networks had a line open & recorded it and of course made it public—hence an international incident." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 372)

The Soviets seized on Reagan's joke, releasing an official TASS statement on August 15: "This episode is being perceived, and with every justification, as a manifestation of the same frame of mind that earlier was officially formulated in calls for a 'crusade,' in the doctrines of limited and protracted nuclear war, and in military-political plans for gaining a dominant position in the world for the US. Now, the US administration prefers to keep silent about all this, but its practical actions speak for themselves." ("Reagan 'Bombing Joke' Irks Moscow: TASS Calls it 'Unprecedentedly Hostile,'" *Current Digest of the* 

Soviet Press, volume XXXVI, No. 33 (September 12, 1984), page 5)

In an August 15 memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane, National Security Council Staff member John Lenczowski suggested: "If public discussion and press attention to the President's joke about bombing Russia persists, one way we can handle it is by explaining the real nature of the joke: the President was merely making a parody of Soviet propaganda attempts to portray him as a trigger-happy warmonger. The joke, therefore, was designed to illuminate how ludicrous that propaganda is. Such an explanation can put the President on the offensive rather than remaining on the defensive with the explanations of how it was an 'unfortunate comment.'" (Reagan Library, John Lenczowski Files, NSC Files, Chron File August 1984)

# 264. Special National Intelligence Estimate 1

SNIE 11-9-84

Washington, August 14, 1984

### SOVIET POLICY TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IN 1984

# **KEY JUDGMENTS**

Current Soviet policy toward the United States expresses deep hostility to US aims and interests. It is shaped primarily by the Soviet perception that the United States is acting to alter the overall military power relationship, seeking to strengthen US alliances, and conducting regional security policies—all for the purpose of containing and reducing Soviet influence in world affairs. US policies threaten to undercut earlier Soviet expectations that the 1980s would be a period in which the USSR could, against the backdrop of its military power, expand its international influence at low risk, and enjoy the economic and diplomatic benefits of Western acceptance of its superpower status. US policies and pronouncements also contain a degree of challenge to the moral and political legitimacy claims of the Soviet regime which its leaders find unusually disturbing. Soviet policy is motivated by the desire to combat and, if possible, deflect US policies, and to create a more permissive environment in which Soviet relative military power and world influence can continue to grow. [portion marking not declassified]

Current Soviet policy toward the United States makes hostile initiatives in crisis areas, such as Central America and Pakistan, a distinct near-term possibility. However, we do not see in current Soviet political and military behavior preparation for a deliberate major confrontation with the United States in the near future. [portion marking not declassified]

The Soviets perceive that US policies directed against their objectives enjoy a considerable base of political support within the United States and in NATO. At the same time, they see weaknesses in that political base which can be exploited to alter or discredit US policies, making it possible to blunt the challenge posed by the United States and perhaps to return to a condition of detente on terms consistent with Soviet international ambitions. [portion marking not declassified]

The policy implications of these perceptions for Moscow are fairly straightforward, up to a point:

—First, Soviet leaders seem at present to believe that the likelihood that the United States will continue the policies of the past several years into the rest of the decade is high enough to require some political and military gearing up for a period of lasting and more intense struggle. How vigorous an effort this will require in the future is uncertain to them, and possibly in some dispute. [portion marking not declassified]

—Second, the Soviets believe they can influence the content, effectiveness, and durability of US policies they see directed against them. The rigidity and hostility of Soviet policy toward the United States, on one hand, and attempts to take initiative and show flexibility, on the other, are aimed at negating those policies. Up to now, they have evidently calculated that rigidity and hostility are the most promising posture. But their recent performance and the

outlook for the future plausibly call this into question. [portion marking not declassified]

Moscow's policies toward the United States are focused on undercutting the domestic and alliance bases of public support for US policies and programs. Hostile propaganda, which blames the United States for an increased danger of war and for diplomatic rigidity with regard to regional security and the major arms control issues, is used to put the US administration on the defensive where possible and to excite opposition to Washington's policies. [portion marking not declassified]

At the same time, a hostile stance toward the West is seen by Soviet leaders as convenient for exhorting greater discipline, sacrifice, and vigilance on the Soviet home front, where the Politburo is preoccupied with a range of complex problems. These problems include stagnating economic performance and the resistance of the system to reform, flagging social morale and the dwindling effectiveness of exhortation and disciplinary measures to boost worker performance, continuing isolated dissent, ethnic nationalism, "antisocial" attitudes among youth, and some doubts among the elite as to top-leadership effectiveness. Commanding a great deal of their attention, these problems create a setting in which a deliberately stimulated image of the USSR's being embattled abroad is used by the Politburo to reinforce its political and ideological control at home. [portion marking not declassified

An alternative view is that, while the Soviet leaders recognize the existence of a number of longstanding domestic problems, they are not so preoccupied with addressing these issues that it prevents them from acting decisively and resolutely on foreign policies. Moreover, the

holder of this view also believes that, while there may be some criticisms among party functionaries, there is no evidence that these criticisms affect Soviet policies.  $^{2}$  [portion marking not declassified]

Although there may be debates among Soviet leaders about tactics toward the United States, we believe that current Soviet policy, combining a dominant hard line with steps and hints of progress, is based on consensus in the Politburo. The uncertain political power of General Secretary Chernenko, his and other Politburo members' limited foreign affairs expertise, and Gromyko's long experience as Foreign Minister have probably given the latter influence over Soviet foreign policy tactics he has not enjoyed under any previous General Secretary. We doubt, however, that he is unilaterally able to enforce his preferences over the objections of the rest of the Politburo, or that explicit contention on foreign policy—as recently rumored with respect to the USSR's space arms control initiative—led to his being temporarily overruled. The consensus-maintaining mores of the Politburo and the skills of its members in avoiding isolation make such showdown situations unlikely. Rumors of foreign policy conflict in the Politburo are probably exaggerations of more routine debate over tactics, and may be deliberately spread to influence Western perceptions. [portion marking not declassified]

In the last few months, the Soviets have been amenable to progress on several US-Soviet bilateral issues and have made a prominent initiative on antisatellite systems/space weapons negotiations. On bilateral issues, such as the hotline upgrade and the renewal of the technical and economic cooperation accord, the Soviets appear motivated by a desire to preserve the basis for substantive dialogue on issues of direct benefit to them, despite their underlying

hostility toward the present US administration. The space weapons initiative, on the other hand, was intended primarily to stimulate concessions from the United States, or political controversy about them, in an election period when the Soviets judge that the administration wants to display progress in US-Soviet relations. Failing US concessions, the Soviets want, at a minimum, to deny the US administration any basis for claiming that it can manage constructive US-Soviet relations while pursuing anti-Soviet military and foreign policy goals. [portion marking not declassified]

The USSR's as-yet inconclusive initiative on space weapons is an example of the policy mix being pursued. Soviet behavior on this subject is motivated by a profound concern that the United States will develop strategic defense capabilities—whether space-based or an ABM version—that would seriously undercut the credibility of Soviet strategy and by a strong desire to achieve real constraints, by agreement or political influence, on what the Soviets regard as threatening long-term technology challenges by the United States in space weapons. This desire will persist and shape future Soviet actions whether there are space weapons talks in the near future or not. But short-term political considerations have clearly influenced the Soviets' tactics so far. They proposed specific talks in Vienna in September for a combination of reasons: to put Washington on the defensive if it refused, to coax it into major concessions if it chose not to refuse, and to stimulate political interference from Congress and elsewhere with US ASAT and space weapons programs. The Soviets have expected all of these possibilities to be greater in an election season, and have evidently been willing, for a time, to risk the US administration's claiming progress on arms control for its own political advantage. Throughout the diplomatic exchanges that followed their proposal of 29

June, the Soviets combined a dominant line of hostility and accusation that the United States blocks the talks with repeated hints that compromise leading to Vienna is possible. [portion marking not declassified]

The USSR is currently following a deliberate dual-track policy toward the United States. It involves, on one hand, hostile propaganda on all subjects, hostile acts such as harassment of US diplomats and tampering with access to Berlin, stubborn resistance to compromise on central arms control issues, and incremental increases in military capability dramatized by exercises and INF-related deployments. It has also allowed, on the other hand, forward movement on selected bilateral issues and contained hints of progress on arms control and wider US-Soviet issues if the United States makes concessions. Sustained Soviet efforts to undermine US interests and policies, from Central America, to Europe, to the Middle East, are an integral part of this policy course. [portion marking not declassified]

We expect this mixed Soviet policy to continue in the near future. It provides a basis for denying political benefits to the US administration—which the Soviets expect, but are not sure, will be reelected—while exploring for concessions and a new tactical base for dealing with the administration in a following term. This tactical posture leaves open the possibility of joining ASAT/space weapons talks in September if the United States appears ready to make inviting proposals, and also the possibility of refusing such talks, or walking out on them, if the administration looks politically vulnerable to such moves. [portion marking not declassified]

As of now, we believe the chances are well less than even that the Soviets will see it in their interest to start some form of ASAT/space weapons talks in September. They have probably not yet conclusively decided this, notwithstanding high-level assertions that talks are not expected. In any case, they will handle the matter for the short-term purpose of stimulating pressures for a US ASAT test moratorium and to coax concessions on the agenda and substantive issues. Should such talks begin, it is highly likely that the Soviets will hold over them the constant threat of a walkout or suspension to keep up this pressure. If they see the US administration as unbending on Soviet demands, divided within, and politically vulnerable as the election approaches, there is a significant chance they would stage some sort of walkout for political effect. It is somewhat more likely, however, that they would remain at the talks, press for a scheduled adjournment or suspension before the elections, and maintain a drumfire of public and private accusations that the administration is blocking progress on a vital arms issue that could open the way to progress on the rest of the strategic arms control agenda. This tactic would maintain pressure on Washington for concessions, keep the issue alive during the campaign, but not damage irretrievably the prospects for resuming the game should the administration be reelected. [portion marking not declassified

Soviet desires to exacerbate the political vulnerabilities of the administration or to exploit inhibitions on its behavior in the preelection period could play a role in Soviet behavior toward potentially confrontational situations that may arise in regions of tension, or could be instigated by Soviet action. On the whole, Soviet behavior toward regional crisis contingencies will be governed more by local opportunities and risks than by the Soviet reading of the US political environment. As regards the latter, while the Soviets may see opportunities to hurt the US administration politically or to exploit election-year

inhibitions, they will also reflect on a spotty record of assessing these effects, realizing that a Soviet challenge might strengthen the administration's standing and generate support for a forceful response unwelcome to Moscow. The following examines possible contingencies we believe most worthy of attention, and we have reached judgments as to their probability: [portion marking not declassified]

—In *Central America*, an insurgent offensive of limited scope and moderate effectiveness is likely to occur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Soviets expect it to undermine Washington's claim that its policies there are working. There is evidence that the Soviets are arranging the shipment of L-39 trainer/combat aircraft to Nicaragua, possibly before November. Although the United States has made clear that it will not accept MIGs or other combat jets in Nicaragua, the Soviets would count on the less capable L-39 to introduce ambiguities into the situation and to complicate a US response. The Soviets would be betting that the United States is unwilling militarily to challenge the L-39 deployment before the election, and constrained by its prior acceptance to tolerate the planes thereafter. The Soviets may intend to introduce more advanced fighter aircraft (such as MIG-21s) into Nicaragua at some point in the future. Their decision on MIGs or other advanced aircraft would depend principally on US reaction to deployment of the L-39s. The Soviets could also exploit the availability of Nicaragua's large new military airbase for visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW aircraft, to shape the political environment for other deployment actions, and for military activity, such as maritime monitoring at the approaches of the Panama Canal. An

alternative view is that the estimate places too much emphasis on the L-39 issue. If these aircraft are shipped to Nicaragua, Moscow would perceive their introduction as only one of a number of increments in the Sandinista regime's military capability—others would include the construction of a large military airfield at Punta Huete and three Soviet-equipped communications intercept facilities. In evaluating the probable US response to the MIGs, Moscow would consider US reaction to all of such increments, not to the L-39s alone. The Soviet concern not to provoke the United States into military action that has kept Moscow from delivering MIGs to Nicaragua for over two years would continue in play. [portion marking not declassified]

—The Soviets may take hostile action against *Pakistan* to end its support of the Afghan resistance, the tenacity of which appears to have increased the Soviets' frustration and perhaps led to doubts as to whether they ought to be satisfied with their protracted strategy for imposing control on Afghanistan. They are likely to support, and may take some measures to stimulate, an Indian military initiative against Pakistan, such as an attack on Pakistan's nuclear facilities, to pressure President Zia into more congenial policies while leaving the United States in a position where it is politically difficult to support him. The Soviets cannot direct Indian actions against Pakistan. But we believe that the likelihood of India's taking action over the next 12 months for its own reasons has risen distinctly, and we believe that the Soviets are in consultation with New Delhi about the situation and strongly motivated to exploit it. $\frac{4}{2}$  It is somewhat less likely that the Soviets will make direct but limited attacks on Pakistan's border

because this would present the best political circumstances for increased US support while not altering Zia's policies. Nevertheless, given Moscow's strong incentives to try to change Pakistan's policies toward the Afghan war, recent signs of increased Soviet pressure on Islamabad, and Moscow's inability to command Indian action against Pakistan, the prospect of unilateral Soviet political and military pressures on Pakistan, such as limited air attacks and hot-pursuit raids on border sites, cannot be ruled out. The Soviets may decide to increase the frequency and scale of limited cross-border raids in an attempt to force President Zia to rein in the insurgents, but we believe large-scale Soviet military actions against Pakistan remain unlikely. [portion marking not declassified

—In the Persian Gulf region, escalation of the Iran-*Iraq* war and the prospect of US intervention might induce the USSR preemptively to apply military pressure on Iran to end the conflict and to assert a Soviet role as a superpower in the Gulf region. Various developments in the Gulf are possible, but in the short term the most likely Soviet responses will be efforts to gain increased political influence in Iran and other regional states, rather than confrontational military actions. An Iranian victory over Iraq and Soviet reaction to it could lead to a Soviet invasion of Iran, and thereby to a direct military confrontation with the United States. But we believe this course of events is highly unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate. There is no evidence to suggest that the Soviets are readying their military forces in the region to exert visible pressure or to take local action, but they could be brought within weeks to sufficient readiness to attack Iran or play a part in a

Soviet pressure campaign against Iran. [portion marking not declassified]

—In *Berlin*, where the Soviets have been acting to remind the West of its vulnerable access, the Soviets could escalate pressures to stimulate fear and tension among the United States and its allies. Some increase in Soviet actions to test US and allied reactions cannot be ruled out in the short term. We believe any major escalation of pressure is very unlikely because the risk of counterproductive political effects in the West or a genuine confrontation is higher than the Soviets wish to run now. [portion marking not declassified]

Taken together, these regional conflict situations, in which US and Soviet interests are opposed and the potential for local conflict escalation is significant, generate possibilities for limited US-Soviet confrontation over coming months which we cannot rule out, although we judge them unlikely. Circumstances could arise in which local events combine with Soviet desire to gain local objectives and, secondarily, to embarrass the United States, resulting in a degree of confrontation the USSR did not originally seek. Domestic political conditions in the United States will play some role in Soviet calculations. The Soviets would expect the election period to impose inhibitions on US responses to their initiatives or other developments which would enhance their prospects of local success. To a lesser extent, they may expect regional crises to put the US administration on the defensive regarding its overall foreign policy. At the same time, uncertainties about US reactions to challenge and about the political effects of Soviet challenges on US politics will continue to be a restraining influence on Moscow's actions. [portion marking not declassified]

Recent Soviet military and political actions have created concern that the Soviets may be preparing for a major military confrontation with the United States. During the past six months or so the Soviets have pursued a vigorous program of large-scale military exercises, have engaged in anomalous behavior with respect to troop rotation and withdrawn military support for harvest activities, have demonstratively deployed weapon systems in response to NATO's INF deployments, and have heightened internal vigilance and security activities. Amidst continuing propaganda and intermittent reporting [less than 1 line not declassified] about Soviet fears of impending war, there is concern that recent Soviet military and defense-related activities might be read as revealing (or attempting to cloud) definite Soviet preparations for a near-term confrontation with the United States that could sharply heighten the risk of a general war. [portion marking not declassified

There is also concern about the possibility that the Soviet leadership might be of a mind to attempt a "now-or-never" effort to dramatically shift the terms of the US-Soviet power struggle through central confrontation, fearful that future Soviet domestic problems may make it excessively difficult for the USSR to achieve its military and international goals in the future. It is feared that Soviet military activities could be in preparation for such a confrontation. [portion marking not declassified]

We strongly believe that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that Soviet war talk and other actions "mask" Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR. [portion marking not declassified]

Supporting the conclusion, the analysis underlying the present Estimate has led us to judge, further:

- —The Soviet leadership displays an expectation of intensified power competition with the United States in the years ahead, along with some hope that US policies can be deflected by a combination of stubbornness and cajolery. It does not now display a view that dangerous confrontation may be required to defend its interests and advance its power. [portion marking not declassified]
- —While pleased with the USSR's improved military situation achieved in the past decade, the Soviet leadership is not so confident in it that it would deliberately seek out a central test of US-Soviet strategic strength to "keep history on track." [portion marking not declassified]
- —Patterns of power and decisionmaking in the Soviet Politburo at present are very unlikely to generate initiatives that are politically dangerous for its members, which a risky confrontational strategy would be. [portion marking not declassified]
- —Examined comprehensively, Soviet military and defense-related activities are in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for a major war. Noteworthy by their absence are widespread logistics, supply, and defense-economic preparations obligated by Soviet war doctrines and operational requirements. We have high confidence in our ability to detect them if they were occurring on a wide scale. [portion marking not declassified]

To be sure, Soviet propaganda and other information activities have deliberately tried to create the image of a dangerous international environment, of Soviet fear of war, and of possible Soviet willingness to contemplate dangerous actions. Some, although by no means all, recent Soviet military activity appears to have been directed in part at supporting this campaign, especially large and visible Soviet military exercises. We believe that the apprehensive outlook the Soviets have toward the long-term struggle with the United States has prompted them to respond with a controlled display of military muscle. [portion marking not declassified]

In reaching these judgments, we must point out that the indicators and methodologies of our strategic warning establishment are oriented toward the provision of warning of war within a short period, at most one to two months. Because we give less emphasis to defense-economic and other home front measures that might provide strategic warning beyond so short a period, and because a pattern of such activities is inherently difficult to detect in their early stages unless deliberately signaled by the regime, we have less confidence in longer range warning based on military and defense-related activities alone. However, in the total context of Soviet foreign and domestic developments, we judge it very unlikely that the Soviets are now preparing for a major war or for confrontation that could lead to a major war in the short run. [portion marking not declassified]

It is possible that, following the US elections and their reading of the overall political results, the Soviets could adjust their present foreign policy tactics to give more emphasis to steps of limited accommodation. Their aim would be to encourage US political trends that would deflect or alter the defense and foreign policies of the

United States which the Soviets see directed against them. They would seek a return in some form to the detente environment of the early 1970s in which they enjoyed many political and economic benefits of East-West amity but suffered few constraints on the expansion of their military power and international activities directed against the West, especially in the Third World. Although political circumstances in the West, both in the United States and in Europe, may encourage them to make more serious attempts in this direction than in the past several years, the present Soviet leaders appreciate that detente consistent with longstanding Soviet aims requires fundamental changes in US policies, namely a substantial US retreat from efforts to contain Soviet power. They also appreciate that this is unlikely to be accomplished solely by diplomatic maneuver on their part. [portion marking not declassified]

It is highly unlikely that the Soviets will fundamentally moderate their military and international aims and shift to a policy of genuine and far-reaching accommodation toward the United States in the period of this Estimate. This could occur in the years ahead as a result of the USSR's facing greater internal problems and external obstacles. For the present and the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders are likely to remain attached to expanding their military and international power. They will try to manage the Soviet internal system to sustain these objectives. They would like to achieve a form of East-West detente that facilitates these objectives while limiting the costs and risks of pursuing them. They are not yet ready for a form of detente that forswears the expansion of their power. [portion marking not declassified]

In brief summary, the near-term projections we have made are as follows (percentages are merely for display of qualitative judgment; note that judgments of probable Soviet behavior in some cases are contingent on prior developments having a lower probability):

- —The USSR is likely to continue through the remainder of 1984 the mixed policy toward the United States observed during the summer months so far, with heavy emphasis on hostility and rigidity, but with an undercurrent of hints about progress in bilateral relations and arms control (70 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —It is now unlikely, but not ruled out, that the USSR will agree at the last minute to commence space weapons talks in September (20 percent). The odds rise sharply if the United States agrees to an ASAT test moratorium (70 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —Should space weapons talks begin in September, there is a chance that the Soviets will contrive some sort of breakoff to damage the US administration politically (30 percent), but more likely that they will simply accuse the United States of blocking substantive progress (70 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —A moderately effective insurgent offensive is very likely to occur in El Salvador in late summer or the fall, and the Soviets will welcome it for putting significant although not decisive political pressure on Washington (90 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —It is likely that the Soviets will introduce L-39 jet aircraft into Nicaragua (70 percent). It is unlikely that more advanced fighters (such as MIG-21s) will

be introduced before November (10 percent). Should they successfully introduce L-39s, then the probability of their sending more advanced fighters rises. See the alternative view, held by the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, as referenced in <u>footnote 2</u>. The Soviets could also use the new large airfield soon to be completed for visits by Bear reconnaissance and ASW aircraft.

—Should India evince interest in attacking Pakistan [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets probably would be privately supportive, and probably would agree to provide intelligence and some logistic support (70 percent). The Soviets' main aim would be an end to Pakistan's support of the Afghan resistance. [portion marking not declassified]

—There is also a serious possibility that the Soviets will take escalated unilateral military steps such as airstrikes and hot-pursuit actions to pressure Islamabad toward this end in the months ahead (40 percent). A major Soviet attack on Pakistan, requiring new deployments and some weeks of preparation, is very unlikely during the period of this Estimate (5 percent). [portion marking not declassified]

—Near-term Soviet behavior toward the more probable developments in the Iran-Iraq war is likely to be continued efforts toward political openings in Tehran and among the Persian Gulf states (80 percent). Only in the event of dramatic military success by Iran against Iraq (10 percent) or major US intervention on Iranian soil are the Soviets likely to take direct military measures toward intervention (70 percent). [portion marking not declassified]

- —The Soviets are unlikely to escalate substantially their present very low-key pressures on Berlin access (10 percent). They may, however, test Western reactions by small increases in the degree and visibility of pressures they are now applying (30 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —There is some likelihood that the Soviets will try, following the US elections, a mix of tactics toward the United States that give greater emphasis to flexibility on arms control and movement on bilateral issues, without giving up fundamental positions (30 percent). Continuation of present policy mix well into 1985 is more likely (70 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —It is highly improbable that the Soviets will shift to more far-reaching accommodations toward the United States during the period of this Estimate (5 percent). [portion marking not declassified]
- —It is highly unlikely that the USSR is now preparing for and will move deliberately into a visible posture of direct, high-level military confrontation with the United States during the next six months (5 percent). It cannot be ruled out, however, that the USSR could move quickly into such a posture as a result of a local crisis escalation not now planned or sought by Moscow (10 percent). [portion marking not declassified]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/08/84-08/16/84). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A fuller copy of SNIE 11-9-84 is available on the CIA

Electronic Reading Room website. A note on the cover page reads: "Issued by the Director of Central Intelligence. Concurred with by the National Foreign Intelligence Board. The CIA, DIA, NSA, the intelligence organization of the Department of State, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence of the Department of the Navy, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Department of the Air Force, and the Director of Intelligence of the Marine Corps participated in the preparation of the Estimate." In a June 26 memorandum to Casey, McFarlane requested further analysis of Soviet activities related to Casey's June 19 memorandum to Reagan (see <u>Document</u> 229) and building on the May 1984 SNIE (see Document 221), resulting in this SNIE. McFarlane wrote: "It would be helpful if you would integrate pieces of evidence to develop further these and any other relevant hypotheses which may help us anticipate potential Soviet political or military challenges during the coming six months. Specifically, detailed discussion of the utility to the Soviets of interfering in various geographic trouble spots, and of indicators that they might plan or have the opportunity to do so, would be helpful, with prioritization of potential problems in order of likelihood. Competitive analysis would be appreciated." (Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 400571)

<sup>2</sup> The holder of this view is the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. [portion marking not declassified; footnote is in the original.]

<sup>3</sup> The holder of this view is the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State. [portion marking not declassified; footnote is in the original.]

<sup>4</sup> See NIE 31/32-84, India-Pakistan: Prospects for Hostilities, 13 August 1984. [portion marking not declassified; footnote is in the original.]

 $\frac{5}{2}$  See footnote 3, above.

## 265. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 14, 1984

SUBJECT
Dealing With Gromyko in September

Further to our conversation on Gromyko, I wanted to review with you our thinking on how we deal with him this fall.

One obvious problem we need to consider is whether Gromyko might be so harsh in his public statements that it would vitiate the positive aspects of a meeting with the President. We certainly can expect Gromyko to be tough in New York<sup>2</sup>—both in private and in public—but we doubt he would attempt to use a meeting as a way to humiliate the President. The Soviets have a strong incentive to keep the lines open and would look at such a meeting as the opening round of talks in the next four years in addition to it being a political gesture by the President.

In fact, they may be hinting at wanting a meeting with the President. A Soviet diplomat (probably Sokolov) told John Scali<sup>3</sup> a few days ago that he thought Gromyko would be invited to meet with the President this fall. Another Soviet diplomat in Berlin told Nelson Ledsky<sup>4</sup> a traditional Gromyko trip to Washington during the UNGA depended on whether he was treated in the same way as he had been before Afghanistan. Today Sokolov passed on Gromyko's "heartfelt gratitude" for your letter on his 75th anniversary,

clearly meant as an appreciation of the diplomatic niceties, and Sokolov pointed to your reference to a meeting at the UN in the message as an important gesture.

I suggest the following scenario: Sokolov owes me a reply on Gromyko's UN plans. At that time it would be appropriate to take up with him the modalities of a meeting between you and Gromyko early in your stay in New York (perhaps on September 25) and tentatively schedule a follow up session toward the end of your time at the UN. If your first session goes well and Gromyko's speech is not too outrageous, you can invite him to Washington to meet with the President at the time already penciled in for a second meeting.

Such a scenario would provide us maximum flexibility and avoid undue embarassment. To increase our leverage on Gromyko's deportment, we might quietly let the Soviets know ahead of time that there was a possibility of a meeting with the President. This could encourage Gromyko to take a somewhat more constructive tack in his public and private utterances. It would also give the Soviets an early graceful out if they calculated that they did not want to provide a boost to the President during the election campaign.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Gromyko was scheduled to attend the UNGA session in late September in New York.

 $^3$  John Scali was a senior ABC News correspondent. From 1973 to 1975, he served as the U.S. Representative to the United Nations under President Nixon.

<sup>4</sup> Nelson Ledsky, U.S. Minister in Berlin, 1981-1985.

### 266. Note From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>

KWD: Washington, August 17, 1984

I wrote the attached while you were in Mexico. I put it aside when the Vienna excitement broke, because no one concentrates on long-term issues when there is a hot subject to work instead. Now that Vienna has receded over the horizon, I offer it as a thought for approaching the next term.

You will notice right away the big role for GPS. I am skeptical of the notions I see in the looking ahead exercise of turning this all over to a band of outsiders. The few months after November 7 offer a rare opportunity for an experienced Secretary to make a fresh effort with the Soviet leadership. It would be a waste to use that time educating a set of loose cannons so they could set out to discuss a common strategic policy with the Soviet Union. That is clearly impossible. What may be possible are practical steps. The only way to find out if they are possible is to propose some and see what happens.

IT<sup>2</sup>

### Attachment

Memorandum From the Advisor for Strategic Policy to the Deputy Secretary of State (Timbie) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam) $\frac{3}{2}$ 

Washington, July 2, 1984

### Permanent Features of the Landscape

—Arms control will continue to be a difficult and complex subject. Major problems include (1) finding a way to define equality despite differences in forces and geography, (2) securing Soviet agreement to significant reductions in modern weapons, (3) devising effective verification measures, and (4) treatment of third-country forces.

—The Soviets will be difficult to negotiate with, will continue to oppose our interests around the world, and will periodically act in a manner contrary to all civilized norms. The Soviets consider relations with the U.S. important, but subordinate to their perceived security needs.

—There will be no consensus in Washington on our objectives in pursuing arms control. There will be articulate opposition to all plausible agreements as contrary to U.S. interests.

—There will be broad public support for arms control, but practical steps will be controversial. Opposition to agreements comes from many quarters—levels too high, not verifiable, unduly constrains U.S. programs, does not end the arms race, etc.

Success in overcoming these obstacles will require substantial measures of hard work, imagination, and good luck. There is considerable room for improvement within the Administration and within the State Department in preparing ourselves substantively and organizationally to deal with this challenge.

### Setting Priorities

Fifteen years ago there was only one major arms control forum—SALT—and major agreements were produced in 2½ years of concentrated effort. Today arms control efforts are spread over at least six major subjects, and nothing of consequence has been accomplished over the last five years, and only one significant agreement—SALT II—has been concluded in the last ten years. There are, of course, many reasons for this, but one is a lack of what in business is called strategic planning—setting priorities and focusing effort and resources in areas of highest potential payoff. Agreements are possible only with the direct and personal intervention of the leadership in both countries, a scarce resource that should be concentrated on one or two subjects at any one time.

START (including INF) should obviously be the top priority. It deals with the essential subject of our time, and substantial agreements in other areas are not likely in the absence of accomplishments in START.

The other subjects (MBFR, nuclear testing, space, CW, and CDE) all have rationales and should be nursed along. From time-to-time it may make sense to briefly focus some high-level attention on one of them, and some (e.g. space) might be packaged with START. But START should have top priority, and we should recognize that concrete accomplishments require great concentration of resources to surmount obstacles large and small. If this seems unfair to people with personal stakes in the other subjects, it should be kept in mind that success in START would give a

large boost to the other subjects, and conversely without a START agreement prospects for most of the others are poor.

### Leadership-to-Leadership Exchanges

Delegations in the field have a role to play, especially in working out the language of formal Treaties. Delegations, however, are extensions of bureaucracies, and the U.S. and Soviet bureaucracies are incapable of significant arms reductions agreements. The basic elements of all significant arms control agreements have without exception been worked out in direct exchanges between the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Direct exchanges also have potential for overcoming the procedural obstacles which have prevented negotiations for the past six months.

### Experiment and Exploration

There is usually more than one way to achieve a given objective. Our ignorance of the Soviet decision-making process is such that it is extremely difficult to predict which approach is the most promising. It is therefore useful to have a mechanism for informal experiments and exploration. Each side could try out ideas, objectives, and tentative proposals on the other. Such informal probing and testing is a common negotiating technique, but has become rare in arms control negotiations. Such exploration would be conducted with the knowledge and approval of the White House, but the President would reserve the right to review any tentative results.

The risk of such a procedure is that a tentative bargain could be overruled by the White House, which would discredit the U.S. officials involved, would add to the U.S. reputation as an unreliable negotiating partner, and could cause political problems for the White House. This actually happened in January, 1976, when a SALT II deal worked out by Kissinger in Moscow was rejected by President Ford.

The potential benefits, however, outweigh the risks. Reliance on the existing interagency process has three drawbacks: (1) It is extraordinarily time consuming. (When we tabled our draft INF Treaty in February 1982, we told the Soviets the accompanying verification procedures would be tabled shortly. Two and one-half years later, these procedures are still being worked out.) (2) The inevitable result is a compromise between conflicting agency views, which may be justifiable on bureaucratic grounds but which usually lacks substantive rationale and has little value for advancing negotiations. (The recent "move" in MBFR is a typical example.) (3) Once such a position is arrived at and blessed by the President, it becomes very difficult to change. Informal exchanges would allow testing of ideas on the Soviets without the delays and distortions of the interagency process, and without locking us into a position.

One example of a subject that could usefully be explored with the Soviets is the possibility of a new interim restraint regime to replace SALT II after 1985. (This, in fact, is next year's number one priority.) A second example is the new START framework.

Mutual Benefit

In order to conclude an agreement, both sides must perceive benefits in the bargain. This elementary notion is not reflected in our START approach to date, which calls for dismantling two-thirds of the Soviet ICBM force in return for marginal constraints on U.S. forces. More generally, our arms control approaches tend to be most popular with the least informed, regarded skeptically by the well-informed, and of little interest to the Soviets.

We have, however, been extremely successful in deriving public relations benefits from the fact of START and INF negotiations and from the positions we have taken, notwithstanding their small prospects for success. Both INF deployment and the M-X program have been greatly facilitated by our approach to the negotiations, and the Soviets are not likely to cooperate further in unproductive negotiations which benefit us without corresponding benefits for them. Predictions that the Soviets will return to the negotiations after the election are probably optimistic. More likely, they will return when they perceive that there is some prospect for a result that would be in their interest. They are not likely to be interested in talking for the sake of talking. From this perspective, the Soviet walkouts are not so much a pressure tactic as a refusal to cooperate in a process that is working against their interests, even though this refusal has serious costs, especially in Europe.

If this analysis is correct, introduction of new U.S. ideas is more likely to lead to resumption of START than the passage of time or the occurrence of the election.

### Substance

Lack of substantive ideas is not a serious problem. The proposed "framework" should be the basis for the next

substantive exchanges on START. It would implement the U.S. objectives (reductions, equality, enhancement of stability, and verification), meets the Soviets half-way on the central issue (aggregation of warhead limits), combines the best features of our position with the least objectionable elements of the Soviet position, and represents a vast improvement over SALT II in unit of account, levels, and structure. This approach has the potential to reduce the negotiations on the basic provisions of a START agreement to haggling over numbers.

The most difficult problem in strategic arms negotiations is the treatment of INF and third country systems. This has been the case since 1969, and while the separate INF negotiations have obscured this fact for the last few years, it will be obvious when talks resume. The problem arises from the clash of fundamental goals—the United States needs U.S.-Soviet equality, the Soviets need constraints on all comparable forces facing constrainted Soviet forces. The long-term solution is a five-power arrangement. The short-term solution is to isolate strategic force reductions from INF to the maximum extent possible, and create an outcome which permits each side to claim victory.

It will not be easy to isolate a START agreement from INF. In the past this has been done by keeping the levels of strategic forces high (so INF is relatively insignificant) and granting the Soviets an offsetting asymmetry (heavy missiles). Our objective of significant reductions well below SALT II, our continuing deployment of LRINF missiles, and British and French plans to expand their number of missile warheads by about an order of magnitude all ensure that INF will be a very difficult problem for START. The one positive note is the possibility of "tradeoffs", which the U.S. could consider to be a balancing of U.S. and Soviet

strategic advantages, but which the Soviets could consider to include an element of compensation for FBS.

Another major problem will be future ballistic missile defenses. While development and deployment decisions will not be made for many years, if ever, the Soviets will not be interested in constraints on offenses if there is a serious prospect of large-scale defenses. It is possible that a simple provision making a START agreement contingent on continuation of the ABM Treaty would suffice. But it is also possible that the future of defenses will need to be addressed and resolved again before a START agreement can be concluded. Properly handled, there is leverage here; the Soviets respect our defensive technology.

Once a basic framework for a START agreement begins to take shape, a large number of other problems will come to the fore—verification measures, Backfire, definitions, counting rules, and many more. This is the way the negotiating process proceeds—as central issues are resolved, new layers of problems previously perceived as too obscure and technical for senior-level attention present themselves for senior-level decision and negotiation. These need to be considered problems to be resolved rather than reasons why agreements are impossible.

### *Form*

Most of our efforts are directed toward formal Treaties. Treaties are, however, only one part of a spectrum of possibilities, and we should consider other, less formal concepts as well. One possibility would be a new interim restraint arrangement to replace SALT II when it expires next year. Such an agreement could, for example, cap certain parameters near current levels. A follow on could

lower these levels. Such a simple arrangement would produce substantively and politically useful results long before negotiations on a complete Treaty were concluded.

When we attempt to breathe life into START next year, our immediate objective should be to work out a new interim restraint regime to replace SALT II in 1985. The expiration of SALT II is an action-forcing event, and the best solution would be to have in place by December 31, 1985 a replacement regime based on our preferred unit of account —warheads and ALCMs. Absent this, we would face a tough choice—continue to abide by SALT II, which would require dismantling of large numbers of Poseidon and MM-III as Trident boats are deployed, or be the first nation to breach the central provisions of the Treaty (which we have criticized as setting levels that are too high).

Since a new interim restraint regime would set a precedent for the follow-on agreement, and since the interim restraint arrangement would be most defensible as a temporary measure pending a more comprehensive agreement, our proposal for temporary, informal restraints should be consistent with and advanced together with a more comprehensive proposal (e.g. the framework). Once direct exchanges have produced a replacement interim restraint formula and an agreed framework analogous to the one produced for SALT II at Vladivostok, the stage would be set for useful work by the delegations.

### Proposals and Objectives

When we make proposals, we should adopt the practice of advancing both our position and the objectives we seek to achieve. Giving our objectives equal weight with our position has advantages:

- —Sometimes the Soviets agree with the objective but not the position, and can propose an alternative way to achieve it.
- —Keeping our objectives clear can help avoid inflexible adherence to a particular means rather than the intended end result. (For example, our single-minded emphasis on a ban on encryption of telemetry, which is not plausible, is impeding our ability to pursue other ways to verify missile characteristics.)

### Organization

Serious negotiations would require the State Department to carry out the following tasks, all more-or-less simultaneously:

- —Conduct of informal exchanges with the Soviets, including formulation of ideas and tactics, coordination with the White House, etc.
- —Management of the interagency process for analysis of ideas, problems, options, etc. Most of the groups formerly chaired by NSC are now chaired by State or co-chaired by State and OSD.
- —Support of the Delegation in Geneva. ACDA plays a big role here, but needs State's help where there are interagency differences.
- —Take the lead in dealing with compliance problems and interim restraint.
- —Consult with the Allies and Congress, engage in public diplomacy, etc.

*PM.* The PM bureau has over the last few years put together a small group of people highly skilled in arms control analysis. They spend the great majority of their time writing interagency papers and attending and presiding over interagency meetings. They think of themselves primarily as members of the interagency community, and when they do think about State's interests, it is usually in terms of which option in an interagency paper State should support.

This deep involvement in the interagency process has advantages: PM has taken over much of the management function once carried out by NSC, and much of the technical analysis function once carried out by ACDA. PM, and Admiral Howe in particular, have earned the respect of the other agencies. The down side is that after devoting 60 plus hours a week to their interagency work, PM analysts have little additional time or energy for supporting the Secretary. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that a PM analyst considers his job is finished when he has successfully negotiated interagency clearance on a paper hundreds of pages long analysing a dozen or more options.

General Chain should be encouraged to reorient PM to play a larger role in State's internal efforts to find solutions to problems, explore possibilities with the Soviets, etc. General Chain needs a few more people, especially at the working level, in order to devote more resources to this task while continuing to discharge State's interagency obligations.

*EUR*. EUR has also put together a small group of highly skilled people, and they have been the source of most of the innovative ideas in START, INF, and other subjects over the last few years. EUR has a flare for initiative and action, and many of their suggestions which were controversial at the

time are now widely considered to have been successful (e.g., the INF moves in 1983, the CW Treaty draft, and the Dublin offer on NUF). $^4$  EUR is well positioned to support serious negotiations conducted on several levels.

The Seventh Floor. The Seventh Floor has played a small role in START and other arms control negotiations to date. A serious negotiation conducted on several levels will require much more participation by the Seventh Floor principals. The Secretary himself would have major responsibilities as the principal point of contact with the Soviets and with the President. He could use substantial support, however, in such tasks as management of the process (planning, analysis, tactics, etc.) supporting the private exchanges, liaison with the White House, coordination of the positions State representatives take in interagency meetings and papers, and senior-level discussions with other agencies. These functions are best carried out at a level between the bureaus and the Secretary. Such a role would (if the negotiations go anywhere) require a major commitment of time and energy, and would involve engagement in this issue on a day-to-day basis. I, of course, think D would be a good place for this responsibility, but other possibilities are P or a new Seventh Floor principal.

The traditional entree for the Deputy Secretary into this subject was the SIG. There would be no point in resuming meetings of the SIG, however, since there is no need for a group between the IG and the SACPG. While the interagency analysis is necessary, and in some cases even useful, it will never resolve the major problems and is not the place where additional effort should be expended.

*ACDA*. The ideal ACDA would consider itself to be de facto, if not de jure, a branch of the State Department. ACDA

retains significant capability for technical analysis, and would be a useful ally. In the past ACDA has at times worked closely with State, and at other times opposed State. Today it is somewhere in between. ACDA's problems include uneven staffing, a mandate that overlaps State's, and a subject matter that is too important and too bureaucratically difficult to be left to a tiny and bureaucratically weak agency. Once serious negotiations began, ACDA would want very much to be involved. State could benefit from access to ACDA's technical analysis capability. If handled carefully, there is therefore the basis for closer cooperation than in the recent past.

### Conclusion

The combination of smart but largely procedural U.S. moves and dumb Soviet moves has worked well to date in gaining support in Congress and elsewhere for our arms control approach. The build-down episode illustrates that a surprising amount of short-term political gain can be extracted from an initiative with no substantive content whatever. But as time goes by, more will be demanded of our arms control policy than statements that arms control is difficult, the Soviets are hard to deal with, and everything is under study. Without either tangible results or evidence of innovative efforts, the perception will grow that while our stated goals are laudable, little is being done to achieve them. This will have an increasingly negative effect on support for the defense program, on the Alliance, and on overall support for the President.

It is possible that even with our best efforts nothing worthwhile can be accomplished. The Soviets may or may not be prepared to make the major changes in their approach that will be necessary. The only way to determine how the Soviets would respond to a more equitable proposal is to suggest one and see what happens.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, August 1984. No classification marking. In a covering note forwarding the note and attached memorandum to Shultz, Dam commented: "I highly commend this memo for your careful review. Despite its length, it is by far the most refreshing and cogent piece that I have read on the process of arms control negotiations." Shultz replied in the margin: "KD for discussion next week."
- $\frac{2}{3}$  Timbie initialed "J.T." above his typed initials.
- <sup>3</sup> Secret. Not for the System.
- <sup>4</sup> Reagan traveled to Ireland from June 1 to 4, addressing the Irish Parliament in Dublin on June 4. In this speech he addressed U.S.-Soviet relations and the Soviet proposal for 'non-use-of-force.' For the full text of this speech, see the *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 804–811. See also footnote 3, Document 224.*

# 267. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, August 20, 1984

SUBJECT 1985—Year of Decision for Arms Control

EUR's recent paper on the next four years of US-Soviet relations noted that 1985 was likely to be a particularly critical year for nuclear arms control. This memo explores in greater detail the issues and dangers we will face this coming year. Our focus is explicitly short-term: how do we cope with a potentially serious and immediate set of problems. But our proposals will also need to be examined in the light of the longer-term piece we are doing for you reviewing the strategic situation as it is likely to develop toward the end of this decade, and suggesting means by which arms control could enhance stability.

### The Erosion of the Current Regime

The current arms control regime, the product of two decades of intensive US-Soviet negotiations, has proven relatively resilient, withstanding five years of mounting suspicion, intense recrimination, lack of new accords or even progress toward them. Yet an unraveling process is visible, and is likely to accelerate in the months ahead. In recent months we have formally accused the Soviets of violating both the accord which opened that arms control

era—the 1962 Limited Test Ban Treaty—and the agreement which closed it—the 1979 SALT II accord—as well as many arms control agreements concluded in between (most notably the ABM Treaty, viewed by many as the single example of an arms control agreement that has worked).<sup>3</sup> Further, there is in preparation a report to Congress that will charge the Soviets with further violations.<sup>4</sup>

For our part, the United States has not ratified or put formally into effect (as opposed to "not undercutting" as a matter of policy) any US-Soviet arms control accord since 1973, nor have we concluded any such agreement since 1979. As a new four-year Presidential term opens, no bilateral US-Soviet arms control negotiations will be underway.

This erosion of the existing arms control regime is likely to gather further momentum. The Soviets are likely to persist and expand their self-serving interpretation of commitments under existing (and for the most part, unratified) arms control agreements—if not renounce them altogether. We will find ourselves under similar pressures. The SALT II accord was intended to run only until the end of 1985, and we will need either to abandon our "interim" compliance with it, or explain why we are extending the term of this "fatally flawed" accord in the face of numerous allegations of Soviet noncompliance. We will face this decision at precisely the moment when the provisions of that agreement would require us to begin dismantling existing US systems. For it is in late 1985 that the launching of another new Trident ballistic missile submarine will require the dismantling of Poseidon submarines or Minuteman III ICBMs if the US is to stay under the SALT II limits of 1200 MIRVed missile launchers. We are thus entering an increasingly vicious cycle in which each side's suspicions of the other's intentions and actions make that side less likely to adhere scrupulously to its commitments, in turn further stimulating the other side to reinterpret or disregard its commitments. Our commitment to SDI, for instance, will force us to break, abrogate, or renegotiate the ABM Treaty within a few years. It is not credible to assume that the Soviets will wait passively until we do so, particularly given their own very active ABM program and the role that defense plays in their strategic doctrine. By the same token, there is already strong pressure within and outside the Administration for us to abandon our compliance with SALT I and II on the basis of judgments—based frequently on ambiguous evidence—of Soviet violations.

### Are "Existing Agreements" Worth Preserving?

In the light of the Soviet compliance record, and the continued military buildup on both sides which has been permitted under existing agreements, one must ask whether the current arms control regime is in fact worth preserving. The following considerations should guide our answer:

—The Soviet Union is still observing the majority of its nuclear arms control commitments, although as noted, the trend toward noncompliance with selective constraints is quickening. These commitments place meaningful, if modest, constraints on the size and capabilities of US and Soviet offensive and defensive nuclear forces: for example, a ban on deployed ABMs save for one site per side; a prohibition on increases in the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers, including a requirement that older missile submarines be dismantled as new ones are deployed; a

ceiling on the number of missiles with MIRVs and limits on the number of warheads per missile.

- —By certain measures, these constraints have been more onerous for the USSR than the US. In observing SALT I limits, the Soviets have in the last few years been forced to dismantle recent-vintage Yankee missile submarines, whereas the US has only had to retire Polaris submarines that had reached the end of their serviceable life in any case; moreover SALT II limits have prevented the Soviets from putting 20–30 warheads on their heavy SS–18 missiles, or from building any new ICBM silos.
- —The Soviet Union could respond more quickly than the US to a lifting of these restraints to expand substantially the number of its missiles and warheads. The Soviets have a more active production base to support deployment of a substantial number of additional MIRVed ICBMs in existing single-warhead ICBM silos, and could quickly test existing types of missiles with greater numbers of warheads, as well as rapidly expand their ABM coverage, as noted above.
- —The resultant situation, were the restraints to be lifted, could be more dangerous, less stable, and more costly for both sides.

The arms control regime built up over the past two decades has one key attribute particularly worth preserving—enhanced predictability. The network of commitments, and the extensive communications required to arrive at and sustain such undertakings, have increased both sides' understanding of the other's force structure and future plans. In an earlier era, lacking such understanding, the United States was constantly reacting to unpleasant surprises—the Soviet Union's first atomic weapons test in 1949, five years earlier than expected; the Soviet Union's

first H-bomb test in 1953, only a year after the first such US test; the 1957 launch of Sputnik; the bomber gap of the mid-1950s; and the missile gap of the early 1960s. Our understanding of Soviet strategic programs has improved to the point where militarily important developments are projected years in advance of their actuality. For instance, the mid-1980s' "window of vulnerability" of the US ICBM force was foreseen by the mid-1970s. Although we were not able to "solve" this problem in the interval, we have had time to adjust our thinking and plans to the new situation.

Today, however, as a result of the absence of serious arms control dialogue with the Soviets since the late 1970s, and despite our vast intelligence collection efforts, our understanding of Soviet strategic intentions is again deteriorating. As one example, the Soviets are developing and will soon begin deploying mobile ICBMs. Yet we remain uncertain as to the form of mobility (e.g., rail, road, crosscountry) or the numbers envisaged. This is information which should have been the by-product of the START talks. Another example is our lack of any real understanding of how the Soviets plan to deploy their air, ground- and sealaunched cruise missiles. A third example is our current uncertainty as to when the SS-20 program will stop, with total numbers already nearly double our earlier predictions.

The uncertainties we and the Soviets face over each other's space weapons and ballistic missile defense programs are even more extensive. Our knowledge of where the Soviets may be going in these areas is skimpy, and having given them some unpleasant shocks with our recent ASAT and ABM tests, we will, in the absence of serious talks, ourselves encounter comparable surprises sooner or later.

### Other Obstacles to Arms Control

Predictability is a necessary prerequisite to stability, for if one has less confidence in the future evolution of the strategic balance, one is less able to judge what steps are necessary to assure stability. While arms control alone cannot provide stability or guarantee security, it can create a more structured context in which both sides can develop force postures with a higher confidence of meeting those criteria.

Yet Americans have constantly asked more of arms control. Since the days of the Baruch Plan<sup>5</sup> and the open-skies proposal, American hopes for arms control have been excessive. Beyond helping to establish the parameters of our strategic problems, we have insisted unrealistically that arms control solve them. This Administration has further fed unrealistic expectations for arms control, proposing for instance to abolish an entire class of INF weaponry, to close the window of ICBM vulnerability, and to eliminate the throwweight gap. If we are to make any progress in this area in the coming years, we must bring our objectives, and our rhetoric, into line with the more modest results we can expect to achieve.

But even a more modest set of goals will be difficult to achieve in the environment of the mid-1980s. For a decade arms control has been moving slowly, and finally not at all, while technology has been developing apace. There are three principal areas where the challenge to arms control is becoming particularly acute:

—Technological developments are making it more difficult to define or categorize many new weapons, and hence to limit them effectively. The line between strategic and tactical, between nuclear and conventional, between

offensive and defensive weapons is becoming increasingly blurred. Cruise missiles epitomize this trend: they can carry conventional or nuclear warheads; they can be launched from airplanes and from ground- and sea-based launchers; their range can vary substantially depending on the payload and fuel supply; they are, as a result, suitable for a wide variety of missions ranging from short-range anti-ship to strategic counterforce attack. In addition to cruise missiles, many other systems also fall into the "gray areas" between traditional arms control categories: US dual-capable aircraft deployed in Europe, which the Soviets sought to limit in INF as "forward-based" nuclear systems, but which we insisted could not be constrained because of their conventional mission; the Soviet Backfire bomber, which was developed and deployed for theater missions, but which has inherent intercontinental capability; and the SS-20, which is deployed as an intermediate-range missile, but could be modified to attain intercontinental range.

-New weapons technologies are becoming increasingly difficult to verify. The miniaturization, versatility and mobility of new weapons systems makes it difficult, if not impossible, to monitor their numbers, range or armament through "national technical means," and in some cases, even through intrusive on-site inspection. Cruise missiles, again, are the prime example. While the number of cruise missiles deployed on aircraft can be monitored with some confidence, their tiny size and mobility make them difficult to count when deployed in ground-launched versions, and virtually impossible to count when deployed on surface ships or submarines (where they can fit in any torpedo tube); determining whether they carry a conventional or nuclear warhead is impossible without taking each missile apart. Verification problems just as formidable are emerging in other areas, as both we and the Soviets move toward deployment of mobile ballistic missile systems

which rely on concealment and deception for survivability. While we have been able to monitor SS-20 numbers because of their deployment at centralized bases, the Soviets may be developing a rail-mobile launcher for the SS-X-24 ICBM that will be far more difficult to verify.

—The growth of third-country nuclear arsenals is making it more difficult to pursue limitations on a strictly bilateral basis. The Soviets have long sought to obtain compensation for British and French nuclear forces, and this emerged as one of the central issues that blocked the INF talks. By the 1990s, when UK deployment of MIRVed Trident missiles is complete, [3½ lines not declassified]. These developments will make it harder for us to insist on strict US-Soviet equality in arms control agreements, despite the validity of our position that UK and French forces fulfill a qualitatively different role from that of US nuclear forces (in particular, they do not provide a "nuclear umbrella" for the nonnuclear states of NATO), and thus cannot be treated as one-for-one equivalents of US forces.

Arguably, many recent developments in strategic weaponry—nuclear SLCMs, mobile ICBMs, new ABMs—can enhance deterrence, reduce the incentive to strike first, and thus reinforce stability. But the growing uncertainties created by the unrestrained introduction of these new technologies, especially in the current political climate, are stimulating new anxieties and suspicions, and thus uncertainty itself is becoming a source of additional tension and potential instability (as well as the cause of increasing public and congressional pressures for arms control results). Yet the problems of verification and definition are such that, even with the best will in the world, with an agreed agenda and sustained high-level commitment, the United States and the Soviet Union would be hard put to come up with sound and verifiable limitations on these weapons.

#### Restoring the Dialogue

Decisions taken by Washington and Moscow in the early months of 1985 will do more than set the pattern for another four years. Events in 1985 will determine whether the US and the USSR prove able to build upon the legacy of a generation in arms control, or whether we must begin again the slow process of constructing a wholly new structure for communication, mutual accommodation and restraint of defense programs.

The Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons offers one potential vehicle for a resumption of the US-Soviet arms control dialogue. We need, of course, not only a vehicle, but some fuel—that is, some substance for the dialogue. We have sent you our proposals for a comprehensive US approach to a Vienna meeting. EUR's recommendation is for a three-year interim agreement on offensive and defensive systems, including:

- —a three-year moratorium on all ASAT and ABM testing;
- —interim reductions in offensive nuclear delivery vehicles and warheads along the lines of our START framework, perhaps expanded to encompass INF systems; and
- —a commitment to open new nuclear arms talks encompassing both offensive and defensive systems, aimed at reaching accord by the end of the three-year interim agreement on deeper reductions and longer-term limits.

PM has recommended a somewhat different package:

—a limited-duration ban on testing of high- and low-altitude interceptors against targets in space;

—a short-duration moratorium on ASAT tests while talks proceed;

—an expression of U.S. willingness to go beyond our current START position along the lines of the earlier START concepts work, and to expand on last fall's INF proposal, with a view toward concluding an early Valdivostok-style understanding on the outlines of a long-term offensive arms agreement; and

—a substantive discussion of future missile defense technologies with the possibility of negotiating specific limits in the longer term, but no immediate constraints on the SDI beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty.

Unfortunately, it appears unlikely that we will have a Vienna forum for advancing a proposal along either of these lines this year. Indeed, much of next year could also be lost in sterile US-Soviet maneuvering over the modalities of resuming bilateral arms control talks. The President's address to the UNGA in September offers an alternate venue to lay out such a new agenda for US-Soviet arms control; the interagency work going forward in preparation for Vienna could provide the basis for such a Presidential statement. Alternatively, you might put such a comprehensive proposal privately to Gromyko in September, as the suggested basis for more serious US-Soviet dialogue in the new year.

However the proposal is presented, we should not anticipate a positive Soviet response in the near term. But a set of realistic and attractive US proposals, along the lines cited above, could provide the basis for early resumption of the substantive dialogue in 1985. In particular, agreement on the main outlines of a long-term strategic arms reductions agreement, or negotiation of a

shorter-term interim strategic accord involving more modest reductions, would provide the basis for dealing with the looming question of "interim" compliance before the problem of Soviet non-compliance and the momentum of our own defense buildup bring about the collapse of remaining restraints in the strategic arms field.

#### Preparing for the Worse

Even as we press for an optimum outcome—a resumption of serious US-Soviet negotiations on the basis of a meaningful and balanced US proposal—we also need to prepare for the situation more likely to obtain in 1985—an absence of meaningful communication on these issues between Moscow and Washington, declining compliance with existing commitments on both sides, accompanied by mounting pressures to abandon them altogether, and a quickening pace of technological and military developments which, while they may arguably reinforce our national security, will certainly generate a heightened sense of insecurity, which will in turn make a rational approach to arms control and defense planning all the more difficult.

In these difficult circumstances we will need to:

- —elaborate the best possible case for further extending some or all of the SALT I and SALT II limits;
- —deal with compliance issues in a way which does not further diminish Soviet incentives to fulfill their obligations;
- —put forward publicly, even if the Soviets will not negotiate privately, a persuasive arms control agenda; and

—review the impact of our own evolving military programs upon the strategic balance.

We will also want to begin presenting a more modest vision of arms control. There will be a strong temptation to do just the opposite: to engage in public competition with the Soviets, each side touting ever more ambitious and unrealistic proposals. But if our rhetoric continues to feed the American public's appetite for arms control, while our accomplishments fail to satisfy it, we will generate an eventually unmanageable counteraction—not against arms control, but against our management of it.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/S, Lot Lot 92D52: Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, 1984–1989, August 16–31, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Dobbins and Vershbow on August 17; cleared by J. Gordon (PM/SNP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), R. Dean (PM), and Palmer. An unknown hand wrote in J. Campbell (P) as an additional clearing official. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins. Forwarded though Dam. The memorandum was also slated to be sent through Armacost, but his name is struck through.
- <sup>2</sup> See Document 260.
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 11, Document 159.
- <sup>4</sup> Reagan sent a report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements to Congress on October 10. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1493.*
- <sup>5</sup> Bernard M. Baruch served as the U.S. representative at the first meeting of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946, where he presented a proposal to establish international oversight of atomic energy and prevent the unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons. Of the 12 members of the UNAEC, the Soviet and Polish

representatives abstained and prevented the adoption of the Baruch Plan. For documentation, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1946, vol. I, General; The United Nations, Documents 395 4-577 2.

<sup>6</sup> For an explanation of President Eisenhower's Open Skies proposal, see *Foreign Relations*, 1955–1957, vol. XX, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Document 48. Reagan addressed the UN General Assembly on September 24. See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206. For the full text, see *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1984, Book II, pp. 1355–1361.

### 268. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1

Moscow, August 23, 1984, 1402Z

10777. For Under Secretary Armacost and Asst Secretary Burt. Subject: Looking Toward the UNGA—Moscow's Mind-Set.

- 1. (S—Entire text).
- 2. Summary: As the Department begins preparations for the Secretary's UNGA bilateral with Gromyko, 2 it may find useful some sense of the mind-set he will bring to the exchange. We expect he will be self-righteous at best and possibly quite confrontational. The political environment for the meeting will be less than propitious, and nothing in Gromyko's recent performances, or in Soviet policy more generally this year, suggests he will be any more prepared in New York than heretofore to respond constructively to US initiatives. This does not obviate the need for a positive US position nor does it diminish the value of the bilateral itself. It does mean we should not have unrealistic expectations as to what the meeting will accomplish. We should use the exchange to prepare the ground for Soviet policy reviews likely to follow the US Presidential elections. Sending Gromyko back to Moscow with the impression that US policy for the mid-eighties will be vigorous, consistent and constructive regardless of the Soviets' attitude will be far more important in this context than our treatment of specific issues. End summary.

Gromyko—A Confrontational Approach

3. Meetings between US and Soviet Foreign Ministers have taken place under less auspicious signs than the forthcoming UNGA bilateral—but not much. Gromyko has spent the past year honing his anti-administration spiel on interlocutors from Perez de Cuellar to Geoffrey Howe. 3 He has lambasted US policy every time he has been given access to a podium. In the wake of KAL first anniversary recriminations, the perceived slights which led him to cancel his UNGA trip last year will be fresh in his mind.4 He will sit down with the Secretary within days of the proposed start of the Vienna meeting that didn't happen, a source of embarrassment to the Soviets, and one which will not improve Gromyko's mood. In short, there is no evidence Moscow will have come out of its nearly year-long sulk, and no reason, a month before the US Presidential elections, why it should choose New York to do so. Odds are, therefore, that we can expect Gromyko at his worst both publicly and privately.

#### Publicly . . .

4. In terms of substance, we doubt he will have anything very dramatic to say in either forum. Having been burned by their June 29 space arms control ploy, any initiatives Gromyko may unveil in his address to the Assembly will probably be confined to areas on which we will have difficulty responding positively. Based on recent Soviet moves, candidates for a public proposal include something on limiting naval forces, a repackaging of one or more elements of Chernenko's March 2 arms control/nuclear norms menu, or the July 29 Soviet Middle East plan. None of these are likely to electrify the audience, and Gromyko may resort to harsh criticism of the administration, a la his performances in Stockholm and Budapest earlier this year,<sup>5</sup>

to mask his unwillingness to come to terms with the big issues.

#### . . . and in Private

5. We see no reason to expect anything different in private. Gromyko's objective, in the absence of any fresh ideas of his own or desire to respond to our initiatives, will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive by attacking the Administration's record. He will make the most of the August 11 joke. He will portray our handling of the Soviet space initiative in the worst possible light. He will dwell heavily on the "state terrorism" theme. He will lecture the Secretary that US claims to have regained the strength necessary for serious arms control are belied by the administration's failure to curtail military budgets. He will, in short, seek to make the case that our actions do not correspond to our words, and that the basic thrust of Ronald Reagan's foreign policy is to undermine the Soviet Union and its allies as viable social systems.

#### Prospects for a Change

6. Nothing we can do at this point is likely to make Gromyko and his colleagues adopt a more constructive approach in New York. That will come—if it comes—after November 6, when the Soviets will no longer be able to argue that conciliatory US statements are an electoral ploy, and especially when they have had a chance to reassess the substance of post-election US policy. Any proposals we make for cosmetic or minor steps in New York are likely to be turned aside as inadequate or cynical; more substantive overtures will simply be pocketed. This does not mean that we should not use the period between now and September

(or even November) to keep the ball in the Soviets' court through prudent initiatives. On the contrary, we should recognize that the Soviets have become prisoners of their own immobility (of which Gromyko is a principal architect) and they need to find their way out of the impasse. We should not expend negotiating capital to overcome their intransigence, but they need to be convinced that it is worth their while to resume real negotiations.

7. The UNGA meeting offers a good opportunity to drive home this message. While Gromyko will not have a negotiating brief, he will be alert to any indications as to the long-term direction of US policies. The impressions he takes back will shape post-election Soviet reviews of East-West policy which are certain to begin once the votes are counted in the US. That being the case, the agenda for the New York meeting will be less important than the general approach the Secretary brings to it.

#### Some Thoughts on the Agenda

8. As suggested above, Gromyko's aim will be to keep the Secretary on the defensive. He is likely to focus on the administration's arms control record, and particularly our response to Moscow's recent space initiative. We will need to rebut firmly Gromyko's litany of complaints. But we will find little advantage in a "who-struck-John," and should seek as early as possible to move the conversation beyond simple polemics. In addition to whatever we may have on arms control, we will want to raise Sakharov and human rights in general, reiterating our call for an independent verification of his condition and for an end to Bonner's persecution. In view of Moscow's non-response to our proposals for detailed discussions of Southern Africa and the Middle East, it would be inappropriate to press further

for such talks. This need not prevent the Secretary from outlining our views on these and other regional questions, however. In view of recent Soviet/DRA pressure against Pakistan, we should take advantage of the occasion to make clear to Gromyko our solidarity with Islamabad.

9. In the bilateral area, it will not hurt to recognize the small steps taken in recent months, underscoring that such progress reflects the administration's willingness to approach issues of mutual concern in a businesslike fashion when it finds a partner. It would be well in this context to emphasize the importance of a positive response to our proposals on improving North Pacific civil air safety, in unblocking a variety of bilateral matters (Aeroflot, consulates, and possibly the exchange agreement). New York would also be the logical place for new initiatives to expand the bilateral consultative process. We could express our readiness to raise the frequency and level of US-Soviet political contacts during the year ahead. If a concrete proposal were considered desirable, we could indicate a willingness to begin yearly pre-UNGA consultations at the policy level—a move under discussion in 1979 but never implemented.

#### A Broader Message

10. As already noted, however, more important than the ritual exchange of views we can expect on specific issues will be the overall impression we make on Gromyko. The Secretary's presentation—on specific topics and more generally—should pose for the Kremlin a fairly stark choice: To move toward a more businesslike and satisfactory relationship with the US after November or accept the consequences over the next four years and beyond. At the UNGA, as in our other high-level exchanges

with the Soviets in recent months, our message should be that the US is strong, vigorous in its approach to the problems facing it, and confident of its ability to engage the real issues of the eighties. Gromyko should understand that our approach is not directed a priori against Soviet interests, and that the demise of the USSR is neither our goal nor our expectation. It should be equally clear to him, however, that we will be as consistent as we will be patient, and that we have no intention of begging or bribing Moscow to deal with us on matters which are as much of concern to the Soviets as to ourselves.

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- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840010-0077. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
- <sup>2</sup> Shultz and Gromyko had a meeting scheduled during the UN General Assembly session in New York in late September.
- <sup>3</sup> Javier Pérez de Cuéllar was the United Nations Secretary General. Geoffrey Howe was British Foreign Secretary.
- <sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 260.
- <sup>5</sup> For Gromyko's address to the CDE at Stockholm, see footnote 3, Document 159.
- <sup>6</sup> See Document 263.

# 269. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 4, 1984

SUBJECT

Establishing a Private Channel with the Soviets

While it is encouraging that Secretary Shultz has decided that a private channel could be useful, I do not believe that the idea of proposing one to Gromyko (or inviting him to propose one) is the way to proceed if we want one that is effective and which does not give Dobrynin a monopoly over both directions of the messages.

Private channels are useful basically for two reasons:

- (1) They would allow us to work out compromises privately and informally, giving the Soviet leadership the possibility of avoiding accusations that they are compromising on principles; and
- (2) If properly established, they would allow us to communicate directly with elements of the Soviet bureaucracy outside the Foreign Ministry.

When and if the Soviet leadership has decided that they want improved relations, they will desire a private channel, largely for the first reason. But if we put the ball in their court, by working through Gromyko, we can be sure that he will arrange any channel established so that it is maintained under his control, thus depriving us of the second advantage—which could ultimately prove very

useful to us. Also, if we accept Dobrynin as *the* channel, we in effect give him a monopoly over communications in both directions. This is something we should never do again, since (particularly in the absence of frequent high-level direct meetings), we would have absolutely no control over the spin he puts on our messages.

I believe that any effort to establish a private channel should be made directly to the Soviet agency with which we wish to communicate. The obvious target for us is the Central Committee apparatus, which provides the staff support for the General Secretary (and other Central Committee Secretaries such as, for example, Gorbachev).

Such efforts undoubtedly would be reported to Gromyko, and if they come from someone in State, he would have solid bureaucratic ground to turn it off, since it is his formal duty to deal with foreign ministries. An effort by the White House to communicate with the CC Secretariat is different, however. Since it is, roughly, counterpart to counterpart, Gromyko would in effect have to argue that the Secretariat personnel cannot be relied upon to deal with us. This would be more difficult for him to do, and Zagladin's willingness to meet with me in February and to have Menshikov meet me in March shows that it is not out of the guestion. (You will recall that Menshikov pointed out that the contact had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko, and that Zagladin was authorized to receive messages through Hartman provided they were from me—but only under that condition.) I take this as confirmation that the bureaucratic factors mentioned above are in fact operative.

Since we have not followed up on the March meeting, we cannot be sure that the arrangements worked out earlier are still acceptable. However, *if* we have something substantial to say, I believe the route to try initially is the

one used before; if the Soviets reject it, then it will be a signal that they are not ready for a private channel in the full sense. If they are willing, however, such a mode of communication could be very useful to us if (as appears very likely) the Soviets are on the brink of another transition. The CC Secretariat will be in the vortex of any maneuvering; the Foreign Ministry will be very much off on the side.

Testing Soviet willingness to reactivate the channel established earlier would be very simple. With Secretary Shultz's approval, I could ask Hartman by secure telephone to pass a proposal to Zagladin that the two of us meet. If he accepted, it would mean that they are willing to activate the contact.

#### In sum, I recommend:

- 1. That Secretary Shultz be dissuaded from mentioning the matter of private channels to Gromyko or anyone in his party, and
- 2. That I be authorized to proceed as outlined above if we wish to test Soviet willingness to establish a channel.

Before anything is decided or done, it might be useful if I had the opportunity to discuss privately with Secretary Shultz and you some of the tactical considerations in establishing and maintaining a special channel.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984–09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-23-1-0. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw

it. Reagan also wrote in the margin: "This sounds practical. RR."

<sup>2</sup> See <u>Documents 180</u> and <u>195</u>.

# 270. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 6, 1984

SUBJECT Ogarkov Removal

The intelligence community is in the throes of trying to reach a judgment on Ogarkov's removal and will presumably have a considered piece available in the morning. The basic problem in judging the implications of this move is the paucity of information: as if now we literally have nothing more than the brief public announcement. In the meantime, I offer the following very tentative thoughts.

- 1. The announcement implies that Ogarkov's removal is *not* in connection with a promotion (e.g., to replace Ustinov as Minister of Defense) or a more-or-less lateral transfer (e.g., as CINC Warsaw Pact Forces). In either of these cases, the promotion or transfer is normally announced first, or at least simultaneously with, the announcement of a replacement.
- 2. These circumstances lead one to suspect that Ogarkov is being demoted. And if that is the case, one must suspect that it is either for policy reasons, or as part of a leadership power struggle.
- 3. Akhromeyev was Ogarkov's most senior deputy, and therefore was, in bureaucratic terms, the logical successor. He has been more active in the past than the

other deputies in speaking with foreign visitors, particularly on arms control matters. However, I am not aware of any information available which would give us a fix on possible policy differences between him and Ogarkov.

- 4. Although it is intriguing to speculate as to what this might mean for a succession, I see little point in it at this time, since we know too little to do more than imagine conceivable scenarios. The important thing to note is that it may be connected in some way with a policy or power struggle. If so, we will have to wait for future events before we can judge what it is about. At a minimum, however, this sudden move, and the cryptic announcement, do reinforce the growing impression that major changes may be afoot in the Soviet leadership.
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (08/27/84–08/31/84); NLR-748-25A-25-1-1. Secret. Sent for information. A stamp on the first page reads: "Noted."
- <sup>2</sup> On September 8, Robert Kaiser reported in the Washington Post: "One of the most powerful men in the Soviet Union, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, was suddenly, unexpectedly replaced as chief of staff of the Soviet armed forces and first deputy minister of defense." The article continued: "Tass announced that Ogarkov had been removed from his post and replaced by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, his chief deputy and apparently his intimate colleague. This sequence confirms that Ogarkov's ouster was sudden, and probably a surprise to Ogarkov himself. But why did it happen? Moscow was rife with rumors and theories today, none of them confirmable." (Robert G. Kaiser, "Moscow Mystery: Theories Abound on Cause of

Marshal Ogarkov's Ouster," Washington Post, September 8, 1984, p. A17)

For the official Soviet announcement, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 36 (October 3, 1984), p. 6. Several telegrams provided analysis of the situation: telegram 11384 from Moscow, September 7; telegram 270143 to Jerusalem, September 12; and telegram 270792 to Bonn, September 12. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840569-0399, D840579-0534, and N840010-0366, respectively)

In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Ogarkov had been known in military circles for his 'independent of the party' tendencies. At sixty-one, Akhromeyev was the youngest marshal in the Soviet army. He reputedly had extensive arms control experience and major responsibilities for operations in Afghanistan. Art Hartman had met Akhromeyev and described him as candid, affable, and less prone to polemics than other Soviets, with an unusually sophisticated grasp of strategic and arms control issues." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 480-481)

#### 271. Editorial Note

After a series of discussions, President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Shultz, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane decided to invite Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to the White House during the UN General Assembly session in September 1984. During a September 11 press conference, Reagan announced: "I've invited Soviet Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to meet with me at the White House on September 28th, and Mr. Gromyko has accepted. I believe it's important to use the opportunity provided by Mr. Gromyko's presence in the United States to confer on a range of issues of international importance. One of my highest priorities is finding ways to reduce the level of arms and to improve our working relationship with the Soviet Union. I hope that my meeting with him will contribute to this goal, as our administration continues to work for a safer world." Reagan then responded to questions from reporters. (*Public Papers:* Reagan, 1984, Book II, pages 1268-1271)

In his memoir, Shultz wrote that Gromyko's invitation had been under discussion since August: "During the first part of August, while I was in California, hints came in that Gromyko might be looking for a chance to meet the president. A Soviet diplomat—we thought it was probably the Deputy Chief of Mission Oleg Sokolov—had told Washington correspondent John Scali that he thought Gromyko would like to be invited to meet with the president 'this fall.' Another Soviet diplomat in Berlin told Nelson Ledsky, one of State's German specialists, that a traditional Gromyko trip in Washington during the UN General Assembly depended on whether he would be treated in the same way as he had been 'before

Afghanistan.' Shortly thereafter, Sokolov passed on to my Gromyko's 'heartfelt gratitude' for my letter marking his seventy-fifth birthday. Sokolov also pointed to my reference to our prospective meeting at the United Nations in New York as an important gesture." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 480) See <u>Document 265</u>.

Reagan, who had been on vacation at his ranch in California since July 28, had a meeting in Los Angeles on August 13 with Italian Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti and Shultz. After this meeting, Shultz recalled: "I sought a little extra private time with the president and told him of these feelers from Gromyko. I reminded the president that Gromyko had not been invited to the White House since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 and that 'we would be reinstating something without a change in Afghanistan.' But 'if we could get something going that would be a little more constructive, that would be helpful.' There was no need for him to decide this right away, I said. 'But perhaps you'd like to consider whether to invite Gromyko this fall.' The president said he didn't need to think about it. 'It's the right thing to do. Try to work it out,' he said." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 480) On August 13, Reagan "lunched with Bud & George S. & we looked at the Soviets from several directions. I approved asking Gromyko to the W.H. if he comes as he usually does to N.Y. for the U.N. General Assembly opening. I have a feeling we'll get nowhere with arms reductions while they are suspicious of our motives as we are of theirs. I believe we need a meeting to see if we cant make them understand we have no designs on them but think they have designs on us. If we could once clear the air maybe reducing arms wouldn't look impossible to them." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 372) Following two more discussions with McFarlane and Shultz on August 29 and September 5, Reagan noted:

"George S. & Bud came by. It's just between us for now but I am going to meet with Gromyko. Sept. 28 is the day." (Ibid., page 379)

## 272. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 14, 1984

SUBJECT

The Issue of Arms Control in the President's UN Speech and in His Meeting with Gromyko (U)

- (S) What needs to be done now at the UN and with Gromyko is quite different from the issue before us when we responded to the possibility of Vienna talks in September. At this time, we can and should take a broader, longer-term view, seeking to reshape US-Soviet relations on arms control in a more fundamental way.
- (S) Given the present turmoil and uncertainty at the top of the Soviet government, and given the proximity of our elections, I believe it would be a mistake to use the forthcoming meeting with Gromyko or the UN speech to present specific, short-term arms proposals to the Soviets. Specific proposals aimed at the next six to twelve months of negotiations can be presented far more effectively *after* the elections.
- (S) The theme of the "arms control" part of the President's UN speech (and of his discussion with Gromyko) should be a broad one. We should stress the need to develop a long-term charter for US-Soviet relations in general and for arms control in particular. In other words, we first need a *program* for arms control before we need more arms control *proposals*.

- (S) Specifically, the President's speech at the United Nations should present the following themes:
- —The United States, the Soviet Union, and other major powers, must make a fresh effort to advance the prospects for peace and disarmament.
- —The diplomacy of arms control has focussed a great deal on proposals and counter-proposals for various measures, and on the many differences of the proposed measures, without being able to develop common long-term objectives. To realize the potential promise of genuine arms control, the nations will have to take a long journey together. They must agree on a common road map. The ultimate, and only really important objective is to secure a real and a major *reduction* in arms of all kinds, down to levels of parity, and all agreements must be fully verifiable.
- —The United States is ready to meet with the Soviet Union (and with other powers as appropriate) to develop a plan for disarmament and for strengthening the peace that will take us into the next century. This plan should guide us on the steps we must take the first few years, and beyond, and it will show the goals we should reach in five years, in ten years, and at the end of this century. We need to insure that the arms reduction measures we manage to agree on will have a cumulative effect, that they can survive moments of crisis and tension, and that they will truly lead to a safer world. In the last two decades, there were many prolonged arms control negotiations and quite a few agreements. But as we total up this whole effort, we find that progress fell far short of our hopes. None of them really reduced arms. Most provided for some attempts to limit the ratio of expansion, but along the lines desired by the Soviets. The necessary consensus on this broad objective was in fact

lacking; and even some other agreements that we signed were violated.

- —It is also essential for long-term progress on arms control to agree on a steady reduction in military secrecy. (*Explain* why movement to an "open world" is critical for arms control verification.) To make possible the progressive implementation of a long-term arms control program leading to a safer peace, the US proposes a comprehensive schedule to move towards an "open world." This should include:
  - An agreed calendar for specific reductions in secrecy measures for the next twenty years.
  - A commitment to move ahead, far more vigorously than has been the case, with negotiations on military observers and exchange visits.
  - An annual exchange of military five-year plans, subject to JCS and DCI review and approval.
- —Thus, the arms control program "for the journey towards a safe peace at the beginning of the next century" will have three elements: (1) the series of cumulative arms reduction measures, (2) a schedule to reduce secrecy, and (3) full verifiability of everything agreed on.<sup>2</sup>
- (U) If you feel that these above suggestions would serve the President's objectives, you might want to task someone to see how they might be phrased as part of the UN speech.

Cap

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2. Secret; Sensitive. Weinberger wrote "Bud" above McFarlane's title. In a September 13 covering memorandum to Weinberger, Iklé wrote: "I had a good discussion with Tony Dolan who is quite enthusiastic about using these themes for the President's UN speech. But he says it would be easier for him to work on it if Bud McFarlane requested him to do so. Hence, the last paragraph in the attached memo." He continued: "I also discussed these ideas with Jeane Kirkpatrick. While she agrees with the general thrust I proposed, she feels more strongly about the economic aspects of the UN speech. I have talked to Ken Adelman also, and he is more or less moving in the same direction. At the NSPG, now scheduled for Tuesday [September 18] to discuss arms control, he intends to argue against making a specific proposal now and that we should instead urge general talk on an overall framework for arms control." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330-86-0048, USSR 388.3 (Jul-) 1984)
- <sup>2</sup> A September 17 memorandum to McFarlane from Kraemer, Lehman, Linhard, and Matlock noted: "NSC staff generally support the thrust of Weinberger's recommendation; however, we would need to review the specifics such as the five-year plan exchange proposal. Weinberger's suggestion is generally compatible with our own 'Option 1½' approach." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 #2) In a September 18 memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane forwarded Weinberger's memorandum noting: "Cap may well present this proposal at today's NSPG meeting." (Ibid.) See <u>Document 277</u>. Reagan initialed McFarlane's memorandum, indicating he saw it.

### 273. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency 1

Washington, September 14, 1984

SUBJECT What To Expect From Gromyko

Andrey Gromyko will come to Washington at the peak of his political career and with 45 years of experience in negotiating with the United States. Neither his increasing influence in the Kremlin nor his long exposure to US leaders—he has met every President since Hoover—has mellowed the Soviet Foreign Minister. Westerners who have met with him over the years report that, if anything, he has grown more suspicious of the United States. [portion marking not declassified]

Gromyko will come as an emissary of the Soviet leadership as a whole and will report fully to his colleagues on his meeting with the President. At the same time, he personally is a principal architect of the tough Soviet line toward Washington and has a stake in proving that it will lead eventually to more moderate US policies. His strongminded instincts will color his presentation and his perceptions of what the President will tell him. His recommendations upon returning to Moscow will do much to shape the Soviet approach to bilateral relations for months and even a year or so to come. [portion marking not declassified]

Operating Style

He does not like small talk and prefers a no-nonsense approach in negotiating situations. He rarely couches his comments in ideological terms or engages in discussions about the relative merits of the Soviet and American political systems. He is a dour, sober-sided person and delivers his remarks without enthusiasm. He is cagey about starting a substantive discussion and likes for his adversary to show his hand first. As in previous conversations with recent US Presidents, Gromyko is likely to be tough—even abrasive—in presenting Soviet positions. He has long been unwilling to make even small concessions in the interest of getting to the heart of an issue or finding common ground. [portion marking not declassified]

#### Soviet Motives for Agreeing to Visit

Gromyko will be intent especially on making a personal assessment of the President and gauging how his personality and convictions affect US policies. He will probe in various ways to estimate the prospects for doing business during his second term. [portion marking not declassified]

He may seek to evoke the President's reactions both by delivering a strong presentation of Soviet views and by occasionally hinting at flexibility. He is unlikely to use the meeting with the President, however, either to provoke a further deterioration in relations or to offer a quick deal. [portion marking not declassified]

He may expect the President to raise the possibility of a summit. Given Chernenko's health, he is likely to hew to the standard Soviet position that such a meeting must be well prepared and based on some degree of mutual understanding on fundamental issues. [portion marking not declassified]

#### Bilateral Issues

Gromyko's remarks probably will hone in on bilateral issues, particularly arms control. He will criticize US defense and arms control policies, harping on two major allegations:

—That the United States seeks to upset an existing military balance and achieve superiority through a massive buildup of arms. To support this charge, he will refer to US defense programs for strategic and space systems, reject any notion that the USSR has upset the military balance, and staunchly assert that sufficient Soviet military programs will be undertaken to offset US defense efforts. [portion marking not declassified]

—That the United States is not serious about arms control and puts forward proposals deliberately designed to be unacceptable and to camouflage a continued arms buildup. He may charge that the United States is setting preconditions for space talks, holding up ratification of existing nuclear testing treaties, and refusing to resume negotiations on a comprehensive test ban. [portion marking not declassified]

Gromyko probably will devote a substantial portion of his remarks to the issue of space talks. He is likely to argue strongly for a moratorium on the testing of space weapons, claiming that talks would be meaningless if such tests continue. He may reiterate the statement in Chernenko's

early September *Pravda* interview<sup>2</sup> that progress in the area of space talks could "facilitate" progress on limiting and reducing "other" strategic arms, possibly hinting that US agreement to a moratorium on ASAT testing might lead to a resumption of strategic arms talks. He probably will reject any suggestion, however, that space talks be combined with INF and START talks in a single negotiating forum. In broad terms, Gromyko is likely to argue that US ASAT and ABM testing threatens to undermine the basis of strategic arms agreements and that it will create a new strategic, political, and psychological climate. [portion marking not declassified]

Gromyko will maintain that arms control agreements are needed by the United States no less than by the Soviet Union and must be based on the principle of equality and equal security. He may complain that US charges of Soviet SALT violations demonstrate US ill will, and he is certain to claim the USSR is fulfilling all its obligations under past agreements. He is likely to assert that US questions regarding treaty compliance should be addressed confidentially. If pressed on this issue, he will lay out counter-accusations of US violations. In an effort to probe US intentions, he may ask about US willingness to continue to abide by SALT limitations, particularly the ABM Treaty. [portion marking not declassified]

He is likely to claim that preventing nuclear war is the cornerstone of Soviet foreign policy and refer to a laundry list of Soviet proposals. In this regard, he may:

—Reiterate the standard Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and criticize US reluctance to assume a similar obligation.

—Call for a mutual freeze of the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

He also likes to recall the 1946 Soviet proposal to ban nuclear weapons—a proposal he tabled while Ambassador to the United Nations. [portion marking not declassified]

Regarding Moscow's position on reductions in nuclear arms, Gromyko probably will highlight the Soviet proposal at START that called for a 25 percent reduction of the strategic armaments of both sides. Concerning INF, he probably will contend that US missile deployments in Europe have created a new situation and maintain that negotiations cannot resume while such deployments continue. He may hint that a moratorium on further US deployments in Europe might be sufficient basis for resumed negotiations. In meetings this summer with UK Foreign Secretary Howe and Senator McGovern, he avoided an explicit call for the removal of US missiles already deployed in Europe. 4 He will continue to insist, however, that British and French missiles be taken into account in any agreement. [portion marking not declassified]

Gromyko probably will refuse to discuss the situation of dissident Soviet physicist Andrey Sakharov although he may state that he is alive, well, and working. In May, when Australian Foreign Minister Hayden brought up Sakharov's treatment, he cut off conversation on the subject and said that Moscow would not talk about Sakharov with "anybody." [portion marking not declassified]

Public Followup

Gromyko's public comments after the meeting are likely to be reserved or downbeat, designed to defeat any expectation of a breakthrough in relations. Moscow is well aware of the impact of this meeting on the US elections. Gromyko's public comments are likely to be carefully crafted to maintain pressure on the President from domestic constituencies eager to see an easing of US-Soviet tensions and tangible progress toward a renewed arms dialogue. We consider it somewhat less likely that Gromyko will assail the Administration in harshly critical terms in an effort to embarrass the President. Gromyko personally is clearly capable of such a performance, but Moscow's agreement to the meeting and the apparent Soviet assumption that the Kremlin will be dealing with the President for the next four years suggest that Gromyko will adopt a more measured public posture. [portion marking not declassified

#### Foreign Policy Issues

Although Gromyko will concentrate in substantive discussions on exploring the President's intentions on bilateral issues, he probably also will raise a number of global issues that have been irritants in relations. In addition to Arab-Israeli issues, there are other possible areas of dispute:

—He will reject criticism of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and rule out the possibility of Soviet withdrawal until external assistance to the insurgents is terminated and the Communist regime in Kabul is accepted as legitimate. He may repeat the proposal that a political resolution must be fashioned by the states in the region (Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran) with appropriate guarantees of non-interference by

the United States and the USSR. [portion marking not declassified]

- —On the Iran-Iraq war, he will argue the USSR has regional interests it must protect and might insist on international guarantees of freedom of navigation in the Persian Gulf. He will reject any US claim of special interest in the area. [portion marking not declassified]
- —Moscow has argued consistently that Nicaragua is not an East-West issue, but should Central America come up in the talks, he would condemn US military activity in Central America and the Caribbean and question whether Washington is serious about negotiations with Managua and the Contadora group. [portion marking not declassified]
- —The Soviets have signaled privately that Southern Africa need not be a cause of Soviet-US conflict, but he may choose to raise the subject, portraying South Africa as the cause of the region's troubles and berating Washington for encouraging Pretoria to take an "aggressive policy" in the area. [portion marking not declassified]

He is likely to be most defensive in those areas where he perceives US exploitation of Soviet weakness, particularly the Sino-Soviet dispute. He might attempt to probe US intentions toward Beijing and might warn against providing the Chinese with modern technology and military equipment. [portion marking not declassified]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (2/5).

Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum.

<sup>2</sup> For the full text of Chernenko's interview, see *Documents* on *Disarmament*, 1984, pp. 658-661. In telegram 11179 from Moscow, September 4, the Embassy provided an analysis of Chernenko's September 2 comments. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840561-0003) See also Seth Mydans, "Chernenko Statement Urges Talks with U.S. on Disarmament Issues," *New York Times*, September 2, 1984, p. 1.

<sup>3</sup> Gromyko served as the Soviet permanent representative to the United Nations from 1946-48. He made the proposal on June 19, 1946, at the second meeting of the UN Atomic Energy Commission. For the text of his address, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 17-24. <sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 259.

## 274. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 17, 1984

SUBJECT

Organizing for Serious Arms Control Negotiations

For a number of reasons, which will be presented in a separate paper,<sup>2</sup> I believe we can expect the Soviets to have a high interest in making headway on arms control during the next four years. In order to be able to have a responsive and imaginative process within the US Government, I recommend that you consider two fundamental changes in the way your Administration handles this issue. First, the record of the first term makes clear that there is determined opposition within the Department of Defense (OSD, not JCS) to the very concept of arms control. In my judgment, this opposition will endure unless personnel changes are made. Secondly, this opposition and a traditionally incremental approach to making changes to the US position within State makes it desireable to elevate the management of the bureaucracy to the White House. Right now, the Interdepartmental groups (IGs and SIGs) are managed by the Departments. Unless and until these groups are chaired within the White House, we will continue to face the paralysis we have often faced these past four years. What I am suggesting is that you consider naming a high-level experienced personal representative to manage this process—a man the Soviets would respect and who is knowledgeable on both the technical and political aspects of arms control. There are two or three possible candidates for such a position.

Were you to think this a sensible thing to do, it would be important to discuss it with George Shultz so that there is no appearance of his suffering a diminution of his authority. But the truth is that your predecessors have only been able to make breakthroughs when they have entered the process directly from the White House. If George can be asked to think about this, it could lead to its being his idea and thus minimize the public appearance of his being subordinated in the process. You may wish to think about this prior to your meetings with the Secretary this week. If he comes to agree with the value of such a change, it might be possible to use it in your meeting with Gromyko and, later, to announce this initiative which promises a more visible and active role by the President in the next four years. Such an announcement would show leadership and meet persistent criticisms from the Congress and press of the way the process has been handled these past four years. It would also be seen by Gromyko and the Soviet leadership as indicative that you are indeed serious about arms reductions in the coming years. I would be glad to discuss this at your convenience.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984-09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-6-6. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan wrote in the margin: "Let's talk about this. RR."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> An interagency paper entitled "Next Steps in Preparing for Vienna," September 4, is in a package of preparatory material for the September 18 NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

## 275. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, September 17, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today With Ambassador Dobrynin

Looking toward our upcoming meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, I called in Ambassador Dobrynin today. I told him you are looking forward to your meeting with Gromyko in order to discuss your views of the US-Soviet relationship and your hopes for the future. I said you would also probably want to discuss arms control issues, particularly those raised in conjunction with the Vienna talks proposal, some regional questions, human rights, and bilateral topics.

Dobrynin reported that following his vacation, Gromyko was also eager to talk with us. He essentially accepted my agenda, but did ask if you really needed to raise human rights. I responded that you did and that you would want to explain to Gromyko why they were important to us. Dobrynin said Gromyko would want to give you his appraisal of the US-Soviet relationship and to address the issues raised in your correspondence with Chernenko.

In discussing plans for my meeting with Gromyko in New York, I told Dobrynin we would want to go through our agenda in some detail, as Gromyko and I had usefully done in Stockholm. I also told him that we believed their Vienna Talks proposal had held some promise as a way of organizing discussions on the issues involved, and offered some hope of reenergizing our negotiations; we should therefore pick up on these discussions again, this time in

private. Dobrynin replied that they were interested in talking about the demilitarization of outer space and he probed for further indications of our thinking.

We discussed modalities of both meetings. I confirmed that you would meet with Gromyko from 10:00 to 12:00 on Friday<sup>5</sup> and then host a lunch for him. Dobrynin said that he and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko would sit in on the meeting (and, of course, lunch). He asked if I was considering a second session with Gromyko before he left, noting that Gromyko would be available Friday afternoon and until late afternoon on Saturday, when he had to leave Washington for return to Moscow. I confirmed I would be available in that period, and we agreed that an additional meeting could be arranged if needed.

Finally, I raised the question of the five Americans detained several days ago on the Siberian coast. I emphasized the men should be released right away so that their detention does not become an irritant in our relationship. Dobrynin noted that our Embassy had been in telephone contact with the captain of the vessel earlier today, but he clearly registered my point, saying that he also hoped the issue would be resolved quickly.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/01/84); NLR-748-25A-26-3-8. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer according to the forwarding memorandum from Burt to Shultz. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, July-December, 1984 Super Sensitive Documents). Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on September 18, indicating he saw it.

- <sup>2</sup> See Document 159.
- <sup>3</sup> See Document 233.
- 4 For discussion of establishing a private channel, with the goal of bypassing Gromyko and the Foreign Ministry, see Document 269.
- <sup>5</sup> September 28.
- <sup>6</sup> On September 12, a U.S. barge, the *Frieda K*, based in Alaska, accidentally entered Soviet territorial waters and was seized by Soviet forces. On September 14, Kapralov delivered a Soviet oral statement to the Embassy, which noted that on September 12, the Soviets seized the Frieda K and its five crew members. After drifting into Soviet territorial waters, the barge was intercepted by a Soviet vessel and escorted into the Bay of Providence. The crew was being housed at a local hotel. An investigation was underway. (Telegram 11751 from Moscow, September 14; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840585-0280) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: the "U.S. embassy in Moscow managed to get a phone call through to the captain of the barge, Tabb Thoms, and heard that all were safe and well. Then the phone 'inexplicably' went dead when Thoms was asked whether he had been allowed to contact the embassy. Soviet authorities were handling the manner in a tough and uncooperative manner." He also recalled telling Dobrynin that "it was 'ridiculous for an incident of this type to become an issue right now,' that we should 'get rid of it—solve it—right away.' By September 20, I was able to report to the president that the five crewmen of the *Frieda K.* had been safely escorted by the Coast Guard cutter Sherman en route home." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 481) <sup>7</sup> In telegram 11945 from Moscow, September 18, the Embassy commented on the short conversation with Thoms. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840592-0586)

## 276. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 18, 1984

**SUBJECT** 

Possible Gromyko Arms Control Proposal

Gromyko could, during his U.S. visit, put us on the spot by proposing a resumption of INF and START negotiations, if we agree to begin space talks with a concurrent moratorium on ASAT testing and deployment. Chernenko's September 2 *Pravda* remarks strongly hint at this.<sup>2</sup>

Chernenko was quoted by *Pravda* as stating that an agreement to negotiate on the "arms race" in space with a simultaneous reciprocal moratorium on the testing and deployment of "strike space systems," including ASATs, "would facilitate the solution of questions of limiting and reducing other strategic armaments." He then added: "I would especially like to stress this." This is clearly a significant emphasis. (See Tab A for text.) About a week later Gorbachev in Sofia generally seconded Chernenko's remarks. (See tab B.)<sup>3</sup>

As you know, both Chernenko and Gorbachev omitted the standard Soviet precondition for resuming START and INF talks: withdrawal of all U.S. INF systems from Europe. In fact, Chernenko blamed breaking off the Geneva talks not on the INF deployments, as had always previously been asserted, but on the U.S. rejection of the principle that both

sides' "equality and identical security are strictly observed." This is clearly a significant shift in position.

The Kremlin probably now despairs of ever reversing the INF deployments and, at the same time, has become gravely concerned about current and future U.S. military space programs. The Soviets are now giving top priority to thwarting current U.S. ASAT programs and the future deployment of our SDI and of nearer-term possible BMD capabilities.

I have no doubt that Moscow sees the pre-election period as the ideal time for pressuring us into making arms control concessions. Recent Soviet public statements clearly reflect the belief that the President is under considerable pre-election pressure to "appear" to be more accommodating in respect to U.S.-Soviet relations in general and specifically to arms control negotiations. It would be remarkable if Gromyko and the rest of the Politburo did not believe this. They also no doubt believe that Mondale would be more forthcoming on arms control issues. His position on a "freeze," for example, would validate this belief. This may well be the reason why Gromyko wants to see Mondale before he sees the President. Despite any protestations to the contrary, it might be difficult for Mondale to oppose the kind of Soviet proposal described at the beginning of this memorandum.

One cannot really know what Gromyko will do here, but I am sure you will agree that it is always prudent to be prepared for all contingencies, and this seems to be a likely one. $^4$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (09/22/84);

NLR-748-25A-26-4-7. Secret. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Many thanks. M."

- <sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 2</u>, <u>Document 273</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> Tabs A and B were not attached.
- <sup>4</sup> At the bottom of the page, Lehman wrote: "Bud, These scenarios are among a number of difficult challenges Gromyko may place before us. Even as we look at what we want to say, we must also prepare carefully for what Gromyko may do. Ron Lehman." Next to Lehman's note, Matlock wrote: "Bud—Certainly we should think about all contingencies, and if Gromyko should propose something like this, the President should agree to consider it most carefully. It would, however, surprise me greatly if Gromyko made this specific proposal. Jack Matlock."

## 277. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting 1

Washington, September 18, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

#### SUBJECT

Next Steps in the Vienna Process (C)

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

#### STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz Under Secretary Kenneth Dam Dr. Henry Cooper

#### OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger Dr. Fred C. Ikle

#### CIA:

Director William J. Casey Mr. Robert Gates

#### USUN:

Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

#### ICS:

General P.X. Kelley Admiral Arthur S. Moreau

#### ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman Ambassador Edward L. Rowny Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

#### WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

#### NSC:

Mr. Ronald F. Lehman Col. Robert E. Linhard

#### **Minutes**

Mr. McFarlane: Over the last four months we have worked in developing a position on anti-satellite systems that would be in the US interest and aid stability. On June 29, the Soviets offered to talk to us about the militarization of space. We agreed but reformulated their offer so as not to let the Soviets off the hook on discussing offensive systems. Since that time, the interagency has concluded its work in planning against two contingencies:

- —What should be the US position if the Soviets agree to the talks?
- —How should we handle the situation if they do not agree to the talks? (C)

Three alternative approaches were developed. Each addresses both anti-satellite capabilities and offensive systems. (S)

The first option suggests that we use a Vienna meeting to simply discuss with the Soviets issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Option two suggests that we use such a meeting to negotiate an incidents-in-space agreement. Such an agreement would provide rules of the road for space operations. Such an agreement would largely depend upon goodwill and be more of a statement of intent to abide by these rules of the road than anything else. (S)

Option two also suggests that we could possibly offer not to test our anti-satellite systems against high-altitude objects if others show similar restraint, and to suspend testing of the F-15 system after completing some certain number of tests. (S)

With respect to offensive systems, this option would have us encourage the Soviets to return to the negotiating table by signalling our willingness to discuss possible trade-offs, e.g., limits on bombers and cruise missiles. The approach would have us implicitly link negotiations on ASAT limitation or changes to other arms control positions to specific progress in negotiations. (S)

The approach would also make it clear that we are willing to talk about the offensive, defensive force relationship and to discuss how we could both move toward a greater reliance on defensive forces while maintaining stability. (U)

The third option suggests a comprehensive proposal envisioning two phases. In Phase One, we would suggest to the Soviets that we agree to a temporary moratorium on the testing of specific ASAT interceptors and an interim agreement to cap or limit offensive systems. This cap could perhaps include INF forces. This agreement would also involve a commitment to certain objectives for later phases of negotiations. (S)

Phase Two would involve a long-term ban on the testing and deployment of ASAT interceptors. This would require the Soviets to dismantle their existing ASAT systems. It would also involve the negotiating of an incidents-in-space agreement. On the other hand, with respect to offensive forces, we would expect progress toward deep reductions, a discussion of the offensive, defensive force relationship, and in the context of these items, we would consider whether we would accept limits on defensive systems. (S)

Beyond the content of these specific options, we must consider how the Soviets are currently looking at arms control and what the Soviet calculus may be. For example, when will it be in their interest to engage the US across-the-board in this area? It may be that our assessment will argue against any proposals being made right now. To make such proposals may cause us to appear too anxious and may signal to the Soviets that they could coerce us into concessions. The other view that one could hold is that pursuing any initiatives now would demonstrate US leadership and put the Soviets on the defensive. Could we have agency views on this issue? (U)

Secretary Shultz: We should try to move the ball along now. To do so, we need to make reasonably concrete proposals. (S)

First of all, unconstrained military growth by the Soviet Union is not to our advantage. We have more difficulty with the politics of modernization than they do. Reductions are to our advantage. (S)

Secondly, the Soviets' Vienna proposal has some interesting aspects. It provides us the opportunity to change venue from Geneva. It provides a way to rearrange the situation, to permit them to go back to the table at a different place (i.e., saving face). (C)

Third, the idea of holding simultaneous discussion of offensive and defensive systems is good. They are worried about our SDI program. (S)

We should take timely action on this. We should show to the Soviets where they could go with the U.S. at this time. We need to put out enough concreteness to demonstrate to Gromyko that we are interested in serious negotiations. (C)

I think a quick interim agreement would be to our advantage. We could go on from there to a better agreement, and short-term constraints may be a real benefit to us. (S)

With respect to your upcoming UNGA speech, any arms control initiatives offered in such a speech would not be viewed by the Soviets as serious. I feel we should make our points privately and make them directly to Gromyko. (U)

Mr. McFarlane: We are all agreed on that point. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: Now is very inappropriate for any proposal.<sup>2</sup> (S)

- —There is no interagency position on ASAT or defensive systems. (S)
- —The Soviets most fear SDI and that will be what they urge us to give up. (S)
- —What we limit on an interim basis now could harm us in the future. This applies to a temporary ASAT moratorium as well as an interim agreement on offensive forces. (S)
- —We will find it impossible to back away from an interim agreement. (S)
- —We're not ready to set the trend which a set of interim agreements establishes. (S)
- —We would be binding ourselves at a time when the Soviet leadership is in a state of turmoil. (S)

With Gromyko, Mr. President, I would recommend that you reaffirm your commitment to genuine reductions. Make it

clear you are prepared for general discussion but discussions aimed at framing specific negotiations. Note the advantages and disadvantages of our different force structures, etc., and highlight the benefit of understanding how we both view first principles. (U)

Now is the worst time in the world for a temporary ASAT moratorium interim agreement proposal. It can lead us to preclude SDI development, and interagency agreement is lacking. (S)

We should use the Gromyko meeting to reaffirm U.S. commitment and the need for resumption of START/INF. Beyond this, we should stay flexible. (C)

We could set the stage for more substantive talks later. (C)

Given the total lack of verifiability associated with ASAT options and no real Soviet government, any accord would prematurely bind us to patterns of behavior not in our interest. (S)

General Kelley: I echo the SecDef. We should avoid a premature accord which binds our SDI activity. Our understanding of the relationship between offensive and defensive systems and SDI is vague at best. (S)

Director Adelman: I would recommend Option Two once we are in the negotiations. But the real problem is, how do we get back into negotiations? If the Soviets are serious, we need to find a way. We could have a delegation go to talk about offensive and defensive systems, SDI, START, INF, and ASAT, along the lines of SALT I. (S)

I would avoid concrete proposals *now*. We should only pursue general discussion, because the Soviets will pocket specific proposals. On interim accords—it's a good idea to

seek reductions, but the reductions should not be interim. It's too optimistic to hope for militarily significant reductions any quicker by approaching the project as an interim accord. (S)

With respect to your meeting with Gromyko, we should revisit the idea of on-site inspection of our sites and theirs, and move on a Threshold Test Ban Treaty. (C)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: No comments. (U)

Director Casey: I agree with Cap and General Kelley. The Soviets want to cut SDI. Bellikov<sup>3</sup> is here in the U.S. trying to build Backfire as a counter to SDI. There are two in Geneva who tell that there has been a fivefold increase in science to counter SDI; trying for counter measures by cutting IR plume of ICBMs by 60 percent or by a small nuclear explosion in space; they are worried about optics. (S)

This degree of open discussion is unusual in the amount of detail concerning Soviet plans; it is authorized to create a public backwash. (S)

The Soviets see ASAT as an opening wedge to SDI. We could entangle ourselves on SDI via ASAT. There could be an opportunity if we were able to handle ASAT as a part of discussions of the range of offensive and defensive systems; then ASAT weapons would be only a small portion of *all* weapons. (S)

Option One is an approach which could provide a framework for the future. We should work toward the future. (S)

Secretary Shultz: I agree with most but not all of this. We should use ASAT both as a stalking horse to protect SDI

and as a way to get limits on offensive systems. (S)

The idea of waiting for the interagency group to agree is a non-starter. The IG never agrees. If we wait for it to agree, nothing will go to the President. The IG is not a fourth branch of government. We can't give it a veto power. (U)

The idea of general palaver now and specifics later is unreal. We have been around four years. What have we been doing? (C)

The President: Gromyko's visit may have an effect. I had not anticipated specifics. I have to believe that the USSR (mainly its leaders) has a world aggression program. But, in meetings we have to show an understanding of its concerns: a fear of invasion, a fear of being surrounded. It's the only country in the world with an internal passport. During World War II, no Allied planes were routinely permitted to land in the USSR. Since World War II they approach us with suspicion; they're not getting soft. Maybe we have tried too hard for specifics; we fear world aggression. (S)

Maybe we need a general discussion to clear the air, telling them "here are the reasons why we fear your actions." We are not going to seek advantage, but we will keep our defenses up. The Soviet must be made to have a healthy respect. They must know we will stay even. This being the case, our mutual choices are: We can keep going up and up, or *reduce down* down to a point neither side is a threat. We should avoid an arms race which impoverishes both sides. We should explore in a general way how to get agreement; if there is any *agreement*, then discussions on specifics can follow later. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: It's important that you let them see your desire for reducing but also that we are not going to permit them to maintain an advantage. If we get into specifics, we are likely to preemptively preclude areas where our greatest hopes lie. We could be playing into their hands, limiting what they fear—like Pershing II. (C)

About the IG: My point is not that they decide; my point is they haven't sent you options on this subject so that you can see options and agency positions. (C)

Viewing this meeting as a theater for progress is wrong. (S)

Let him leave knowing that we have strength and will. Then let's discuss reductions. (U)

The President: We need to understand the other actors pushing us to make reductions. We have weakness we must correct soon; they don't. Without us honestly moving on track, Congress will prevent us from doing what's needed. (S)

We can't ignore developing specific proposals. (C)

You are tempting me with the idea of having no IG papers to review. (U)

We need to take care. We are moving toward defense programs that could make certain destabilizing offensive weapons useless. We don't want to be trapped from that path. However, with respect to ASAT—maybe we could make some progress, maybe through some high-level *informal* discussion. (C)

The idea of interim agreement is aimed at carrying us until we can find a way back to more comprehensive agreement. (C) Secretary Weinberger: The Soviets did cave in the face of U.S. resolve during the Cuban missile crisis. But, of most importance is the simple fact that an interim agreement is not interim; as a first stage, it has total lack of verifiability. They have no public or Congress to deal with. They can engage in "interim" policies that we can't. They need to see and know your resolve. (S)

The President: During the Cuban missile crisis, we had an eight to one advantage. They said they'd never be in that position again. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: We must recognize that our ASAT program is linked to SDI in many ways. The Soviets are working on defense just as hard as we are. (U)

Ambassador Kirkpatrick: The Russians think we do everything for a purpose. If we don't say something, it means something. They worry about CW and BW. In your meeting with Gromyko, you must include some reference to CW and BW and to the problem of verifiability. (C)

The President: That is a good point. (U)

*Director Casey:* The Soviets have two new BW sites. They have 5,000 people at each, working on biological and chemical agents. They put a lot of emphasis on this. (S)

*Director Adelman:* The Soviets have shown us they are able to shift their positions. For example, in 1979 they argued they would never negotiate on the basis of NATO's dualtrack decision, and reversed themselves. The US should not make their return to START and INF more difficult. (C)

The President: I agree. But when they reversed themselves, we had not yet deployed weapons. (C)

Director Adelman: If there are general discussions in a grand setting, the discussion of the relationship between offensive and defensive systems would be a good springboard back to negotiations on offensive systems. (C)

Richard Pipes notes that the USSR did not move from a small duchy to eleven time zones by being invaded. In 1898 the Czar's General Staff did a study that concluded that 80 percent of the wars fought by Russia were okay since Russia started them. (U)

The President: Genscher told us that they still have left the World War II barbed wire up near Moscow, to show how far Hitler got in World War II. The U.S. is allied with the FRG. The Soviets have great fear of US/FRG capacity. How do you argue with this fear? (S)

Secretary Weinberger: That's what we need to tell the Soviets: make them understand that we understand their fear, yet we still can't let them possess enough force to dominate the world. (U)

Secretary Shultz: But suppose Gromyko says "okay; let's talk. Why not set a date before the end of the year?" Could we take "yes"? (C)

Director Adelman: Yes, the preparatory work is laid out. (U)

Secretary Weinberger: No, we have not figured out a full approach. (C)

Secretary Shultz: Don't need the full approach. We need agreement on the end points. (C)

*Mr. McFarlane:* Mr. President, you have already reviewed the options for START and INF. (S)

The President: Yes. (U)

Ambassador Nitze: I'm a skeptic on interim agreements. They are all poison. If you want a useful agreement, don't go down the interim agreement path. (S)

The President: Concerning the ASAT thing, all theirs are ground-based. Ours are on a plane. I don't know how limits on either ground-based or airborne ASAT systems interferes with SDI. (C)

Secretary Weinberger: Because you offer a moratorium, they won't move. It puts us on a slippery slope. If we could limit the final agreement to matching our opening position, fine, but we can't. By beginning, we must open the entire area for discussion. (C)

We need to have final limits in mind before entering into negotiation; therefore we must avoid a three-year moratorium or incidents-in-space. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane:* It is their ability to argue that an ASAT is a system that hits a satellite; but that SDI systems can do so *too.* They are difficult subjects to keep separate. (C)

Secretary Shultz: We're not ready to take "yes." (S)

Secretary Weinberger: No. (C)

Director Casey: I want us to be able to say "yes," but we need to be ready to take on negotiations on *all* areas. We must not negotiate just ASAT and mortgage SDI. We risk being out-traded. If we start in ASAT, they will push into SDI. (S)

Secretary Weinberger: They should go home sincerely convinced of the President's desire for arms reduction. (U)

*Mr. McFarlane:* Mr. President, I think you have heard it all. (U)

The President: Ed— (U)

Ambassador Rowny: The Soviets are interested in trade. You should make clear we are ready to discuss trade-offs in START. (U)

The President: No matter what happens, no one should consider giving away the horse cavalry. (U)

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 noon. (U)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Institutional Files, NSPG Meetings, Box SR-109, NSPG 96. Secret. There is no drafting information on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Although titled a "National Security Council Meeting," this meeting is listed in numerical order as NSPG Meeting 96 in the NSC and Reagan Library files. In a September 15 memorandum to McFarlane, Kraemer and Linhard forwarded a package of preparatory materials for this NSPG meeting, including the interagency paper detailing Options 1,2,3 and the NSC-formulated Option 1½. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, September 1984 Chron File #40-42)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Document 272.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Reference is to Yevgenii Velikhov of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, who was involved in the analysis of SDI and space weapons.

## 278. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State $(Dam)^{1}$

Washington, September 18, 1984

I attended the NSPG meeting with the Secretary today.<sup>2</sup> The ostensible subject was preparations for Vienna negotiations. The actual subject which surfaced more or less during the meeting from time to time was what the President and the Secretary should say to Gromyko in their upcoming meetings. I found the discussion rather appalling. It was clear that the President wanted to take some steps in his meeting with Gromyko and particularly to hold out some prospect of real movement on our arms control position. But except for the Secretary of State, all of the agencies appeared implacably against anything significant. Only Ken Adelman was prepared to see any movement and very slight at that. Bob Gates from the CIA handed me a note near the end of the meeting saying that the President was out in front of all of his advisers, and that was certainly true, with the exception, of course, of Secretary Shultz. Somehow or the other everyone seems to believe that we can keep the "high ground" without making any concrete moves. It is certainly true that we don't want to make public concessions designed to bring the Soviets back to the table, but at the same time, if we are not prepared to unveil even informally to Gromyko what we would be prepared to do in Vienna negotiations, there aren't going to be any ASAT negotiations nor any START or INF negotiations either. The State Department's approach has generally been to feel that the Vienna forum is a good one, because it would allow us to link offense and defense and involve negotiations on offensive systems with the Soviet Union without forcing the Soviets to admit that they

were coming back to START and INF negotiations. That is a principal advantage of the Vienna forum over a Geneva forum. But everyone seems to be frightened that we might make a mistake, and Cap Weinberger seems so concerned that something might be done which would in some way compromise the strategic defense initiative, that no one else is willing to move. That said, it is of course true that almost anything that we might negotiate in the ASAT area or on defensive systems generally would hold out the possibility that we would in some way restrict the strategic defense initiative. The problem, of course, with that kind of concern, quite aside from what anyone may think about the SDI program, is that we are not going to be able to get funding from the Congress for a strategic defense initiative unless we are shown to be willing to deal with the Soviets on arms control.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983-Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 18.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 277</u>.

## 279. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 19, 1984

The weekly Defense/State/NSC breakfast was held today. Either because the Secretary was having difficulty getting started this morning (which is quite atypical for him) or because he decided not to have substantive discussions with Cap Weinberger this morning in view of the tension in yesterday's NSPG meeting on the Gromyko visit and arms control,<sup>2</sup> there was almost no substantive discussion. In fact, we didn't get around to the agenda until three-quarters of the hour was gone but rather spent the first three-quarters of the hour on pleasantries and the discussion of mutual friends, such as Frank Carlucci's new job at Sears and so forth.<sup>3</sup>

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union]

The people in the State Department concerned with arms control met with the Secretary this morning to review where we stand in light of yesterday's NSPG meeting. The Secretary is now convinced that it is unrealistic to expect us to present a great deal on arms control to Gromyko when he is here, because no President is going to be willing to overrule his Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a major issue involving national security just before an election. Therefore, the tack we are now on is to pull out of previously cleared guidance the most forthcoming positions that the President has taken, such as in the talking points that Shultz never used at the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm and the exchange of communications with the Soviets as we were negotiating

about having a Vienna ASAT negotiation, and then using those as a basis for the Presidential talking points and what Shultz will say to Gromyko in New York.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1983-Sept. 1984, No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on September 19 and September 22.
- $\frac{2}{2}$  See Documents 277 and 278.
- <sup>3</sup> Frank Carlucci, who served as Deputy Secretary of Defense from February 4, 1981, until December 31, 1982, joined Sears World Trade as Chairman and CEO in 1983.
- <sup>4</sup> The U.S. presidential election took place on Tuesday, November 6.
- <sup>5</sup> Shultz's talking points titled "New START Framework" were found in his preparation packet for a different meeting, his September 21 meeting with the President. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 18, 1984 Sept. 21 Mtg w/ the Pres)

# 280. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Wick) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Dear Bud: Washington, September 19, 1984

My staff and I have had time to reflect more fully on Professor Tumarkin's remarks on war psychosis in the Soviet Union,<sup>2</sup> and I am sending a somewhat fuller reply than my brief note of last week.

The Tumarkin essay was particularly informative about ordinary, everyday Soviet citizens who—all our information indicates—do not take an active interest in international politics, do not actively seek out knowledge about it, and are probably the most susceptible to Soviet government propaganda. While we are of course very concerned with this group, it is clear that the opinion of military, party, industrial, cultural, and scientific cadres as well as what we in this country call the "informed public" is more important to the Soviet leadership because these groups are critical to the functioning of the regime.

We can best reach these groups as well as the general Soviet population by strengthening a number of programs already in progress, by pushing for continued innovation and upgrading of the means available to reach the Soviet population, and by refining our message to them. The themes you suggested in your note—our historical restraint in using force, the defensive nature of our military modernization, our good will toward the Russian and other

Soviet peoples—are all themes we invoke constantly and will continue to invoke. We should also draw upon the substantial reservoir of good will that most Soviet citizens hold toward the U.S. as part of shared experiences such as World War II. We should reassert that our extensive net of bilateral contacts with Soviet citizens and institutions, particularly in the U.S. private sector, and our efforts to conclude a comprehensive exchanges agreement are evidence that we have been and are ready to speak to one another. We should emphasize that we stand ready to expand such contacts.

We must continue to upgrade our facilities, especially VOA. We should strive to gain access to more of the people we wish to influence through exchanges, exhibits, and publications, all of which are part of the new exchanges agreement we are currently negotiating with the Soviets. We will continue to expose the cynical manipulation of their own people in which the Soviet leaders engage, and emphasize the open nature of our society where Soviet leaders at the highest levels can gain access to public media while our own Ambassador is prevented from making his traditional July 4 speech on Soviet television. Indeed, as our own media are being inundated with Soviet spokesmen, it would be useful to keep pointing out that Americans do not have similar opportunities to reach the Soviet people through their media.

Finally, we must be careful in our programs and products of the sensitivity of the Soviet people. It will serve our interests to explain that we share their fundamental desire for peace and cooperation to reduce international tensions, and that we appreciate the difference between Soviet leaders and the Soviet people. As you know, we have been engaged in our own research on this subject for some time. We are planning and have under way several activities which bear on this problem as well as that of communicating with the Soviet peoples:

- We are discussing with NASA the possibility of coordinated direct satellite broadcasting with VOA.
- We have initiated discussions with Ford Aerospace about the development of low-cost consumer DBS antennae and other ways to broadcast to Soviet listeners how dishes can be constructed cheaply and easily. We recognize that there are diplomatic and legal problems here, but we are nonetheless proceeding on the technical front. We understand that "home-made" dishes developed by Ford's space group are being used in India.
- We will be coming out shortly with the latest in our series of analyses of Soviet perceptions which includes information on the issue of war psychosis in the Soviet Union.
- We are keeping a close watch on Soviet media in order to track trends in the propaganda campaigns which encourage war fears.
- We will be in contact with FBIS on the importance of keeping this issue high on their watch list.
- Our media elements will be extensively covering the President's UNGA speech and his meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko with the goal of conveying to the Soviet people our peaceful intentions. Of course, all of the Agency's assets, including Worldnet and VOA, will be used to transmit the President's speech to the world.

- Soviet war psychosis will be discussed at the next IIC meeting, tentatively planned for early October.
- We are reactivating our New Directions Advisory Committee, chaired by Norman Podhoretz, to discuss these issues. In addition to Mr. Podhoretz, this group includes prominent writer and social commentator Michael Novak, the noted historian Gertrude Himmelfarb, former Executive Director of the American Political Science Association Evron Kirkpatrick, and one of the outstanding experts on democratic philosophy Robert Nisbet.
- We are working on USIA's response to the NSDD  $130^{4}$  section on communicating with closed societies, which will explore the political and technical opportunities and obstacles, particularly regarding television, for us to get our message across to the Soviet peoples.

As always, I encourage my staff to examine its work and to seek out new approaches. I can assure you that we will continue to study the challenge the Tumarkin piece raises and consult closely with the NSC and the Department on what to do about it. You will be receiving our analyses and recommendations.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Matlock Files, Chronological File 1980-1986, Matlock Chron, September 1984 (2/5). Secret.

<sup>2</sup> In an August 24 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock forwarded an article by Professor Nina Tumarkin entitled "Does the Soviet Union Fear the United States?" Matlock wrote: "Tumarkin, a member of the history department at Harvard who has specialized on Soviet internal propaganda, sent me an article she wrote following a trip to the Soviet Union this summer." The article examined "the question of Soviet fear of the U.S., and comes to the conclusion that while ordinary citizens fear our military might (as the result of regime propaganda), the Soviet rulers, on the other hand, fear our culture—while respecting our military strength." McFarlane passed the article to President Reagan who wrote in the margin of the covering memorandum: "Bud—this is very revealing & confirms much of what I've been trying to say but didn't have the knowledge or the words. RR. P.S. Maybe Charlie Wicks outfit should see this." In a PROFs message to Kimmitt on August 30, McFarlane wrote that after reading Tumarkin's paper, Reagan wanted to "have VOA (and putatively RFE/RL) focus on making clear our peaceful purposes to the Russian people." (Ibid.) Matlock prepared a package, including the article, which was forwarded to Wick. (Ibid.)

<sup>3</sup> See <u>footnote 2, Document 207</u>.

<sup>5</sup> Wick signed "Charlie" above his typed signature.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Documentation on NSDD 130 "US International Information Policy," March 6, is planned for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XXXIX, Public Diplomacy.<sup>4</sup>.

## 281. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 21, 1984

SUBJECT

Gromyko Meeting: Setting, Objectives, Tactics

Though, in his UN speech, Gromyko may present a re-mix of typical Soviet propagandistic fare in a fresh wrapping, he is most unlikely to be bringing any significant new proposals with him. Nevertheless, your meeting will be of great importance as the Soviets sort out how they are going to manage their relations with the United States over the next four years. This will be the first time since you took office that any Soviet leader of Politburo rank has had the opportunity to meet you personally and take your measure. The conclusions Gromyko draws, and the impressions he chooses to convey to his colleagues, will influence their subsequent decisions.

#### Our Objective

We should aim to have the meeting encourage the following conclusions on Gromyko's part: (1) You are confident of your political position in the United States and feel no need to make concessions to the Soviet Union to shore up your popularity; (2) You recognize that the power of the Soviet Union requires you to deal with it, despite your ideological distaste, and as a pragmatic statesman, you are prepared to do so; (3) You feel that you have made substantial moves to improve the relationship, and do not seem inclined to move further until the Soviets demonstrate a willingness to

engage you in a realistic give-and-take; (4) Your positions are not rigid, and in a negotiating context could be brought sufficiently in line with Soviet needs to permit some agreements; and (5) You would be willing, in fact, to implement any major agreements if the negotiations were successful.

We cannot expect a single meeting, no matter how persuasive, to achieve these objectives, given the heavy burden of resentment and suspicion that beclouds Soviet judgment, and their assumption (a mirror-image of their own habit) that we never state what is really on our minds directly. Nevertheless, the meeting can provide an important stimulus toward the sort of conclusions which can facilitate realistic negotiations in the future.

#### The Obstacles

Specifically, the most important psychological obstacles on the Soviet part to entering into comprehensive negotiations are: (1) A conviction that we have used negotiations in the past not to reach accommodation, but to keep Congress and the public at bay while you proceed with your defense modernization program—and that this is your intent in the future; (2) The fear that when you are reelected, whatever interest in accommodation you profess now will disappear; and (3) The strong suspicion that your real goal is to bring down the Soviet regime (synonymous in their mind with their personal rule), which is, naturally, a non-negotiable proposition for them.

There are things we can do to diminish these specific obstacles, and the second will disappear after the election if you sustain your current policy, but we must recognize that these psychological obstacles stem from a more

fundamental cause which we must do nothing to alter. While the Soviets talk a lot about the damage done by "rhetoric," this is not at the root of their problem. What is at the root of it is the alteration in the balance of power which your policies have brought about. The Soviets feel it keenly, do not like it (and cannot be expected to), and are squirming to find a way to cope with it. So far with notable lack of success—and they know that too. In fact, they confront a pair of extremely uncomfortable policy options, both of which have serious dangers from their point of view.

In broad terms, they face the choice between accepting our offer to negotiate an accommodation and reduce arms, and that of hunkering down, tightening up further internally, and trying to limit the accretion of U.S. strength by encouraging public opposition here to key defense programs and instigating allied disaffection. Both courses present large risks for the Soviet leaders.

They know that accommodation with the U.S. would require more restrained behavior abroad, limitations on their use of military power for political purposes, and very likely some loosening at home, which leads to "contamination" by Western values and disaffection. This would be true even if the policy worked and produced limitations on U.S. military programs, better access to Western technology, and more somnolent Western publics as regards the Soviet threat to their security. And if it didn't work—if the U.S. proved too intransigent to allow any substantial Soviet benefit—then it could be a disaster for them.

On the other hand, the "hunker down" option also has serious dangers for them: the technological race with the U.S. would be in an area where Soviet performance is weakest and their confidence low; increased repression

might not produce the required sacrifice without public unrest and further economic malaise; fearful Western publics might not, in fact, successfully force their Governments to abandon defense programs. In this case, the Soviet Union would end the decade in a more disadvantageous position, and possibly even with strategic military inferiority just at a time when the U.S. would be poised to add effective defensive systems to its offensive strategic arsenal.

Nevertheless, in the Soviet mind, the first option is likely to seem the more risky, because it would require some genuine accommodation on the U.S. part. Many Soviets will argue that the second, bleak as it is, is the safer because it does not depend on partnership with an adversary, and besides, the adversary has never been known to stick to a given policy for very long, so the threat may dissipate of its own accord.

What all the Soviet leaders clearly understand is that *if* they accept your overtures to negotiation and enter upon a course of strategic arms reduction, they will have validated your policy of dealing from a position of strength, and thus contribute not only to the survival of that policy beyond your incumbency, but probably also to a stiffening of the posture of many of our Allies. The Soviets obviously will not want to do this. Our task is to encourage the thought that the price is acceptable, given the long-term dangers of rejecting our offers.

#### Succession Struggle

On top of this dilemma, the Soviet leadership is beset by weakness at the top, and very likely, a struggle to determine Chernenko's successor. Gromyko himself doubtless is playing a major role in this drama, though it seems unlikely that he could aspire to the top Party post himself. (He could, however, be named Chief of State if there is a decision not to combine this post with the Party general secretaryship—a practice for which there is plenty of historical precedent.)

We cannot know what role, if any, disputes over policy toward the U.S. play in the succession struggle. Normally, Soviet leadership struggles are not based so much on policy disputes as on a raw jockeying for power. Policy issues are used, however, as weapons in this process, and can be affected by the outcome.

Even if we knew more about infighting in the Soviet leadership, it would be a delusion to think that we could manipulate this process to our advantage. What we can and should do is to see to it that our policy is crystal clear, so that Soviet decisions are not based on misperceptions of it. Your meeting with Gromyko can contribute importantly to this goal.

#### Getting Your Point Across

Although it will be important to stress your commitment to peace, to arms reduction, and to your other ultimate objectives, Gromyko is likely to receive such statements with great skepticism. A cynic himself and a master at holding his cards pressed to his chest, he will be wary of taking your general statements at face value. What he will be looking for is concrete indications of the direction your policy will take over the next four years, to contribute to an assessment of whether the possible payoffs to the Soviets will justify the risks involved.

Given these circumstances, some might advise using the meeting to advance a bold, new substantive initiative, or highly specific negotiating positions on matters known to be of interest to the Soviets. I think they are wrong. Until the Soviets have made a fundamental decision to negotiate on the major issues—or at least until you have been reelected so that they can no longer suspect that the proposal is a political gesture and a trick—highly specific proposals regarding nuclear weapons, ASAT or missile defense would be untimely.

However, you will need more than general pledges of good will if you are to be convincing. I believe the most effective way to do this is to suggest, as part of your discussion of the issues, how in broad terms you think the problem might be resolved. These suggestions should not be so specific or detailed that they could simply be pocketed, and should be made contingent on a change in the Soviet stance regarding the issue. I will forward to you shortly a list of candidates for this sort of treatment.<sup>3</sup>

#### Sizing You Up

An important part of Gromyko's mission will be to size you up as a person. They know very well that you are a strong, charismatic leader of the American people. But they don't know you personally, and this is important to them. Paradoxically—since they are Marxist-Leninists and should theoretically believe that personalities do not play a key role in history—they actually put great stock in the personal characteristics of their interlocutors.

Aside from trying to determine whether you are serious about negotiation, Gromyko also will be forming judgments on such questions as whether you are really in command of your administration or are subject to manipulation by advisers and whether you are a pragmatic politician capable of making deals and holding to them or an ideological zealot who is out to bring the Soviet system down. They are convinced (however mistakenly) that there are important members of your Administration who fall into the latter category and wonder whether you would be willing and capable of overruling them if the Soviets take the plunge and set their policy on a negotiating track.

These are of course questions which are not amenable to direct discussion—and even if they were, Gromyko would not be persuaded by anything you said about them. What he will be looking for is indirect evidence. He will note how many assistants are in the room, who they are, and what role they play. Do you often turn to them for prompting (on other than detailed, technical issues), or have you mastered your brief? Are you willing to concentrate on practical ways to get from here to where you say you want to go, or are your fine-sounding objectives just a smokescreen for policies designed to put the Soviets at a disadvantage?

Your most powerful ally is, of course, the truth. You need take note of the sort of questions Gromyko may have about you personally only in order to make sure that nothing in the arrangements unwittingly contributes to a false impression.

#### Gromyko's Tactics

Although Gromyko is famous for his pugnacious approach to negotiation, he is unlikely to come on as strong with you as he would, for example, with a foreign minister. He will defend Soviet policies and attitudes vigorously, and is much given to irony and even sarcasm, but will likely refrain from the sort of emotional pyrotechnics he used on George Shultz in Madrid after the KAL shoot-down. Nevertheless, his presentations will be blunt, will be supported by a host of allegations about American "transgressions" and "unreasonableness," and he is unlikely to give an inch on standard Soviet positions in his initial presentation.

Obviously, you will not want to spend much time in the meeting scoring debating points. But it is important to nail the more egregious of Gromyko's false statements before turning constructive. This is important for two reasons: you thereby win Gromyko's respect (despite his dour demeanor, he seems to enjoy a good debate), and—more important than Gromyko's personal opinion—you place on the record for his colleagues the U.S. point of view. (A detailed report of the conversation will doubtless be passed to the key decision makers on the Politburo, and Soviets consider an unanswered accusation as tacit admission of its accuracy.)

Your rebuttals can be brief, and should match Gromyko's in tone. If his language is polite and tactful, yours should be the same, though equally firm. If, however, he should become strident and emotional, you should show a little passion.

Only when you have rebutted, briefly and pointedly, important false charges should you turn the conversation to the positive with a remark such as, "But we won't get anywhere if we keep debating the past; let's concentrate on where we go from here. Now it seems to me . . ."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Soviet Union—Sensitive File—1984 (07/27/1984-09/27/1984); NLR-362-3-22-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. Sent

for information. Prepared by Matlock. A copy was sent to Bush.

- <sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 4, Document 287</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> This list was not found.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Documents 104</u>, <u>105</u>, and <u>106</u>.

# 282. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, September 22, 1984

SUBJECT Your Meeting with Gromyko

In the NSPG meeting Tuesday, you said you intend, in your meeting with Gromyko, to deal with arms control in broad terms, not to advance specific proposals. As I mentioned at the meeting, I very much agree with this approach.

You might wish to use the meeting with Gromyko to propose broad discussions on a framework for specific arms control negotiations, so that we can proceed with an agreed road map.

In line with such an approach, you might find the following talking points useful:

- The time has come for our two countries to agree on a fresh approach to arms control. I trust, we can overcome the present difficulties that are holding up progress.
- We have made clear our serious desire to reach agreement and have shown a great deal of flexibility, but unfortunately your side has walked out of two negotiations.
- In the 1970's, the United States placed great hope in the SALT process. But SALT has failed to stop increases in nuclear arms. As you know, we found it necessary to modernize our strategic defenses to

respond to the increases and new systems in your nuclear expansion.

- In addition, as we explained to your side, we have encountered serious problems regarding the compliance with existing agreements and the arrangements for verification. Arms control can prosper only in a climate that permits effective verification. We can agree, I am sure, that excessive, deliberate concealment practices will make progress in arms control impossible.
- We have to make a new start. We need a broader framework that will give our future negotiations and our specific proposals a sense of direction. We want to move together with you toward a safer peace at much lower levels of armaments. But we cannot take this long journey together unless we are both agreed on where we are going. As the Ancient Greeks said, if you don't know where you are sailing, every wind will take you there.
- Thus, we need to map out a common approach to arms control. What can our two countries do together to reduce the risk of crises and accidents? What can we do together to reduce the danger of nuclear war and begin to eliminate nuclear weapons as we look ahead to the next century? Your side has expressed concern about our research program on ballistic missile defenses. But we are prepared to discuss the role of offensive and defensive nuclear forces and how they will fit into a program leading to reductions and to greater stability. We are concerned, as you know, about your chemical weapons programs and the danger of biological weapons, and have found that this is an area where concealment and secrecy

exacerbates the danger. And how should we both cope with the risks of nuclear proliferation that may well increase over the next twenty years?

- With these questions in mind, I want to propose that we agree to undertake a fundamental discussion between our two sides, to develop a larger consensus on arms reduction and to chart a course for our negotiators that will permit them constructively to work out specific measures that will reduce arms on both sides to achieve parity at much lower levels, and that will be fully verifiable. We should develop objectives that we want to reach, and a framework for specific issues on which we must follow-up.
- But the United States cannot accept negotiations with pre-conditions set by your side, any more than you would accept pre-conditions established by us. What we must do is to work together to create agreed objectives and procedures that will make success possible.

Cap

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, USSR: September Meeting President/Gromyko Meeting September 1984 (3). Secret. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock wrote: "Secretary Weinberger has sent a memorandum to the President recommending certain talking points for his meeting with Gromyko. I believe the points he proposes are sound and deserve a place in the President's presentation to Gromyko." There is no evidence Matlock's memorandum went forward to the President.

<sup>2</sup> September 18. See <u>Document 277</u>.

# 283. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union (Ermarth) to the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (Gates)<sup>1</sup>

NIC #05512-84

Washington, September 25, 1984

**SUBJECT** 

Upbeat View On Gromyko's Mission

- 1. Ray McGovern, who has been serving as A/NIO/USSR pro tem, has developed the attached interpretation of the Gromyko visit, which is decidely more optimistic than the mainline of the material we have been sending forward, and my own view. He makes a significant case that Chernenko is leading a contentious effort toward a new opening. As indicated by his remarks at the staff meeting, George Kolt is leaning a bit in this direction.
- 2. On the totality of evidence, I continue to believe that the best case is as we have made it. There may be an exploratory element in the Gromyko mission, but his main aim is to try to put the Administration on the defensive. The Soviets may still not appreciate how unlikely they are to be really successful at this.
- 3. Ray's argument has merit, however. Thus I want to send it forward to you. At the same time, I'll stick by the more pessimistic prognosis. Moreover, I still would not absolutely rule out some sort of negative surprise.
- 4. At this point, it seems fruitless to anticipate Gromyko's performance over the next three days unless we get some truly dramatic reporting about his script. There are doubtless a variety of high-level US-Soviet interactions now

taking place in preparation for the meetings with Gromyko that give the policymakers a better insight into the immediate future than we can. If Gromyko comes in more amiably than we have forecast, the President will have the instincts and time to pick up his cue, I would bet. What I'm afraid of is he'll make some "sneaky", unacceptable proposal which we've failed to warn about.

Fritz W. Ermarth

## Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the National Intelligence Council $^2$ 

Washington, September 25, 1984

**SUBJECT** 

Further Thoughts on Gromyko Visit

- 1. The very fact of Gromyko's visit here marks an important tactical turn in the Soviet approach to the US—a turn spearheaded by the ailing Chernenko and supported by what appears to be a fragile consensus that could evaporate with his passing from the scene.
- 2. We have only an imperfect understanding of how this change came about. The Soviets may indeed have concluded that Mr. Reagan will be President for four more years and are moving now to lay the groundwork for a better working relationship. The political benefit accruing to President Reagan, while presumably undesirable in the Soviet leaders' eyes, may have been played down in their deliberations, with the rationalization that he is going to win anyway—with or without a boost from Moscow.
- 3. We are not fully persuaded.

- —It would seem, for example, totally out of character for the Soviets to believe that they can expect to win concessions from a formidable, committed opponent by doing him a gratuitous favor—in this case a benign visit by Gromyko.
- —For the four-more-years argument to prevail in Kremlin councils, the burden of proof would have to be on those arguing that the advantages of trimming sails before the US election (virtually ensuring a Reagan victory) clearly outweigh the merits of hewing to the more obdurate, waiting policy of the past spring and summer.
- —The Soviets normally have a price (they don't put much stock in credit cards), and Gromyko presumably has his. And there is still an outside chance that if he does not get satisfaction, the Soviets will try to use Gromyko's talks here to create a political "defeat" for the President.
- 4. Most of the recent signs point in the opposite direction, however, with Chernenko himself spearheading Moscow's more flexible, conciliatory approach. While he continues to cast aspersions on Washington's motives, his recent statements are a marked departure from the acerbic rhetoric earlier this year.
  - —On 5 September, shortly after the decision to send Gromyko, Chernenko talked about the need "to infuse Soviet-US relations with the elements of mutual trust that are so missing at present."
  - —In his Pravda "interview" on 2 September,<sup>3</sup> Chernenko for the first time raised the possibility of a connection between progress on arms control in

space and progress on other issues, including INF and START. (Chernenko and his Politburo colleagues have passed up several recent opportunities to reiterate Moscow's standard formulation about INF missile deployment being the obstacle to resumption of talks.)

—Inserted into Chernenko's otherwise uninteresting speech today<sup>4</sup> is the assertion that "there is no sensible alternative" to the normalization of Soviet-US relations, phraseology remarkably similar to President Reagan's statement yesterday that "there is no sane alternative" to negotiations on arms control and other issues between the US and USSR.<sup>5</sup> Chernenko went on to make an unusually explicit allusion to the costliness of the arms race. (Radio Moscow, in its initial reaction to the President's speech, took a much more negative line, claiming that he continues to insist on US military superiority.)

5. Turns in policy toward improving relations with the US have historically been highly controversial among Kremlin leaders—and particularly when high-level meetings are involved. The decision to send Gromyko was probably no exception.

—It may, in some Byzantine way, have cost Ogarkov his job. (Ukrainian leader Shelest lost his in 1972 after he objected to the decision to go ahead with the first Nixon summit just a few weeks after the US started bombing Hanoi and mining Haiphong.)

—The fact that Soviet media have still not mentioned that Gromyko will talk with the President on Friday suggests that the subject remains contentious. Soviet media also ignored the encounter at the reception on Sunday evening.

- —The bizarre way in which the Soviets handled the issue of ASAT talks over recent months also suggests high-level division.
- —In a recent conversation with a Western diplomat, a Soviet official indicated that there are differences in Moscow on dialogue with the US, and that the decision to send Gromyko to meet with the President was a particularly difficult one.
- —Where Gromyko himself stands in the apparent debate is not clear; most of the reporting has him favoring a hard line.
- 6. If you think these musings are useful enough to send forward, we could provide a version for the PDB to carry tomorrow morning before Secretary Shultz meets with  $Gromyko.^{7}$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 86M00886R: Subject Files (1984), Box 6, Folder 7: B-257, Hostile Intelligence Threat Analysis Committee. Secret. In a covering note forwarding this memorandum and its attachment to Casey, Jay Rixse wrote: "Bob Gates sent the attached memo up to John [McMahon] as a matter of interest. As it represents a different interpretation of the Gromyko visit, John thought you should see it also." Gates wrote in the margin: "ADCI—FYI. RG."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Secret.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 273.

- <sup>4</sup> Reports from the Embassy in Moscow on Chernenko's remarks are in telegram 12312 from Moscow, September 25, and telegram 12375 from Moscow, September 26. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840609-0847 and D840613-0307) <sup>5</sup> See footnote 7, Document 267.
- <sup>6</sup> Soviet Defense Minister and Chief of the General Staff Ogarkov was replaced on September 6 by Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev. See <u>Document 270</u>.
- <sup>7</sup> Paragraph 6 is crossed out. Rixse wrote in the margin: "not being done per DDI—JR."

# 284. Memorandum of Conversation 1

New York, September 26, 1984, 9:45 a.m.-12:35 p.m.

### **PARTICIPANTS**

US

Secretary of State George P. Shultz Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman Assistant Secretary Richard Burt Jack F. Matlock Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin Aleksey A. Obukhov Viktor Sukhodrey, Interpreter

After some preliminary greetings, Secretary Shultz began the substantive discussion by proposing to Gromyko to agree on an agenda for the meeting, as they had done in the past. He said that he would like to begin by mentioning the fact that when they had met in New York a few years ago they had tried to identify areas of mutual interest and constructive work.<sup>2</sup> One such area was the area of nonproliferation. Gromyko had passed on instructions to the Soviet side and the Secretary had passed on instructions to the U.S. side, after which Ambassador Kennedy had met with his Soviet counterparts. The U.S. side had felt that those meetings had proved very useful and the two sides cooperated on this issue in the IAEA. The result of this cooperation was a stronger posture within that agency. The Secretary added that in reviewing this issue, it was interesting to observe that fifteen years ago experts in the field said that by now there would be many states with nuclear weapons. But with all the difficulties and problems

we have today, the number of states having such weapons has been well contained. Therefore, this effort was a very worthwhile one, and the Secretary wanted to use it as an example of the fact that the possibility exists for constructive cooperation on substantive matters, which would contribute to results beneficial to both sides and to other nations as well. The Secretary went on to say that this is the spirit in which he was approaching today's talks, and he was sure that the President approached his upcoming meeting with Gromyko in the same spirit.

The Secretary indicated that he had reflected on the meeting with Gromyko in Stockholm, where Gromyko had said, and the Secretary had agreed, that the meeting was a useful one. The Secretary would now review what had happened since then and where the sides stood. While he could point to some progress, basically the situation between the countries has not changed. However, there have been good exchanges on many questions. A meeting on MBFR is now taking place. We have concluded an agreement to update the Hotline. The two sides are meeting within the CDE context, although, unfortunately, no progress has been made.

The Secretary continued that on the whole there have been a number of meetings in a confidential and private atmosphere, and this has been good. In Washington, leaks sometimes occur, but the U.S. felt that it could keep the situation under control. Gromyko had had a number of meetings with Ambassador Hartman, and the Secretary had met with Ambassador Dobrynin. Last July, before Dobrynin returned to Moscow, the Secretary had an indepth review of U.S-Soviet relations with him, which the Secretary felt had been very useful. The two sides could review some questions here with the purpose of normalizing the relationship, that is, have more useful

meetings and more constructive relations. This did not mean that there would be no competition between us, since our systems are different, and would continue to be so. But given that fact, we can channel this competition and find areas of constructive cooperation. The Secretary indicated that he would like to touch upon a few such areas, and then lay out the proposed agenda for the meeting.

The saddest aspect of our relationship was that we have made no progress and there seems to be no prospect of making progress in the area of offensive nuclear arms. This was the most important question.

Secondly, the U.S. had noted the Soviet proposal about demilitarization of outer space, and had tried to reply to this proposal. Nothing has come of this reply, but the U.S. agrees that this is an important area.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. had made proposals concerning conventional forces in Vienna and proposals concerning CBMs and non-use of force in Stockholm. The President, in his speech in Dublin, supported the concept of non-use of force. Since the Soviet side had spoken of this in Stockholm, he felt that he was responding to comments made by President Chernenko in his correspondence, and the U.S. side was disappointed that this had not brought any results.

On regional issues, there had been brief exchanges in Stockholm, specifically concerning South Africa and the Mideast, but there are no such exchanges taking place today. The U.S. has tried to lay down an appropriate basis for this, and has made corresponding proposals.

On the bilateral side of the relationship, there are a number of areas where progress has been achieved, for example, upgrading of the Hotline, some consular matters, discussions on the Pacific Ocean boundary. Although there has been no agreement on the latter, there has been movement. The sides have also discussed search and rescue operations at sea, and naval contacts have been good.

In the economic field, we have extended our long-term agreement and we are moving towards convening a meeting of the Joint Commission, which would be the first such meeting in many years.

We have extended our fisheries agreement, have expanded our joint venture in this area, and the U.S. has given the USSR a specific allocation. 9

The U.S. has facilitated the sale of grain to the Soviet Union, <sup>10</sup> and the two countries have had discussions on improved safety for north Pacific air routes. <sup>11</sup> The sides have extended some agreements in other areas, and have agreed to high-level meetings in some of them. One of these areas is the environmental agreement in which the head of the EPA, Ambassador Ruckelshaus, has met with Soviet counterparts.

Therefore, the Secretary continued, in the bilateral relationship, some steps have been taken, but much still remains to be done.

The Secretary pointed out that the area of human rights was an important one, and that when Gromyko meets with the President, the President will want to talk to him about this, specifically, to explain why this issue is so important to the U.S. In discussing these matters, the U.S. prefers quiet diplomacy. It considers that the issue of the Pentecostalists was handled in a constructive way on the Soviet part,

following discussions between Ambassador Dobrynin and the President. This was done privately, without public fanfare. But we now see the very harsh treatment of Sakharov and Bonner and we think that Shcharansky has been placed under a stricter regime. We do not see any prospects of increase of Jewish emigration, and there seems to be no regard for the constitutional rights of people in the Soviet Union. Any positive steps in this area would be a great help in improving our relations. These matters are questions which Gromyko should examine and perhaps Ambassador Hartman could hand Minister Korniyenko appropriate materials subsequently. Such issues include binational marriages and a number of claims by Soviet citizens to American citizenship.

The Secretary indicated that this was the overall review of relations as the U.S. saw them, and now he would propose the agenda for this meeting.

The first question on the agenda should be the question of arms control, a very important one for the two sides. The second one could be regional issues, where the sides could discuss both substantive matters and procedural questions on arranging meetings. The third item on the agenda could be bilateral relations, to see what could be done to improve them.

Gromyko indicated that the questions which the Secretary had touched upon were questions which were on the Soviet agenda as well. There were, of course, some questions not mentioned by the Secretary which should also be discussed. He would touch upon some of these matters in the present discussion, and would save some for discussing with the President. The question of questions in our relations is the question of where the U.S. and the USSR are to go in their relationship. Will we take the path of

increasing tension and preparation for war, or will we take the path of peace? Competition exists between us, and will continue to exist between the two socioeconomic systems. This cannot be denied.

The Secretary interjected that he agreed with Gromyko that we should move toward peace. The U.S. does not want to increase tension which would lead to war or create a psychology of war.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's initial remarks]:

*Gromyko* stated that history will have the final verdict. History is the best judge, better than any other judge, and self-appointed judges do not count. So the sides should talk about where they are to go in their relations.

The Secretary interjected that the President also wished to discuss this issue with Gromyko.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret *Gromyko's* initial remarks]:

Of course, in the exchange of opinions which we have, we have to evaluate, as time permits, present U.S. policy. This policy has existed now over a number of years.

Gromyko continued that the second question should be nuclear arms. This is also the question of questions. It does not occupy fifth, tenth, or twentieth place in importance. It is a question which occupies first place, and if one of the sides participating in these discussions were to forget this, it would need to be reminded that it has a bad memory. This issue should be discussed between the governments and, of course, for reasons which were obvious, between the leaders of the U.S. and USSR.

The Secretary interjected that he agreed, and that he was sure Gromyko noticed that in his own review of the relationship he had said that matters of nuclear arms should get priority.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's initial remarks]:

Gromyko repeated that the question of nuclear arms and what to do with them and whether people will control them or they will control people, and whether people will control them in such a way that we would subsequently not find ourselves in a situation where we would not even be able to determine who was at fault, was a question which should be on the agenda as one of the first ones, or even the very first one. This was a very basic question. But Gromyko did not want the Secretary to think that the Soviet side wanted to continue negotiations or to begin negotiations about some variations of what had already been discussed sufficiently in fora such as Geneva. No. The principal question was how our leaders should approach the question of dealing with nuclear arms. There was a genius who lived in the United States, Einstein, who said a very intelligent thing. He said that after the creation of nuclear weapons, man changed, he was no longer the same, and he needed to find solutions to problems which would bring about a situation in which such weapons would no longer exist. Today, science has given us an even clearer answer to what nuclear war would mean and what would happen if mankind does not find solutions to these questions which concern his very existence.

The Secretary interjected and asked if Gromyko was proposing that in the end there should be total elimination of nuclear weapons. *Gromyko* replied that this was indeed the ideal solution. The Secretary remarked that he hoped

that Gromyko would clearly indicate this to the President. *Gromyko* replied that he would do his best. *The Secretary* said that Gromyko would be interested in the President's views on this, which the President had voiced in Tokyo, in Dublin, and elsewhere, that his dream was the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. The Secretary said that if Gromyko considered this to be the key question of principle, and that today we need negotiations to show how we can get there, then the President would be very responsive. *Gromyko* said that he would remind the President of this, and that since the Secretary had now interjected this thought, he had to say that there were different paths to achieving this end. The American approach was to amass nuclear weapons, which was not compatible with such an aim. The Soviet approach, on the other hand, was to reduce these weapons, with a view to finally eliminating them. These were different approaches.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret *Gromyko's* initial remarks]:

This question should be on our agenda. If we have closed our eyes to this, then we should ask someone from the outside, and they would say that we cannot close our eyes to this. Of course, many other questions exist. All of the questions mentioned by the Secretary were on the Soviet agenda as well.

At this point in his initial remarks, Gromyko indicated that he should let Sukhodrev interpret, and *the Secretary* joked that he felt bad that he would not be able to correlate Sukhodrev's words with the facial expressions of Gromyko that he had been observing.

*Gromyko* continued that in examining specific questions of Soviet-American relations, it does not hurt to talk about

such matters of principle, and how we are to proceed in our relations. The present U.S. administration has rolled up its sleeves and is working yearly, monthly, daily to bury, tear apart and overturn all the good that has been so far in Soviet-American relations. The result is that relations are at their lowest point since they were normalized in 1933. This is what the U.S. side has brought about. That is why the Soviet side wants the U.S. to clarify the question of where we are to go in our relations. Should we bury them even farther, or does the U.S. side think that we should seek better and more constructive relations? The Soviet side does not see very much of the latter desire.

Gromyko indicated that he had already said that there should be an exchange of views about the questions which the Secretary had mentioned. But before getting a clearer idea of what we should talk about, Gromyko wished to indicate what he did not plan to talk about. The Secretary interjected that he did not think that needed to be translated. *Gromyko*, continuing, said that the Secretary would not be surprised that Gromyko was not planning to talk about Sakharov, Shcharanskiy and other questions of the same nature which the U.S. side perhaps had in reserve. The Secretary was familiar with Gromyko's views on these points from the Madrid meeting and other meetings. Gromyko said that the Secretary wished to discuss questions of human rights without taking into account differences between social systems, and by naming names of individuals. The question of human rights was a very broad one, and the Soviet side was not afraid to discuss it. It could discuss how human rights are not respected in the U.S. But, frankly, there were more important guestions to discuss, such as those which Gromyko had mentioned, and others as well. So there was no need, even in principle, to discuss this matter, and,

anyway, the time was limited. The question of weapons in outer space was an important one.

The Secretary said that before leaving the subject of human rights, he wanted to ask Gromyko to listen to the President when he explains why this question is so important to the U.S. and has such an impact on our relations. Just now Gromyko had talked about how our relations were to proceed, and this issue has a bearing on that, as do Soviet arms increases and Soviet behavior in general. The Secretary indicated that the President would speak of these issues, and the Secretary was sure that Gromyko would listen.

*Gromyko* said that he would, of course, listen. He then went over the items proposed by the Secretary for the agenda, i.e., space weapons, the Middle East, South Africa, and nonproliferation. He agreed with these items, but thought that they could be discussed in a different order. He also agreed to include bilateral economic relations.

Gromyko also indicated that he wished to touch upon other subjects, i.e., the Far East, the Caribbean and, if time permits, terrorism—certain aspects of that problem. In addition, the sides should also discuss the conferences now taking place in Stockholm and Vienna, as well as the present situation in Europe. Then the sides would see how they should proceed after that. Obviously, the sides would not be able to cover all these matters in the detail that they should.

The Secretary indicated that the list Gromyko had proposed was a good one and compatible with the U.S. list. He felt that it would be best to group the questions in the categories he had mentioned, i.e., arms control, regional issues and bilateral questions.

*Gromyko* thought that the sides should not take a bureaucratic approach, but rather a political one. The sides probably would not be able to cover all aspects of all the questions.

The Secretary agreed and thought that he and Gromyko should go through the basic aspects, and the fact that there would be no time to go into as much detail as they would like meant that the sides should look at procedures for discussing this in greater detail than such meetings during the UN General Assembly permit. He believed that Gromyko had referred to talks on the political level rather than the technical level. Should the sides now begin talking about space weapons?

*Gromyko* said he wished to return to the first question which he had raised, i.e., where is the United States heading? The Soviet side feels that the U.S. is doing everything to prepare for war. It has a program for manufacturing nuclear weapons, and various doctrines for using nuclear weapons. It has refused to take upon itself the obligation of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. It has not agreed to Soviet proposals which would establish parity between the U.S. and USSR in nuclear weapons and in the military strategic area. What should the USSR then think of U.S. policy? The USSR has thoroughly analyzed the statements of policy which the U.S. President and others have announced, as well as the practical steps which the U.S. has taken in international for a with regard to the Soviet Union and other countries. This was not the first time that the Soviet side had made these observations. This had been mentioned by Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko, so the U.S. was familiar with Soviet views. But since the U.S. was continuing these policies, the Soviet side had to again call its attention to this, and the Soviet leadership had to make the appropriate conclusions

regarding U.S. policy. Soviet policy was made in reply to U.S. policy. If the U.S. were to change its policies with regard to the Soviet Union, the USSR would, of course, change its policy as well, including its policy on nuclear arms. The USSR has clearly indicated this, and Gromyko was saying it today, and indicated that he would repeat it to the President in Washington. The Soviet side would be prepared to listen to U.S. comments about this if the U.S. was ready to make them.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had presented a gross misreading of U.S. intentions. The U.S. is not a warlike country. In no way is the U.S. preparing for a major war. The United States is fully aware of the possible horrors and the catastrophe of a nuclear exchange. So Gromyko's notion that the U.S. is preparing for a war is not correct. Gromyko had spoken of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and the U.S. has indicated that it does believe in no-first-use of force. With regard to the U.S. posture in NATO, the U.S. believes in having a flexible potential response to the Soviet Union, but NATO has never had an aggressive posture. It is only a defensive alliance. The U.S. does not reject proposals if they lead to a decrease in arms. Historically, the U.S. has always proposed to decrease arms, and this is especially true for the Reagan administration. There is no area of arms (nuclear, conventional, chemical, CBMs, etc.) where the U.S. has not wanted discussions. We are looking for results.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. looks for ways to reduce arms which would leave deterrence intact, but it has no warlike intentions or hostility toward the Soviet Union or other countries. He hoped that Gromyko would raise this question with the President, because the President is likely to point out how the U.S. views the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted that the U.S. sees a great arms increase in the Soviet Union, and is taking steps in response to this. The U.S. sees very aggressive behavior in various areas of the world by the Soviet Union, and this makes us say to ourselves that the Soviet Union is increasing its arms in order to use them. So the Soviet concern about the U.S. (which the U.S. feels is unjustified) is mirrored in U.S. views of Soviet intentions.

The Secretary indicated that Gromyko had said that the question of where Soviet-American relations were going was one of first priority, and the Secretary agreed with this. If this was Gromyko's view, he should invest some time in discussing it with the President. The U.S. does not have any aggressive intentions, but does intend to protect its interests and values. We do not intend to get into a situation which would endanger those values.

*Gromyko* asked how the USSR should view U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons first, which the U.S. sometimes says with regard to Europe, sometimes not, in response to a mythical aggression by Warsaw Pact countries. The U.S. knows that the Warsaw Pact is not planning any aggression, and will not carry out any aggression, either against NATO or against the U.S. Such concepts are purely theoretical exercises on NATO's part.

Gromyko said that the U.S. was aware of the actions that Hitler's Germany took on the eve of the Second World War to create the impression that military activity was being carried out against it. The present situation should not be equated, of course, with that one. But the USSR has noticed that the NATO countries, especially the U.S. administration, allow for the possible first use of nuclear weapons. And this is the basis for U.S. policy with regard to various proposals made by the Soviet Union and the

Warsaw Pact countries. This was the first thing that Gromyko wished to say. The second was that for some reason the U.S. and the others who talked of this matter have glided over the indisputable fact that even without the additional U.S. arms in Europe, the NATO countries already had one and a half times more nuclear weapons there.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union has spoken of approximate parity. The word "approximate" was not used accidentally, since there was no real equality—NATO had superiority. Of course, the Soviet Union was counting the nuclear weapons of all the NATO countries, as well as all the delivery vehicles, including aircraft. But the U.S. keeps saying over and over again that the USSR poses a great threat with its buildup of weapons. Even today the West has superiority, although the Soviet Union still speaks of approximate equality. This is done in order to lay a better foundation for a possible agreement, but strictly speaking, the Soviet side could propose to first eliminate such superiority, and then to negotiate about subsequent reductions.

Gromyko indicated that he had noted the Secretary's words that the U.S. has no bad intentions with regard to the Soviet Union. However, there is a difference between words and actions, and U.S. actions say that it is preparing for war. If the U.S. could objectively look at the situation through Soviet eyes, it would see things in the same light, but this is difficult to do.

Gromyko noted that if the sides were to discuss this question in detail today, there would be no time for other questions, so he proposed to switch to the question of space weapons, and then see how to proceed from there.

The Secretary replied that before doing that, he would like to respond to what Gromyko had said. He wished to repeat again that the U.S. has no warlike intentions regarding the Soviet Union. Competition between our countries and our systems will continue. We think our system is better and you think your system is better. History will judge. But this is different from the development and use of weapons. The U.S. has no aggressive intentions regarding the Soviet Union in that area.

The Secretary pointed out that the number of nuclear weapons in Western Europe has been diminishing. He could not give the exact decrease in weapons over the past five years; Rick Burt could, but he would stress only that there was a program for further decreases.

The Secretary said that the Soviet Union had first spoken of rough equality under Brezhnev, and since that time a great number of SS-20s had been deployed, whereas the number of weapons in the West had been decreased, so such a statement is not logical. But what is needed is a reduction of forces to agreed levels, and not arguments concerning previous levels of forces. For example, the MBFR negotiations have been going on for so long that not only have people made careers in MBFR, but their children and grandchildren were beginning to do the same. There have been difficulties about data, and so forth. The U.S. feeling is that it is time to come to grips with the problem and to reduce forces to agreed levels. At this point the Secretary proposed that the question of space weapons be discussed, and Gromyko agreed.

The Secretary stated that, recognizing the importance of Gromyko's point that discussions of particular items should take place within a general framework of relations, we should aim for establishing broad discussions of issues at the highest political levels.

*Gromyko* said that he would touch on this question in Washington, of course, and that this would be one of the main questions.

He went on to say that he had listened carefully to what the Secretary had said, but wished to stress that it was not words that the Soviet Union feared so much as U.S. actions in Europe and in other areas. There did not exist an area where U.S. actions were not directed against the Soviet Union. It was the Soviet Union's opinion that even when it was clear to the U.S. that the Soviet Union was not involved in something, this was boring and the U.S. looked to find Soviet involvement even if there was none. So all U.S. activity is focused against the USSR.

The Secretary interjected that this was an exaggeration, but that the U.S. did see evidence of Soviet aggression in many places around the world. The U.S. did see the Soviet Union as the other superpower, and treated it as such.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's previous remarks]:

Gromyko said that such an attitude was one of the things that explained the U.S. military buildup. The U.S. was determined to be the dominant force in both the military and political sphere worldwide. Gromyko said that he did not know how to express how appalled the Soviet Union was when it heard certain people (without naming names) say that any means were justified if they were aimed at extending the American model of society and way of life throughout the world. And in the military area, the U.S. always said that it wanted to be number one, whereas the

Soviet Union felt that there should be equality between it and the U.S. For this reason it supported the principle of equality and equal security. Such a principle should apply both in the military area with regard to nuclear and conventional arms, and in the political area as well. There should be no interference in the internal affairs of other nations, and there should be no policy which states that everything is permitted in order to impose the American model of life on others.

The Secretary said that he wished to dwell on the word "impose". There were no examples of the United States imposing its system on others. There is competition between our systems, as the sides have agreed. This is legitimate and will continue. But it should not be by military means. This is different from imposition. There is no history of imposition by the United States.

Gromyko asked whether what was going on in Nicaragua was peaceful competition. The U.S. was indirectly and officially saying that Nicaragua had to have the same social structure as the United States. He could give other examples, but then the sides would never get to the other questions. But what he had said is part of the question about whose acts constitute a source of danger.

The Secretary indicated that he wished to say a few things about Nicaragua, but he agreed that the sides might not get to the other questions. The U.S. viewed Nicaragua as a country which for years has been engaged in aggressive acts with respect to its neighbors, specifically El Salvador. The U.S. has seen military supplies shipped from Nicaragua and its allies directly or through Cuba. The U.S. has seen these arms used by guerrillas in El Salvador to blow up bridges and plants—in a country that is waging a heroic struggle for its political and economic development. Thus,

Nicaragua by so building up its arms, has an extraordinary level of them for a Central American nation, and has become a threat to the region. He wanted to reaffirm that the emergence of jet fighters in Nicaragua simply would not be acceptable to the United States.

Gromyko said that the U.S. could not really believe that the arms in Nicaragua were a threat to the region and to the U.S. Nicaragua could not pose a danger for anyone. It is a small country. The U.S. could not say it was a danger to its neighbors. The U.S. was demanding that Nicaragua change its internal structure, and Nicaragua is not the first country to which the U.S. has said this. But perhaps he and the Secretary could get to this item later in the agenda. Now it would be better to talk about space weapons.

The Secretary responded that he did not want his failure to respond to what Gromyko had said to be taken as agreement, but he thought it would be good to proceed to the topic of space weapons.

Gromyko noted that the Soviet government thought that the U.S. was making a big mistake in aiming to put nuclear weapons in space. The Soviet Union thought that space should be free of weapons, nuclear or otherwise. For many years, the U.S. had also thought this along with the Soviet Union. Statements to this effect were made in the United Nations. But now the U.S. has drastically changed its position and wishes to militarize space, so the arms race will be extended to space. If this happens, the chance of nuclear war will increase manifold. Within the U.S. administration, and not only there, you are engaged in elaboration and building-up of a large-scale ABM system. This would in fact lead to the militarizing of outer space. It is a serious step directed against the Soviet Union and its allies, as well as a serious step against peace. It is a step

that increases the threat of nuclear war. The Soviet Union would like to believe that the U.S. administration will think seriously about this and will change its mind and agree to keep weapons out of space.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union had made specific proposals to meet in Vienna to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space. When the USSR made these proposals, it had certain doubts, since it was aware of U.S. plans, which the U.S. had made no secret of for some time. But the Soviet Union hoped that the voice of reason would prevail and that the U.S. would agree to discuss the issue. Unfortunately, the U.S. administration gave a negative reply to the Soviet proposal. The situation is made no different by the fact that for public consumption the U.S. says that it has accepted the Soviet proposal. In reality, it has refused it. The U.S. says that it is ready to negotiate, but it links this issue with other questions about nuclear arms, such as those which were discussed in Geneva, concerning strategic arms, medium-range nuclear arms, etc. What is this? The Soviet Union wishes to talk about how to prevent the placement of nuclear arms in space, and not about how to militarize space. It very much regrets the U.S. response. What the U.S. is saying is for the consumption of the public which does not understand the issues. The U.S. says that it hopes the Soviet Union will change its position by the end of the year and agree to the U.S. approach. Obviously, there is no chance of this. The USSR cannot change its position on the prevention of the militarization of space. Our position will be the same in September, October, November and December. The Soviet Union believes that it is in the mutual interest of the two countries to free space of nuclear strike weapons. Gromyko indicated that he wished to say this so that the Secretary and the President would clearly understand it before the meeting in Washington.

Expanding on the same question, Gromyko said that it was enough to look only at the economic aspect of the matter. It would cost an enormous amount of money to create a large-scale ABM system. Has the U.S. considered that it would be merely increasing tensions and throwing away hundreds of billions of dollars? If the U.S. did not change its approach, the USSR would have to take it into account as it does in other areas, and do everything necessary to provide for its security and the security of its allies. But this would not be done by Soviet choice. It would be caused by U.S. actions. So the Soviet Union hopes that a lot of thought will be given to this in Washington and that this path will not be taken.

Gromyko stressed that the Soviet Union is very much in favor of an agreement on space weapons, and such an agreement might open the way for better relations and for agreements in other areas as well.

The Secretary noted that the difficulty of saying that we do not want the militarization of space was that space was already militarized, since ballistic missiles fly through space and since both sides have and will continue to have satellites in space for surveillance purposes. Moreover, the USSR has already tested and deployed an ASAT system. Therefore, space has already been militarized, and the question is one of finding ways of not increasing this militarization and coping with the already existing militarization.

With regard to what Gromyko had spoken of first, the Secretary wished to say that he did not know where Gromyko had gotten his information. Perhaps he had better knowledge of U.S. plans than the U.S. did. The U.S. has no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space. The U.S. has a research program, but as far as it knows, is behind the

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union already has a system in place, and the U.S. does not. As an old engineering and construction specialist, the Secretary was impressed by how the Soviet Union learned by doing, and considered that the U.S. should do the same. It would be foolhardy for the U.S. not to do anything in the ABM area when the USSR already has such a system. The U.S. has no desire to spend resources on this that could be used for other things. But as he had already said, the U.S. would not let itself get into a situation where it was not able to defend its interests and values.

The Secretary continued that the U.S. was very disappointed in the results of the exchanges concerning the Soviet proposal about negotiations in Vienna. The U.S. had felt that it had replied favorably to that proposal, and was prepared to go to Vienna or some other place to discuss questions of the militarization of space without any preconditions. The President had spoken of this in his speech at the UN and will speak of this in Washington. It is an important question and has many ramifications. Difficulties exist from the point of view of verification. There are many questions which need to be explored. But it has been difficult to engage the Soviet Union on this. In any case, the sides should not go into this without a clear recognition that space is already being used for military purposes.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. has no plans for putting nuclear weapons other than ballistic missiles into space. As he had indicated, the U.S. feels that offensive weapons are the principal threat to the future of the world, and that the sides should deal with them.

The Secretary noted that whether we were discussing space weapons or other issues, it would be good to have a

forum for such discussions, and the U.S. had made some procedural suggestions on how this could be done. We thought the Soviets' Vienna proposal provided a good way to proceed, but we were open to Soviet proposals. So if the Soviet Union was ready for talks on this, the U.S. was also ready.

Gromyko stated that he had described the Soviet position, and there was nothing he could add. If the U.S. would spread information to the effect that the Soviet Union is ready to come to such negotiations by the end of the year, the Soviet Union would have to deny it, and would indicate that the U.S. administration had given a false impression.

The Secretary interjected that he had not said such things. He had indicated that he spoke for the United States, and he had indicated that the Soviet Union would indicate what it would do. He had not predicted what the Soviet position would be, so the Soviet Union should listen to what he and the President were saying. *Gromyko* replied that he had referred to what others had said about the matter.

[Sukhodrev continued to interpret Gromyko's preceding remarks]:

Gromyko noted that the Secretary's statement about the fact that space was already militarized was a recent thing, although ballistic missiles have existed for many years. The U.S. has to make up arguments, since it has no real ones. The argument about the fact that space is militarized because ballistic missiles travel through space is sophistry, and the U.S. knows it. The USSR could logically show that such statements are absurd. Arguing along such lines, it could be said that before going into space, missiles must be deployed on earth, and that before they are deployed they must be manufactured, and that before they are

manufactured, the equipment and plants which produce them must be built, and so forth. That would bring you to the point that, in order to prevent the militarization of space, you would need to destroy all the links on earth. It is absurd to say that space is already militarized. The U.S. knows that this is not so. This is a very serious issue. If space becomes militarized, the situation will become much more dangerous. Americans, Soviets and people throughout the world will feel much less comfortable, since a nuclear sword will be hanging over their heads. So the Soviet Union hopes that the U.S. administration will give this question very serious thought.

Since time was running out, Gromyko wanted to take five minutes to "headline" some issues:

Non-proliferation. Gromyko indicated that an agreement on this had been in force for many years. The Soviet Union was in favor of implementing the non-proliferation treaty, and against an increase in the number of nuclear states. The Secretary replied that the U.S. agreed with this and that bilateral cooperation and consultations should continue. Gromyko agreed and Korniyenko noted that the next such consultations were scheduled for December. Gromyko agreed they should be held in December or brought forward.

CDE. Gromyko noted that work could proceed in a constructive fashion only if there was movement on Warsaw Pact proposals and not just those raised by the West. If there was no movement on Warsaw Pact proposals, then, frankly speaking, it would be a deadlock. There could not be a program of legalized espionage. The Secretary replied that the U.S. was ready for constructive results in Stockholm, and that the President felt that he was replying directly to Chernenko in his letter when he proposed non-

use of force, looking to combine that with Western CBM proposals. The agreement to have U.S. and USSR representatives meet in Stockholm had formed a good basis for contacts, and the U.S. is urging the Soviet Union to use it to achieve satisfactory results.

Middle East. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union wishes only for peace. It is protecting the Arab position since it considers it to be a just one. However, the Soviet Union supports the existence of an independent Israel, and Gromyko had confirmed this to Foreign Minister Shamir in his meeting with him. Why should there not be an international conference on this issue? The U.S. has not been enthusiastic about this, but such a conference would not hurt the U.S. or Israel, since it could not force them to do anything which was not acceptable to them. Decisions could be reached only by agreement of all countries involved. Perhaps the U.S. would give more thought to agreeing to such a conference, and perhaps the two sides would learn to talk on other issues at such a conference as well.

Southern Africa. Gromyko stated that the Soviet Union was aware of what was happening with regard to contacts between nations in the region, but did not believe in the purity of South Africa's intentions. The U.S. was in fact an ally of South Africa on the basis of U.S. actions. The Soviet Union did not believe that South Africa would act as aggressively against its neighbors if the U.S. were not supporting it. The Soviet Union was for peace in the area, but on the basis of non-aggression against Angola and on the basis that Namibia receive its independence in accordance with the relevant UN resolution.

Gromyko proposed to end the meeting at this point since time had run out, and remaining questions could still be discussed in Washington.

The Secretary indicated that he wanted to touch upon two areas which Gromyko had mentioned, as well as one additional one.

The Secretary welcomed Gromyko's meeting with Foreign Minister Shamir, calling the fact that it had occurred constructive. However, the U.S. did not think that an international conference on the Mideast at this time would be constructive. On the other hand, the U.S. side had again stated, as the President noted in his UN speech, that it was ready to discuss these issues on a bilateral basis with the Soviet side. The Soviet side had not yet responded to this proposal.

Gromyko interjected—on a bilateral basis? The Secretary responded, yes, and on other regional subjects as well, including southern Africa. The U.S. is observing South Africa, and it does not like its apartheid policy, but to get a more stable situation in southern Africa, you have to work with South Africa. It interacts in important ways with other countries in the region, and its economy has a central significance to the region. The U.S. would like to see Namibia independent, but considers that the obstacle to this is the presence of the Cuban forces in Angola. As long as these forces are present, the U.S. believes it will be difficult to persuade South Africa to go along.

The additional area which the Secretary wished to raise was the area of the Pakistan border. The U.S. supports Pakistan. The recent crossborder raids into that country were unwarranted and could lead to trouble.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he was sorry that time had run out, and they had not touched on issues in the detail which they deserved. That is why the President felt that some of their discussions should be devoted to developing procedures so we would have a chance to deal with these issues, and he would speak of this himself.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Reagan/Bush/Shultz/Gromyko/Dobrynin in New York and Washington September 1984. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Palmer, Butler, and McKinley. An unknown hand initialed for the clearing officials. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission to the United Nations in New York. Brackets are in the original. In preparation for this meeting with Gromyko, Burt provided Shultz with a 36-page briefing packet on September 22, prepared by Simons and cleared by Palmer. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, March 1984 Super Sensitive Documents Super Sensitive July 1-Dec 31, 1984) <sup>2</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1981-1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981-January 1983, Document 217 .

<sup>3</sup> For summaries of some meetings between Kennedy and his Soviet counterparts see the following telegrams: Telegram 55033 to Mexico City, March 19, 1982, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D820112–0524; telegram 7317 to Moscow and all NATO capitals and various posts, January 11, 1983, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830016–0316; telegram 7652 from Moscow, June 16, 1983, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D830343–0176; and telegram 7676 from Vienna, June 7, 1984, Department of State,

Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840371-0965.

- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 159</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> After several sets of discussions, the U.S. and Soviet delegations reached an agreement to upgrade the "hotline" (formally known as the Direct Communication Link or DCL) on July 13. "The delegations agreed on the text of an exchange of notes to add a facsimile transmission capability to the Direct Communication Link (DCL). After the Soviet delegation received Moscow's approval of the texts, Acting Secretary Dam and Soviet Charge D'Affairs Isakov initialed the notes on July 17 in the presence of the two delegations." (Telegram 236476 to Moscow, August 10; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840512-0983)
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 73</u>.
- <sup>7</sup> See <u>footnote 4, Document 266</u>.
- <sup>8</sup> In telegram 213951 to Moscow, July 20, the Department reported: "Since 1981, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have held three rounds of discussions on our maritime boundary off Alaska, in November 1981, May 1983 and January 1984. A fourth round of talks will be held on July 23–24 in Moscow. These discussions have focused on differences between the two countries over the manner in which the line established by the 1867 convention ceding Alaska should be depicted. Our differences result in the existence of an area in the Bering Sea which each country considers to be under its exclusive maritime resource jurisdiction." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840467–0125)
- <sup>9</sup> In telegram 226966 to Moscow, August 2, the Department reported: "On July 31, Soviet Minister-Counselor Sokolov informed DAS Mark Palmer that the USSR had completed its internal review and accepted the extension of the Governing International Fisheries Agreement until

December 31, 1985. In response to Department's note of July 20, Sokolov gave Palmer a diplomatic note stating that the extension was effective immediately." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840491–0737)

- 10 See Document 76.
- <sup>11</sup> Discussion of the Pacific Air routes was directly related to the downing of the KAL 007 in August 1983. The talks were ongoing at the ICAO in Montreal. See <u>footnote 8</u>, <u>Document 185</u>.
- 12 See Document 10.
- 13 See Document 213 and footnotes 2 and 4, Document 219.
- <sup>14</sup> The United States broke diplomatic relations with Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. After a period of non-recognition, diplomatic relations were established with the Soviet Union in November 1933.

# 285. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House 1

New York, September 27, 1984, 0105Z

Secto 11010. Subject: Memorandum to the President on Meeting With Gromyko.

1. S—Entire text.

2. Begin text:

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Meeting With Gromyko

—As I told you over the phone,<sup>2</sup> my three hours with Gromyko were relatively free of polemics, but did not surface anything new on the Soviets' part. Gromyko blamed us for all the problems in the relationship, and said that our behavior had to change before things could improve. The message, thus, was unyielding, although the tone was calm and even philosophical. It seemed that Gromyko wanted to concentrate more on where the overall relationship was heading than on specific issues.

—This emphasis on what Gromyko called the "principles' for US-Soviet relations may foreshadow Gromyko's approach to his meeting with you on Friday.<sup>3</sup> If so, this would dovetail nicely with your plans to take a similarly philosophical approach.<sup>4</sup> Of course, Gromyko's attitude may also indicate that he simply has nothing concrete to say, and that Soviet policy toward the U.S. remains on

automatic pilot, with the leadership either unwilling or unable to make the decisions needed to move forward. In this regard, Gromyko's responses on most issues seemed unusually stale, involving largely canned language.

## Highlights of the Conversation

—I opened the meeting by reviewing the modest progress we had made since our Stockholm meeting<sup>5</sup> on a range of bilateral issues, along with the areas where progress had been disappointingly slow or non-existent. I stressed that what was now needed was to move forward on the larger questions, such as arms reductions, and that this was what you planned to focus on in your Friday meeting. I also emphasized at the outset the significance of human rights to the overall relationship, noting that you would want to explain why this was important to the American people. I cited the difficulties created by the many backward steps the Soviets have taken in this area, including their treatment of Sakharov and Shcharanskiy, and urged Gromyko to consider positive action in a number of human rights categories.

—Gromyko's opening remarks focused on what he termed the "question of questions"—whether we want to lead the world toward peace or toward war—and on the equally important question of whether we will be able to control nuclear weapons. He repeated familiar charges that the U.S. was preparing for war and unwilling to accord the Soviets "equality." He effectively dismissed the significance of the many small steps forward we have taken on bilateral issues, alleging that we were bent on destroying everything positive that has been accomplished in our relations. Echoing Soviet propaganda, he said relations were at their lowest point since the establishment of diplomatic ties in

1933, and asked whether the U.S. wanted to "bury them still deeper" or to make a "turn for the better."

—Turning to the question of the agenda for the rest of the meeting, Gromyko stressed that human rights was one subject that he was not prepared to discuss. I told him I hoped he would nevertheless listen carefully to your explanation of why this was so important to us, and reiterated the point that human rights can have a major bearing on the course of our relations.

—After an exchange on the allegedly aggressive character of U.S. and NATO policy, we turned to arms control. Gromyko agreed with me that there was no more urgent task than reducing nuclear arms. He paraphrased Einstein in arguing that mankind needed to get rid of all nuclear weapons—to which I responded that you have many times stated the very same thing; Gromyko replied by suggesting that the U.S. approach—piling up nuclear weapons—was incompatible with this goal. He said he was not prepared to go into the specifics of negotiating positions. I suggested that we try to use political-level exchanges to get the process moving again, but Gromyko did not respond.

—Gromyko went on at length about the need to "prevent" the militarization of outer space, and repeated the claim that we had rejected their June 29 offer by linking space weapons to offensive nuclear systems. He accused us of planning to deploy a space-based ABM system and even space-based nuclear weapons. I told him that we had no plans to deploy nuclear weapons in space, and that the SDI was strictly a research program at this stage and, in fact, less intensive than Soviet efforts in the ABM area. I also pointed out that it was the Soviets, with an operational ASAT, who had already "militarized" space.

—Gromyko's bottom line on the Vienna talks was that the U.S. would have to change its "negative" position before talks could take place. Interestingly, however, he did not mention the question of an ASAT moratorium, and he repeated Chernenko's formulation that progress on space could make it easier to move on other arms control subjects.

—We discussed other arms control issues only briefly. Gromyko was sharply critical of Western confidence-building proposals in the CDE, which he termed a plan for "legalized espionage" with respect to Warsaw Pact military activities. I expressed our disappointment at their failure to respond to your offer of a trade-off between non-use of force and concrete CBMs, which was a direct response to the views expressed by Chernenko in his letters to you. I closed the arms control discussion by underscoring the need to find new procedural mechanisms to give momentum to our negotiating efforts—the broader "umbrella" to which you referred in your speech. On this as on the rest of your UNGA initiatives, Gromyko did not respond.

—We did not have sufficient time to cover regional issues in much detail. Gromyko did not pick up on our call for expanded consultations on regional problems, and made the expected pitch for the Soviets' warmed-over Middle East conference proposal. He said that while Moscow supports the Arab position because it was "just," the Soviets were firmly committed to Israel's existence as a Jewish state. (It is interesting to note that he spent some two hours with Shamir.)<sup>7</sup>

—For my part, I reiterated our warning that provision of jet fighter aircraft to Nicaragua would be unacceptable, and affirmed our support for Pakistan in the face of increasingly threatening Soviet tactics along the Afghan-Pakistani border. I told Gromyko we continued to see no promise in the idea of a Mideast conference, but reiterated our readiness to hold more detailed bilateral exchanges on that region as well as on Southern Africa.

—Time ran out before we could get into questions of bilateral cooperation. Gromyko indicated that he had more to say on several other subjects and, intriguingly, he mentioned international terrorism as an item on his list. As the meeting broke up, I told Gromyko that we might want to consider a second meeting on Saturday, prior to Gromyko's departure for Moscow. But we will want to wait and see how your meeting goes before making a decision.

End text.

Shultz

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0169. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the Department of State. Repeated as telegram 293390 to Moscow, October 2. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0327)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> No record of this telephone conversation was found. Reagan spent most of the day on September 26 campaigning in Ohio and Wisconsin. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> September 28.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Document 277.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See Document 159.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See <u>footnote 7, Document 267</u>. For Reagan's September 24 speech, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1981–1988, vol. I,

## Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 206 .

<sup>7</sup> Shultz and Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir met on October 1 in New York. During their meeting, the two men discussed their respective meetings with Gromyko. Shultz reported to Reagan: "Shamir said Gromyko's manner seemed slightly more moderate in their bilateral, although his pitch to Israel to accept a peace conference and his stonewalling on Soviet Jewry were entirely negative in substance." (Telegram Secto 11041 from New York, October 2; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0296)

8 September 29. See Document 288.

## 286. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, September 28, 1984, 10 a.m.-noon

#### **SUBJECT**

The President's Meeting with Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union Assistant Secretary of State Richard Burt

Jack Matlock, NSC

Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko

First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Korniyenko

Soviet Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker

Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

After several minutes wait, as journalists came through for photographs, the *President* opened the meeting at 10:20 a.m.<sup>2</sup> He said that he was pleased that Foreign Minister Gromyko had been able to come to Washington to meet with him and he hoped that he could demonstrate to Gromyko that he was not the sort of person to eat his own grandchildren.

The President pointed out that our political systems are very different and that we will be competitive in the world. But we live in one world and we must handle our competition in peace. He emphasized that the United States will never start a war with the Soviet Union. He added that they did not have to take his word for that but only look at history. For example, after World War II when

the United States was the predominant military power in the world, we did not use that power to force ourselves on others. Instead we set out to help—allies and one-time enemies alike—to restore their economies and to build a peaceful world. We have been trying to reduce stocks of nuclear weapons and today have only two-thirds as many as we had in 1967.

Of course, we are now rebuilding our military strength, but we are doing this because of the massive Soviet buildup. We feel this is a threat to us. Soviet leaders have proclaimed their dedication to revolution and to our destruction. And we have experience with Soviet aggression: the Cuban missile crisis, the attempts to extend Soviet influence in Africa, their efforts elsewhere. Throughout, the Soviet Union seems to consider us the enemy to be overcome.

The President said he mentioned this only to explain why we feel threatened—not to debate the matter—but he wanted to make it clear that while we do not intend to be vulnerable to attack or to an ultimatum that would require us to choose between capitulation and annihilation, we have no aggressive intent toward anyone. He added that we are willing to accept Soviet concerns for their own security. We understand the loss of life in World War II, and we understand their feelings based on a number of invasions of their country over the years. But the problem is that we are mutually suspicious; both sides are fearful. The time has come to clear the air, reduce suspicions, and reduce nuclear arms.

As the two superpowers, we must take the lead in reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. If the two of us take the lead, the rest of the world would have to follow. And this applies not only to nuclear weapons, but also to such weapons as biological and chemical as well.

The President mentioned that the Soviet Union had proposed negotiations on weapons in space. He said that we are ready for this. But we also feel that offensive weapons must be a subject of concern and a subject of negotiation. And he wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on antisatellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms.

The President also suggested that we need to have representatives of senior levels meet to discuss the whole situation and to try to find ways to negotiate these problems. A private channel would be useful. For example, someone here and a counterpart there could take up contacts privately in order to consult confidentially and give direction to negotiations. The President stressed that we both have confidence in our Ambassadors and should use them more, but there may also be a need for confidential contacts without the formality of more official channels.

The President then referred to the American commitment to human rights. He said that he understands the Soviet feeling that these questions impinge upon their sovereignty, but they must understand that the United States is a country of immigrants, and that many ethnic groups in the United States maintain an interest in ties with their home country. They take a great interest in human rights questions, and they insist that their government be responsive to these concerns. The fact is that it would be much easier for the United States to make agreements with the Soviet Union if there is improvement in this area. As an example, he cited the resolution of the case of the

Pentecostalists who took refuge in the American Embassy in Moscow, and said that we treated their permission to leave the Soviet Union as a generous act on the part of the Soviet Government. We never attempted to portray it as an arrangement between our two governments, but did attempt to respond and ease relations by, for example, concluding the long-term grain agreement. The President added that although the Foreign Minister knows the United States fairly well, some of his colleagues may not, and the Soviet leadership should understand that the President cannot simply dictate to the Congress or to the public. The atmosphere must be right if the President is to be capable of carrying out and implementing agreements with the Soviet Union.

The President stressed that peace is our greatest desire and we are prepared to move in a peaceful direction and to discuss how we can reduce arms and set a goal of ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons.

Foreign Minister Gromyko responded that the President had touched on many problems and he thought it was necessary to set out their policy. He realized that the President had heard and read many authoritative statements from the Soviet leadership, including Chernenko's letters and public statements. He observed that it cannot be questioned that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are of tremendous importance for the entire world. Indeed, this is axiomatic and no one in the world would deny it. The conclusion he would draw from this is that the leadership of the United States and the Soviet Union must see to it that both bilateral issues and international questions that concern us are conducted in full accord with the responsibilities which the leadership of both countries carry.

Gromyko said that he did not know how the President got the idea that the Soviet Union set for itself the goal of demolishing the American system, or that the Soviets think about that at all. The Soviet Government has no such goal, and the U.S. has no basis for making the accusation.

Gromyko stated that in accord with the philosophy held by the Soviet leaders, the course of historical development is unavoidable, and just as they believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, they also believe that the capitalist system will be followed by a socialist system which in turn will be followed by a communist system. But that is not a goal. And, indeed, "volunteerism"—attempts to force historical developments—is alien to their philosophy. It is, he said, "anti-scientific." Therefore, there is no goal of undermining the social and political system in the United States. He felt that if some of the President's statements have been motivated by such a misunderstanding, the President would do well to correct his comments. He would not use the word "insult" to characterize these accusations because it is too mild. The fact is, the Soviets have a philosophy of historical processes, but not a goal of changing or replacing the political and economic systems in other countries.

Gromyko continued that it was not the first time that they had heard that the United States had acted generously after World War II and that the U.S. had possessed nuclear weapons, but had not used them. He observed that it is true that the United States acted wisely in not using nuclear weapons, saying in passing that the U.S. had only a negligible number, of course, but he wouldn't emphasize that. He continued by saying that at the end of the war, if the Soviet leaders had waved their armies to the West, no force could have stopped them. It would have been like a tidal wave. Yet, they did not do it; they were loyal to their

agreements with the Allies, to their agreements with the United States and the United Kingdom. France, of course, later joined as an ally, but principally with the United States and the United Kingdom. The USSR was true to its word and did not move beyond the boundaries specified in the post-War agreements. The President would recall that President Truman signed the Potsdam Accord along with Churchill and Stalin. The Soviet Union had lived up to this agreement.

Gromyko continued that in the President's observations, he detected the thought that the Soviet Union is a threat to the West. The fact is, Gromyko said, that after the war when the guns fell silent, all the military bases which had been set up by the United States throughout the world were retained. They were kept and even increased; new ones were built. Arms were increased as well. He asked, rhetorically, if the Soviet Union should have taken this into account, and answered "of course," and said that these events were still fresh in their memories.

Gromyko went on to charge that the United States had built a wall—a barrier—against all attempts to reduce arms. He said he would remind the President that after the war ended in 1945—and he digressed to say that the Soviet Union had entered the war against Japan precisely in accord with its commitments—and nuclear weapons appeared on the scene, it had been no miracle for the Soviet Union to acquire them. All nuclear weapons require is a certain technological potential and funding decisions. But Gromyko claimed that at that time the Soviet Union had proposed a permanent ban on nuclear weapons, and a commitment to use nuclear power solely for peaceful purposes.

He recalled that he himself had introduced in the United Nations in New York a draft convention for the permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons. The United States Administration (Truman was then President) rejected this idea. So what was the Soviet Union to do? They had to reconsider their position. They had to draw conclusions from the path the world was taking.

Gromyko then stated that the West always raises questions of verification. It does this as if the Soviet Union doesn't do all it should do in carrying out its commitments. But the Soviet proposal was a very comprehensive one. It was for both nuclear and conventional disarmament, and as for verification at that time, they had proposed "a general and complete verification." And what was President Truman's response? He refused. He refused because the United States simply wanted more and more arms.

Gromyko then observed that we now have at our disposal mountains of arms. It's not a very pretty picture. We're sitting on mountains of nuclear weapons. We must ask how far we want to go in this direction.

He then recalled that when President Nixon came to Moscow in 1972 and entered Brezhnev's office, he observed that we both have enough nuclear weapons to destroy each other nine times over. And Brezhnev replied, "You are right. We have made the same calculation." So both came to the conclusion that it would be senseless to continue piling up these arms, and the result was the SALT II Agreements—the ABM Treaty, and the interim agreement on offensive weapons. These are historic agreements and they are still alive.

Gromyko continued by saying that the question now is which direction we will go: toward a further accumulation

of nuclear weapons or toward their reduction and elimination? This is indeed the "problem of problems." It is a question of life and death; it is a problem which must be overcome.

He suggested that a helpful step to start us on the right direction would be to freeze nuclear weapons where they are. He added that he wanted to say directly to the President that the Soviet Union is not threatening the social system of the United States. Indeed, the Soviets have great admiration for the talent of the American people, for its technology, for its science, for its vitality. They want to live in peace and friendship. And, he believes Americans want the same. Everyone wants trade, and trade can be mutually beneficial. The USSR needs the more advanced American technology and Americans can make a profit from it to the benefit of its own society. In short, Gromyko said, "we are offering peace as we have always offered peace. We will extend our hand if you extend yours."

Gromyko continued by observing that the President could say that the Soviet Union has more arms than the United States. That is not true, he said, the USSR does not have more. The United States and its allies have more, but an approximate equality exists. The Soviets say an "approximate equality" because it is not exact and the advantage is actually on the Western side. But, they are willing to say equality in order to move things forward.

In Europe, for example, NATO has fifty percent more weapons than the Warsaw Pact yet the Soviets have declared that this is approximately equal. In counting, of course, they take into account tactical and theater weapons, British and French systems and aircraft, including carrier aircraft.

So this is the situation as the Soviets see it. They do not wish to follow the course the United States has set of adding to the weapons in Europe. Of course, they are determined not to stay behind if the U.S. moves ahead.

Gromyko observed that one thread that ran through some of the argumentation he had heard was the contention that the Soviet Union cannot keep up in an arms race, and it is true that an arms race would cost the Soviets much in the way of material, intellectual and financial means. But they would do it. They were able to develop nuclear weapons even after their economy had suffered the colossal losses in World War II, and they will be able to keep up in the future regardless of the sacrifice required.

Gromyko added that he had heard some good words in the President's statement. He agreed that the United States and the Soviet Union must deal as equals and he wanted the President to know that the Soviet Union is seeking peaceful relations. The United States has advanced technology and can profit from trade with the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union felt that it is better to trade than to compete in nuclear arms. Trade could be to the mutual benefit of both countries.

As far as outer space is concerned, the problem, according to Gromyko, is that we already have arms competition on the ground, under the water, on the water, in the air, but not yet in space, and we should prevent its spread to space. The Soviet Union, he said, is against the American plan to extend the arms race into space. They condemn it and if the effort continues it will be irreversible. Tremendous resources will be spent, and yet there will be no advantage gained in this field. Look at it coolly, he said. We are fed up with the competition in nuclear arms. Why involve space as well? Think it over calmly and coolly, he repeated.

He noted that the United States had taken a negative attitude toward the Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. It would have been better, he said, if the United States had not proposed its formula at all. It is clear the United States wants the militarization of space, which the Soviet Union opposes.

Gromyko continued that a freeze of weapons is not a reduction and they would like to reduce nuclear weapons, but that a freeze would improve the atmosphere for reduction and might make it possible. He believed that no nuclear power would be hurt by a freeze. He went on to say that the average person in the United States knows very little about the Soviet Union but does know that he wants peace.

Gromyko continued by saying that the President's speech at the United Nations spoke of contacts and consultation. These are not contrary to Soviet desires; they are not bad. The Soviets do not reject the President's proposal at all. What disturbs the Soviets is that everything seems to be reduced to the question of contacts, and they wonder if this is something just to make people think that something is happening. If nothing, in fact, happens, then that would be an incorrect impression.

Gromyko stressed that we need a constructive goal for these meetings. We need to decide what they will lead to. One cannot combine arms reduction with the current American policy of increasing military budgets and increasing the arms buildup. So long as American arms keep growing this is inconsistent with reductions or a mutual goal that can be set. He added that this may be unpleasant to hear but he felt he must explain it.

Gromyko concluded his initial presentation by saying that the entire leadership of the Soviet Union and the General Secretary personally wanted to find a common language with the United States. We must find a way to put our relations in motion. It must be understood that they are not trying to undermine the American social system. The U.S. must seriously and coolly analyze the current situation. The Soviets will defend their interests, but want peace and cooperation. The choice is up to the United States, but it should be understood that the Soviet Union wants good relations with the United States.

The President stated that he could not agree with many of the things which Gromyko had said. First, the idea that Soviet policy is not directed against our system is inconsistent with many statements made by Soviet leaders over the decades. The President quoted from Lenin and from others to make his point, but then said that there was no point in continuing citations and that what is important about all of this is that it is evidence of the high level of suspicion that exists between us.

As for American behavior at the end of the war, he recalled that one of the few things that Stalin said that he agreed with was that the Soviets would not have been able to win the war without American help. Gromyko had said that we had retained our bases at the end of the war. This is simply untrue. The United States had demobilized its forces. The Soviet Union did not.

As for arms control Gromyko had spoken of "a wall constructed against arms and troop reductions," and of the Soviet proposal for a nuclear weapons ban. He had not mentioned, however, the U.S. proposal for international control of all nuclear weapons and activity—the Baruch Plan—which the Soviet Union turned down.<sup>8</sup>

Gromyko had also mentioned the U.S. concern for verification, and the President commented that yes, this is a U.S. concern and should be the concern of the Soviet Union and of other countries. He recalled that President Eisenhower had made his "open skies" proposal, which would have allowed each country to inspect everything that went on in the other, and the Soviets had rejected that. In addition, the United States had made at least nineteen proposals regarding nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had been unresponsive.

The President then turned to Gromyko and said, "You say you want to eliminate your weapons. Fine. We'll sign an agreement on that right now." He pointed out that the U.S. has already made proposals in that direction. For example, in the INF negotiations, the U.S. proposed that all INF systems be eliminated from Europe. When the Soviets did not accept that the U.S. proposed the lowest possible levels, and the Soviet Union still did not accept. As far as the START negotiations are concerned, the United States at first concentrated on ICBM's because they are the most frightening and the most destructive of the weapons. But the United States is prepared to include also submarines, aircraft, and other strategic systems.

The President noted that Gromyko had mentioned President Nixon and the SALT I Agreement and pointed out that the Soviet Union has deployed 7,000 warheads since the SALT I Agreement, and since the SALT II Agreement, has deployed 800 ballistic missiles. So far as INF is concerned, he showed Gromyko a chart depicting SS-20 deployments and noting the statements of various Soviet leaders that there was a balance, while each year the Soviet total mounted and the U.S. was making no deployments in Europe.

The President added that the United States had taken many tactical weapons out of Europe, whereas the Soviet Union had not, but has been adding to them. He said that so far as our armies are concerned, the United States has seventeen divisions and the Soviet Union 260 divisions.

The President then pointed out that the Soviets are saying they want peace and we are saying the same, but we need deeds. He agreed that there is a mountain of weapons, and made clear that the United States will keep pace with the Soviet buildup. But he asked what the purpose of a continued buildup can have, and suggested that we start reducing. He observed that reducing equally and verifiably would produce just as effective a defense for both countries as they have now.

The President pointed out that the United States does not have more warheads than the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union had developed several entire families of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. was developing only one. He noted that Gromyko had mentioned the cost of the competition, but referred to the U.S. experience when the previous administration had cancelled systems, but the Soviet Union did not reciprocate and slow its buildup.

In regard to anti-satellite systems, the President pointed out that the Soviets had a tested system and the U.S. did not, and therefore calls for a moratorium before the U.S. has tested a system and is on an equal basis were one-sided and self-serving. He added that his criticism of SALT II was that it simply legitimized the buildup of arms.

The President stressed, however, that we want peace and that we are willing to believe that the Soviets want peace. But the fact is that the United States did not walk away from the negotiating table. He agreed that we need deeds and specifically to resume negotiations on nuclear weapons.

*Gromyko* referred to the President's opening remark and said he wanted to assure the President that they did not believe he ate his own grandchildren or anyone else's.

Then Gromyko referred to the table the President had shown him of the buildup in Soviet nuclear weapons. He said that one should remember the way our respective nuclear weapons systems developed. At first the United States had a superior Air Force and the Soviets began to develop missiles. The United States then developed submarines and so the two systems developed in parallel, but resulted in structures that are quite different.

The President pointed out that the Soviets had gone on to outbuild the United States in submarines, to build more modern aircraft while the United States was still flying B-52s which are older than the pilots that fly them, and in addition, had developed several new missiles. The President added that in the START negotiations we did propose to concentrate initially on ICBM's, but that this was not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal and was simply based on the consideration that the land-based missiles are the most threatening. But we have agreed to talk about all the systems and to take them into account.

What we want, the President pointed out, is reductions. He recalled a statement by President Eisenhower that modern weapons are such that nations possessing nuclear weapons can no longer think of war in terms of victory or defeat, but only of destruction of both sides. We bear that in mind and want to reduce as much as possible. The President then asked why, if we both are of this mind, we cannot proceed to agree on the reduction of weapons.

Gromyko said that he wished to recall a few facts. At Vladivostok, the question of Soviet heavy missiles had been raised along with the question of the U.S. forward-based systems, and at that time, President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger had agreed that if the Soviet Union dropped its insistence on including forward-based systems, the United States would drop its insistence on restricting Soviet heavy missiles. <sup>10</sup> If now the United States insists upon raising the question of restraints on heavy missiles, the question of forward-based systems immediately arises.

Gromyko then turned to the British and French systems and asked how the Soviet Union could leave them out of account inasmuch as Britain and France were allies of the United States. He added that President Carter had a different opinion from President Reagan and recalled that once when he was at lunch at the White House, President Carter had said that in principle these systems should be included. 11

With regard to nuclear weapons, Gromyko said that he could give an answer as follows: "as soon as the United States corrects its position." He then asked rhetorically whether the U.S. considers the Soviets to be such frivolous people as not to know of American aircraft carriers and what they mean to the Soviet Union. According to Gromyko, each carrier has 40 planes which can carry nuclear weapons. Six times 40 equals 240 nuclear launchers which the U.S. is not willing to count at all.

The President interjected that the U.S. is willing to put this on the table in negotiations, but he pointed out that Gromyko seemed to forget that their SS-20s were targeted on our allies and even if NATO carried through all of its planned deployments, they would amount to only a fraction of the Soviet missiles targeted at Europe.

*Gromyko* then asked if we were willing to include tactical and theatre weapons, and whether the British and French systems were included.

The President stated that, no, we would not be willing to count British and French systems. In fact, he pointed out, there had been a net decline of nuclear weapons in Europe available to NATO.

*Gromyko* asked if the U.S. would include carrier-based aircraft, and the President, referring to the U.S. START position, reiterated that we had started by concentrating on ICBM's but that we were willing to consider aircraft and other systems in the overall negotiations.

*Gromyko* stated that there is no question of excluding carrier-based aircraft from the negotiations.

Secretary Shultz pointed out that the Soviet Union has a greater number of nuclear-capable aircraft than the United States, that so far as British and French systems are concerned, we had made it clear that when strategic levels were reduced substantially, there would be a time to consider British and French systems in the negotiations. The main point, however, is that the U.S. fully recognizes the differences in the structures of the nuclear forces of our two countries. We have been trying to generate a discussion which recognizes these as asymmetries. To search for a framework is a necessary ingredient in this process.

*Gromyko* asked if we were saying that the Soviet Union is concealing its aircraft.

*Shultz* said no, not concealing aircraft, but simply that they have more nuclear capable aircraft than the United States.

*Gromyko* retorted that that was incorrect, that we seemed to be counting cargo planes and other aircraft which do not carry nuclear weapons and observed that this was not serious reasoning.

Gromyko continued by saying that the U.S. position is that we should simply sit down, but the Soviet Union has experience with that. So far no one had mentioned the improper use of the language of ultimatums in these negotiations. Gromyko claimed that the U.S., in effect, said, "This is our plan, accept it. If not, there is a deadline that has to be met and we will deploy." In fact, that is what happened.

So, the U.S. must liquidate the results of that decision. The Soviet Union does not see any point in continuing negotiations otherwise.

The President asked how it would have been possible for NATO not to deploy under the circumstances of the SS-20 threat and the Soviet rejection of our zero proposal and also U.S. proposals to negotiate lowest possible equal levels.

*Gromyko* claimed that NATO now has 50 percent more nuclear weapons.

*The President* said that the proper procedure is to count each other's systems.

*Gromyko* then asked specifically about British and French systems and carrier-based aircraft. He asserted that if we count all of these systems and then compare, we will find that NATO is ahead.

The President disputed this, but noted that the time for lunch had come and invited Gromyko to stay a few minutes

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (5). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Matlock. This meeting took place in the Oval Office. According to the President's Daily Diary, from 3:03 to 3:54 p.m. on September 27, the President participated in a briefing for Gromyko's visit. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) McFarlane also briefed Reagan for the meeting with Gromyko at 9 a.m. on September 28. (Ibid.) No record of these meetings has been found.
- <sup>2</sup> On September 28, Reagan wrote in his diary: "The big day—Andrei Gromyko. Meeting held in Oval office. Five waves of photographers—1st time that many. I opened with my monologue and made the point that perhaps both of us felt the other was a threat then explained by the record we had more reason to feel that way than they did. His opener was about 30 min's, then we went into dialogue. I had taken notes on his pitch and rebutted with fact & figure a number of his points. I kept emphasizing that we were the two nations that could destroy or save the world. I figured they nurse a grudge that we don't respect them as a superpower. All in all 3 hrs. including lunch were I believe well spent. Everyone at our end thinks he's going home with a pretty clear view of where we stand." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, pp. 386 - 387)
- $\frac{3}{2}$  See Documents 34 and 74.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 76</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> See <u>footnote 3, Document 273</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> For the private meeting between Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on May 22, 1972, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–

- 1976, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 257.
- <sup>7</sup> See footnote 7, Document 267.
- <sup>8</sup> See footnote 5, Document 267.
- <sup>9</sup> See footnote 6, Document 267.
- <sup>10</sup> Ford and Brezhnev met in Vladivostok November 23-24, 1974, to discuss arms control. For documents related to this summit, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969-1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976, Documents 83 ♣-95 ♣.
- <sup>11</sup> Carter met with Gromyko on September 23, 1977. For their discussion of SALT, see <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, <u>Document 183</u> . ♣.
- 12 No official account of this private meeting was found. However, in his memoir, Shultz wrote: "As we were about to leave for lunch, the president took Gromyko aside and had him stay back in the Oval Office, where the two of them conversed in English without interpreters. The president later told me that in their private conversation he had been struck by Gromyko's description of the two superpowers sitting on top of ever-rising stockpiles of nuclear weapons and by Gromyko's statement that the Soviet Union wished to reduce the size of those piles. 'My dream,' Reagan had told him, 'is for a world where there are no nuclear weapons." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 484) Dobrynin also wrote of this private conversation: "Reporting later to us about the brief conversation, Gromyko observed that he did not quite understand what the excitement was all about. The president emphatically told him, as if this was a big secret, that his personal dream was a 'world without nuclear weapons.' Gromyko answered that nuclear disarmament was the 'question of all questions.' Both agreed that the ultimate goal should be the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And that was about all

there was to the private meeting." (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 556)

# 287. Memorandum of Conversation $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, September 28, 1984, 12:30-1:45 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

President's Meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at White House Lunch

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President

The Vice President

Secretary of State George P. Shultz

Secretary of the Treasury Donald T. Regan

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger

Edwin Meese III, Counselor to the President

James A. Baker, III, Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President

Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President

Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

John M. Poindexter, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

Assistant Secretary of State, Richard Burt

Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director European and Soviet Affairs, NSC

Dimitry Zarechnak, State Department Interpreter

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko

Georgiy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Aleksey Obukhov, Notetaker

Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Ambassador Vasiliy Makarov, Chief Aide to Foreign Minister Gromyko

Minister-Counselor Oleg Sokolov, USSR Embassy

Minister-Counselor Viktor Isakov, USSR Embassy

Ambassador Albert S. Chernyshov, Member of the Foreign Minister's Staff

Vladimir B. Lomeyko, Press Spokesman for the Foreign Minister

After a fair amount of preliminary informal conversation at the table, *Vice President Bush* asked Minister Gromyko whether he thought there was any hope for a solution to the Iraq-Iran war. *Gromyko* replied that he did not see any hope. He indicated that the Soviet Union had spoken several times with the participants, but they were not listening. It seemed as if the Iranians were planning a major offensive, but the Iraqis were confident that they would once again withstand it.

*Vice President Bush* commented on the tragic loss of life in the war and Gromyko agreed.

Secretary Shultz indicated that one of the difficult problems of the war was the attempt to disrupt shipping in the Gulf. Such attempts had not been very successful so far. *Gromyko* agreed with this.

Shultz compared the present situation with the one in 1973, indicating that the situation was much easier now since the U.S. had one hundred days worth of oil reserves in case anything should happen, and the oil market was much softer now than it was then.

Gromyko asked if Israel would withdraw from Lebanon.

Shultz pointed out that a senior U.S. diplomat, Dick Murphy, was in the area working on the situation. Shultz indicated that he thought it was clear that Israel wished to withdraw. Israel is concerned with southern Lebanon since it is the base from which guerillas attacked northern Israel. In Shultz' conversations with Assad and others it was clear that there was a recognition of the legitimacy of these security interests. The question was how to solve the problem. Shultz felt that it was quite clear that the present government of Lebanon could not assert enough authority to do this, and that Syria would have to be involved. UNIFIL would also have to play a role. As Gromyko was aware, Israel had dropped its requirement that Syria withdraw simultaneously. Israel would be ready to

withdraw if appropriate security arrangements could be made.

Shultz continued that, however, just as when Israel wanted to withdraw from other parts of Lebanon, it was asked not to for fear that this would bring about communal violence, there was a similar fear about Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. He felt that the role of UNIFIL was a very important one, and that Israel would withdraw if it felt that northern Israel was secure. What did Gromyko think of strengthening UNIFIL's role?

*Gromyko* replied that the UN Security Council would meet on this question.

Shultz noted that the Security Council would not be able to make a decision without seeing the options available. As the parties tried to work out a solution, they would ask whether a possibility exists to augment the UNIFIL role. If such a possibility exists, this would be one course of action. If it does not, then different options would have to be considered. But the general attitude is that the role of UNIFIL would be important.

Gromyko indicated that he had met with the Israeli Foreign Minister three days before, and that the latter was optimistic about southern Lebanon. However, the Security Council would have to decide the issue. Without UN Forces there would be no possibility of resolving the situation.

Shultz indicated his agreement.

*Gromyko* stated that if there is agreement on the part of Syria and Lebanon, and if other countries agree to send forces, then there would be good reason to take this course of action. But such a solution could not be a permanent

one. It could not be in effect "until the second coming of Christ."

Shultz joked that the latter could happen soon. He added in a more serious vein that he was pleased to hear this comment of Gromyko's, and noted that he and Gromyko had spoken of the importance of comparing notes on the Middle East. The U.S. would like to broaden its discussion with the Soviet Union with regard to the role of UNIFIL in the Mideast.

Gromyko stated that he wished to say something in the presence of the President. The Soviet Union had proposed to convene a conference on the Middle East, and all the Arab countries had agreed to this. Gromyko had spoken about this to the Israeli Foreign Minister, who had indicated that he thought it would be better to convene such a conference after normalization of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel. Shamir did not flatly say that such a conference was a bad idea.

Gromyko continued that no one at such a conference could force his views on anyone else, and that at such a conference, perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union would also learn how to talk to one another. Perhaps the President would consider to agreeing to such a conference.

Shultz stated that on the basis of his conversations with the Israeli Foreign Minister, he learned that Israel felt that such a conference would not be constructive, but would be used as propaganda by the participants. For this reason, the Israelis prefer direct negotiations with other countries, or negotiations through intermediaries.

Gromyko confirmed that the Israelis told him that they were concerned that the Arabs would use such a conference for propaganda. However, he felt that if the United States and the Soviet Union were to approach such a conference seriously, the Arab States would also take it seriously. He felt that Israel would have nothing to lose by participating in it. Israel did not wish to be in a state of war forever with the Arabs.

Shultz agreed that it was very important for Israel to find a solution which would bring peace to the region. Since the Soviet Union had contacts with the PLO, and the U.S. did not, and since the question of the PLO was at the center of much of the Mideast difficulties, PLO views would need to be reflected. What did Gromyko think of the coherence of the PLO (e.g., Arafat's "war" with Syria)?

Gromyko stressed that before such a conference could begin, the parties would have to agree that the Palestinians needed to have a territory to create their small independent state. Without such an agreement, the conference could not begin. A great deal of the terrorism in the Mideast is nourished by the fact that the Palestinians have no home. Gromyko described the terrible conditions that he observed in the camps in Syria.

The President noted that one of the problems was that the Arab States did not want the Palestinians to have their own state. Hundreds of thousands of the Palestinians live in other areas. If the Arab States could give these Palestinians citizenship, then one would only have to deal with those Palestinians that had left the area. These could settle in the West Bank. However, there would not be enough room for all the Palestinians to live there.

*Gromyko* noted that there were about two million Palestinians.

*The President* observed that if all of Israel were given to them, they would not be able to live there.

*Gromyko* said that it would not be practical to try to assimilate them in the Arab countries.

Shultz observed that the U.S. felt that the West Bank would not be appropriate as an area for a national entity since there would be no possibility of having an adequate economic basis there, and there were other limitations. Such an area would need to be associated with another State, and be a part of it, as California is a part of the United States. Such an area could be identified with Jordan. But the Palestinians living in other Arab countries should be encouraged to assimilate themselves in those countries, and those countries should be encouraged to take them in. For this reason, the President made a proposal a few years ago on creating a Palestinian unit affiliated with Jordan but with enough of an identity to satisfy the Palestinians' need to have a "passport," so to speak.

The President repeated the comparison to the status of California, which has its own government, within the United States.

Gromyko indicated that he had told Shamir that the Soviet Union considered that Israel had a right to exist as a State. The Soviet Union stuck by the 1947 UN Resolution to create two independent states in Palestine—one Israeli, one Palestinian. The Soviet Union did not agree with Arab extremists who felt that Israel ought to be eliminated and pushed into the sea. The Soviet Union would stick by this

position even if Israel would not ask it to. But Israel must free the territories it has occupied. This occupation is a source of permanent hostility and war. At the moment the Arab States are weak and disunited. But who knows what will happen in the future? Israel should normalize its relations with the Arab States. It could serve as a good example to them in the area of economic development and science. It does not need to rely on aggression in order to have a firm basis for existence.

The President stressed that the nub of the problem was that the Arabs say that Israel does not have a right to exist, and that they will not recognize it.

*Gromyko* replied that Syria would be ready to recognize Israel's existence.

The President stated that perhaps a solution could be found, in that case.

*Gromyko* noted that Libya might not want to go along, but added that it would if all the others agreed.

The President noted that time was running short, but said that he would like to return to the idea of an umbrella arrangement for continuing discussions of issues between the two countries.

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union was not against having consultations, discussions and meetings, including along the lines proposed in the President's UN speech. But this is not what is needed if we approach the subject seriously. Consultations are needed which lead to practical results. If it is the Middle East that we are discussing, we need to arrive at agreed solutions; if it is nuclear arms, then we need to work out a plan. It is not enough to talk

and have exchanges of opinions. The same applies to space weapons. The sides have not even begun to discuss the latter. If they do begin to discuss the issue, one will pull one way and the other will pull the other way, and the result could be a negative one. The U.S. has a rigid position which is a mistaken one, aimed at militarizing space. The Soviet Union would like to ask the U.S. not to take that route, but rather to change its policies in order to arrive at peaceful relations between the two countries as well as to create an overall peaceful atmosphere. The sides should not talk of eliminating each other, but rather of finding ways to peacefully coexist.

The President stated that he has long believed that difficulties arise when countries talk about each other rather than to each other. He wished to comment about Gromyko's reference to "rigid positions." On this issue there were two positions, one on each side. The Soviet Union wished to talk about space weapons, and the U.S. wished to talk about nuclear arms, which, as Gromyko had said, it would be better to rid the world of. The United States also wished to talk about space weapons, but the Soviet Union said that if we do not first talk about space weapons, there can be no negotiations on other subjects. However, a formula could be found covering all of the issues and the sides could thus rid themselves of the suspicions which each has of the other. The best way of allaying such suspicions is to have such talks as well as corresponding actions. The two countries should find a way to discuss both space weapons and nuclear weapons.

*Gromyko* stressed that there needed to be precise agreement on what prevention of militarization of space means. The other issues the President had mentioned were equally important, and ways needed to be found to have serious negotiations on them. But the Soviet Union was

afraid that the intent of the U.S. was to make a sort of "layered pie" where space weapons would only occupy an incidental place, and strategic and medium range nuclear forces would be the most important thing. The Soviet Union could not agree to this. It could not agree to negotiate along the lines laid down in Geneva, and the Soviet Union had explained why, namely, because the U.S. had already deployed the first part of its new group of nuclear weapons in Europe, thus creating an artificial obstacle to negotiations.

Gromyko continued that the sides should think about how to deal with strategic and medium range nuclear weapons, but if the U.S. had not changed its position on them, there would be no use in talking. Therefore, these issues should be separated from the question of space weapons.

The President emphasized that the U.S. felt that all of these questions were equally important, and that space weapons would not be treated as a sideline. He imagined that there could be separate concurrent negotiations on these issues. He was proposing to establish a framework where serious senior officials could talk about the militarization of space in one set of talks, and equally important people could discuss other questions at other talks, to work on them simultaneously. Gromyko had said in his UN speech that the Soviet Union wished to rid the world of all of these weapons, including space weapons. The U.S. says the same. If the sides agree about the desired results, they should be able to find a method of discussion which would lead to such results. Each side would send its representatives and would "ride herd" on them.

*Gromyko* stated that it should not be a case of all these people sitting down at one table to discuss all of the issues.

The President stressed that it would not have to be discussed all together at one table. He also believed that those who were expert in questions of strategic arms need not necessarily be the best qualified to discuss space weapons. He envisioned these as separate negotiations. But the Soviet Union should not ask the U.S. to discuss only the one issue without the other two. Both countries should have their way by discussing all three issues.

*Gromyko* stated that all three issues were important, but the two sides had no common ground on the other two issues, and therefore, could not move forward on them. Because of this, the third issue would suffer, especially if the first two were tied to it. The sides would find themselves in a thick forest from which they would not be able to get out. The Soviet side had proposed a more practical path. The U.S. was saying that the sides should resume the Geneva negotiations, but this would not be possible unless the U.S. changed its position at those negotiations. The crux of the matter was the deployment of U.S. missiles. The President should ask his technical and political experts to reexamine their views and change the U.S. position, and to tell the Soviet Union once this had been done. Moreover, development of a broad scale ABM system would kill all such negotiations, and would waste hundreds of billions or maybe even trillions of dollars. If such developments went forward, even a hundred wise men might not be able to reverse the process.

The President noted that it was late, but stressed that the U.S. could not agree to talk only on one of these issues without attempting to find solutions to the others—issues which Gromyko himself had emphasized at the UN. The U.S. felt all three of these issues were important. Perhaps there could be agreement not to implement solutions on any of the issues until all three had been agreed. But the

main thing would be to continue contacts at levels where such results could be achieved.

*Gromyko* noted that the Soviet Union was not against contacts and meetings, but meetings were not a substitute for negotiations. He had already indicated that each of these subjects should be treated separately.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials President-Gromyko—Working Papers (7). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Zarechnak. This lunch took place in the State Dining Room at the White House. In his memoir, Dobrynin recalled of the reception and lunch: "Nancy Reagan appeared during the cocktail party before lunch. Gromyko, after the introductions, proposed a toast to her. He had cranberry juice, her glass was filled with soda water. 'We both are certainly fond of drinking,' he remarked with characteristic dry humor. Gromyko had a short chat with the president's wife. 'Is your husband for peace or for war?' he asked. She said that he of course was all for peace. 'Are you sure?' Gromyko wondered. She was one hundred percent sure. Why, then, does not he agree to our proposals?' Gromyko insisted. What proposals? she asked. Someone interrupted the conversation, but right before lunch Gromyko reminded Mrs. Reagan, 'So, don't forget to whisper the word "peace" in the president's ear every night.' She said, 'Of course I will, and I'll also whisper it in yours, too.' I must report that Gromyko got a kick out of this exchange and recounted it to the Politburo with great animation." (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 555)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 7</u>, <u>Document 285</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See footnote 7, Document 267

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Gromyko addressed the UNGA on September 27. Telegram 2345 from USUN, September 17, provided an

analysis of the speech. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840617-0023) For the full text of Gromyko's speech, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 39 (October 24, 1984), pp. 1-6. Key sections of the speech were printed in the *New York Times*, September 28, 1984, p. A12.

### 288. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, September 29, 1984, 10 a.m.-12:20 p.m.

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

US

Secretary of State George P. Shultz Ambassador Arthur A. Hartman Assistant Secretary Richard Burt Jack F. Matlock R. Mark Palmer Thomas W. Simons, Jr. Dimitry Zarechnak, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Viktor F. Isakov
Aleksey A. Obukhov
Vladilen A. Merzlikin
Vasiliy G. Makarov
Viktor Sukhodrev Interpreter

After a few introductory remarks, *Secretary Shultz* suggested to Foreign Minister Gromyko that perhaps Gromyko would like to begin by giving his impressions after yesterday's meeting,<sup>2</sup> and he would also say a few words. He had the impression from the message from the Soviet embassy that Gromyko's time was limited. Therefore, the sides should get down to discussion of substance.

*Gromyko* began by noting that the sides had spoken about contacts, consultations and meetings at various levels. The Soviet side considers that each time a meeting comes up the subject and the level of each should be the subject of prior arrangements between us. If both sides desire it, representatives of the sides could then meet. Clarity is

needed on this. It did not mean that there should be a whole string of meetings, like a conference broken at various intervals. Gromyko felt the US had the same approach, and the USSR was not against it, for reasons that he had explained. But a specific task should be set for such meetings; there must be prior agreement on the subject matter and personnel for each. This was the first thing that he wished to say.

Gromyko continued that he thought the sides could make more intensive use of their diplomatic channels. At present, they are not being used with sufficient intensity. Of course, this is not the fault of the channels or the diplomats. It is up to those who give diplomats their instructions to make better use of them. An example of where such channels could be used much more effectively was the area of regional issues.

Gromyko indicated that one specific question of a regional nature was the Middle East. The sides should not have to wait for meetings on the ministerial level or other high levels to discuss the issue. Surely we are not limited to this. A simpler way would be to use diplomatic channels for a more extensive exchange of views. The reservations which the US had about starting a dialogue with the USSR on the Middle East are not justified. The US seems to think that its ties with Israel give it a very secure footing, along with contacts with one or two other countries. Of course, the Soviet side is not begging; it is up to the US to decide, but common sense should prevail. It would be acting correctly for the US to have an exchange of views and to seek mutual solutions in the Middle East. The same could apply to other areas as well.

Gromyko recalled the Secretary's statement in Stockholm where he said that it is unfortunate that Europe is divided.<sup>3</sup>

It was clear that the Secretary had in mind the results of World War II. Why was such a statement made? It was shocking. How could something like that have been said? The US and USSR fought on the same side in World War II. The USSR was also allied with England. France—although it had no organized military force—and other countries had come in, but the real alliance was this triad. The results of that war have been written into history. They are firm and permanent. What does it mean to speak of "division?" What does the US not like about the situation there? What about the agreement signed in Potsdam? This was one of the greatest events of history, where the Soviet Union, the US and England confirmed the results of the war in writing. Pre-war Germany was no more. Now there are two German states. There are fixed post-war borders between the two countries, as in the rest of Europe.

Gromyko continued that the USSR, the US, Great Britain and other countries must and do respect what was written into history by the blood of those who perished. The USSR was more than shocked to hear the US say at Stockholm that the "division" of Europe was an unpleasant thing. This view was repeated in subsequent NATO statements. The USSR noted how the US, if it had truly thought through its position, looked at the common victory, the results of the war, and the obligations which it had taken upon itself as a result of conferences during and after the war. When they read about this, surely people in the Soviet Union wonder how this could be so, how to deal with a country which had radically changed its position on the obligations it had assumed.

Gromyko continued that the USSR would like the US to know that no one—no one—can change the reality of the situation in Europe. But such statements as the one to which he had referred poison the atmosphere and cast a dark shadow over relations between the two major powers. So the USSR asks for realism on the part of the US. We should cherish what has been achieved, and not make statements which poison our relations, where there is already enough disarray.

The US was certainly aware of West German reactions to such US statements, Gromyko went on. There are people in the FRG who reach out and grasp at such things for nationalistic aims, not unlike those expressed by the Nazis before the war. Gromyko mentioned that he had spoken recently with Foreign Minister Genscher. The West Germans do not like it when the representatives of the USSR talk of this matter. Genscher said that there was almost no one in Germany who believed in this. Gromyko had said that Genscher should look around him more attentively, and then he would see that there were such people. This, too, is an obstacle to our relations, and it would be good to remove it.

The Secretary said that he would talk about Europe in reference to what Gromyko had said; that he would then like to use the technique which Gromyko had used last Wednesday, i.e. to "headline" certain questions; and finally that he would return to some of Gromyko's thoughts about how to conduct relations between the two countries.

On Europe, the Secretary said the US does not want to change the treaties Gromyko had referred to. It wants to see those treaties implemented, just as it wants implementation of the Helsinki accords. But it was descriptively true to say that Europe was divided. Arrangements and symbols exist which demonstrate that. For example, the leading countries of Western Europe belong to the NATO alliance, and the leading countries of Eastern Europe belong to the Warsaw Pact. This is a

symbol of division. The wall in Berlin is a symbol of division. It is difficult for people to travel between countries, which also shows the same thing. The fact of division is simply an observation. The US thinks it is not a desirable situation. There should be an easy flow of people throughout Europe, as there is in Western Europe. This would not change the national identity of countries; but it would increase the sense of ease in relations among countries. A division does exist in Europe, and the Secretary had simply wanted to call attention to it, and to the fact that things would be better if it were not there.

The Secretary continued that if events should ease this division and if all the things which Gromyko had mentioned, as well as the Helsinki accords, are implemented by the decision of our governments, and there is more freedom for people to move around, it would be so much the better. Our objective is not to call for a change in borders or for a change of the treaties concluded after the war. It is simply to call attention to the fact of division and to say that it would be better if such a division did not exist. To some extent, the kind of measures he and Gromyko had mentioned in Stockholm were one way of resolving this issue. The same applied to the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, as well as to other negotiations.

The Secretary said he was glad to have a chance to talk about what he had meant regarding the division of Europe, which was that it was simply a description of what is so, and the fact that it is undesirable.

The Secretary then proceeded to "headline" certain issues.

On arms control, the Secretary said he wished to explain once again what the President had in mind. What he was about to say was the result of many hours he had spent alone with the President struggling together to see how we could find ways to produce forward movement in relations with the USSR.

As he saw it, we have Gromyko's "question of questions." The President had thought this description quite apt. After Gromyko had left, he had mentioned it several times. Then we have nuclear arms as the preeminent question, and here the President felt that the US had made a number of good proposals. From the time he put them forward, he had thought a lot about the issues from both standpoints. He also even asked that a group of experts be assembled who would play the role of Soviet experts thinking from the Soviet viewpoint, in order to be able to understand it better.

*Gromyko* asked in English how they had behaved. *The Secretary* replied that they were much tougher than Gromyko. *Gromyko* smiled and said in English that he would have to take this into account.

The Secretary continued by saying that the President had struggled with this question of questions. He felt that there was a lot of US thinking which the Soviet Union was not aware of. We see, as Gromyko had noted, that in the area of space weapons and in the general area of defensive weapons there is a great deal of technological development, as there is in the area of offensive weapons. A lot of research is going on. We do not yet know where it will go, but it will change things. This is related to the interaction between offensive and defensive systems, and the President feels this should be worked on.

The Secretary continued that the President feels, as the Soviets feel, that there was a possibility of chemical and biological weapons getting loose, and this would pose a

great threat. We need to do everything we can to get it under control. He was often asked about the Iran-Iraq war, and he replied that it has nothing to do with Soviet-American competition. But it was the bloodiest conflict going on today, and the use of chemical weapons in it was very bad. *Gromyko* interjected that this was true. This was an example of the threat of chemical warfare, *the Secretary* went on, and the US had warned Iraq about this.

The Secretary continued that these things frustrate the President. He takes the Stockholm negotiations very seriously. In his Dublin speech and privately through our Stockholm negotiator he tried to be responsive to the Soviet proposal on non-use of force. In the field of nuclear testing, which is a sort of sub-set of offensive weapons, the President is also anxious to see us capable of moving things forward. As we see it, we could do better in calibrating the levels of tests, and that is why the President suggested that we invite Soviet experts to witness a test in our country, and that the Soviets invite ours to theirs. This would give us more confidence about what's going on, so we can get on with it.

The Secretary commented that the President says to him, "George, there's all this substance out there, and we have other ideas, but we don't seem to be able to get to it." That was where the idea of an umbrella came from. Maybe the way to get at these issues is not to go back to Geneva, but we need a forum we can both agree on, where we can talk about how to get all these things moving along, how to divide the parameters and perhaps to give our negotiators a kick in the rear end to get on with it. The Secretary concluded that he had wanted to explain how the concept had emerged from the President's frustration.

Continuing with his "headlines," the Secretary noted that Gromyko had alluded to the Far East in New York, and that he wanted to talk about the tensions on the Korean Peninsula. Both sides would like to ease these tensions. The US felt that the best way to do that would be to have more talks between the two Koreas. The relief which North Korea is now providing to South Korea is a good thing. The Secretary could assure Gromyko that South Korea wants to have a dialogue with North Korea. He had met with the South Korean Foreign Minister, who had told him that South Korea would like to be admitted to the UN, and hoped that the Soviet Union would not stand in the way of this. He also wants the Soviets to know that South Korea will not stand in the way of North Korea's membership either. If the two Koreas were both members of the UN, this could provide a good setting for contacts between them.

The Secretary said he wanted to say two things about bilateral US-Soviet relations. These were issues which were not directly involved with the "question of questions," but did reflect life. The Secretary indicated that he had a long list of such questions before him, but he wished to especially point out two.

The first was that the US is supporting the revival of exchanges of young political leaders. He understood there is a visit planned soon in this connection, and we support that. The second issue was that the two sides had begun negotiations on a new exchanges agreement, and that this was a good thing. As the President had said, exchanges among people are among the most constructive things we can achieve.

The second thing was in the economic area, the Secretary went on. He said that whenever a meeting was scheduled between him and Gromyko, he was flooded with letters requesting various things. He had gotten one such letter from the Secretary of Commerce, and all Secretaries of Commerce want to do business. He especially wanted the Secretary to tell Gromyko that the proposed economic meeting in December should go forward. He was sending a good man, Lionel Olmer, to head the US side, and he hoped this would lead to a meeting on the ministerial level. The aim of such cooperation would be to stimulate non-strategic trade. The Secretary of Commerce is a former businessman and is serious about what he speaks of.

The Secretary said that he would now like to turn to the question of contacts and exchanges between our countries. If he had understood Gromyko correctly, his idea had been that meetings on various subjects need to be monitored and controlled through our foreign ministries, and that there should not be meetings for the sake of meetings. He agreed with that, and we should be able to organize our respective governments accordingly. There would also need to be a process by which to decide on the level and subject of such meetings, and we should be able to achieve that.

Gromyko had touched upon regional issues, including the Middle East, the Secretary went on. We had discussed this topic the day before at lunch, and he thought the discussion had been very worthwhile. We have had the US specialist handling the Middle East, Ambassador Murphy, out in the area, and he was due back that afternoon. We also have on the table a proposal he had made to Ambassador Dobrynin that two or three experts on the Middle East on the US side get together with about the same number of Soviet Middle East experts to discuss this issue. Ambassador Murphy would be our designee for such talks, and the Secretary said he would like to sit in himself. These discussions ought to be confidential. The Secretary did not know what results would come from such meetings,

but at a minimum there would be an exchange of views. Moreover, each side would then understand better the thinking of the other side, so that there would not be any miscalculations, and perhaps areas of mutual interest could be found and ways to achieve results. For example, on Lebanon, both countries would like to see Israel withdraw, both would like to see more stability, and are supportive of the role of UNIFIL. The Soviet Union has contacts with Syria, and the US also has some contacts with Syria. There are ingredients for some understanding of what needs to be done. If the Soviet Union is ready for such a meeting, the US is also ready.

The Secretary noted that the US had also spoken about similar meetings on Southern Africa, and as the President had said, we would also be ready for meetings on various other areas. Discussions did not necessarily need to be conducted only in connection with trouble spots.

Sometimes trouble can be avoided by timely discussions. There are only two countries that are genuinely world powers, and if we can compare notes on a systematic basis perhaps we can get something out of it.

The Secretary said we wanted to stress that the US was not interested in empty talk. Such talk can be counterproductive, since people can expect too much and feel that something is being accomplished, whereas actually nothing is. The US is interested in moving things along in many areas. Sometimes meetings can be about important subjects such as arms control. Sometimes, meetings on a lot of little things can create a better environment for things to happen in other areas. An example of this is the economic field, to deal with the Don Kendalls of this world. The US is for discussions but the form will vary with the subject matter, and if there is no movement in one specific discussion, it could be decided to

terminate them and to move to discussions in a more fruitful area.

The Secretary said he wished to return to the essential importance of arms control, and to convey again the President's sense of frustration that no progress is being made. The President believes that there is lots of room for substantive discussion, but none is taking place. He's looking for some way to solve this. He has made proposals, but he's willing to listen to other proposals; the question is how to bring about forward movement.

*Gromyko* said he was glad to note what the Secretary had said about the fact that the US remains dedicated to the obligations it had assumed during and after the war regarding Europe, and that the Soviet side had misinterpreted what had been said at Stockholm and in other statements. At the same time, when the Secretary had made that statement, and there were subsequent statements by the US and its Allies about this subject, these statements were not accompanied by the type of explanation that the Secretary had just given, i.e., the obligation to abide by former agreements. If it is true that the US and its Allies feel this way, why is it necessary for the US alone and subsequently together with its Allies to make statements that it is necessary to seek to bring about a unified German state? What prompted this? Such statements are picked up by certain forces in West Germany which Gromyko had spoken of, and interpreted by them in a very definite way.

Gromyko said he would not want to see a contradiction in the US position between loyalty to post-war agreements and how we see the future of Europe. Statements should not be made indicating the goal of a unified German state; otherwise, contradictions would exist. Gromyko repeated that he was glad to hear the Secretary's statement about US loyalty to the obligations it undertook as an ally. Perhaps the Secretary underestimated the significance of what he had said. But everything that runs counter to it should fall away. The Soviet Union for its part has been loyal to the spirit and letter of the Allied agreements, and will observe them scrupulously.

Gromyko observed that the Secretary had said that there should be recognition that a division exists between the countries of Europe, citing Berlin as an example, where everything was not as it should be. This was an exaggeration. The Soviet side felt that the Berlin Agreement was being well implemented on the whole, and that the parties to it had not raised serious complaints. Of course, there are differences in Europe. The US and its allies and the Soviets and their allies had many differences on Europe, and on international affairs generally, including those discussed forcefully and vigorously the day before. There are many divisions in the world, in many regions, for example in the Middle East, in the Far East, in Southern Africa, in the Caribbean. So things do not always go smoothly, but should we call these differences "divisions?" Of course the US can use the words it wants, but it is important to understand what each side means. The most important thing is that the US remains faithful to the agreements it signed as an ally, and that would be no sense in attempting to unify Germany. Such an attempt is a chimera, an illusion, and it would be better for the US as well as the USSR not to build policies on illusions, but on reality. If we build our policies on reality, relations between our two countries and with other countries are bound to improve.

With regard to chemical weapons, Gromyko indicated that the Secretary had read his thoughts, for he also wished to speak about this subject, since it was indeed an important one, and the Soviet side attached great importance to it. A great amount of chemical weapons is being produced. The USSR knows that the US is producing them, and the Soviet Union is not a saint either, and needs to think about these things. So it would be good if our countries stopped the production of chemical weapons and instituted an effective ban on them. This would be a good step forward in the struggle to achieve peace. It would be important in itself, and a successful resolution of this issue would also make it easier to examine other issues, perhaps even the question of nuclear arms. So the USSR asks the US Government to seriously look at this issue. These weapons are not needed by the interests of the US, the USSR or any other state.

Gromyko observed that both sides had made proposals on verifying a ban on chemical weapons. But on verification he had one remark: he did not think anything would come of proposals that seek to trick or outsmart the other side. There was something of that sort in the US proposal in Geneva, where the US indicated that everything government-owned should be open to verification. It was clear that this was aimed at the Soviet Union and other states with public ownership of property. Verification would be different in the US and other countries, where ownership of property is not in the hands of the State. Such an approach will not work. It is artificial, and it has made the US look the worse for proposing it. The USSR has been told by other countries that the US proposal was made with the purpose of not having an agreement. But it would be good to have an agreement.

Gromyko said the next question he was going to raise was not one which he often spoke about with the Secretary. The US was aware of the Soviet Union's relations with Japan, just as the Soviet Union is aware of US relations with Japan. The Soviet Union wants only good relations, good-neighborly relations, with that country. This is an obligation that comes from history itself. However, the USSR has been observing how relations between the US and Japan have been developing over a long period of time, and this has led the USSR to conclude that the US wishes to increase Japanese military power—at a level that is senseless because it is simply not needed for a country that wishes to live in peace with its neighbors, including the Soviet Union.

Gromyko continued that some circles seeking to formulate Japanese policies have perhaps concluded from this US support that they can increase Japan's military expenditures and harden its foreign policy. But this is not at all necessary. The Soviet Union is not against having good relations with Japan. The US is demonstratively showing that in Japan a new hostile anti-Soviet force is being born. This is a strange thing to see. The events of the last war have not yet receded that far into history. How often the US asked for Soviet assistance in the war against Japan! This was done in Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta, at the level of principle and with an increasing level of intensity. Sometimes it was just Roosevelt and Stalin alone. The Soviet Union promised to help the United States and kept its promise. The main Japanese land force in the Far East was essentially defeated by the Soviet Union, and Pentagon specialists can indicate how much this cost the Soviet Union.

Gromyko continued that the Soviet Union respects its obligations, and did not understand why Japan had to be militarized, why the US was attempting to foster hostile attitudes against the Soviet Union. It would be in the US interest to encourage Japan to be friendly with the USSR. The Soviet Union is not against friendly relations between Japan and the US, but if this is aimed against the Soviet

Union, the latter would have to and does take this into consideration, including in its military policies, for the sake of self-defense. From the standpoint of future policy, the US should perhaps examine all of this from a higher, longer-term vantage point.

The Secretary said he wanted to speak about the three questions Gromyko had raised.

On Germany, he said that the question of reunification was not a contemporary question for the US. The US is not against this, but it is not pushing for it. It would be determined in the future. It is not a contemporary issue. That was not the point. The point we do pick up, and favor, is that contacts between the two Germanies can be expected to increase. This is inevitable; they have a similar culture and language, and there are many family ties. Such contacts should be encouraged. But this is completely separate from the question of reunifying Germany. No one is pushing that except maybe a few people in Germany.

On chemical weapons, the Secretary indicated that the US was interested in bilateral dialogue on this with the USSR. There had been some bilateral talks in Geneva within the multilateral framework. This is an area where the US is ready to push its negotiators to get ahead to an agreement to rid the world of these weapons, which we agree should be the objective. With regard to Gromyko's assertion that the US proposal is deceptive or tricky, since it did not take into consideration the difference between different social and economic systems, he wanted to say that the US had no such intention. The US would be glad to sit down with the Soviet Union and explain how it sees the matter. For the US, private companies doing business with the government would be part of the system subject to verification. They would not be exempted if they did

business with the government. But to achieve progress, we need to look at the words of the proposal, or at other wordings. We agree on the objective, and on the importance of verification. It is not only important but difficult, in many ways more difficult than verification of major nuclear offensive weapons. But the US is ready to work with the Soviets to find an answer.

The Secretary wished to say something with regard to Japan, and Asia in general, since he had spent a lot of time there both as a private businessman and as a government official. Japan is seeking to build a defensive force. It did not want to build up an offensive machine, and he did not think Japan's neighbors would want that. But Japan needs to have a defensive capability. What affects Japan's thinking is the great volume of Soviet ships passing by, of aircraft which it observes, and the SS-20's within range of Japan. It finds these things disturbing. The Secretary said he knew the Soviets did not like to hear about the northern islands, but both the USSR and the US know that the northern islands are a very big issue in Soviet-Japanese relations, and will continue to be one.

The Secretary observed more generally with regard to Asia that it was a place of great dynamism. The people there are smart, they have drive, they are industrious, with strong goals. They are ingenious. He felt that we would hear more and more from them. We already see this in Japan, the most developed of the Asian nations. It has the most creative technical economy, and the US is competing with it in all technical fields. The other nations of the area are also very industrious; this is true of the Koreans and the Chinese too, whether they are on the mainland or in Taiwan or in other places, even San Francisco. So the US and USSR should pay attention to Asia, and if a fruitful pattern of regional

discussions could be established between them, Asia should get due attention.

With regard to Japan, the Secretary indicated that yes, that country should be able to defend its territory and territorial waters and waters nearby. We think it should have the capacity to be less dependent on us. The US is working to have strong and friendly relations with Japan. Japan is a tough competitor, but the US is nevertheless improving the climate for friendly relations.

Gromyko pointed out that a great deal of attention had been paid the day before, by the President, the Secretary and Gromyko himself, to what both sides considered the most important question of nuclear arms. This was justified, since it was the main axis around which many other issues turned, both of a bilateral and international nature. For this reason, he had tried to stress both the acute nature of the issue and the urgency of our considering and trying to resolve it while it was not yet too late.

Gromyko said he wanted once again to emphasize the tremendous importance of seeing this issue resolve. He asked the Secretary to tell the President on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership and Konstantin Chernenko personally that they consider it the most acute question in the world today. It hangs over the world and all other unsolved issues like an evil dark cloud.

Gromyko said he had had the impression that the President had once or twice been close to saying, as had the Secretary, that the principle of equality and equal security was acceptable to the US. If this was so, then practical policies should be built on this principle. But he had not discerned any commitment by the US to follow up and

observe this principle in terms of practice. The Soviet Union would like the US to seriously analyze this question and other similar ones which depend on it. Perhaps conclusions could be arrived at which would help us to consider and ultimately to solve these issues. The Soviet Union considers that the question of nuclear weapons is the key to the possibility of preserving peace, and even life on earth. Many people are speaking this way these days, both ordinary people and political leaders, but they give different contents to their words. This is an issue on which we should work night and day, and our practical policies should be aimed at resolving it. There should be not only good words, but political deeds to resolve the question of nuclear arms, be they strategic, medium range or designed for outer space. Gromyko stressed that his hope was that the President would pay great attention to this very important and urgent issue.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to convey to the President his thanks for his courtesy in receiving him, and concluded that if it appeared appropriate for him and the Secretary to have a subsequent meeting, they could be in touch.

The Secretary said that on the last question Gromyko had raised, he wanted to indicate that the US did not seek domination or superiority over the Soviet Union. As the President had said, nuclear arms is the main question and the proper ultimate objective should be to eliminate them altogether. This means that our course should be toward reducing them, along with working on non-proliferation. The two sides should find a pattern to reduce their nuclear arsenals that keeps them in equality as reductions take place and sufficiently strong to maintain deterrence. That is what the President is aiming at.

On Gromyko's last point about meetings of foreign ministers and others, the Secretary said we think such meetings could be useful if the groundwork were to be prepared in a good way. He also wanted to return to what he had said in response to Gromyko's point about better use of diplomatic channels to identify subjects and people for meetings where fruitful discussions can take place, and to encourage that.

The Secretary said that he would think over everything which Gromyko had said, would carefully review the notes in order that there be no misunderstanding, and talk over things with the President. He would then be in touch with Ambassador Dobrynin to review where we are, and he hoped that Gromyko would do likewise with Ambassador Hartman. Perhaps the sides could see if they could not come up with a plan to move things forward. Any plan which would be even remotely adequate would have to deal with the question of questions, i.e., nuclear arms, as well as with outer space.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he felt that the combination of meetings with Gromyko had been the most worthwhile that he had had with him, and he had some sense that the two sides might possibly be seeing genuine dialogue that could lead again to some real interaction. The US intends to pursue things in this light. The day before, Gromyko and the President had agreed "to stay in touch." The Secretary planned to say he and Gromyko had agreed to the same thing, namely, that he expects to keep in touch, not casually but carefully, through diplomatic channels.

*Gromyko* concluded by saying that the Secretary would understand that the Soviet side would not make any references to persons in order that its words not be

misinterpreted, at least in this country, in the political context.  $\underline{^9}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Zarechnak; cleared by Simons. The meeting took place at the Department of State. In a September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz wrote: "I sensed somewhat more flexibility on his part concerning how to get going, and I think that hearing your candid and intense views probably helped." He continued: "Looking over our meetings with Gromyko this week, I think they are the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years. We are addressing real issues, and even—in Gromyko's case—revealing sensitivities that the Soviets usually conceal, on Germany and Japan and the fear of losing what they achieved in the War. This kind of frank discussion on substance cannot help but be useful, in contrast to talking past each other. Moreover, in today's meeting, Gromyko began to display a measure of genuine interest in the expanded dialogue you have proposed. On the other hand, because he was so defensive, he revealed no new substance at this time." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko—Working Papers (2))
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Documents 286</u> and <u>287</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 5, Document 159.
- <sup>4</sup> Genscher and Gromyko met in New York on the afternoon of September 25 during the UNGA session. Earlier that day, Genscher and Shultz had a breakfast meeting and a discussion about German-Soviet and U.S.-Soviet relations. (Telegram Secto 11006 from the Secretary's delegation in New York to the Department and sent for information

Immediate to Bonn; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0153)

<sup>5</sup> September 26.

6 Gromyko proposed a non-use of force pledge in his January 18 speech at the CDE. See footnote 3, Document 159. For Reagan's speech in Dublin on June 4, see also footnote 3, Document 224. On September 11, the opening day of the third round of the CDE, Reagan made the following statement: "The U.S. and other Western Nations have proposed at the Stockholm conference a series of concrete measures for information, observation, and verification, designed to reduce the possibility of war by miscalculation or surprise attack. These measures would apply to the whole of Europe from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has taken a more rhetorical approach to the Conference, seeking the adoption of declarations which are embodied in other international agreements. In an effort to bridge this difference in our approaches, I made it clear in my address to the Irish Parliament in June that the U.S. will consider the Soviet proposal for a declaration on the nonuse of force as long as the Soviet Union will discuss the concrete measures needed to put that principle into action. This new move on our part has not yet been met with a positive response from the Soviet Union." (Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1271-1272)

<sup>7</sup> Lionel Olmer, the Under Secretary of Commerce for International Trade, was the head of the U.S. working group of experts set to meet in Moscow in January 1985 to prepare for a possible meeting of the Joint Commercial Commission. See <a href="Document 351">Document 351</a>. The following telegrams provide additional information: Telegram 318911 to Moscow, October 26; telegram 15041 from Moscow, November 27; telegram 15504 to Moscow, January 17, 1985. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File,

Electronic Telegrams, D840685-0192, D840756-0771, and D850037-0152, respectively)

<sup>8</sup> Donald Kendall was the CEO of PepsiCo, Inc.

<sup>9</sup> In his September 29 memorandum to Reagan summarizing his meeting with Gromyko, Shultz concluded: "I think we can afford to hope that Gromyko will carry an accurate account of his talks here back to his colleagues in the leadership, and that it will make an impression that will be useful as they review our relationship in the months ahead. Our election will obviously be one factor they will take into account, and the substance of what we are proposing will be the best demonstration to them that we mean serious business. But their own leadership situation will also be a primary, if not the primary factor, in whether and how they move; there we know only that the picture is uncertain, and we do not know when it will become clear enough for them to move strongly in any direction. As before, therefore, our policy should continue to be quiet, consistent, and steady-as-you-go." See footnote 1, above.

## 289. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 2, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's 10/1 Lunch with Dobrynin

Art had another good session at lunch yesterday with Dobrynin who probed for our ideas on follow up on the meetings with Gromyko. Below is a fairly full rendition of the topics covered.

View of the Meetings: Dobrynin led off by asking Art about our sense of the meetings with Gromyko. Art said that they had come out pretty much as we had expected. The TASS statement on the last day noting the two sides had agreed to procedures for further discussions seemed about right. Dobrynin confirmed that Gromyko had instructed the wording of the TASS item. While the timing just before the elections had been bad from the Soviet point of view, they had not wanted to miss the opportunity to talk. They too felt the talks had resulted in agreement on a way to manage things at this point. In an aside, Dobrynin described Gromyko's UN speech as "about the same as usual."

Germany and Japan: Art expressed concern that Gromyko seemed to be nostalgic for turning the clock back to the forties in his comments on Germany and Japan. Dobrynin responded that Gromyko was a member of the older generation and felt strongly about this issue. Saying he did

not doubt their sensitivity on the subject, Art said that it nevertheless seemed divorced from reality. If the USSR is run by people in this frame of mind, it could be dangerous. Dobrynin again laid the problem to age, noting people in Moscow were concerned about groups in Germany and Japan who seemed to support the Nazis and wanted to overturn our agreements. Art emphasized that the number of Nazi supporters was very small, adding that the real point was that the Soviet leadership seemed not to understand the present-day situation of two of the most powerful countries on the world scene. He reaffirmed our long-term position that does not oppose but puts off the question of a German reunification until the completion of a peace treaty and suggested the Soviets should also work out something on the Northern Territories with Japan.

U.S. Sincerity: Dobrynin then said that his leaders were not sure if our talk about better relations might not just be preelection rhetoric, and that we would return to trying to force the Soviets to bend to our will after November. He added that they know what the President said in the meeting; they will now be looking at what he says after the election. Art replied the President was, of course, talking about policy after the election and asked what kind of affirmation the Soviets were expecting. Dobrynin said he was not suggesting anything specific, but that they would be looking for some sign post-election. Dobrynin then said that if confirmation was forthcoming after the election that the Presidents wants to move in the direction he outlined. then there would be a positive response from the Soviet side. Underscoring the election point, Dobrynin said at another juncture that they wanted the exchanges talks to move forward but would not sign anything until after the election.

Interim Restraint: Dobrynin brought up interim restraint, asking what the President had in mind in his reference. He read from the Soviet notes of the meeting to the effect that the U.S. might consider an interim agreement that provided a certain restraint on ASAT and simultaneously beginning discussion of strategic offensive weapons. Art promised to check our record and get back to him on the exact wording.<sup>4</sup>

Next Steps: Dobrynin then asked about next steps. Did we plan to send a group of people to Moscow or what? Art responded that this had not been decided, noting you had suggested it might be useful to have a group sort out the issues of arms control. Such a group could talk less formally than in an actual negotiation and avoid getting bogged down in details. Dobrynin pointed to Gromyko's preference for diplomatic channels.

Dobrynin followed up by asking if we had in mind for you and Gromyko to get together again in the near future. Art referred to your comment that you would meet with Dobrynin and he would meet with Gromyko in the weeks ahead. He also suggested that it might take several meetings to decide what to do next. Art offered his personal view that we should not be too quick in this process—there would need to be some sorting out on both sides—and commented that we had the impression that there was some confusion on the Soviet part over the issues. He suggested that the discussions in the weeks ahead could be beneficial in moving toward a meeting between you and Gromyko early next year. Dobrynin conceded that there had been confusion in the Soviet proposal for outer space talks, adding that he himself had advised against putting a date in the Soviet proposal. But the Politburo had decided otherwise. He seemed to agree that it would be best to

have some time to sort out our respective positions on the issues.

Upcoming Plenum on Agriculture: In response to Art's query if he planned to return to Moscow for the upcoming Central Committee Plenum, Dobrynin said that he would not since it would be devoted to Soviet agriculture problems. He added that the USSR's agricultural situation was not good. They were becoming convinced that much more needed to be done with irrigation and some heads might roll in this area. He also mentioned the possibility of other personnel changes, including specifically the Minister of Foreign Trade Patolichev who is in very bad health.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Hartman. Forwarded through Armacost. Printed from an uninitialed copy. McKinley's handwritten initials are at the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 2.
- <sup>2</sup> For the September 29 TASS statement, see the *Washington Post*, September 29, 1984, p. A11.
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 287.
- <sup>4</sup> In his September 28 meeting with Gromyko, Reagan "wondered if we could not consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also an agreement on a process for reducing nuclear arms" (see <a href="Document 286">Document 286</a>). Reagan also addressed this in his UNGA speech: "We've been prepared to discuss a wide range of issues of concern to both sides, such as the relationship between defensive and offensive forces and what has been called the militarization of space. During the talks, we would consider what measures of restraint both

sides might take while negotiations proceed. However, any agreement must logically depend upon our ability to get the competition in offensive arms under control and to achieve genuine stability at substantially lower levels of nuclear arms." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1360*) <sup>5</sup> Dobrynin was referring to the June 29 Soviet proposal for negotiations in Vienna. See <u>Document 233</u>.

### 290. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House 1

New York, October 5, 1984, 1754Z

Secto 11088. Subject: Memorandum for the President: Follow-up to Gromyko Meetings—Letter to Chernenko (Super Sensitive—S/S 8427391).

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: Follow-up to the Gromyko Meetings As I told you in my report on Saturday's meeting, our exchanges with Gromyko were the most lively and genuine dialogue we have had with the Soviets for many years, and may have opened the door a little wider to progress on the major issues over the next four years. At the same time, Gromyko broke no new ground, and did not indicate whether the Soviet leadership will, in fact, be capable or willing to make the decisions needed to move forward. While their internal leadership situation will be the decisive factor in this regard, their response will turn in part on whether we are able to continue conveying the message you successfully delivered to Gromyko last week, and to put some specific substance into our arms control positions, particularly on nuclear arms.

Therefore, I believe we should be thinking about steps we could take before the end of the year to stress the continuity of our approach and our readiness to back up words with deeds. The most important would be a letter to Chernenko providing a comprehensive restatement of our

approach to the relationship, together with suggestions for some concrete steps both sides could take in arms control and bilateral relations. Another step we might also want to consider would be for you to give a speech toward the end of the year putting our basic approach to US-Soviet relations on the public record. You will recall that Lord Carrington suggested that such a reaffirmation of our interest in improved relations would also have a positive impact in Western Europe. We will be giving further thought to the contents of such a letter and speech, and I will be prepared to discuss our recommendations with you when we are further along.

In the near term, I believe it would be useful for you to send a shorter letter to Chernenko that gives your personal assessment of the results of the Gromyko meetings, and reaffirms your desire to move forward in all areas of our relations—above all on the priority question of nuclear arms reductions. In this connection, the letter could also reiterate your expressed readiness to talk about outer space weapons, and your proposal concerning an interim agreement that would both restrict ASATs and begin the process of reducing nuclear arms.

Sending such a letter now would ensure that your basic message got through to Chernenko, and lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive letter later. It would also set the stage for the meeting I plan to have with Dobrynin in about ten days' time to review where we stand and where we go from here (and for Art Hartman's next exchange with Gromyko in Moscow).

A proposed draft of a letter to Chernenko is attached. You will note that the language on the interim agreement indicates that we envisage limits on ASAT and offensive

arms as a single package, but without defining the linkage too explicitly.

ATTACHMENT: As stated

[Omitted here is the text of the draft letter to Chernenko.]

Shultz

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840011-0446. Secret; Nodis; Immediate. Sent for information to the Department of State. An October 3 State Department draft of this memorandum indicates it was drafted by Vershbow on October 3; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Dobbins, and Kanter. In a covering note to Shultz, Armacost wrote: "Mr. Secretary: My only reservation is to the formation of an interim restraint agreement. The linkage proposed is ambiguous. We could agree that 'being the process of reducing . . .' means some actual reductions. But another interpretation is possible. In the initial bargaining stage I would think a more straight-forward linkage is desirable bureaucratically, politically, and for negotiating purposes. I recognize the President's words impose some constraint, but if we want to establish a tougher linkage—as I think we should—this letter offers an opportunity." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) A typed note in the margin of the draft reads: "memo revised by S and dispatched from NY 10/5. bdf."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>footnotes 1</u> and <u>9, Document 288</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Lord Carrington in Washington on September 11, shortly after Carrington's election as Secretary General of NATO.

(Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)  $^4$  The draft letter was not sent to Chernenko.

# 291. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, October 9, 1984

SUBJECT

Suggestion for Presidential Letter to Chernenko

Secretary Shultz has forwarded a memorandum to the President recommending that a short letter be sent to Chernenko reaffirming his basic approach to the relationship and proposing "an interim agreement including provisions that would both place restrictions on anti-satellite weapons and begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms."<sup>2</sup>

I do not believe that a letter at this time would be particularly useful and also doubt that we should put the proposal mentioned in writing at this time. If the Soviets are interested in such an arrangement, we can be confident that they will respond in some fashion to the hint the President dropped in his presentation to Gromyko. But at the moment, I believe they are still digesting the material from Gromyko's visit, as they grapple with their own leadership situation. Trying to force the pace of their deliberations at this time may do more harm than good.

My recommendation would be to wait until *after* the election for any further initiatives, and then to attempt to convey any substantive ideas we may have privately and informally in the first instance. If the Soviets are by then moving in the direction of establishing a broad dialogue,

this would permit some adjustment of proposals on both sides to make them as palatable as possible to the other.

State's proposal seems based on the assumption that the Soviets are looking for something in the ASAT area as an excuse to reopen negotiations on offensive weapons. Conceivably this is the case, but I frankly doubt it. In my judgment, INF is still the key question so far as they are concerned, and though they worry about SDI, they are not particularly nervous about the ASAT program as such. Of course, I may be wrong, but I doubt the wisdom of proceeding down a particular track (especially one which we would not have chosen as optimum from our point of view) unless we are more certain than we can be at the moment of the Soviet reaction.

I have attached a Memorandum to the President pointing out these considerations.<sup>4</sup>

Ron Lehman concurs.

#### Recommendation:

That you sign the Memorandum to the President at TAB I.5

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/05/1984-10/15/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See Document 290.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See Document 286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Neither tab is attached; the Shultz memorandum, listed as Tab A, is <u>Document 290</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> McFarlane did not check the Approve or Disapprove options, but he wrote on the first page: "Jack/Ron, Pls staff

fwd promptly a decision paper on option  $1\frac{1}{2}$ . Bud." On October 15, Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer sent McFarlane a memorandum on "Decision Paper on Option  $1\frac{1}{2}$ ." On October 26, McFarlane sent Reagan a revised version of the memorandum for decision. See <u>Document 297</u>.

## 292. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 15, 1984

SUBJECT

Menshikov Message on Meetings with Gromyko and Future Steps

Jim Giffen, President of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council took me aside at a conference in Vermont Saturday evening<sup>2</sup> to pass on some comments he had received from Stanislav Menshikov, Zagladin's assistant on the Soviet Central Committee staff. (You will recall my conversation with Menshikov in New York last March.)<sup>3</sup> Giffen was in Moscow last week and saw Menshikov during the latter part of the week. Menshikov asked him if he knew me and when Giffen confirmed that he did, asked Giffen to pass on the following (which Giffen read from his notes):

"Tell Matlock," he said, "to review the transcript of the meetings with Gromyko and pay particular attention to Gromyko's references to the need for 'adjustments' in U.S. policy." Menshikov went on to say that they considered the conversations very useful and had noted the "eight-minute private session with the President." On the latter, he commented that the "words were fine," but that we should not expect an "experienced diplomat" like Gromyko to take them at face value unless he saw corroborating evidence.

Menshikov then said that we should also pay attention to what Chernenko had said about a "Code of Conduct of Nuclear Powers," and implied that this could be an avenue

for face saving on their part to get back into broader negotiations. He them commented that the basic Soviet requirement is that we "show some respect," and went to great lengths to describe a scene from Puzo's novel *The Godfather*, when a person went out of his way to accommodate the Godfather on a small matter once he learned who the Godfather was.

Though not part of Menshikov's "message," several other topics of interest arose in his conversation, according to Giffen.

—Giffen received the impression that the Soviets were frustrated by the absence of any means of discussing problems privately and confidentially. Menshikov, for example, observed that they cannot talk to anyone in the State Department without it appearing in a Gwertzman or Gelb story in a few days.

—When Giffen asked about the possibility of reviving Jewish emigration, Menshikov said that this could be a matter for negotiation "at the proper time." (Arbatov, who was asked the same question, simply said that "This is not the right time.")

—Menshikov told Giffen, in response to his direct question, that Gorbachev is now in fact the "number two" official in the Party. He refused to confirm that Gorbachev would be Chernenko's successor, however, stating that "even we at the Central Committee don't know what is going on in that sphere."

—Regarding Scowcroft's trip last spring, 6 Giffen said that he had asked Alkhimov, Chairman of the USSR State Bank, why the Soviets had refused to see him. (Alkhimov's position is a "cabinet level" one and he is usually well

informed regarding US-Soviet relations, in which he has a personal interest.) Alkhimov told Giffen that he himself had been dismayed to learn that Scowcroft was not received and had "checked it out." The explanation he had received was that they had been willing to talk to Scowcroft, but were surprised by the attempt to see Chernenko, and that if Scowcroft had taken the appointment with Komplektov, Chernenko might have seen him subsequently. Alkhimov then observed that an outsider cannot just go to Chernenko directly, but must have a sponsor in the Soviet system and that the "worst way" to arrange the meeting was through the Foreign Ministry. "Next time," he advised, "do it through the Central Committee, or—if you wish—I could probably arrange it if you let me know in advance." [Note: There, as here, everybody wants to get into the act!]

#### Comments

- 1. While I would not consider Giffen an appropriate or reliable "messenger" from our point of view (he has a record of taking Soviet statements too much at face value, and even of defending their positions in trade matters), I have no reason to doubt that he has reported accurately what he was told.
- 2. I have examined the memcons of the meetings with Gromyko and find that Gromyko's references to "adjustments" or "corrections" in U.S. policy arose in at least two contexts. In regard to resuming negotiations on offensive nuclear weapons, he stated that this could happen "as soon as the U.S. corrects its position," then made his claims regarding the alleged relevance of carrier-based aircraft. He repeated this statement toward the close of the lunch, when he said that the President should ask his experts to reexamine their views and change the U.S.

position, and when this was done, to let the Soviets know. The second context was that of the Soviet proposal for negotiations on space weapons, when he also said that the U.S. should review the situation calmly and change its position. At no time, did he define precisely what he meant by a changed position, however.

- 3. By mentioning Chernenko's proposal for a "Code of Conduct," Menshikov *may* have been implying that agreement to address this seriously could represent a "changed position" from the Soviet point of view. (In speaking to Giffen, he was doubtless being deliberately cryptic to avoid revealing details about the meetings with Gromyko.) The allusion to the Godfather was probably intended to convey that the Soviet leaders must be made to feel that we take their proposals seriously. What is most interesting about it is the obvious implication that they have the mentality of mobsters—which, in my view, is right on the button.
- 4. Though we cannot be sure what sort of "adjustments" of U.S. policy the Soviets are looking for, I believe that this rather laconic message clearly indicates two things: First, that Soviet policy makers are still frustrated by what they perceive as the absence of a means of communicating privately and informally with us, and second, that they are not at this point looking for the sort of concrete moves on specific issues that State habitually pushes. What I infer from this is that they are searching for a *conceptual framework* for interaction with the U.S. during the second term, which would provide the basis for resuming negotiations without seeming to be backing down to US demands. Since they do not want to discuss their real aim on the record (or have it bandied about in the press), they are resorting to indirect "messages" to see if we are willing

to respond and engage them in an informal, non-binding and totally private dialogue.<sup>8</sup>

- 5. This also reinforces my previous conviction that further proposals (except for procedural ones) are premature until we have the benefit of some informal discussion. The fact is that in devising various responses, we are really shooting in the dark until we have a firmer grasp of what exactly the Soviets are looking for at this point. Their formal diplomacy often focuses on issues which are not really central to their real concerns. And although they will never bear their souls totally even in a private conversation, they are more likely to provide valuable indications privately than in formal interchanges. For example, it may well be that talking about a "Code of Conduct" is more important to them than agreement on an ASAT moratorium. And if this is the case, then the former step could be less damaging to U.S. interests than the latter.
- 6. Regarding the "Code of Conduct" idea, it occurs to me that it *could* be a key element in getting our "umbrella" concept off the ground. While I am dubious about the value of such declaratory statements in and of themselves, they can provide a rationale and framework for a change in Soviet policy. It seems to me that a carefully worded "Code" could be a cheap price to pay for successful negotiations on reducing offensive weapons. Even a statement which does not go beyond past commitments could be important to the Soviet leaders since it would "show respect" (it is *their* proposal, after all), and could be used publicly to argue that the U.S. position has changed in a way that permits the resumption of negotiations.
- 7. These, however, are only possibilities. We really cannot know without talking it over with them privately—and under conditions that they are confident provide assurance

against leaks. Unless and until we establish a private dialogue, anything we (or they) propose will really be a form of blind man's bluff, but in this case, with both sides blindfolded.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/15/84-10/23/84). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. McFarlane wrote at the top of the page: "Mr. President, I thought you would find this interesting. It reinforces the value of bringing Paul Nitze into the White House. Bud." In an attached handwritten note on Air Force One stationery, Reagan wrote: "Very interesting and if I've read it correctly affirms something I've felt for some time; namely that part of their problem is their inferiority complex. They want to feel we see them as a superpower. I'm willing to look at a pyt channel but believe this would have to have Georges approval. If he, you & I were the only team in on it at this end with someone like Nitze the channel—talking only to us —why not? To bypass George would be a personal humiliation I wouldn't want to inflict. RR."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> October 13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 195</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See footnote 12, Document 286.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See <u>Document 187</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 193</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> This sentence had two vertical lines drawn in the margin, likely by McFarlane.

<sup>§</sup> This sentence had two vertical lines drawn in the margin, likely by McFarlane.

## 293. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 16, 1984

**SUBJECT** 

Chernenko's October 15 Washington Post Interview

Embassy Moscow called about 12:30 p.m. to say that *Post* Moscow correspondent Dusko Doder had an interview with Chernenko this morning and had called to inform Art Hartman about it. Subsequently, *Post* Managing Editor Len Downie informed EUR Deputy Jim Dobbins at lunch that most of the "interview" had been written answers to written questions, but that Chernenko had called Doder in this morning to hand it over and talked to him for 20 minutes. Mike Armacost was later told that Doder reported that Chernenko had appeared vigorous, and that his breathing problem was not as severe as usual.

Matlock asked Tom Simons to try to get a copy, but Downie—an old colleague of Simons from London—refused to give him one, and referred him instead to Lou Cannon, who is soliciting comments from around town, including Sims and McFarlane at the White House. As Cannon described it, Chernenko did not repeat the precondition that Pershings be withdrawn before negotiations could be resumed, but otherwise all his written answers tracked with Gromyko's UNGA speech. Simons warned him that the precondition on Pershings flits in and out, but the general umbrella precondition has been "removal of obstacles" for some

months. Cannon found that in the text, so it appears the written formulations were standard.

In the 20 minutes of verbal exchange, Chernenko answered Doder's questions:

—On the US elections, he said that whoever is President of the USA, Soviet peace policy will remain the same.

—Asked if he were optimistic, he said there were "considerable" possibilities, "very considerable" ones, in US-Soviet relations, and Soviet proposals proved it. Silencing his key advisor Aleksandrov, he went on to reiterate the standard line that Gromyko originated with you, and had repeated by the Politburo, that the Soviets thus far see no businesslike shifts toward practical steps in our policy. The Washington talks need to be translated onto practical tracks, he said, and if the President's current approach is not just tactical, "I will not be found wanting."

—Asked about small steps, he said they are okay, but cloud people's minds. He then referred back to his written answers concerning four areas where the USSR had made proposals which the US had turned down: 1) space arms control (Cannon said the written answer used the June 29 proposal formulation); 2) nuclear freeze; 3) finalizing the 1974/1976 nuclear testing treaties; and 4) non-first-use of nuclear weapons (Cannon said he did not mention conventional weapons).

After we notified Matlock of the interview, the NSC staff met with Poindexter and will have met with Bud at 5:00 p.m. Poindexter's inclination was to try to defer a substantive response till Sunday, but Matlock agreed with us that this would probably be untenable. They are recommending to Bud that he call Cannon, tell him we will

study the interview and may respond, but respond only to the accusation that we have made no practical proposals for forward movement (we have put language that tracks with this approach up front in the draft Department press guidance, attached). Meanwhile, they will prepare White House press guidance for noon tomorrow, to be adjusted once we have the text of the interview in hand. Our draft guidance is subject to similar adjustment.

From the Soviet point of view, the timing of the interview obviously has something to do with the President's debate with Mondale this Sunday. Former Carter NSC staffer and Mondale operative Bob Hunter, who was also at the lunch with *Post* editor Downie, was excited to get the news to Mondale, and eager to answer any questions the *Post* might have. Chernenko's giving the nuclear freeze second billing behind space arms control is also internal evidence that they have the debate in mind in putting out this interview in Washington now, since they know the freeze is a non-starter with the Administration.

At the same time, Chernenko's specific formulations appear to have been very standard indeed, and the Soviet domestic policy ramifications of putting him forward at this time are probably even more interesting than the foreign policy angle. After his hospitalization in August, evidence pointing toward early retirement started to multiply, but he has been making a comeback since early September: first a whole series of public appearances, domestic and with foreigners; then rumors that the "extraordinary" Central Committee plenum at the end of this month would be marked by publication of a new draft party program and announcement of a party congress next year rather than as scheduled in February 1986; now this interview. You will recall that Gromyko spoke to both you and the President in the name of the entire leadership "and Chernenko

personally;" now he himself has said that if the President is willing "I will not be found wanting." So although early retirement is still a possibility, it would be unwise to write Chernenko off at this point.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, October 1984. Secret. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Dobbins and Niles. Shultz's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are also on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on October 16. In a covering note forwarding the memorandum to the White House, McKinley wrote: "Paul, The Secretary wanted Bud to have this internal memo. Brunson."
- <sup>2</sup> See Dusko Doder, "Chernenko Says U.S. Holds Key to Arms Talks," *Washington Post*, October 17, 1984, p. A1; and "The Chernenko Interview," *Washington Post*, October 18, 1984, p. A20.
- <sup>3</sup> October 21.
- <sup>4</sup> A copy of the October 17 draft Department of State Press Guidance is located in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, Oct 1984. The White House Statement issued on October 17 is in *Documents on Disarmament*, 1984, pp. 734–735.
- <sup>5</sup> On October 21, President Reagan and Democratic Presidential candidate Walter Mondale held a debate focused on foreign policy in Kansas City, Missouri. For the full text, see *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp.* 1589–1608.

# 294. Memorandum From Robert Linhard, Ronald Lehman, and Sven Kraemer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane).

Washington, October 24, 1984

SUBJECT
Draft NSDD on Pursuing the Umbrella Talks

The basic issue addressed by this package is whether the US should, for the time being, continue to pursue a more general approach to the "umbrella talks" (along the lines of NSC developed  $Option\ 1\frac{1}{2})^2$  or should now (perhaps in the context of the upcoming Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko meetings) supplement the "umbrella talks" concept with additional and more specific initiatives (along the lines of State's  $Option\ 3$ ).

Per guidance provided by Admiral Poindexter,  $Tab I^3$  provides a memorandum for the President which frames the issue and recommends a draft NSDD, provided at Tab A, for the President's approval.

The text of the draft NSDD has not been discussed with anyone outside of the immediate NSC staff. The publication and normal distribution of an NSDD on this subject could quickly become a matter of public record and trigger unproductive speculation just prior to the election. The recent SACPG tasking ensures that the appropriate staffs have the guidance needed to pursue the approach recommended. Therefore, we would recommend that after the President's review and approval, the NSDD be very

closely held and used only as needed and with appropriate discretion.

#### Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum for the President ( $Tab\ I$ ) and forward the draft NSDD ( $Tab\ A$ ) for his consideration and signature. If possible, that you personally walk the President through the issues involved. $^{6}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984. Secret. Sent for action. Matlock concurred. On a routing slip attached to this memorandum, Poindexter wrote: "I think the NSDD is good. You may feel you are a little beyond the point of the cover memo, although everything that has been done is consistent with it. JP." McFarlane then wrote: "Pls run my proposed chgs by Ron Lehman." On the draft of the NSDD, McFarlane made substantial changes to the last paragraph, which were reflected in the final version signed by Reagan. See <a href="Document 298">Document 298</a>.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 1, Document 277</u>, and <u>footnote 5, Document</u> 291.
- <sup>3</sup> See Document 297.
- <sup>4</sup> See footnote 1, above, and Document 298.
- <sup>5</sup> Presumably a reference to McFarlane's October 12 memorandum to the SACPG members that provided instructions for taskings related to the Umbrella Talks. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984–11/04/1984) See also footnote 6, Document 305.
- <sup>6</sup> McFarlane did not initial his approval or disapproval of the recommendation; however, a signed copy of the

memorandum went forward to Reagan. See <u>Document 297</u>.

## 295. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 25, 1984

SUBJECT
Soviet Embassy Views on US-Soviet Relations

Soviet Embassy Minister-Counselor Isakov invited Mark to a working lunch today. Isakov's main point seemed to be a desire to explore our thinking on the general direction of the relationship after the elections. In preparing for your meeting with Dobrynin tomorrow, I thought it might be useful for you to know the points Isakov made today.

Isakov said that Gromyko had concluded after his talks here that there is now a bridge to the future, an opening for progress. He said that Moscow wants to move ahead. As one indication, he provided the dates for our next round of non-proliferation talks in Moscow (November 28–30, which are acceptable to Ambassador Kennedy).

Isakov said that Moscow was not clear what we had in mind with the umbrella talks. For example, he asked "on a personal basis", could there be umbrella space talks, while offensive arms and other matters were being addressed in diplomatic channels. Mark responded that our concept of umbrella talks was broader than just space, but that we were in general flexible about how to proceed and in particular that you would be prepared to discuss with Dobrynin how we could use diplomatic channels to move ahead with more concrete discussions on arms control.

Isakov drew particular attention to the recent *Pravda* editorial which noted that our INF deployments are a barrier to INF negotiations. He said that this is a problem for them, how could we get started when they have stated publicly for so long that the deployments make negotiations impossible. For that reason, Chernenko had proposed that we get started first on some lesser, easier matters. Moscow could not understand why it was so difficult for the United States to state it would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. Obviously, in an actual war, regardless of what it had said, each side would use the weapons necessary if it found itself losing. In response, Mark said that this was a nonstarter but of the items Chernenko mentioned, TTBT was possible if the Soviets were prepared to show some flexibility.

Finally, Isakov noted that the United States had said a number of times that we have ideas on offensive arms but we never say what they are. He noted that it is difficult to move ahead on the basis of the previous US positions as set forth in Geneva because they are so unacceptable. If the US side has ideas, it should give the details to the Soviets and this would make a major difference. Palmer explained that it was not reasonable for the Soviet side to ask us to show our cards before it was clear that the Soviet side was ready for serious detailed talks. Isakov then asked what would be the Secretary's response if Dobrynin asked for our specific ideas. Mark said that he did not know, but that it would be better if Dobrynin said that Gromyko and the rest of the Soviet leadership were prepared for serious talks and wanted to know our specific ideas.

Mark asked whether we might begin to see some progress on such human rights concerns as Shcharanskiy and Sakharov. Isakov noted that he is not in the KGB and therefore did not know anything about these matters. He indicated that it would be better for us to pursue this through our channels to the KGB like Vogel in Berlin. Max Kampelman was also told recently in Moscow that it would be better not to work through Dobrynin and the Soviet Foreign Ministry but rather through special channels.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, October 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A more complete account of this meeting is in telegram 325166 to Moscow, November 1. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840700-0675)
- <sup>2</sup> In telegram 13761 from Moscow, October 25, the Embassy reported: "An authoritative unsigned article in *Pravda* October 25 justifies Soviet refusal to resume nuclear arms talks. It claims that Western leaders are talking about negotiation in order to deceive the public but are doing nothing to 'clear away the obstructions' to those talks. It stops short of calling directly for withdrawal of NATO LRINF missiles, but maintains that changes in Western policies are needed before negotiations can resume." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840682-0817)
- <sup>3</sup> Reference is to Wolfgang Vogel. See <u>footnote 5, Document</u> 219.
- <sup>4</sup> Kampelman met with human rights activists, dissidents, and refuseniks in Moscow from September 15 to 19. While no record of this message regarding Dobrynin and a private channel was found, it seems likely that a message could have been conveyed during this September visit to Moscow. (Telegram 12028 from Moscow, September 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840600–0727) During September, October, and November

1984, Kampelman visited European capitals to discuss Soviet human rights violations. See <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1981–1988, vol. XLI, Global Issues II, Document 74 .

### 296. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, October 26, 1984

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Dobrynin October 26

My meeting this morning with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin lasted an hour and a half and confirmed that the Soviets are looking at our relationship in a new light after your discussion with Gromyko. Yesterday, his second deputy Isakov told Rick Burt's deputy Mark Palmer that following his talks with you Gromyko reported to his Moscow colleagues that there is now a bridge to the future and an opening for progress that means that we should move ahead. Dobrynin's approach appeared to confirm this. He said that if some names were changed in my speech at RAND, Gromyko could have given it himself, and he meant it as favorable comment.

In his meeting with me, Dobrynin had very little new to offer, but it was clear that he had instructions to probe as deeply as he could for specific ideas from us, especially on arms control and the umbrella concept. I led off by saying that any meeting prior to the election had by definition to be exploratory, but it is important to begin reviewing the issues between us as soon as possible. I told him I had sent instructions to Art Hartman to meet with Gromyko in the next few days and that I hoped to meet with Dobrynin again soon after the election.

To underscore its importance, I moved right to a discussion of the Berlin Air Corridors issue, pointing out that the current situation was unsatisfactory and that our British and French colleagues shared our concern.<sup>5</sup> I emphasized that Berlin was a very sensitive issue that could easily spill over into the rest of our relationship. Dobrynin said he had no new information on this subject but would look into it and get back to me.

I noted that since Gromyko's visit we had taken some further small steps, including the agreement to meet in November to discuss nuclear non-proliferation and in January to hold talks between experts on naval search and rescue and economic relations. I added that we hoped they would sign the common understanding on concurrent operation of ABM and air defense components at the SCC, as Commissioner Ellis has proposed. Turning to the meetings with Gromyko, I said we had come to some agreement, especially on the "question of questions," the importance of nuclear arms issues and the need eventually to eliminate them. I underlined your firm desire to move toward this goal. We had also agreed to discuss regional issues, I noted, and the discussion on the Middle East, particularly Lebanon and the question of UNIFIL, had also been useful.

Turning to subjects on which we did not agree, I noted human rights and then moved on to the relationship between outer space and offensive nuclear weapons arms control. Overall, I said our assessment of the meetings was that they were positive without any concrete outcome. Dobrynin said their view of the meetings "more or less" coincided with ours. The talks had made each side's views clearer, but there was nothing concrete on the "question of questions," beginning with nuclear weapons. I noted that there had also been some factual discrepancies on numbers of nuclear weapons and the purposes of the Strategic Defensive Initiative. I told him you wanted SDI to play a constructive role in strengthening deterrence. I noted that

our research program is fully consistent with the ABM treaty to which we remain committed. But while our commitment to the treaty is strong, I said, we are concerned with Soviet violations of arms control agreements, and hope the radar issue will be clarified in the SCC.

Dobrynin then conducted some intensive probing of our ideas for nuclear discussions. He reiterated the Soviet offer of June 29, and said that SDI should be included under their proposal to discuss the "demilitarization of outer space." I told him we were prepared to discuss the militarization of space without preconditions, but he insisted that although there were no preconditions in their offer we had to agree on an agenda first. I noted that you had put forward a number of ideas for breaking the deadlock that resulted from their Vienna offer, including a readiness to explore the possibility of an interim agreement that would place limits on anti-satellite weapons and at least begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms, adding that we were willing to discuss these subjects and others.

Dobrynin also probed on the concept of umbrella negotiations. I told him that our suggestion was that we appoint a small group of people<sup>8</sup> to explore the question of arms control at a certain philosophical level which Gromyko and I would monitor. He asked if we were talking only about space. I said that the discussions could explore the relationship between offensive and defensive weapons as well as other issues. It stemmed from our desire to sort out the issues and get moving on arms control talks. Dobrynin, as a "personal view," said he had "some doubts" about the concept, since it seemed very abstract. He thought there was a danger that the issues could become "mixed up." When I suggested that it was sometimes useful

to rearrange the furniture and try new things, he commented that useful things sometimes got lost that way. He suggested again a preference for traditional negotiations in which differences could then be resolved in discussions between the two of us or with Gromyko.

I also affirmed our interest in cabinet or ministerial-level meetings and joint commission sessions under our cooperation agreements. I did reaffirm our marker that movement in the health area depended on progress on the treatment of the Sakharovs. He responded with the standard disclaimer that they would not accept conditions on Sakharov. I also underlined our interest in regional discussions and on meetings between defense officials. I emphasized the importance of your proposal for direct measurement of nuclear tests, which could take place independent of the two unratified treaties on testing. 9 Dobrynin responded that the concept might be possible after ratification of the treaties. I urged that they move on some other of the smaller issues, noting in particular the exchanges agreement and the opening of consulates. He predictably brought up Aeroflot which I affirmed depended on progress on the Northern Pacific safety proposals and equitable commercial arrangements. I also pressed for positive Soviet actions on the CDE, MBFR, and human rights in general.

All in all, I think it was a useful review of where we stand, and its usefulness includes Dobrynin's active probing, as a sign of positive Soviet interest. Art Hartman will probably see Gromyko early next week, and I plan to see Dobrynin shortly after the election.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/25/84-

10/30/84); NLR-748-25A-36-3-7. Secret; Sensitive. An October 26 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer. A handwritten note on this covering memorandum reads: "Orig. Sent by Courier 10/26." Reagan initialed Shultz's memorandum on October 30, indicating he saw it.

- <sup>2</sup> See Document 286 and 287.
- <sup>3</sup> See Document 295.
- 4 On October 18, Shultz gave an address at the opening of the RAND/UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior. In his memoir he wrote: "I used my speech to develop the larger conceptual issues that faced us in managing U.S.-Soviet relations over the long term and to make an important conceptual point: I put aside the Nixon-era concepts of 'linkage' and 'détente,' and set out a new approach that I hoped would prove more effective and that reflected the reality of what we were in fact doing." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 487-488) See also footnote 5, Document 262, and Foreign Relations, 1981-1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 209 . <sup>5</sup> In 1983 and 1984, the Soviet Union unilaterally made changes to U.S., British, and French use of air corridors from West Germany flying into West Berlin. A series of Soviet restrictions on the "length-of-the-corridor" led to several "political-level demarches and discussions, both in Berlin and in the capitals, and intense technical-level talks in the Berlin Air Safety Center." (Telegram 2674 from the Mission in Berlin, September 5; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840564-0523)
- <sup>6</sup> Richard Ellis was the U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission, which met in Geneva October 2-December 12.

<sup>7</sup> In an October 22 memorandum to McFarlane and Poindexter, Matlock wrote: "I received informally from EUR the memo sent up to Secretary Shultz regarding a meeting he plans to schedule with Dobrynin Wednesday, October 24 [which occurred on October 26]. Basically, it looks all right to me, except for some items on page 4. The important ones relate to mentioning an 'interim agreement' and the wording of the presentation on reciprocal visits to testing sites. I suggested to Mark Palmer that these sections should be cleared by you before their use." He continued: "I am sending this as a 'heads up.' Please protect me as the source, since it was provided informally before Shultz saw it. Jack." Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, You need to talk to George about this. John." McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Put in my lunch folder for tomorrow." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, President-Gromyko Final Papers (6))

<sup>8</sup> Matlock underlined the phrase "appoint a small group of people" and wrote in a note at the bottom of the page: "This is *not* our concept. The Soviets will never take seriously a 'small group of people'. Your concept—which you stated to Gromyko—was to involve high-level, even White House discussions. That was to convey your personal intention to be involved. I'm afraid this has set us back considerably."

<sup>9</sup> Matlock underlined the phrase "independent of the two unratified treaties," meaning the TTBT and PNET, and wrote at the bottom of the page: "It is *not* independent. It is designed to lead to agreement on improved verification which will make possible ratification of the treaties."

## 297. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 26, 1984

SUBJECT

Decision Paper on Next Steps in the US/Soviet Nuclear Arms Reduction Process

#### **ISSUE**

Should the US, for the time being, continue to pursue a more general approach to the "umbrella talks" *or* should the US now (perhaps in the context of the Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko meetings) supplement the "umbrella talks" proposal with an additional, more specific initiative?

#### **BACKGROUND**

On June 29, the Soviets proposed that we meet with them in Vienna to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space. Shortly thereafter, a special interagency group was tasked to develop US options for such a meeting. Various options were developed. While intended as approaches to handling a Vienna meeting, these options also framed the major schools of thought concerning where the US should go next in pursuing progress in major nuclear arms reductions.

One of the interagency options developed was a proposal that the U.S. offer the Soviets a comprehensive proposal involving two phases. The *first phase* would be an interim

accord involving both (1) a 3 year moratorium on ASAT interceptor *testing*, and (2) an interim limitation on offensive forces (which could take the form of a Vladivostok-type agreement on subsequent negotiating objectives). The *second phase* would involve (1) a long term ban on ASAT testing and deployment requiring the dismantlement of the existing Soviet system, (2) an "Incidents-in-Space" agreement, and (3) major reductions in offensive forces with consideration of limits on defensive systems based upon progress in negotiating offensive force reductions. This option was strongly supported by the State Department, but opposed by all other agencies and by Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze.

After evaluating the three interagency options, an alternative, more general approach was developed. Under this approach the U.S. would propose that U.S. and Soviet representatives meet for "Umbrella Talks" designed to provide a new forum for discussing issues of concern to both sides. For its part, the U.S. would indicate that it is prepared to begin discussions aimed at exploring mutually acceptable approaches to initiating negotiations on the limitation of the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides and the more general topic of the militarization of space, and to resuming negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. The U.S. would also indicate that it is prepared to discuss the nature and purpose of the US Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs, and the relationship between the limitation of offensive and defensive capabilities.

The U.S. would also keep open the option of regularizing these talks. If held on a regular basis, these talks would complement ongoing negotiations and activity in regular diplomatic channels by providing an additional forum to discuss issues which are not yet at the stage at which

substantive negotiations could begin; to bring such issues to the point where formal, substantive negotiations could begin with some likelihood of success; and, to assist when existing formal negotiations have broken down. In short, it would provide a mechanism for us to sit down with the Soviets and discuss broader strategic concepts, and, on this basis, lay the foundation for more concrete negotiations on specific issues.

Your UNGA speech and follow-up meeting with Gromyko reflected this more general "umbrella talks" approach. However, some (Department of State) feel that we should now supplement the "umbrella talks" proposal by also offering to pursue the specific initiatives suggested by the State Department-supported option described earlier but strongly opposed by all other agencies and Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze (i.e., a 3 year moratorium on ASAT testing associated with an interim agreement on offensive arms and a commitment to further progress in a second phase of arms reduction activity). State has suggested that we use the upcoming Shultz-Dobrynin, Gromyko-Hartman meetings for this purpose.

#### DISCUSSION

It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union will embrace any new, substantive initiative offered by the US at this time. This being the case, we must continue to husband carefully our limited negotiating leverage with the Soviets for a time when it can be used with substantive effect. But beyond this, the Soviet Union is well aware of the current, unique US domestic political situation. We must assume that the Soviet Union will assess this situation and use it to its maximum advantage.

If the Soviets choose to make the proposed additional US initiative suggested by the Department of State public, it will likely generate questions and intense partisan domestic debate on the elements of the proposal. For example:

- —Is the proposed interim agreement a freeze? If not, why not? Will it be at SALT II levels? If so, why not just ratify SALT II?
- —How does this track with the Administration's START/INF positions? Doesn't this argue that the Administration approach over the last three years was wrong?
- —Does the proposed interim agreement on forces merge START and INF? If yes, why? If no, why?
- —Does the proposed temporary ASAT moratorium reward Soviet intransigence in START and INF? Why is the ASAT moratorium temporary? What made the Administration flip-flop on the ASAT moratorium now?

Such debate will cause us to negotiate these elements with ourselves, doing the Soviets' work for them, with the Soviets silently watching, and with the Soviets gaining in the process by the corresponding loss of US negotiating capital on the issue without any cost to them. This strongly argues that it would be unwise to supplement your "umbrella talks" proposal with another, more specific initiative at this time.

#### RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION

We have recently tasked the Senior Arms Control Policy Group (SACPG) to begin the longer lead time interagency staff work necessary to support a rather fundamental assessment of the US approach to the arms reduction process to begin during the first weeks of the next term. The staff work now in progress focuses on a reevaluation of Soviet military force and arms control goals, and an assessment of how current Soviet leadership perceives corresponding US goals. We believe that it would make most sense to continue to pursue a more general approach to the "umbrella talks" proposal and not to supplement it with additional specific initiatives at least until we have the benefit of that review and have moved beyond the preelection political environment.

A draft NSDD which reflects this recommended course of action is attached at *Tab A* for your consideration.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That, pending further Soviet reaction to your "Umbrella Talks" proposal, and review of additional work recently tasked to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, the US *not* offer to the Soviets the additional specific proposals suggested by the Department of State as described above.<sup>2</sup>

That you review and approve the draft NSDD attached at  $Tab A.^{3}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981–1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]; NLR-751-7-33-2-2. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Linhard, Lehman, and Kraemer (see <u>footnote 5</u>, <u>Document 291</u>). A stamp on the memorandum reads "signed."

<sup>3</sup> The draft NSDD is attached but not printed. Reagan approved the recommendation and signed the NSDD. See <u>Document 298</u>.

#### 298. National Security Decision Directive 1481

Washington, October 26, 1984

#### THE U.S. UMBRELLA TALKS PROPOSAL (U)

Over the past four years, we have made numerous attempts to get the Soviet Union to join us in the serious negotiation of equal and verifiable agreements involving the significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. To increase our prospects of success in this critical endeavor, I am convinced that we must find new ways of addressing broader strategic concepts and, on this basis, creating a firmer foundation for negotiations on the full range of specific issues involved in the process of reducing nuclear arms and increasing stability. (C)

Building upon my speech presented at the opening of the UN General Assembly, I have decided that we should pursue the proposal that our representatives meet for "Umbrella Talks" designed to provide a new forum for discussing issues of concern to both sides. For our part, we should indicate that we are prepared to begin discussions aimed at exploring mutually acceptable approaches to initiating negotiations on the limitation of the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides and the more general topic of the militarization of space, and to resuming negotiations on the reduction of offensive nuclear arsenals. We should make it equally clear that we are also prepared to discuss the nature and purpose of the US Strategic Defense Initiative and Soviet ballistic missile defense programs, and the relationship between the limitation of offensive and defensive capabilities. (S)

We should keep open the option of regularizing these talks. If held on a regular basis, the talks could complement ongoing negotiations and activity in regular diplomatic channels by providing an additional forum: to discuss issues which are not yet at the stage at which substantive negotiations could begin; to bring such issues to the point where formal, substantive negotiations could begin with some likelihood of success; and, to assist when existing formal negotiations have broken down. (C)

The Secretary of State is requested to solicit a Soviet position concerning the U.S. proposal to open "Umbrella Talks." The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is requested to conclude promptly work already in progress and any additional work needed to support the conduct of these talks. The consideration of any further elaboration of our position in this or in related substantive areas should be addressed only after the completion of this work. (S)

#### Ronald Reagan

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives (NSDD): Records, 1981-1987, NSDD 148 [The U.S. Umbrella Talks Proposal]. Secret. In a memorandum on October 27, McFarlane forwarded the signed NSDD to Bush, Shultz, Weinberger, Stockman, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman.

### October 1984-January 1985 "An iron-ass Secretary of State": Shultz and Gromyko in Geneva

299. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, October 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (3/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information. In a note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, I asked Jack to put this package together. I recommend you discuss with George and try to get him to agree. You could also make the point about future Amb. to Moscow. I think this contact should be made before the Arms Control person is named just so they have a heads up and understand context. JP."

300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/31/84); NLR-748-25A-37-6-3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum on November 2, indicating he saw it.

301. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman, Sven Kraemer, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 3, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 09/17/1984-11/17/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lehman signed "Ron," Kraemer initialed "SK," and Linhard signed "Bob" above their names in the "From" line. None of the tabs is attached; however, they are attached to a copy in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984.

#### 302. Memorandum of Conversation

New Delhi, November 3, 1984, 7-7:34 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Nodis. The Secretary was in New Delhi for the funeral of Indira Gandhi, who was assassinated on October 31. In telegram Secto 16040 to the White House, November 4, Shultz reported on the funeral and his various meetings in

New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0071)

### 303. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 7, 1984, 1529Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/01/84-11/07/84); NLR-748-25A-38-7-1. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

#### 304. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons. Forwarded through Armacost.

### 305. Message From the White House to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)

Washington, November 13, 1984, 0059Z

Source: Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250,

Misc File 6/84. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This message was sent electronically to Charles Hill in Brasilia, Brazil, for delivery to Shultz, who was in Brasilia from November 10 to 13 for the OAS General Assembly meetings.

#### 306. Editorial Note

### 307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491175). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. A November 16 State Department covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer.

### 308. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52,

November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret. The Department of State sent the letter in telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, with instructions that the "Ambassador should seek meeting with Gromyko to present text of the President's letter to Chernenko." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1/2))

309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 16, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.

### 310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84–11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz gave McFarlane this memorandum on November 17 to give to the President in California (see footnote 2, Document 309).

## 311. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Santa Barbara, California, November 18, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-1-3. Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "President has seen. JP." McFarlane was in California with Reagan from November 17 to 25.

### 312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, November 18, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt. Although Shultz did not sign it, a typed note on the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Sent by special courier 11/18/84 1735 SWO." In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt reported: "Following our discussion at your residence earlier this afternoon, I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. (I originally prepared it as a memorandum to Bud McFarlane, as you instructed, but changed it to a memo to the President at Jock Covey's request.) Jack Chain has read it and concurs fully with it. With your approval it will be sent to Bud McFarlane in Santa Barbara this evening. Separately, we have instructed Art Hartman along the lines we discussed earlier today."

According to handwritten notations on the covering memorandum, it was "pouched to Secretary 1650 11/18"; "Approved by Sec and sent to WH (McFarlane and Kimmit) 1730 11/18)"; and "McFarlane (in California) has this document."

### 313. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 19, 1984, 1347Z

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-6-8. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

#### 314. Minutes of a Senior Arms Control Group Meeting

Washington, November 19, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/18/1984-11/20/1984. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote: "Bob [Linhard]—Close Hold," "Draft," and "Ron—Bob L has cy" at the top of the page. The unknown hand put brackets around Linhard's last name. No final version of the minutes has been found. Handwritten notes, likely Lehman's, correspond to this typed draft. (Ibid.)

315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

## 316. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 19, 1984

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/15–30/84. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan and Kagan. Kaplan initialed the memorandum for Rodman. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials also appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

#### 317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 20, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 4001158. Secret. Weinberger wrote "Bud" next to

McFarlane's name on the memorandum. In a note on a covering memorandum, Kimmit wrote: "Per RCM, Weinberger memo only put in 11/30 PDB. RMK 11/30." Reagan initialed another copy of the memorandum on December 2, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

### 318. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

Moscow, November 27, 1984, 1527Z

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985); NLR-362-1-35-14-5. Secret; Immediate: Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. A stamp indicates McFarlane saw the telegram. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, I think Art is way off base in this cable. See my note next page. JP." See footnote 2, below. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on the Department of State copy of this telegram, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: I wanted to be sure you had seen the cable Art sent in on the Geneva talks. He gave it relatively wide distribution in an effort to be helpful around town. Art asked today if it would be useful for him to come back at this point for consultations. He could be here as long as you thought necessary up to December 17. His conversations around town have been guite useful in the past, and his being here would probably have value now. I will get back to Art in a few days after we have had time to discuss this." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979-1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1984, #39)

319. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
(Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, November 27, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft, Vershbow, Dobbins, and Markoff (PM/SNP) on 11/24; cleared by Pascoe, Palmer, J. Gordon (PM), A. Kanter (PM), W. Courtney (P), and Timbie. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins, Markoff, Pascoe, Palmer, Kanter, Courtney, and Timbie.

320. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, November 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Arms Control—USSR (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. In a December 1 covering note to Shultz on another copy of this memorandum, McFarlane wrote: "George: Attached is a very thoughtful memo from Jack Matlock. I must ask that you protect Jack on this and not share the memo with others. As an aside Jack is truly one of the most thoughtful men I have ever met on the Soviet Union. I agree with Jack's views with the exception of one idea on the last page [see footnote 8, below]. But I send this along in the hope that after you have read it we might be able to discuss whether/how we might try to

implement some of his ideas. Bud." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21 (2 of 4).

#### 321. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room

Washington, November 29, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/27/84–12/04/84); NLR-748–25A-42–3–0. Confidential. This note is based on reporting from the CIA on November 27. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, You probably saw this last night. One of the dangers we face in not taking them up on this is that the Soviets may begin to think we are not serious. JP."

#### 322. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 30, 1984

Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. "Only copy" is typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.

### 323. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, November 30, 1984, 1:45-2:45 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room. On November 30, Reagan wrote in his diary: "An N.S.P.G. meeting about forthcoming arms talks with the Soviets. I made it plain there must be no granting of concessions (one sided) to try & soften up the Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 402)

324. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 1, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84–12/2/84–12/2/84. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. "No log" is typed at the top of this memorandum, indicating it was not entered into the NSC system. In a covering note to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "Bud, Attached is an 'eyes only' on Shultz's views of Geneva. Also, we are preparing a package on the Geneva decision-making process. Attached is a first draft of a schedule. While we work the decision-making paper, you may find this useful. It doesn't deal with the punchline, however,—how we finalize the position & what it is. Ron."

325. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant
Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs
(Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of PoliticoMilitary Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; King. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Markoff, and J. Gordon (PM). Forwarded through Armacost. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on this packet, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 4.

### 326. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 5, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

### 327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/13/84); NLR-748-25A-43-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on December 8. Reagan initialed the memorandum on December 11, indicating he saw it.

### 328. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, December 7, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491237). Secret. Burt forwarded a draft letter to Shultz on November 28; Matlock made some revisions. McFarlane forwarded the revised letter and a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan on December 7. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984) According to an information memorandum to Shultz on December 7, Burt delivered the letter for Chernenko to Sokolov later that afternoon. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984–12/07/1984))

### 329. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, December 8, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on December 10.

330. Paper Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, December 10, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/16/84); NLR-748-25A-43-8-4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Defense Spending Branch, Econometric Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Reagan initialed the paper on December 12, indicating he saw it. In an undated handwritten cover note to Poindexter, Matlock wrote: "The attached analysis is worth a guick glance, since it deals with an interesting comment by a Soviet 'scholar' which would indicate that the CIA may have been underestimating the real impact on the Soviet economy of the Soviet defense effort. I have personally long thought that this was the case, and that the Agency, relying greatly on Soviet published statistics, underestimated the real impact. Since much of the latter is qualitative, it is difficult to quantify in the statistical terms the Agency uses. Jack." Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Thanks. I gave this report to the President yesterday. I agree with you. JP." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (2/5)

### 331. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 10, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Lehman. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

### 332. Memorandum for the Record by Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, December 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum for the record is unsigned. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "Attached for your information is a Memorandum for the Record of our conversation with Paul Nitze with a copy of his paper that I have annotated."

## 333. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 13, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Good work Ron."

### 334. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting

Washington, December 17, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/22/1984-12/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A set of handwritten notes of the meeting, likely Lehman's, are in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/14/84-12/20/84. Another set of handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files—Arms Control, 1983-1985. In his diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.P.G. meeting again on our negotiating posture in the upcoming meeting with Gromyko & the arms talks. I believe the Soviets have agreed to the talks only to head off our research on a strategic defense against nuc. wpns. I stand firm we cannot retreat on that no matter what they offer." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 408)

#### 335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 21, 1984

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. According to a December 21 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the letter was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. A typed note indicates the package was "Delivered to WH Sit Room at 2100 hours per S/S."

### 336. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko

Washington, December 21, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (2/2). No classification marking. Shultz sent Reagan a first draft of this letter with a covering memorandum on December 3. The letter went through several rounds of revisions by the State Department and the NSC Staff. In a memorandum forwarding both the revised letter and Shultz's memorandum to Reagan on December 17, McFarlane wrote: "Shultz has sent over a memorandum recommending that you reply to the letter, keeping this subject separate from your correspondence regarding the Geneva meeting and other subjects. I agree with George's recommendation, particularly since I believe that Chernenko's letter gives you an opportunity to reiterate in the most authoritative fashion the unacceptability of supplying jet aircraft to Nicaragua which could be used for combat." Reagan approved the recommendation to sign the letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984)

#### 337. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40-11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Thatcher, 1984. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Reagan wrote in his diary entries for December 22–23: "Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of Soviet U. In an

amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the US. Then we joined the others—Ambassadors, Shultz, McFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research ('Starwars') I believe [we] eased some concerns she had." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 411)

#### 338. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan

Washington, December 22, 1984

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Box 16, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1–31 Dec '84). Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to McFarlane, Casey wrote: "The attached is in response to your request, of 20 December, for my views on the upcoming Geneva Talks. There is a copy for you, as well as the original for the President." The words "GENEVA TALKS" are typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the page.

### 339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to President Reagan

Washington, December 22, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Prep III—December 1984 "Geneva —NSDD Instructions" (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; King. A copy was sent to Weinberger. In a handwritten covering note to McFarlane, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Vessey wrote: "Bud—The JCS views in response to your 20 Dec memo. I have sent a copy to Cap. Jack." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/21/1984-12/26/1984)

### 340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, December 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

## 341. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 24, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 12/20/84-12/24/84. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock and Lehman.

### 342. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan

Washington, December 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

### 343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, December 27, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive; King. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Vershbow and Pifer; cleared by Nitze, Gordon, and Courtney. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)

## 344. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, December 28, 1984

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (5/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information.

345. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-4-7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

## 346. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Palm Springs, California, undated

Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 01/01/1985-01/03/1985. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The memorandum is unsigned. In a December 28 memorandum, Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman forwarded to McFarlane this memorandum and a "proposed decision package for the President's use in making final decisions and in providing instructions to the delegation for discussion of arms control issues in Geneva on January 7 to 8, 1985." They continued: "The cover memorandum from you to the President outlines the contents of each of the three major tabs and portrays the fundamental consensus and differences of principals and agencies on the substantive and procedural issues resolved in the Decision Directive." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]).

## 347. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-3-8. Secret. Sent for information. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

#### 348. National Security Decision Directive 153

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Gromyko— January 1985 [Final NSDD—Geneva Instructions 01/01/1985] (1). Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan was in Palm Springs, California, from December 29 to January 2 (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) so presumably signed the NSDD in Palm Springs. Reagan also initialed at the top of the first page. In a January 1 PROFs note, McFarlane wrote: "At the conclusion of a one hour, forty-five minute meeting with Cap, George and me, the President approved the instructions for Geneva subject to a few minor edits." McFarlane listed the changes, which were incorporated into this final version. McFarlane instructed: "With these changes, the President has signed it. Please have a smooth prepared but do not distribute it." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (1) In an undated handwritten note to Reagan

on "Aboard Air Force One" stationery, likely written during their January 2 return trip to Washington, McFarlane wrote: "Mr. President, This is a 'smooth' version of the NSDD you've already signed after your meeting with Cap and George Jan 1 at Annenberg's. Could you please sign this 'original'. It is a verbatim reprint. Bud."

349. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 2, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (1/1/1985-1/17/1985); NLR-775-13-1-1-5. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on December 31, 1984; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Timbie, and Courtney. Forwarded though Armacost. A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Text same as State 004 (Tosec 200055)."

350. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 3, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400005. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1984. In a handwritten cover note to Poindexter dated January 3, Matlock wrote: "John—this report reached me only this afternoon. I am not sure that either you or Bud have seen

it. It is of sufficient importance and sensitivity that I think Bud should discuss it with the President—privately if possible—tomorrow. I believe that it should not be disseminated to members of the SACG at this point since it requires the most delicate—and confidential—handling—Jack."

## 351. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, January 4, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Roger Robinson Files, Chronological File, Robinson Chron January 1985-February 1985; NLR-487-11-29-3-5. Sent for action. Prepared by Robinson. Poindexter initialed the memorandum for McFarlane.

#### 352. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, undated

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on January 5; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Schwartz (PM/SNP), Chain, Nitze, and McFarlane. Palmer initialed for all clearing officials. This memorandum was the first document in the

Secretary's briefing book for his trip to Geneva. The book also contains schedules and other papers to prepare for Shultz's meetings with Gromyko.

### 353. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger

Washington, January 5, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File. Top Secret; King. A copy was sent to Shultz. In a January 5 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane wrote: "Mr. President, the plain facts are these. You, I, George and others have stated publicly that we will be going to Geneva with new ideas; that we will be flexible and constructive. If we arrive and simply restate our existing position without even an explanation of what we are talking about, we face the high likelihood that the Soviets will make that public, charge us with bad faith, and we will be held responsible for the impasse." Additional passages from McFarlane's memorandum are provided in footnotes below.

### 354. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State

Geneva, January 6, 1985, 2208Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0117. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Shultz arrived in Geneva on January 6.

#### 355. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 9:40 a.m.-1 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4)). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original.

### 356. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 1347Z

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985 Morning (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, Hill, M. Bova (S/S), and K. Clark (S); and approved by Shultz.

#### 357. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 3:35-6:55 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Carolyn Smith. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission.

358. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow. In his diary for January 7, Reagan wrote: "Only 1st reports from George S. & Bud in Geneva & not much to talk about. I'll try to remember 'no news' may be good news." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

### 359. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0305Z

Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0161. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

#### 360. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9:30 a.m.-noon

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission in Geneva.

361. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/08/1985 Morning. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, M. Bova (S/S), Hill, and K. Clark (S); approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Moscow.

#### 362. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 3:35-7:55 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Smith. This meeting took place in the U.S. Mission in Geneva. The memorandum of conversation mistakenly identified the end time of the meeting as 6:55 p.m. Brackets are in the original.

#### 363. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22A, 1985 Arms Control, Geneva. No classification marking.

# 299. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, October 29, 1984

SUBJECT

Thoughts on a Private Channel to the Soviet Leadership

I have compiled some thoughts on the whys and hows of a private channel which may be useful to you in further discussions with Secretary Shultz and the President. They are at TAB 1. Also, I have made an initial stab at describing what I would recommend discussing in a private meeting, if it is decided to arrange one (TAB 2). The latter is very preliminary and is meant to be indicative of the *way* the issues would be discussed. Some of the talking points need to be elaborated in more detail (particularly those for contingency use), and some key points are subject to decision and guidance. (The more important of these are underlined.)

Even if the Soviets accept a request for a meeting, we should not expect immediate results. They will doubtless wish to feel their way a bit and to gain some experience before they rely totally on the pledges of confidentiality. But even in the early stages, it would provide them a vehicle for conveying messages if they choose to send some. The most useful thing we are likely to obtain initially, however, will be comments which will improve our ability to assess Soviet priorities among the various proposals they have made, as well as hints as to how some of our proposals could be framed to make them more palatable.

I am not sure of the reasons for Secretary Shultz's caution. If it is a fear of offending Gromyko, I would argue that the fear is misplaced: if Gromyko does not want the meeting to occur, it will not. It is more likely that he would find it acceptable since it does not violate jurisdictional distinctions as the Soviets interpret them. In any event, requesting the meeting will do nothing to complicate anything we have proposed.

If it would be helpful for me to be present when the matter is discussed (to answer questions about how it could be done and the way the Soviets look at the various issues involved), I of course will be glad to join you.

#### Tab 1

Paper Prepared by Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff<sup>3</sup>

Washington, undated

#### A PRIVATE CHANNEL TO SOVIET LEADERSHIP: Some Basic Considerations

#### Reasons for Channel:

- —Need for mechanism to consult privately, informally, and off the official record.
- —Need for a better feel for the factors entering into Soviet decision-making.
- —Need for conveying our views to the Soviet leadership without the Foreign Ministry filter.

—Need for *total* confidentiality, the best insurance for which is that the public and the bureaucracy be unaware that the channel exists.

#### Possible Modes:

—Use of Ambassadors in both capitals.

[While this is probably the best arrangement in theory, it is not immediately available to us because of Soviet bureaucratic hang-ups. It would, additionally, require an Ambassador who is and is believed by the Soviets to be an "insider" in the decision-making process and who can deal with all the issues comfortably in Russian—some important Soviet interlocutors are not comfortable in English and introducing interpreters undermines the informality necessary and discourages candor.]

—Use of someone thoroughly familiar with the President's thinking and the decision-making process in Washington, but outside the normal structure for diplomatic contact.

[The first qualification is necessary to ensure the reliability of the messages we send, and the accuracy of feed-back; the second to get around Soviet "turf" considerations. The latter are minimized when the contact appears to be "counterpart to counterpart."]

—Use of a "special negotiator" from outside the USG.

[Potentially useful for discussions in a particular, well-defined area, but less so for broader discussions since a person not a part of the policy-making machinery would be hampered in interpreting and reacting to comments on the whole range of

problems. It also runs a greater risk of becoming public knowledge.]

—Use of intermediaries for specific messages.

[Useful in arranging specific deals which are delicate for one or the other side (e.g., a prisoner exchange), but of limited utility for a broader discussion since it does not provide direct contact with persons active in the decision-making process.]

#### Soviet Attitudes

- —They understand the need for confidential and informal consultation and will desire it if and when they are serious about solving problems.
- —They would probably prefer to establish Dobrynin as the sole interlocutor, since this would serve their interest by giving them access to our decision-making process but denying the same to us.
- —Since we have made it clear that an *exclusive* role for Dobrynin is not acceptable, there are indications that the Soviets will probably accept informal contacts in another form.
  - —"Knowledgeable" officials have been suggesting such since the beginning of the Reagan Administration (several approaches in 1981).
  - —Central Committee officials have periodically sent "messages" via third parties, implicit invitations to initiate a dialogue.

- —We were informed earlier this year that White House/Central Committee contacts had been approved by the Politburo, including Gromyko.<sup>4</sup>
- —The Soviets doubtless feel "burned" by some of the earlier efforts to communicate unofficially by other means.
  - —The contact with Kampelman backfired for reasons which are unclear, but our selective briefing of Allies may have played a role, since knowledge of the contact was spread very widely among NATO delegations at Madrid, their home capitals and even their Embassies in Washington.<sup>5</sup>
  - —Publicity given the "walk in the woods" and the subsequent informal conversations between Nitze and Kvitsinsky is likely to make the Soviets hypercautious for some time to come in dealing with U.S. negotiators on the private level.<sup>6</sup>
  - —The facts that the abortive Scowcroft mission became public knowledge and that private comments by Soviet diplomats in Washington to senior U.S. officials reach the press rapidly also act to reinforce Soviet doubts of our ability or willingness to keep any contact completely private.<sup>7</sup>
- —Once the election is over, the Soviet suspicion that we seek contacts for their own sake (i.e., just to *claim* that we are negotiating for a public impact) will be attenuated. If we judge that a private channel would be useful to us, it would be a good time to try again.

Basic Operating Principles

- —A private channel should not be used as a substitute for any other mode of communication, but rather as a supplement which may help both sides to make formal channels as productive as possible.
- —Both sides must insure that everything discussed in the channel, and knowledge of its very existence, is kept scrupulously confidential.

[On our side this will require direct knowledge of the channel to be limited to a *very* small number of the most senior officials, probably designated by name, and with a strict injunction against mentioning it to anyone not on the list, including personal aides and secretaries. Illustratively, such a list might include, in addition to the President, the Vice President, the National Security Adviser and his deputy, the Secretary of State and the Undersecretary for Political Affairs, and our Ambassador in Moscow.]

- —It should be used for tactical policy guidance, not concrete negotiations or precise commitments. At most, commitments should be in contingent form (e.g., "if you do x, we will respond with y"). Any general understandings reached would be subject to confirmation and detailed negotiation in formal channels.
- —All positions taken in the "channel"—including general guidelines for "personal remarks"—should be cleared in advance by the Assistant to the President for National Security and the Secretary of State, and as regards the more important issues, by the President personally.
- —A clear understanding should be reached on these matters (except those relating to internal USG procedures) at the outset, and it should be made clear that establishing

the "channel" does *not* imply an effort to bypass any principal policymaker in either country.

#### Steps Necessary to Activate

If we decide that we wish to explore whether the Soviets are willing to allow private contacts between the White House staff and the Central Committee staff, we can initiate the matter as follows:

- —Request Ambassador Hartman, by secure telephone, to pass a message to Zagladin that we do not fully understand some of the comments passed by his staff recently to us, and if he agrees, we feel a meeting might be useful.
- —If the Soviets want to pursue the contact, he will respond favorably and set a date; if he does not we will know that the time is not ripe from their point of view.
- —If Zagladin accepts, arrangements could be made to travel to Moscow for consultation with the Embassy (perhaps as part of a trip with other stops).
- —If he prefers to meet here or somewhere in Western Europe, that also could be arranged.
- —After setting a date, the talking points could be developed, discussed, and cleared in detail.
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron September 1984 (3/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information. In a note on the attached routing slip, Poindexter wrote: "Bud, I asked Jack to put this package together. I recommend you discuss with George and try to

get him to agree. You could also make the point about future Amb. to Moscow. I think this contact should be made before the Arms Control person is named just so they have a heads up and understand context. JP."

- <sup>2</sup> The talking points are attached but not printed.
- <sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 195</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 295.
- 6 See footnote 3, Document 6 and footnote 4, Document 137.
- <sup>7</sup> See <u>Document 193</u>.

## 300. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, October 31, 1984

SUBJECT

Art Hartman's Talk Today with Gromyko

Ambassador Hartman reported to me that he had a cordial session today with Foreign Minister Gromyko.<sup>2</sup> The news of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination had just arrived, and Art got Gromyko's agreement that we should work to keep the situation calm in the sub-continent during this traumatic period.<sup>3</sup> To hold them to this and avoid inflaming the situation in India, we have been pressuring the Soviets all day here and in Moscow to back off from blaming us for the tragedy.

The bulk of the meeting was devoted to arms control issues. Gromyko predictably said there should be changes in the US approach and complained about our intentions in space. He said we were agreed on the need for dialogue, contacts and negotiation, but complained, as usual, about the substance.

The most striking element of the talk was Gromyko's request for the first time that we give them our "specific ideas" to move forward. He also suggested that all critical arms control issues should be discussed at the same time, noting it was not possible to single out one issue such as space, strategic systems, or tactical nuclear weapons while leaving the others "on the side." Finally, Gromyko agreed with Art that the immediate problem before us was to determine "how" to conduct further exchanges, clearly playing off the points we have been making on the need to

define a new concept to get back to serious arms control talks.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (10/31/84); NLR-748-25A-37-6-3. Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum on November 2, indicating he saw it. <sup>2</sup> In telegram 14011 from Moscow, October 31, Hartman provided a detailed account of his meeting with Gromyko. (Ibid.)
- <sup>3</sup> In a separate telegram on Gandhi's assassination, the Embassy reported that the death of Indira Gandhi had been confirmed minutes before Hartman's meeting with Gromyko: "The Ambassador noted that the assassination was a tragedy and that India was in for a bad time in its wake. While he had no instructions from Washington, he was certain that the USG would view it as in the interests of both the Soviet Union and the United States that the situation in India remain calm. The USG wanted a unified India, an India at peace with its neighbor. We were prepared to do all we could toward those ends. Gromyko responded with the hope that the Indian people would be able to deal with Mrs. Gandhi's death in a way which served their interests. He agreed that her assassination was a 'grave loss', interrupting his interpreter to add that 'it would be well' if things remained calm." (Telegram 13974 from Moscow, October 31; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840012-0530)

# 301. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman, Sven Kraemer, and Robert Linhard of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane).

Washington, November 3, 1984

SUBJECT

The Timing of Arms Control Decisions

Purpose. This package has two objectives:

- (1) It recommends a specific course of action and pace for decision making related to arms control.
- (2) It provides reading material that we feel it would be useful for you to have with you for your immediate reference as needed during the upcoming California trip.<sup>2</sup> This includes:
  - $Tab\ A$ : a copy of NSDD 148 and the previous SACPG tasking memorandum referenced in the NSDD;<sup>3</sup>
  - *Tab B:* a copy of the various cables and reports provided on the recent Shultz-Dobrynin/Gromyko-Hartman discussions;<sup>4</sup> and
  - *Tab C:* a short package of summary reading material on the Umbrella Talks concept and how it could be implemented.

The Current Status of Arms Control Issues. NSDD 148 (Tab A) provided sufficient basic guidance on the Umbrella Talks concept to carry us forward until additional SACPG work is

completed. It directed that further elaborations of the US position on this and related arms control initiatives not be made pending the completion of the work program currently in progress. The SACPG is scheduled to conduct what amounts to a mid-term review of our arms control positions and options, beginning with its next meeting on November 20.<sup>5</sup> A major Intelligence Community assessment of Soviet force structure and arms control objectives is already in progress to support this review, and it will be completed by November 15.<sup>6</sup>

Considerations for US Movement. The Shultz-Dobrynin/Hartman-Gromyko meetings have just recently taken place. The reporting record on those meetings is provided at *Tab B*. It appears that in the Gromyko-Hartman meeting, Gromyko may have left an opening for the US to explain its ideas more fully. Some are likely to argue that we should move on this opening rather quickly by providing to the Soviets the details of our Umbrella concept or even details supporting a new initiative like the State proposal that we offer an ASAT moratorium coupled to an interim agreement on offensive forces. However, NSC staff feel that there are compelling reasons why we should not go into details on this until we have properly laid both the substantive and political groundwork. We should be able to address the substance of a US response during the planned SACPG review. Some may also argue that there will be a special window of opportunity for progress with the Soviets immediately after the election and that we need decisions made now to be in a position to exploit it. However, even if this were the case, the Soviets will likely first want to determine if the President's position of the past year, elaborated in his UNGA speech and in the meetings with Gromyko, will still hold after the election. While NSC staff feel that (1) we do need to decide how and what type of signal to give the Soviets promptly on this score after the

election, and (2) the President should use certain themes in his post-election remarks to begin sending appropriate signals, NSC staff feel that such a signal need not, and should not, involve making immediate decisions on substantive policy choices.

What we should not do. No immediate events (not even the recent Gromyko comments) should force premature White House decisions on issues of either form or substance. NSC staff feel that we need the scheduled SACPG activity in the last two weeks of November to conduct as fundamental a review and staffing of options as desired. We do not have to rush into difficult and controversial choices before they are needed (e.g., who would be a US arms control "special envoy" before the Soviets have even bit on the idea of Umbrella Talks or the implied format for such talks). Nor do we need to press the pace of interaction with the Soviets literally the day after the President's reelection (e.g., to draft a hurried response to the potential opening offered by Gromyko to Hartman). On the contrary, such precipitous moves (1) would reduce the quality of the policy review, (2) would limit US flexibility on future options, and (3) could, if leaked, create lightening rods for criticism of particular choices made even before these choices could be implemented in dealing with the Soviets.

What we should do. We should take certain definite actions:

1. Start sounding the themes of US bi-partisanship and the desire for progress with the Soviet Union on peace/stability issues. It is important that, at the earliest opportunity, we set the new Administration's tone towards its relationship with the Soviet Union and towards the way it will approach the national security policy development process. Therefore, we should begin immediately to weave three

principal themes into whatever remarks the President has the opportunity to make following the election:

- a. bi-partisanship, especially on national security matters ("Let us move forward together");
- b. a balanced, long-term program involving (1) offensive force modernization as needed, (2) research into the increased contribution of defenses, and (3) equitable, mutual and verifiable arms reductions—all designed to work together to enhance stability now and into the next century; and
- c. a renewed offer to the Soviets to join with us in building a better foundation of understanding upon which a more stable peace at lower levels of nuclear arms can be built.

We can begin sounding these themes in a coordinated fashion and with an air of quiet resolve (which would also signal seriousness of purpose) in post-election Presidential statements. We can then build gradually and effectively to a crescendo in the State of the Union address.

- 2. Protect a range of options for the President's decision at the appropriate time. Among the options that should be protected are the following:
  - a. the creation of a *Presidential Board on Strategic Stability* (bipartisan, but along the lines of the PFIAB model without Congressional confirmation) chaired by a distinguished figure and chartered to advise the President on strategic programs and arms control—with special attention to SDI, MX, the offense-defense relationship, the Umbrella Talks, and related issues;

- b. Presidential meetings with key Members of Congress, supported by comprehensive Administration briefings to members (which the NSC staff is now coordinating), to both demonstrate and implement his desire to rebuild the bipartisan basis for our foreign and national security policy;<sup>7</sup>
- c. if the Soviets bite on the Umbrella Talks, the appointment of a distinguished figure as *ambassador* or special envoy reporting to the President through the National Security Advisor and guided/supported on policy issues out of the White House via a modified SACPG chaired by the National Security Advisor (the National Security Advisor in effect becoming the policy "czar");<sup>8</sup>
- d. *modification of the GAC*, providing for overlapping terms, but ensuring that its role in the arms control process is clearly defined; and
- e. some reorganization of the arms control policy generation process within the Executive Branch with greater responsibility for management and direction of the process moving back to the White House through the SACPG and the NSC staff. (This reorganization, as well as all the other options listed above, should be cast in a positive light as a step to unite and build upon our strength, and not as a repudiation of any individuals or past policy.)
- 3. We also must anticipate possible alternative scenarios:
  - a. The Soviets could accept the Umbrella Talks idea in concept and request specific details on the agenda and timing of the US proposed Umbrella Talks and who would negotiate for the US. (In this case, we

would accept, focus on the arrangements for beginning the talks, but withhold any discussion of the substantive details until we complete the work now in progress, and with no additional new US initiatives—if any—being presented before the talks actually begin.)<sup>10</sup>

- b. The Soviets could repeat their June 29 proposal that we meet to discuss the prevention of the militarization of space, but avoiding reengaging us on a debate about preconditions. (In this case, we should probably promptly accept and accelerate work on a strategy to both exploit the opening and move the discussion in the direction of the Umbrella Talks concept.)<sup>11</sup>
- c. The Soviets could make a concerted effort to press us for more details on the "example" used by the President and Shultz/Hartman of an interim agreement covering both ASAT testing and offensive forces. (In this most dangerous case, until we can complete our anticipated review, we should respond that such details would be presented only once formal discussions are underway and use this as a lever to move the Soviets towards implementing the US Umbrella Talks proposal.)<sup>12</sup>

As indicated above, anticipating these scenarios *should not, however, require us to take immediate decisions*. Instead, it should provide a context for refining our existing options and developing others as needed.

The "Bottom Line". With the exception of the items cited above, what we most need to do right now is to keep our options open while we implement our gameplan and strengthen our position. 13

- —We need to keep in mind that a clear picture of what we want should be developed before we take decisions on how we go about getting it (e.g., desired output should drive selection of input, substance should drive form).
- —We now need to take the time we have to ensure we understand fully the desired output and to take whatever time we need to refine the options we have developed or generate new ones as needed. We must ensure that we start the next four years on a sound basis. Serious mistakes now could cause exceptional damage to US interests for the next four years and well beyond.
- —We must stay flexible and agile. On most issues, taking immediate decisions would be unnecessary, premature, and counter-productive.

#### Recommendations

### That you:

- (1) counter arguments for premature decisions and support the course and pace of action outlined above;
- (2) read carefully the summary material provided at Tab C; and
- (3) keep the other material provided in this booklet available for immediate reference as needed. 14

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 09/17/1984-11/17/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Lehman signed "Ron,"

Kraemer initialed "SK," and Linhard signed "Bob" above their names in the "From" line. None of the tabs is attached; however, they are attached to a copy in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984.

- <sup>2</sup> McFarlane traveled with Reagan to California. According to Reagan's diary, after several campaign stops on November 4, he went to Sacramento, California. After a stop in Los Angeles on November 5 and 6, he remained at his ranch until returning to the White House on November 11. (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, pp. 394–396) According to McFarlane: "In keeping with the permanent requirement that the administration be at all times prepared for nuclear attack, I accompanied the President wherever he went." (McFarlane, *Special Trust*, p. 285)
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 298</u>. This tasking memorandum was not found, but see <u>footnote 6</u>, <u>Document 305</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> See Documents 296 and 300.
- <sup>5</sup> Draft minutes of an SACG meeting held on November 19 (rescheduled from November 20) are printed as <u>Document</u> 314. On November 3, Hill forwarded four papers to McFarlane entitled: "SACPG Follow-Up: Tactics and Strategy" dated November 1, "US-Soviet Exchange of Defense Plans" dated November 2, "Exchanges of Observers at Exercises and Other Military Locations" dated November 2, and "Nuclear Testing Initiative" dated November 2. In a covering memorandum dated November 3, Hill wrote: "In response to your October 12, 1984 memorandum to the Senior Arms Control Policy Group, an ad hoc interagency group has developed four papers following-up specific initiatives cited in the President's UNGA speech." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Arms Control File, Proposals)
- <sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this paragraph.

<sup>8</sup> McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this

paragraph.

- <sup>9</sup> McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Use GAC if it can be done." Above this in the margin, he wrote: "Pls find specific proposals now."
- 10 McFarlane wrote "agree" in the margin.
- <sup>11</sup> McFarlane put a check mark in the margin beside this paragraph.
- 12 McFarlane wrote "agree" in the margin.
- 13 McFarlane put check marks next to this paragraph and each of the three points below.
- 14 McFarlane initialed his approval of these recommendations and put a check mark in the margin next to recommendations one and two.

### 302. Memorandum of Conversation 1

New Delhi, November 3, 1984, 7-7:34 p.m.

The Secretary's Meeting with USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov, November 3, 1984

The Secretary met with USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Tikhonov, November 3 (1900–1934). Participants were:

U.S. SIDE

Secretary Shultz
Senator Baker
Senator Moynihan
Assistant Secretary Burt
Executive Assistant Hill
Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer

USSR SIDE

Chairman Tikhonov Deputy ForMin Maltsev Interpreter Sukhodrev

The Secretary began by saying that the funeral had been moving and different than anything he had experienced. Tikhonov replied that it was also the first time he had been to such a funeral. These were tragic circumstances, almost incredible that one of her own bodyguards had hit her with eight bullets. She was a wise, great woman, with a high degree of erudition. India took its right place in the world under her, almost like a great power. Of course, they have their problems. But she continued the cause of her father Nehru. Now Nehru's grandson is the leader. The Soviet Union will do all it can to ensure that India remains stable, to help. India has many problems: housing, cultural level,

educational level, and external problems. All these are big matters which must be resolved.

The Secretary said he agreed that the assassination seemed incredible. We were shocked in the United States by radio Moscow's statements suggesting that somehow the United States was behind this event. We believe it is important to develop constructive dialogue on regional problems involving instability and danger such as Pakistan and India, and Afghanistan and the Soviet forces there. So we were very upset at Soviet suggestions that the United States would have anything to do with such a shocking event.

Tikhonov replied that he was not in Moscow at the time (of these reports). But he had looked into it especially, and the Soviet media reference was to a source not in the Soviet Union, to a report of some agency. The Soviet Union has not made and does not intend to make a statement that the U.S. is connected to this tragic event. "It's out of the question—it is excluded that the United States was related to this event in any way." The region is dangerous, Tikhonov continued, and "ample fuel" has accumulated. Such things must be judged soberly and great powers need to do all they can to see that it develops in calm and tranquility and without aggravation.

Secretary Shultz thanked Tikhonov for his statement. Tikhonov interjected that even before he knew that he would be meeting the Secretary, he had looked into the matter and the reference was not to a Soviet source.

The Secretary said he had a report for Tikhonov, who said he would be happy to accept it if it was pleasant. The Secretary said he hoped it would be. The Secretary said that last Wednesday he had spent an hour talking alone with President Reagan just before his last campaign swing. The President is superstitious, and does not believe in acting as though the election has been won—and in our country elections are never won until the votes are in and counted. But the President did talk to the Secretary at some length about the President's plans. The President had reflected on his meetings with Mr. Gromyko and on our own thinking about relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And since Mr. Gromyko had been in Washington, the Secretary had met with Ambassador Dobrynin and Art Hartman had talked further with Mr. Gromyko. We had all the reports.

The Secretary continued that this discussion with President Reagan had not been in preparation for his coming to Delhi, but just a private chat in general about the outlook as we see it. The President had expressed his determination if elected to do everything he can to help bring about a relationship with the Soviet Union that would be a problem-solving relationship. So the Secretary was reporting to Tikhonov, as a statement, that the President Reagan you see before the election will be the same President Reagan you will see after the election. The efforts he has been making to improve our relationship will continue.

Tikhonov responded that if the President remains the same Ronald Reagan it would not be that good. But if he were to change course and really seek solutions to problems that would be good. Now the U.S. and the Soviet Union have very different points of view on practically all issues between us. The questions of armaments are not stabilizing, just growing. All other areas such as the economic field are in stagnation. "So is this talk not just a pre-election tactic?" Tikhonov continued by saying he had

visited the United States twice during the Eisenhower presidency. He remembered walking streets absolutely freely, he had even been a guest in homes and had been pleased. But today probably no one would invite him to their home. He hoped that all this is temporary.

The Secretary said Tikhonov missed the point. Insofar as events in U.S.-Soviet relations could influence our election, the campaign is over. Nothing would happen now to affect an outcome only 2–3 days off. The Secretary's point was that as the post-election period, he spoke privately to the Secretary—not in front of the TV cameras, and not as a public statement. He spoke of improved relations, if possible.

The United States, the Secretary said, sees strains in the relationship as principally due to positions the Soviet Union takes. If there is no give on the part of the Soviet Union, then there can be no improvement. "But I can assure you," the Secretary said, "that President Reagan will be working towards constructive ends."

The Secretary noted that Chairman Tikhonov might be interested in hearing the views of the two Senators in our bipartisan delegation—the Majority Leader and a leading democrat, Senator Moynihan.

Senator Baker said he wanted to underline what the Secretary had said. The President will be re-elected and is sincerely anxious to pursue a dialogue with the Soviet Union that will lead to better understanding and concrete results. Senator Baker said that he knew the mood of the Senate and it would welcome and would participate in improving relations. So he hoped that the Soviets would take at face value the statement that the Secretary had just made. The U.S. and the Soviet Union have an obligation to

each other to try to accomplish peaceful objectives together.

Tikhonov said he could only say one thing. If President Reagan does indeed move not towards talks for the sake of talks, but towards solutions, the Soviets "will not be found wanting for reciprocity." Then he could say without reservation that the U.S. may rest assured the Soviets would make their own contribution.

Senator Moynihan mentioned that when he had served as American Ambassador he had spent pleasant evenings in this house. He recalled that when Brezhnev visited Delhi in 1973 he had made the strongest statements about improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations. Senator Moynihan warmly recalled that the Soviet translator then, as today, was Mr. Sukhodrev. He made no mistakes then, and would not surely make any today in conveying the Secretary's point. Certainly President Reagan will have the support of the Senate for what he proposes. But both sides in Congress fail to understand why the Soviets have been so unforthcoming in recent years when he believed progress was being made ten years ago. The Senate will support constructive measures to help progress and improve relations.

Tikhonov said he could only say he did not know anyone in his right mind in the Soviet Union who was against better U.S.-Soviet relations. Tikhonov did not want to get into a polemic about who is to blame for the past. Soviets have their opinion and the U.S. has its. But if President Reagan wants better relations, then he will find that all on Soviet side are prepared to return the favor. The Secretary concluded by saying the two should shake hands on that note.

(Comment on Tikhonov. Tikhonov entered the room with a show of energy, looking quite healthy and smiling. Throughout he was alert and making a clear effort to be pleasant, without giving an inch on substance. Given his extensive travel and work in the preceding few days—he had just come from a trip to Cuba and had been holding extensive talks in Delhi—he looked in remarkably good shape for a man of 79 fast approaching 80.)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Nodis. The Secretary was in New Delhi for the funeral of Indira Gandhi, who was assassinated on October 31. In telegram Secto 16040 to the White House, November 4, Shultz reported on the funeral and his various meetings in New Delhi. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0071) <sup>2</sup> In telegram 324156 to Moscow, November 1, the Department reported on Palmer's telephone call to Isakov "to protest Radio Moscow statement that Mrs. Gandhi's death was due to 'world imperialism.'" The telegram continued to report: "Shortly after the Palmer-Isakov exchange, FBIS reported Radio Moscow commentary alleging that 'ideological inspiration' for the Gandhi assassination came from CIA. In addition, TASS report of Moscow press briefing on U.S. policy of 'state terrorism' quoted MFA spokesman Lomeyko as condemning the 'criminals' who had killed Gandhi and 'their inspirers'—the implication being that the U.S. was responsible." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840012-0534) <sup>3</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Shultz and

Reagan met in the Oval Office at 1:30 p.m., on Wednesday,

October 31. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No substantive record of this meeting was found.

- $\frac{4}{2}$  See <u>Documents 296</u> and <u>300</u>.
- $\underline{^5}$  Moynihan served as U.S. Ambassador to India from 1973 to 1975.
- <sup>6</sup> Brezhnev visited India in November 1973.

### 303. Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of $State^{1}$

Moscow, November 7, 1984, 1529Z

14297. For the President and the Secretary. Subject: National Day in Moscow—Your Message. Ref: State 330956.2

- 1. (S—Entire text).
- 2. I used the occasion of the National Day reception to present to General Secretary Chernenko and First Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko your oral message sent after the election results were known. I explained that you wished them to know immediately the seriousness with which you approached the difficult problems of our relationship and the great importance you personally attach to reaching an agreement to reduce substantially the stocks of nuclear weapons. I stressed our understanding that this would not be an easy task but that both sides must devote the utmost to the effort.
- 3. Both leaders asked that their best wishes be passed to you. And this was echoed by many others at the reception. The news of your massive win and the statements you had made during the course of the election evening were well known and greeted as hopeful signs. I told Gromyko that his speech last night had been much too negative and that serious, non-polemical talks were necessary.
- 4. The downside of today's events from the Soviet point of view was obviously the absence of one of their stalwarts—Marshal Ustinov. He has been absent from public view

since September and to have missed this event he must be very ill indeed. Chernenko was treated almost like an invalid. For the first time it was visible that he and 79-year-old Prime Minister Tikhonov sat through the parade. When Chernenko made his one short speech of the day to the assembled throng at the reception, it was even more labored and halting than usual. The embarrassment was palpable as he sometimes waited to catch his breath a full 30 seconds between phrases. Eyes among the loyal crowd lowered and feet shuffled as they waited for the painful episode to end.

- 5. In talking with foreign policy advisor Aleksandrov and First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko I had the impression that, while there is expectancy and modest hope, they still put things in terms of waiting for us to change. I tried to disabuse them of this and explain that they will find you and your administration calm, confident and generous in the propositions we will consider but we must find a balance that leads to real stability and not a false sense of euphoria that will quickly be dispelled by ugly facts.
- 6. The head of the U.S. Department of the Foreign Ministry, Bessmertnykh, had one positive note—although it was said in a slightly ambiguous way. He said apropos our demarche last night on the possible delivery of jet aircraft to Nicaragua that quote our fears were groundless unquote. Since he did not specify what he thought our fears were and I had no time to clarify, I am still not wholly reassured. I did say to all who would hear me that this is no time to do something stupid or thoughtless that would interfere with the chances of our approaching the vital issues of our relationship with the utmost seriousness.

7. Needless to say, I join all here in congratulating you and sending you and Mrs. Reagan our very best regards and hopes for turning this sow's ear of a relationship into something a little more safe and stable if not aesthetically more beautiful.

### Hartman

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/01/84-11/07/84); NLR-748-25A-38-7-1. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.
- <sup>2</sup> In telegram 330956 to Moscow, November 7, the Department instructed Hartman to pass along this oral message from Reagan to the Soviet leadership during a reception at the Kremlin: "With my reelection as President, I want to reaffirm my conviction that there is no more important task before us than for the United States and the Soviet Union to redouble efforts to ensure the peace and security of all mankind. This will require a serious commitment by both of us, but I am convinced we can and must establish a more stable and constructive relationship for the long term. We need to begin moving forward to diminish the burden of armaments, to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, and to build a new measure of trust and confidence. I, and my administration, will be working to this end in the weeks and months ahead." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013-0125)
- <sup>3</sup> Speaking in Los Angeles after his re-election on November 6, Reagan stated: "By rebuilding our strength, we can bring ourselves closer to the day when all nations can begin to reduce nuclear weapons and ultimately banish

- them from the Earth entirely." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1801–1802*)
- <sup>4</sup> For the full text of Gromyko's speech, given on November 6 during the celebration of the 67th anniversary of the October Revolution, see the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXVI, No. 45 (December 5, 1984), pp. 5–8. For extracts of the address, see *Documents on Disarmament*, 1984, pp. 784–785.
- <sup>5</sup> In telegram 14291 from Moscow, November 7, the Embassy reported: "While we have no solid information on Ustinov's condition, the fact that he missed this most obligatory of leadership appearances—after an absence from public view for more than a month—would seem to indicate that he is seriously ill." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840712-0951)
- <sup>6</sup> In his memoir, Shultz wrote that on November 6: "a report came in that a freighter bearing twelve crates thought to contain MIG-21s was off the northwest coast of South America headed for Nicaragua. If they were MIG-21s, we would take them out. The Soviets knew I had laid that marker down. The next morning, the ship was said to be 225 miles out of port and to have slowed to eight knots. By midday, the ship was off the Pacific Coast port of Corinto. Our ambassador in Nicaragua, Harry Bergold, dispatched some embassy people to snoop around the port town. They reported no unusual activity. 'Look,' I told Motley, 'I'm making you responsible for determining whether those crates contain lawnmowers or MIGs.' We made our concerns known to the Soviets: they said our worries were groundless. Ortega declared, 'It is not the policy of the revolutionary government to announce the type of weapons we receive.' He continued, 'All of the

weapons that we receive are for the defense of the revolution.'"

Shultz continued: "When the ship docked and the crates were opened, they contained high-performance helicopters, not MIGs. 'Voila,' said Motley.

"'Voila?' I asked. 'Motley, you've been in the State Department too long.' I told deputy CIA director Bob Gates that the whole episode, from the standpoint of the intelligence community, had not only been a failure but had been very costly: it revealed to the Soviets how much we don't know and how much we do know.

"The Soviets and Nicaraguans had outmaneuvered us: they had lured us into visible protests in opposition to MIG-21s and then supplied the kind of aircraft that, ironically, would do far greater damage to the Contras in the field than would jet fighters. Then, in the United Nations, they had pointed to our statement that we would not tolerate MIGs as evidence of aggressive intent. The trouble with drawing red lines, as with the MIG-21, is that everything not over the line is taken to be okay." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 424-425)

## 304. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 8, 1984

SUBJECT
My Meeting Today with Soviet DCM Sokolov

I got together for a lunch and a subsequent meeting this afternoon with Soviet Embassy DCM Sokolov to follow up on your last session with Dobrynin. Sokolov brought along an "oral reply" from Chernenko to the oral message Art passed along to the leadership in Moscow early yesterday. The text is attached. In handing over the reply, Sokolov said he wanted us to note two things: first, it was quite unusual that they could get us a reply so quickly during a holiday in Moscow, and second, it was a "very positive" message that he himself was quite happy about.

I told him that it did indeed seem positive and suggested that we move on from these atmospherics to a discussion of the substance. We then went over four different aspects of arms control:

—We first talked about their space arms control proposal. Sokolov seemed somewhat confused about our position on whether a discussion of offensive weapons was a precondition for discussions on outer space. I told him we thought it made sense to discuss offensive weapons in the context of discussions of outer space, but that it was not a precondition. He said he welcomed that statement.

—Second, we discussed the Soviet proposal for an ASAT moratorium. Sokolov asked if we had changed our position on agreeing to a moratorium. I told him this sounded like a precondition to us, but we were willing to discuss it when negotiations were underway on space. When I pointed to the President's comment on the question in his UNGA speech, Sokolov appeared not to understand that this language referred to our willingness to discuss an ASAT moratorium when we were in negotiations.<sup>4</sup>

—Third, we talked about offensive nuclear forces. Sokolov asked about the President's reference to an interim agreement during his meeting with Gromyko at the White House. I told him we had some ideas about such an agreement that we would be prepared to discuss in the context of negotiations.

—Fourth, Sokolov said that in the Soviet version of the Reagan-Gromyko memcon, the President had suggested that a high-level confidential discussion on arms control could be conducted between someone in Moscow and someone in the White House. Sokolov asked what individual in the White House was to carry out these discussions. I told him our version of the memcon showed that the President did not refer to the White House specifically but merely said "here." I said our position on carrying out a confidential discussion was flexible and that we did not have precise ideas about channels. However, as the President and the Secretary had indicated in the discussions with Gromyko, we were prepared for high-level confidential talks that would involve the two Foreign Ministers and possibly others. Sokolov seemed satisfied with this answer.

Finally, I took advantage of the meeting to press Sokolov on the two Berlin issues—the air corridors (following up on your last meeting with Dobrynin) and the closing of the Glienicker bridge threatened for November 15.6 I also asked him if he had anything for me on Nicaragua. He had nothing on Berlin. However, on Nicaragua he said that the Soviet government "stands by" the statement of the Nicaraguan Foreign Minister that the Soviet ship at Corinto contains no combat aircraft. 7

#### Attachment

Oral Reply From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan<sup>8</sup>

Moscow, November 8, 1984

Thank you for the oral message transmitted through Ambassador Hartman. I would like to take this opportunity personally to congratulate you on your reelection to the post of President of the USA.

I want to reaffirm that I and my colleagues in the Soviet leadership come out firmly for reversing the present unfavorable trends in the international situation and in Soviet-American relations. We take note of your statement about the possibility and necessity of establishing more stable and constructive relations between our two countries for the long term.

The main thing there, in our view, is to begin in practice movement forward, to act in specific ways to stop the arms race, to establish the necessary level of trust, and to build our mutual relations on the basis of equality, non-interference and respect for each other's interests.

For our part, we are prepared to search on this path for solutions to the problems that stand before the Soviet Union and the USA, above all the task of eliminating the nuclear threat.

I would like to hope for corresponding reciprocal action in this on your part.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons. Forwarded through Armacost.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 296</u>.
- 3 See Document 303.
- <sup>4</sup> See footnote 7, Document 267.
- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 289.
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 296</u>. In telegram 2983 from the Mission in Berlin, October 3, the Mission reported: "The GDR has told the Berlin Senat that as of November 15 it will close the Glienicker Bridge between the American sector of Berlin and the GDR (near Potsdam). The principal users of the bridge are members of the three Western Military Liaison Missions to the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840630–0006)
- <sup>2</sup> On November 7, Nicaraguan Foreign Minister d'Escoto made an official statement denying that Nicaragua "was about to obtain advanced fighter aircraft from the Soviet bloc." He reported that the cargo of the Soviet freighter unloading in the port of Corinto "contained nothing that would endanger the peace of nearby nations." (Stephen Kinzer, "Nicaragua Says No Jet Fighters Are Being Sent,"

New York Times, November 8, 1984, p. A1) See also footnote 6, Document 303.

<sup>8</sup> Secret. The text of the oral statement, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy. Reagan initialed another copy of this oral message from Chernenko, indicating he saw it. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8498292)) The text of Chernenko's message was sent via telegram to Hartman in Moscow. (Telegram 334288 to Moscow, November 9; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no N number])

### 305. Message From the White House to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State $(Hill)^{\underline{1}}$

Washington, November 13, 1984, 0059Z

WH9034/6970. Please Deliver the Following Message to Charlie Hill in a Sealed Envelope Marked for the Secretary Eyes Only.

FROM: Robert C. McFarlane

TO: Secretary Shultz

November 12, 1984

Mr Secretary,

With apologies for intruding on your extremely busy schedule, there are two or three items which I have wanted to convey concerning pending business here and matters discussed with the President on the way back from California yesterday. While some of the more sensitive points can wait until your return, I believe we both want to move the Chernenko letter as soon as possible and your own guidance would be most welcome.

1. Chernenko letter. John and Mike<sup>3</sup> have exchanged views on the three basic differences which exist on the current State text (forwarded in Hill-McFarlane memo of November 9).<sup>4</sup> The most significant in my judgment concerns the language you propose on the interim agreement. As you know, the President treated this in the Gromyko meeting as follows: "(The President) . . . wondered if we could not

consider concluding an interim agreement with restrictions on anti-satellite weapons, and also agreement on a process of reducing nuclear arms." There was no reference to a time period e.g., three years, or to a moratorium. First, I don't know with certainty what motivated the President to raise this. You had discussed it with him but it was not in the material he developed personally. From talks with him I believe he was thinking conceptually of what it would take to demonstrate U.S. flexibility generally rather than to make a specific substantive proposal. For as you know, the President has always refused to depart from our current position before negotiations resume and the content of an interim agreement as you propose it has not been approved. Indeed the President directed me to set as the first priority, conclusion of ongoing preparations for the "Umbrella Talks" before exploring any new proposals such as the moratorium and I put that in writing to the community in late October. 6 More to the point, however, it seems to me unwise on the merits to sign up now to a general moratorium on ASAT testing (not even limiting it to interceptors) before you have had a chance to see the pitfalls of that through a brief at the Pentagon. There are truly significant problems in such a course—difficulties in verification and real questions as to how we husband the leverage represented by ASAT and SDI systems (which are largely indistinguishable) in the long-term negotiations we envision will take place. In short to ignore those issues with a unilateral concession at this point—a concession the President did not make explicit in the Gromyko meeting would be against our interest. Finally it is essential to recognize that neither the Joint Chiefs nor OSD would support such a position.

My own recommendation—and in my honest judgment, the President's intention during the Gromyko talks—would be to focus on the Umbrella Talks as the way to convene an

overall review of the bidding in START, INF, MBFR, CD, CDE and space systems. Our goal would be to spin off renewed talks in either existing form or new ones as conceptual agreement emerges during the Umbrella Talks. I expect that we can conclude the pending umbrella analysis by the end of November so as to be ready for talks to start anytime thereafter. But there is no need—and indeed it could damage our position in those talks—to make preemptive concessions at this time.

2. The channel for conducting the Umbrella Talks. I am afraid I have been misunderstood as to my motive for leaving the institutional element general. My pledge to you that any senior associate you might choose would work for and through you is firm. That is also clearly the President's commitment although here again, he views the concept as nothing more than an idea that might appeal to the Soviets, but which if not, can be set aside. Its treatment in general terms in the letter is Soviet-oriented not US-oriented. Specifically, history as well as current Soviet practice suggests that the arms control portfolio in the Kremlin is not dominated by the Foreign Ministry and for us to so suggest is gratuitous. The more general formulation leaves them the latitude to decide how they want to put their team together which may turn out to be to repose control in the Foreign Ministry, but that is not for us to prejudge. I would propose that we focus on the Umbrella Talks as follows "One possible approach would be for special representatives (if you wish: ours under the guidance of the Secretary of State), to sit down and discuss the conceptual issues that need to be addressed, such as the relationship between offensive and defensive forces and the nature of the strategic relationship our arms control efforts should seek to establish. Such talks could help expedite the search for agreement on the objectives and structure for specific negotiations in individual areas."

### [Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

4. My talk with the President. As we discussed when last we talked, I talked with the President on the plane yesterday about the next four years. I had sent him our joint cover memo with your changes included and he had read it. I began with an enthusiastic view of the substantive opportunities before him and expressed your own concurrence on the important ways in which U.S. leadership could be applied to the resolution of tough issues from arms control to the Middle East to Asia, Europe, etc. Then saying that I was speaking only for myself I stated that I perceived significant obstacles to the smooth functioning of the policy machinery for as long as personal and ideological differences persisted as I expected that they would. I touched on how these have impeded progress in the past in three specific areas—Central America, the Middle East and arms control. I went over what I viewed his goals and strategy to be in each area and explained where I believed there were disagreements in each. I said that it was possible that a written statement of goals and policy in the leading areas might overcome some of the disagreements and get those concerned to pull together, that I remained worried about disharmony within the community. The President's response was to go over how he wished to proceed in each area. He reaffirmed his sense of the need to negotiate seriously for arms reduction. He does not dismiss the failures of the past but simply believes we are better positioned to negotiate and keep our self-interest in the forefront and not be stampeded into a bad agreement. Similarly in Central America, he sees the risks but believes there would have been little chance of getting as far as we have in gaining congressional approval without the approach we have taken to negotiations, but he does feel that we must achieve our four objectives in the process. He didn't comment on the disagreements. I never

made explicit my personal sense of what it will take to solve the problem but it was strongly implicit in my remarks. It seems to me that unless you wish to broach this directly (with my reinforcement if you wish) we can expect Jim Baker's assessment to you on the phone last Friday to materialize. I've done a lot of soul-searching on the implications of such a scenario which I can wait to discuss until you return.

Warm regards,

Bud

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250, Misc File 6/84. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This message was sent electronically to Charles Hill in Brasilia, Brazil, for delivery to Shultz, who was in Brasilia from November 10 to 13 for the OAS General Assembly meetings.

<sup>2</sup> The President remained at his ranch in California after the November 6 election, returning to Washington on Sunday, November 11. In his memoir, McFarlane wrote: "With the election behind us, and the President's mandate revealed to be the most impressive any modern chief executive had ever been granted, I was eager and anxious to get started on all the work there was to do in the second term." He continued: "The President had been in California for the election, and on the following Sunday we headed back to Washington. On Air Force One, he and I sat down together for a long session, one-on-one. I told him about my planning for the second term, and the detailed issue analyses that were being prepared for his consideration, from which I hoped he would select the two issues on

which we would focus for the next four years." (McFarlane, *Special Trust,* pp. 285–286)

- <sup>3</sup> Reference is to John Poindexter and Michael Armacost.
- <sup>4</sup> Not printed. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) November 1984 (1/3))
- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 289.
- <sup>6</sup> In NSDD 148 (see <u>Document 298</u>), Reagan tasked McFarlane with completing preparations for the Umbrella Talks. In an October 12 memorandum to the SACPG members, McFarlane provided instructions for near and long-term taskings related to the Umbrella Talks and the production of four working papers for the group's November meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Umbrella Talks 10/24/1984-11/04/1984) Regarding the four papers, see <u>footnote 5</u>, <u>Document 301</u>. Although no late October tasking memorandum from McFarlane was found, the November 3 memorandum from Lehman, Kraemar, and Linhard (see <u>Document 301</u>) responds to the tasking for arms control and the SACPG specifically. The SACPG met on November 19. See <u>Document 314</u>.
- <sup>7</sup> Not found.
- 8 See Document 306.
- $\frac{9}{2}$  No record was found of a phone conversation.

### 306. Editorial Note

On November 14, 1984, from 1:30 to 2:45 p.m., President Ronald Reagan met with Secretary of State George Shultz and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane in the Oval Office. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The purpose of this meeting was twofold: to discuss the global agenda and foreign policy for the second term, as well as to address the growing divisions within the administration, specifically between Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger over the Soviet Union, arm control, and various other issues. In his November 14 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "A long meeting with Sec. Shultz. We have trouble. Cap & Bill Casey have views contrary to George's on S. Am., the middle East & our arms negotiations. It's so out of hand George sounds like he wants out. I cant let that happen. Actually George is carrying out my policy. I'm going to meet Cap & Bill & lay it out to them. Wont be fun but has to be done." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 396)

In his memoir, McFarlane recalled discussions with Reagan in the lead-up to this November 14 meeting. During their return trip from California (see <u>footnote 2</u>, <u>Document 305</u>), McFarlane brought up the sensitive issue of disagreements between Shultz and Weinberger with Reagan: "I must tell you, Mr. President,' I said, 'that I fear that nothing can get accomplished if you don't recognize that you face paralysis within your administration owing to the largely personal animus that exists between Cap and George.'

"I told him I believed he would find that the process would work more smoothly if he built his team around one or the other of these two men, but that together, they were like oil and water. If he insisted on keeping them both, I said, 'then you're going to have discord, and you're going to have to be the arbiter and be much more active.'

"These were thoughts I had been having for a long time, and it was time to air them. The need for constant mediation between Shultz and Weinberger was exhausting, pointless, unworthy and immensely frustrating, and although I felt I handled it well, I felt it was important to make this pitch to the President and that he either change the configuration or become more actively involved and in control of his own administration." (McFarlane, Special Trust, page 286)

Once back in Washington, McFarlane met with Shultz: "I told Shultz about the discussion. George and I had discussed the problem he had with Cap on a couple of occasions, and he professed himself perplexed by Weinberger's apparently deep-seated hostility and jealously of his role. He immediately agreed to broach the subject with Reagan himself. At my instigation, Shultz regularly came to the White House twice a week for private meetings with the President. At the next one of these meetings, he picked up the thread of discussion I had had with Reagan on Air Force One." (Ibid., page 287)

Although no notes of this meeting were found, Shultz discussed the meeting in detail in his memoir. (His account corresponds to his talking points and preparatory meeting papers in the Department of State, A Records, Miscellaneous Papers of Secretary Shultz and Charles Hill, Lot 89D250, Misc File 1984.) Shultz wrote: "I asked Bud McFarlane to attend that key meeting, at 1:30 in the afternoon on Wednesday, November 14, at which I would give my detailed views to the president. We talked for a full hour, after which I spent another half hour with Bud. I told

the president that his administration was deeply divided and that I wanted to set my views out for him. 'Standing still with the Soviets is not an option. The choice is to negotiate new agreements or enter a world with no arms limitations. Opponents of negotiations are not troubled by the disappearance of arms control. They argue that nothing useful has resulted, that agreements will undermine public support for defense, and that arms control should be an exercise in public relations.' In fact, I said, 'negotiations have produced security-enhancing agreements.' I called attention to the Austrian State Treaty, the Berlin Accords, the Atmospheric Test Ban, the Nonproliferation Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty as examples. I pointed out that the SALT I Treaty put a cap on further growth in the number of Soviet launchers at a time when we had no program to increase ours and that the ABM Treaty prevented costly deployment of systems that would not have yielded reliable defense, given the technology at the time.

"I had asked the CIA to tell me what a world without current nuclear arms limits and with no arms control agreements in force would look like down the line. I got back the view that in such a scenario Soviet missile warheads would likely double over the next ten years. I noted to the president that this doubling did not assume any vast new commitment of Soviet resources but that the effort to keep pace with them on ballistic missiles was very costly for us, politically as well as financially. An 'unconstrained environment,' I argued, 'is detrimental to the security interests of the United States.

"We need to do better than existing agreements,' I said, 'and seek reductions in the numbers of warheads, as you have proposed.' I also argued that the opponents of arms control misread the key relationship between arms control efforts and public support for defense spending. 'Congress,'

I argued, 'will not support key weapons systems without meaningful negotiations. Similarly, allied support will be problematic if arms control efforts unravel. Extreme positions and inflexibility will not enhance our position but undermine it. Thanks to your policies, the United States is confident and strong and the question now is whether we use strength to achieve significant new accords with the Soviets or see an unlimited increase in nuclear weapons, along with greater tension. Most people in your administration are quite comfortable with the present situation,' I said, 'and are doing all they can to block any effort to engage with the Soviets and achieve arms control agreements.'

"The president interjected frequently as I talked, and it was clear he had thought all this through. His point of view mirrored my own. It troubled him that people within his administration opposed the kind of arms control agreements he had advocated and even opposed an attempt to build a constructive relationship with the Soviets.

"At the end of our discussion, I told the president, 'To succeed, we have to have a team: right now there isn't one. Cap Weinberger, Bill Casey, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and I just don't see things the same way.' Leaks, end runs, cutting people out, refusing to follow through on decisions—all these tactics were constantly in use. 'I have always been able to develop a team wherever I have worked,' I said. 'Here I have been unable to do it. I can't produce a team for you. I'm frustrated and I'm ready to step aside so you can put somebody else in at State who can get along with them. You will see no results without a team.'

The president told me he wouldn't stand for any thought that I would leave. 'I'm not ducking out,' I said. 'There's

nothing I'd rather do than stay here with you and work out these problems. I have no hidden agenda.' I left it at that." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pages 496–498) Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam's November 14 note recounts Shultz's report of this meeting, noting that "the Secretary laid it on the line that the reason we were having problems was that people were not working together as a team and that with respect to arms control agreements with the Soviets and a negotiated settlement in Central America, people failed to agree with the President's policy." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985)

According to Shultz, McFarlane informed him the following day that the "president intended to speak personally to the others involved to get them to pull together and that Meese, Baker, and Deaver had asked Vice President Bush to weigh in after that. I had stirred things up, and that was to the good, but I had no illusions that the battle would end." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 498) In his November 15 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "Cap W. came in re some defense problems. I didn't take up the Sec. St. problem with him—pending a session with the V.P. who has some input on that matter." The following day he wrote: "Tomorrow morning I'm meeting with Cap W. & Bill Casey to iron out (if I can) some difficulties involving George S." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 397) According to the President's Daily Diary, he met with Casey and Weinberger on the morning of Saturday, November 17 from 10:28 to 11:21 a.m., before leaving to spend the Thanksgiving holiday in California. No record of this meeting was found. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

## 307. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 16, 1984

SUBJECT

Dobrynin's Call to Deliver A Letter From Chernenko on Nicaragua

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin called on me today to hand over a letter to you from Chairman Chernenko complaining about our policy in Nicaragua. In it Chernenko argues that tension is being whipped up around Nicaragua without justification and warns that it could affect US-Soviet relations. But the letter also includes an emphatic denial that Soviet combat jets have been shipped to Nicaragua. It is interesting that he seeks to apply linkage to us by using our desire for improved relations to moderate our Nicaragua policy, since this implies he thinks that desire is sincere. But his warning that our actions against Nicaragua could spoil prospects for better US-Soviet relations is also a reflection of the weakness of the Soviet position in the area.

In handing over the letter, Dobrynin said it was a private message which they did not intend to publish. He also pointed to Chernenko's statement that we should work towards straightening out our relations and his recognition that you are "having thoughts along similar lines". He noted that his deputy Sokolov had just been in to see Deputy Assistant Secretary Palmer to inform him that they are ready now to discuss dates and agenda for sessions of the joint US-Soviet commissions on cooperation on agriculture, the environment, and housing and to suggest

(albeit in a tortured, roundabout way) that they may be ready to talk with us on southern Africa.<sup>4</sup>

We do not believe it necessary to revise the letter from you to Chernenko which Art Hartman is scheduled to hand over to Gromyko on Tuesday morning.<sup>5</sup> I will also give Dobrynin a copy of it here. We will shortly be forwarding to you our suggestions on how to respond to Chernenko on Nicaragua.

#### Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan $^{\underline{6}}$ 

Dear Mr. President,

Moscow, November 16, 1984

I deemed it necessary to write to you on a subject which is of growing concern to us and, as you evidently know, not to us alone. I have in mind the policy and practical actions of the USA with regard to Nicaragua.

I will say it right away: the dangerous tension being whipped up around that country has no justification whatsoever.

Indeed, can one seriously believe that Nicaragua is threatening anyone, especially the United States of America. On the contrary, the people of Nicaragua and its leadership by their concrete actions show their desire for peace and a willingness to have normal good relations with neighboring and other countries. The Nicaraguans are extending their good-neighborly hand to the United States as well.

All they want is to be left alone and be given the opportunity to live and work in the conditions of peace. It is a natural and inalienable right of every people and this right must be respected.

Any attempts to deprive the Nicaraguan people of this right, the policy of pressure and of military threats against Nicaragua are inadmissible, no matter how one may look at it.

The creation of a crisis situation around Nicaragua cannot serve anybody's interests. The way the further developments would go, and it depends above all on the USA, will undoubtedly have an impact not only on the situation in that region, but also on the international affairs in general. A further escalation of tensions there and its consequences cannot but also affect Soviet-American relations.

We are convinced that this cannot be allowed to happen if there is to be an intention to work towards straightening out the relations between us. We do have such an intention. And we made it known to you personally, did so again quite recently. Judging by some of your statements, you are also having thoughts along similar lines.

We urge you, Mr. President, to weigh all this up very carefully. It is necessary to give the countries of Central America a possibility to settle their affairs peacefully and not to impede the achievement of a just political settlement which is the focus of the efforts of Nicaragua and of the Contadora group countries enjoying a broad international support.

For its part the Soviet Union is strongly in favor of the above. We pursue no other goals. We categorically reject

the attempts to cast aspersions on our policy, to ascribe to us some sort of malicious designs, as was the case, for example, with the far-fetched story about Soviet combat jets being shipped to Nicaragua. It is well known that there occurred nothing of that kind. The Nicaraguan government also made an official statement to that effect.

Mr. President, I trust you will understand correctly the motives for my writing to you. It is a serious issue. The further US behavior in this case will inevitably lead to a conclusion also with regard to its general intentions in international affairs.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491175). Secret; Sensitive. Reagan initialed this memorandum, indicating he saw it. A November 16 State Department covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz indicates the memorandum was drafted by Pascoe; cleared by Simons and Palmer.
- <sup>2</sup> See footnote 6, Document 303 and footnote 7, Document 304.
- <sup>3</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 304</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> In telegram 342385 to Moscow, November 17, the Department summarized the Sokolov-Palmer meeting on November 16, which covered the Gandhi assassination, South Africa, and joint commissions. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013–0377)

- <sup>5</sup> Tuesday, November 20. For the text of this letter, see <u>Document 308</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.

## 308. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko<sup>1</sup>

Dear Mr. Chairman: Washington, November 16, 1984

Thank you for your reply to my oral message transmitted through Ambassador Hartman and for your congratulations upon my reelection. I am especially pleased to note that we are both prepared to search for solutions to the problems that stand before us and to address the task of eliminating the nuclear threat. I would like to convey some of my thoughts about what we can do to bring this about.

As I prepare to embark on the next four years of my presidency, I see no more important task before me than ensuring peace and greater security, not only for the United States, but for all countries of the world. It is a fact of life that our two great countries share in responsibility for making mankind more peaceful and more secure. Neither of us alone can succeed in this task.

Of course, we will continue to have fundamental differences in our political beliefs, and both of us will defend the interests of our countries vigorously. Nevertheless, I am convinced that our divergent interests need not—and *must* not—bring us into conflict. We have an obligation to act to put our relationship on a safer and more constructive course, and to expand cooperation as much as circumstances permit.

The world has undergone profound changes over the last four decades, and you and I have witnessed both the best and worst times in Soviet-American relations. The two of us today have not only the power, but the responsibility, to bring about constructive changes in our relationship. Indeed, we owe it to the entire world to do all we can to seek peaceful resolution of our differences and opportunities for cooperation wherever possible.

I have studied carefully our previous correspondence and your recent public statements. The discussions Secretary Shultz and I had with Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko in September, as well as the subsequent exchanges between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Shultz with our respective ambassadors, have been most useful. Secretary Shultz has also reported to me on his necessarily brief but encouraging meeting with Prime Minister Tikhonov in New Delhi. Delhi. 4

In reviewing this record, I have been looking to the future rather than to the past, since my approach is strategic rather than tactical. The conclusions I would draw from these various communications and meetings is that we are in agreement on a number of basic principles which should govern our relations, but that we have not yet found the practical means to move our relationship beyond useful small steps on bilateral issues toward a more productive overall course. On such important matters as the objective of peace and the goal of reducing and eventually eliminating nuclear weapons, we have a common view. But at this point, it seems to me, we must concentrate our attention on how to move forward in practical ways.

Experience shows, I believe, that we cannot do this if either of us demands concessions of the other in advance. I am convinced that we will not be able to find a solution to the problems our two countries face if we should require Soviet concessions prior to negotiations. We pose no such requirement, and if you can adopt an analogous position,

this would open the way for finding realistic solutions to real problems.

The suggestions I made in my address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 24 reflected my desire to find means acceptable to both of us for addressing the issues before us. I kept my suggestions general, because I wished to preserve the possibility of consulting with you privately and thus developing ideas cooperatively. But let me take this opportunity to give you my current thinking on them.

One question that must be addressed is how we go about the task of negotiating new arms control agreements. I think our Foreign Ministers, both directly and through ambassadors, should play an increasingly active role, as was the practice in previous years. In this context, I have suggested that we initiate talks which address broader strategic concepts than do the fora available to us up to now. The objective would be to create a firmer foundation for negotiations on the whole range of specific issues involved in the process of reducing arms and increasing stability. I visualize such talks as providing an "umbrella" under which specific arms control negotiations could be planned, and suggestions from both sides could be examined, with the goal of finding mutually acceptable approaches for negotiation.

George Shultz has suggested to me that one way to test this concept would be for both of us to designate a representative who is thoroughly familiar with the strategic thinking of his highest political authority and who would meet with his counterpart with a mandate to develop specific proposals for submission to us for consideration. Of course, their consultations and recommendations would be totally confidential. If initial experience with this

procedure should be positive, we could consider the possibility of carrying it forward as a continuing means of contact to provide advice and guidance to the total arms control negotiating process.

If you agree that the idea has merit, I am prepared to appoint a person of national stature in the arms control area to work with George Shultz and me.

In our correspondence and in your public statements, you have placed great stress on the question of negotiations on "preventing the militarization of outer space." In his discussions here, Mr. Gromyko reaffirmed the importance the Soviet Union attaches to this issue. As I said in our meeting, the United States is ready to meet with you to discuss space weapons, and we have no preconditions as to the form or scope of the discussions. At the same time, we believe that the most pressing issue is how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms. I think your own experts would agree that these two areas are inherently related, even though we may ultimately choose, as was the case in the past, to discuss them in separate negotiating fora. The broader, "umbrella," consultations I have suggested could give us a vehicle for agreeing on approaches to the interrelated issues.

Nuclear and space weapons are not the only arms control areas in which we should strive to make progress in the coming years. Nuclear testing is another. I have taken note of your suggestion that ratification of the 1974 and 1976 treaties would contribute to progress on other subjects. In this regard, you are aware of the suggestion I made in my United Nations address that we each invite experts from the other country for direct measurement of upcoming underground nuclear tests. There have been uncertainties on both sides about whether the yields of certain tests have

been below the 150-kiloton limit established in the 1974 treaty. The direct measurement I have suggested, while separate from the treaty ratification issue, might reduce those uncertainties in reliable fashion to the point where the path to ratification would again be open.

Another area where positive results could be achieved is that of measures to enhance confidence and reduce the risk of conflict arising through accident or miscalculation. At the Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe, we have agreed to your proposal to discuss non-use-of-force commitments, in the context of negotiations on measures to give that principle concrete new meaning. With political will on both sides, this should provide the basis for an agreement that meets both sides' interests. Bilaterally, we have agreed on steps to improve our Direct Communication Link, and there are further ways to improve communication that I would hope we could explore in the coming year.

I also hope you will give serious consideration to the other suggestions I have made concerning ways of moving forward not only in arms control but in other fields.

Meetings at the ministerial level are one example. Our ministers of agriculture met in 1983 and will be meeting again soon. We would like to see discussion of bilateral cooperative activities in a number of other fields progress to the point where we could envisage joint commission meetings at the ministerial level next year. In the defense field, too, our ministers have met in the past, and the talks between our navies in the context of the Agreement to Avoid Incidents at Sea have been useful. I think further exchanges between senior officials on various defense issues would be a promising way of reducing misunderstanding. This is the context in which I suggested such possibilities as exchanges of observers at military

exercises and exchanges of five-year defense procurement plans.

Regularized meetings at the policy level on regional issues would be another appropriate way to enhance our dialogue. The danger of turbulence and instability in various regions reinforces my conviction that it is important for us to be explaining our policy approaches concerning regional issues to each other more systematically than in the past. Placing our discussions of regional issues on a more systematic basis would help us to understand more fully each other's approach and would at least reduce further the danger of miscalculation in times of crisis. We have made specific offers for experts' talks on the Middle East, southern Africa and Afghanistan, and hope you will be able to respond positively to these proposals.

Questions in our bilateral relations have not figured prominently in our correspondence, but I would like to emphasize that I am strongly in favor of concrete steps to increase cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts to the mutual benefit of our peoples. I hope that we can find ways to give new momentum to an invigoration of activities in these areas. In this connection, let me say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve pending humanitarian issues can have a very important positive influence in every other field of our relationship, for the reasons I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko.

So that we can move from consultation to action—the concrete deeds we both want—I hope that we can implement these ideas as rapidly as possible.

Our Foreign Ministers can follow up in greater detail on all the various issues between us, and I believe that an early meeting between them might be useful.

Let me say once again that I value our correspondence, and I look forward to receiving your reaction to my thoughts and proposals.

Sincerely,

### **Ronald Reagan**

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret. The Department of State sent the letter in telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, with instructions that the "Ambassador should seek meeting with Gromyko to present text of the President's letter to Chernenko." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1/2))
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 304</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>Documents 284</u>, <u>286</u>, <u>287</u>, <u>288</u>, <u>296</u>, and <u>300</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 302</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "In the president's postelection letter to Chernenko, he suggested that we each appoint a high-level official, in whom we had special confidence, to deal with arms control. I was determined that Paul Nitze should be our man and that the chain of command should run from Nitze to me to President Reagan. Interagency committees would meet, and NSC members would fight for their views, but ultimately the decisions would be made through the Nitze-Shultz-Reagan lineup. This idea, I knew, would evoke more protest: Nitze had been considered 'soft' and 'uncontrollable' by many

hard-liners in the administration ever since his walk in the woods." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, pp. 498–499)

In his memoir, Nitze wrote: "It was about this time that Bud McFarlane decided that the work in Washington on arms control matters needed greater centralization and coordination. He asked me whether I would take on the job, reporting to both the President and to Secretary Shultz. He suggested that I have an office with the NSC staff in the Old Executive Office Building, as well as an office in the State Department.

"I was tempted by the offer, although I had had bad experiences before when I had tried to work simultaneously for two bosses. Secretary Shultz vigorously opposed my shuttling between offices in State and the White House. He wanted me to move my office from ACDA on the fifth floor of the State Department building to the seventh floor in an office adjacent to his. I agreed to his proposal." (Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost, pp. 402–403)

<sup>6</sup> In his speech to the UNGA on September 24, Reagan stated: "We would also welcome the exchange of observers at military exercises and locations. And I propose that we find a way for Soviet experts to come to the United States nuclear test site, and for ours to go to theirs, to measure directly the yields of tests of nuclear weapons. We should work toward having such arrangements in place by next spring. I hope that the Soviet Union will cooperate in this undertaking and reciprocate in a manner that will enable the two countries to establish the basis for verification for effective limits on underground nuclear testing." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, pp. 1360–1361).

# 309. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Secretary: Washington, November 16, 1984

We have received very good news from Chernenko. I have attached his letter and a memorandum from you to the President commenting on it.<sup>2</sup> In my view our response should be positive.

I briefed Bud on the content and we discussed handling. Bud asked that you call the President tonight. He will be at the ranch after 6:00 p.m. our time. (I've attached at Tab 1 some points you might make to the President.)<sup>3</sup> Bud is going out to California tomorrow and will take the memorandum from you to the President with the Chernenko letter (Tab 2) once you have approved it. Bud agrees that we need to think about public handling. It would be unfortunate if it leaked right away. What I think we should consider is a joint announcement by the two sides early next week that we have agreed to begin negotiations on key arms control issues and that the two foreign ministers kick off this process in early January.

Let me just point out a couple of things about the letter itself:

—The Soviets are clearly calling for "negotiations", not just discussions.

—They are also continuing to use the term "non-militarization of space".

I don't consider either of these points to be important problems. But others in the interagency community will. The main point is that the Soviets have accepted the President's and your position, and have abandoned their preconditions.

This Soviet response, in my view, immeasurably strengthens your position both because it is substantively forthcoming and because they have invited you to Moscow to begin the process. I hope we can take advantage of this to remove the impediments in the interagency process to decision making on arms control.

We have reread the President's letter to Chernenko which Art is scheduled to deliver to Gromyko Monday morning in Moscow. The substance is still on target and it is worth conveying to the Soviets. We would have Art explain that it was drafted prior to receipt of Chernenko's two letters and that we will be responding to these letters shortly.

It's quite possible the Soviets purposefully delayed receiving Art so that they could get their letters in first. Nonetheless, it will be clear to everyone that they're accepting our positions.

In light of the above, I have decided that it would be best for me to cancel my plans to leave for London tomorrow morning, where I was going to meet with the Quad political directors, and to send my deputy, Jim Dobbins, instead. I will therefore be in town all day Sunday and Monday and available if you would like to follow up with me on these matters.

### Richard Burt<sup>5</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it.
- <sup>2</sup> Attached at Tab 2. See <u>Document 310</u>. A handwritten note on Burt's memorandum reads: "Original memo (Secpres) given to Mr. McFarlane by the Secretary 17 Nov."
- <sup>3</sup> The talking points are attached but not printed.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 308</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> Burt signed "Rick" above his typed signature.

## 310. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Soviets Agree to Negotiations on the Basis of Your Proposal

In a major move in our relations with the Soviet Union, Chairman Chernenko has sent you the attached letter which accepts your approach of negotiations on both space weapons and offensive weapons, including both strategic weapons and what they call medium-range weapons or in other words INF. But he says "productive" talks on nuclear arms control cannot take place "without the two sides deciding what measures they intend to take to prevent the spread of the arms race into outer space." The implication is that agreement on space arms restrictions must precede conclusion of an agreement on nuclear arms, though not necessarily negotiations themselves. Chernenko's letter in fact specifically acknowledges "an organic" and "objective relationship" between space weapons and offensive systems.

Chernenko's new position represents a major concession by the Soviets, since they have abandoned their earlier precondition that the US INF be withdrawn from Europe before negotiations could begin. The meaning of all this is quite clear. When Viktor Isakov, the Minister-Counselor at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, delivered the letter to Rick Burt this afternoon he explicitly noted how pleased he was to be delivering this message since "for the first time in four years we can say we may be in business."<sup>2</sup>

Chernenko also says that it is "especially important" for the sides to go to the negotiating table "with a clear and mutually arrived at understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations." (You'll recall that last summer one of the Soviet demands for the Vienna talks was that the U.S. agree in advance to "objectives" which predetermined the negotiating outcome.) To "settle these matters" Chernenko has suggested that I meet in early January with Gromyko. Chernenko indicates that the Soviets are prepared to host the meeting in Moscow but they would also be willing to meet in a mutually agreed third country.

We need to develop our public position on this major development. It will be necessary to do this in a coordinated and disciplined manner in order to preserve confidentiality as we enter a new era of arms control negotiations. In the first instance we may want to consider a joint public statement with the Soviets to announce agreement on the resumption of negotiations and pre-empt leaks.

#### Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan<sup>3</sup>

Dear Mr. President, Moscow, November 17, 1984

In my oral message to you on November  $8,\frac{4}{}$  I already briefly expressed our view in what way it is possible and necessary to reverse the current unfavorable trends in Soviet-American relations and in the international situation as a whole.

I believe, Mr. President, there is no need to go back to the question what caused the present state of Soviet-American relations and the general aggravation of tensions in the world. We set forth our assessments in this regard on more than one occasion.

The main thing now, in our view, is to join our efforts in stopping the world from edging towards a dangerous line. For this, resolute and immediate practical measures are required.

In this letter I would like to express the thinking of the Soviet side as to what exactly the USSR and the USA could do in a practical way in order to alleviate and, in the long run, to remove although the danger of a catastrophe.

Specifically, we propose that the Soviet Union and the United States of America enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and space weapons.

For objective reasons, the resolution of the issue of space weapons in this regard is of key importance, since, should the space arms race start, it would not only preclude any serious talk about the limitation and reduction of strategic arms, but would inevitably become a catalyst for the arms race in other directions as well. To put it briefly, a productive discussion of nuclear arms limitation issues, and above all strategic arms, is impossible without the two sides deciding what measures they intend to take to prevent the spread of the arms race into outer space.

There is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues and it is precisely in this way that they should be treated at the negotiations we are proposing.

In other words, such negotiations must encompass both the issue of non-militarization of space and the questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear systems. In all these directions we are prepared to seek most radical solutions which would allow movement toward a complete ban and, eventually liquidation of nuclear arms.

Considering the significance and the nature of the issues to be discussed, it is especially important for the sides to go to the negotiating table with a clear mutually arrived at understanding as to the subject and the objectives of such negotiations.

In order to settle these matters we propose that A.A. Gromyko and George Shultz meet, let's say in the first half of January, 1985. We would be prepared for this purpose to receive the Secretary of State in Moscow, or such a meeting could be arranged in a third country as may be agreed by the sides.

In our opinion, achieving agreement on the beginning of new Soviet-American negotiations on space and nuclear weapons, and a clearly expressed intention of the sides to solve these issues would have a positive impact on the situation in the world and could provide an impetus for the straightening out of the relations between our countries.

We await, Mr. President, a constructive reply from you.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84–11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-3-1. Secret; Sensitive. Shultz gave McFarlane this memorandum on November 17 to give to the President in California (see <u>footnote 2, Document 309</u>).
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 309</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> Secret; Sensitive. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.
- <sup>4</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 304</u>.

## 311. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Santa Barbara, California, November 18, 1984

SUBJECT

Renewed Talks With the Soviet Union

Yesterday, George Shultz advised you of Soviet willingness to renew talks on strategic and intermediate range nuclear weapons as well as space systems. The text of the Chernenko letter is at Tab A.<sup>2</sup> At Tab B is a memo from George providing his views.<sup>3</sup> This morning before leaving Washington, I met with George, Cap and Bill Casey. While all recommend that you accept the Chernenko proposal Cap was chary about getting into a "negotiation" of space systems for reasons he has explained to you.<sup>4</sup> With respect to strategic and intermediate range nuclear systems, all agree that we can easily be ready to pick up where we left off in Geneva, especially given the additional flexibility we have developed through interdepartmental analytical work in the intervening months.

The first step is to get Soviet agreement on an announcement. All of us agree that we ought to try to avoid a long drawn out argument over the text of the announcement (as occured during the abortive "Vienna" discourse last summer). Within our own government the only snag I expect will be on the above point as to whether or not we characterize this session in January as negotiations (on space systems as well as the nuclear issues—Cap will have a problem with this). In the view that we ought, in any event, to move quickly I will ask John

Poindexter to convene a hand-picked group of four or five from State, Defense, the JCS and CIA to meet on this tomorrow morning so as to have a draft proposed announcement to you by early morning California time. George's proposed announcement is at Tab C.<sup>5</sup>

After the announcement is made we will need to turn our attention right away to finalizing our position in each area—strategic, intermediate range and outer space systems. As I have mentioned the first two are essentially on the shelf—we finished this work in May. The work is also near-finished on outer space but the results do not contain much to negotiate about. In order to accelerate this work I believe it would be useful for me to return to Washington as soon as we have an agreed announcement put together for your approval. This would probably be on Tuesday. We could then have a finished paper for you to consider upon your return to Washington.

As a separate but related matter, I believe we gained Cap and Bill's approval for Paul Nitze to accompany George to the January sessions so as to be able to handle the technical issues and stay in place should George and Gromyko have to turn to other duties. In essence, the Soviets seem headed toward acceptance of what amounts to your umbrella talks proposal. This is an enormous achievement Mr. President. There will be hitches but we are on our way. Finally your Ambassador in Moscow, Art Hartman, will deliver tomorrow the long letter to Chernenko you approved last week (the Soviets could not receive him until now). As you recall, it goes well beyond arms control and both George and I believe it is still very relevant. I will keep you informed and will pay close attention to assuring that Cap and Bill, as well as the JCS, are on board.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-1-3. Secret; Sensitive. Poindexter wrote in upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "President has seen. JP." McFarlane was in California with Reagan from November 17 to 25.
- <sup>2</sup> The letter is not attached, but is attached to <u>Document</u> 310.
- $\frac{3}{2}$  The tab is not attached, but is printed as <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> Not further identified; however, see <u>Document 282</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> Tab C is not attached.
- <sup>6</sup> In a December 6 memorandum, Chain forwarded three papers in preparation for a SACG meeting on the Geneva negotiations: "The May 1984 Review of START Concepts;" "The May 1984 Review of INF Concepts;" and "The March 1984 ASAT Report to Congress, Interagency ASAT Studies and Preparations for Vienna." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (1))
- <sup>7</sup> November 20.
- <sup>8</sup> See Document 308.

## 312. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 18, 1984

SUBJECT Response to Chernenko

I met today with Rick Burt and Jack Chain to discuss our response to the proposal in Chernenko's latest letter. We think the way to proceed now is for either me or Rick to call in Dobrynin or Sokolov on Monday to propose that we agree on a joint statement which would announce the two sides' willingness to begin negotiations and name a date in January and a place in which we would meet. Below is our proposed draft statement.

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear arms and outer space. To that end, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko will meet in \_\_\_\_\_ on January

There are several things to note about this proposed statement. First of all, the first sentence draws heavily on the language of the Soviets own proposal contained in Chernenko's most recent message. However, rather than use the Soviet phrase "nuclear and space weapons," as Chernenko does, our draft statement talks about "nuclear arms and and outer space" so as to protect SDI.

Despite this small change, we do think it important to stick to language in Chernenko's letter to avoid a long drawn out discussion of a joint statement. And this means it seems to me, that we would in our statement talk about entering "negotiations" and not just "discussions."

As for the venue of my meeting with Gromyko, I would propose Geneva. It is possible that the Soviets will not agree because this was the locus for START and INF. Thus if this becomes a problem, I propose to fall back to Vienna. I will need to check my own calendar for a date; the Soviets have proposed the first half of January. I will propose something like on or about January 10.

The Soviets may not, at this stage, want to agree to a joint statement that we have agreed to enter into negotiations. In that event I believe that we should just announce that the two foreign ministers have agreed to meet to cover the whole range of nuclear and space arms control issues in order to initiate negotiations.

Art will be meeting with Gromyko tomorrow morning Moscow time. And we should thus have his report first thing tomorrow morning and can factor any results into our thinking. I would hope, however, we could work out a joint statement with the Soviets by Monday or Tuesday to preempt any leaks. I have asked Rick and Jack Chain to keep only a minimum number of people involved in this process to guard against leaks. It will be vital as we begin putting together our thoughts for the meeting in January that the President's options not be circumscribed by untimely leaks. So we need to give thought to how to organize efforts to insure confidentiality.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Burt. Although Shultz did not sign it, a typed note on the upper left-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "Sent by special courier 11/18/84 1735 SWO." In a covering memorandum to Shultz, Burt reported: "Following our discussion at your residence earlier this afternoon, I have prepared the attached memorandum to the President. (I originally prepared it as a memorandum to Bud McFarlane, as you instructed, but changed it to a memo to the President at Jock Covey's request.) Jack Chain has read it and concurs fully with it. With your approval it will be sent to Bud McFarlane in Santa Barbara this evening. Separately, we have instructed Art Hartman along the lines we discussed earlier today." According to handwritten notations on the covering memorandum, it was "pouched to Secretary 1650 11/18"; "Approved by Sec and sent to WH (McFarlane and Kimmit) 1730 11/18)"; and "McFarlane (in California) has this document."
- <sup>2</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> Sokolov and Burt met on November 19. See <u>Document</u> 315.
- <sup>4</sup> Blanks are in the original. In a November 19 PROFs note to Poindexter, McFarlane wrote: "The President has approved the draft text as proposed. He wants us to seek Geneva or another third country site as our going in position but is willing to accept Moscow if considered necessary. Launch." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985))
- <sup>5</sup> Hartman met Gromyko in Moscow on November 19. See <u>Document 313</u>.

### 313. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1

Moscow, November 19, 1984, 1347Z

14653. Subject: November 19 Hartman-Gromyko Meeting. Ref: A. State 339906 B. State 342494 C. State 342498.<sup>2</sup>

- 1. Secret-Entire text.
- 2. Summary: I spent forty-five minutes with Gromyko today going over the President's letter to Chernenko and Chernenko's weekend messages to the President. In hopes of eliciting some reaction, I had the President's letter read in Russian to Gromyko. Gromyko made several points in reply which amounted to an interim response. While his mood throughout was cordial, I sensed in what he said a strong lingering concern that we are more interested in creating the appearance of talks than in what he called "serious negotiations in good faith". This caution at one point manifested itself in a denial that our two approaches coincided on the desirability of a meeting of Foreign Ministers to start a broader arms control discussion. I did not press Gromyko on this for fear he would get even more negative, but suggested Korniyenko and I follow up our talk once the Soviets have had time to digest the President's letter.
- 3. Gromyko's suspiciousness suggests that we may want to be more specific in future diplomatic exchanges leading up to a Shultz-Gromyko meeting. As the process unfolds, it will be more important to exercise close discipline over leaks to avoid being whip-sawed. End summary.

- 4. Gromyko was accompanied by his top deputy, Korniyenko; the head of his USA Division, Bessmertnykh; and an interpreter. I brought my DCM and Political Counselor to the meeting.<sup>4</sup> As in our last exchange, Gromyko welcomed me warmly, joking about my punctuality, and emphasizing that he was "all ears" to hear what I had to say.
- 5. I opened by referring briefly to Chernenko's letters to the President on Nicaragua and arms control over the weekend, noting that the pace of bilateral communications appeared to be picking up. After explaining that we had initially sought to deliver the President's letter before receipt of Chernenko's latest correspondence, I noted that we had concluded after reading the General Secretary's letter that we should deliver our text as planned, especially as there appeared to be certain parallels. I then asked my DCM to read an informal Russian translation of the President's letter in hopes of prompting some reaction from Gromyko. When the text had been read, I went through the talking points provided Ref  $B^{5}$  (deleting the reference to our willingness to meet in a third country per Ref C). Gromyko listened impassively to the President's letter, but more attentively to the talking points. At one point he interrupted to seek clarification as to the level at which we envisioned follow-on exchanges to an initial meeting of Foreign Ministers.
- 6. After hearing me out, Gromyko indicated he would not be able to respond to the substance of the President's letter to Chernenko, but assured me it would be carefully studied and that a reply would be forthcoming. He was nonetheless prepared to make some "general observations".
- —Gromyko first found "positive" and welcomed the fact that the President's letter and the proposals contained

therein showed a willingness to remove the threat of war. He reminded me, however, that the Soviets had often affirmed (as, he said, Chernenko had personally and as he had in Washington "in the name of the leadership as a whole") that the main task was translating such propositions into practical deeds. The Soviets were for serious negotiations on nuclear arms and other important questions of international security and the security of each country. The proposals made by Chernenko in his most recent letter were designed precisely to lead to such negotiations. It was natural that there should be "stages" to such a process. But the Soviets saw no need to use special terms such as "umbrella". They did not want to be tied to such "romantic formulae". When the President talked about negotiations, Gromyko hoped he had in mind "serious negotiations in good faith".

- —As to the specifics of how to set in motion a negotiating process, Gromyko noted, the Soviet position was as outlined in Chernenko's letter to President Reagan. That remained the Soviet position and he hoped the US would give Moscow's proposals serious attention. While this was not the time or place to get into a discussion of substance, he concluded, "it appears from the President's letter and your comments that our views do not coincide". (sic)
- 7. A bit puzzled by Gromyko's final remark, I commented that while there were clearly areas where the approaches outlined in the President's and Chernenko's letters did not coincide, it appeared to us that there was agreement at least on the notion that whatever process was ultimately set in motion should be inaugurated by a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Thinking that there may have been an error of translation, my DCM asked for clarification as to whether it was Gromyko's view that our approaches did or did not coincide on this point.

- 8. Amid some confusion on the Soviet side of the table. Gromyko stated clearly that they did not coincide. He then went on to complain that the President's letter contained ideas which the Soviets had already rejected, noting specifically the President's proposal for exchanging observers to verify nuclear test thresholds. The proposal was unacceptable to the Soviets, Gromyko emphasized, and he could not understand why it continued to pop up in various US proposals. The problem was not one of exchanging observers but of ending testing. Warming to the subject, but not willing to prolong the exchange, Gromyko prefaced additional gripes about US use of the term "arms control" instead of "disarmament" with the injunction that they should be considered to have been lodged "after getting up from the table". The points were semantic ones, he acknowledged, but were of significance nonetheless.
- 9. I told Gromyko that, at the risk of saying something he did not want to hear, I thought he sounded much like President Reagan. One of the President's major concerns was precisely that previous arms control agreements had allowed major increases in armaments. That was why he was in favor of reducing stockpiles to the lowest possible level.
- 10. Sensing that it would be unfruitful to press Gromyko further, and unwilling to risk eliciting further negativism on the substance of the President's proposals, I decided to end the meeting on that note. As we got up, however, I suggested it might be useful for Korniyenko and me to meet at some point after the Soviets have had a chance to digest the President's letter. Gromyko readily agreed.

#### Comment

- 11. Gromyko's off the cuff reaction to the President's proposals suggests he remains suspicious that we are more interested in getting arms control talks started for their own sake than for whatever may come out of them. He clearly views his next meeting with the Secretary as the start of a negotiating process, and he will be out to pin down in as much detail as possible the substance—and even the outcome—of possible follow-up talks. I sensed he was not comfortable with the concept of a special negotiator or the notion that the initial meeting of Foreign Ministers will be a preliminary step essentially dedicated to setting an agenda. We may be able to allay these concerns a bit in subsequent exchanges by being more specific about what we have in mind for the Foreign Ministers' meetings.
- 12. One parting thought. It is clear from the exchanges of the last few days that the relationship is entering a more active and volatile phase. This will make it even more important than it has been in the past to prevent leaks on matters relating to our dialogue. Giving the Soviets a peak at our thinking is simply asking to be whip-sawed as we try to put together an agenda. Specifically, it enables the Soviets to turn down proposals which are only newspaper speculation and not even up to the point of having become official government proposals.

Hartman

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/16/84-11/25/84); NLR-748-25A-41-6-8. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Telegram 339906 to Moscow, November 16, transmitted Reagan's November 16 letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File,

USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491139) (1 of 2)) See <u>Document 308</u>. Telegrams 342494 and 342498 were not found.

- $\frac{3}{2}$  See attachments to <u>Documents 307</u> and <u>310</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> Warren Zimmermann, DCM, and Curtis Kamman, Political Counselor.
- <sup>5</sup> The talking points were not found.

## 314. Minutes of a Senior Arms Control Group Meeting 1

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT
Minutes of SACG Meeting, November 19

John Poindexter chaired the meeting with the following attendees: Fred Ikle, Richard Perle, Art Moreau, Jack Matlock, Doug George, Ron Lehman, Paul Nitze, Rick Burt, Jack Chain, and Ken Adelman.<sup>2</sup>

John Poindexter began by passing around a letter dated November 17 from Chernenko to the President.<sup>3</sup> Everyone read the letter and, at the end of the meeting, JP took back all copies. JP asked Richard Burt to set the stage on events.

Richard Burt indicated that Chernenko had sent a congratulatory letter to the President after the election and that Art Hartman had tried to deliver the President's response last week, but that the Soviets obviously deliberately delayed Hartman until this week so that Chernenko's letter could be delivered first. In previous meetings between Gromyko and Hartman, Gromyko had indicated that the Soviets did not like the phrase "Umbrella Talks" and Burt expressed the view that "this is in contrast with real negotiations." Gromyko told Hartman that "our thinking did not coincide on how to begin." 4 Hartman responded that perhaps our position is closer than people think. Burt then characterized the November 17 letter as a significant movement by the Russians and a significant victory for the President's strategy. The Soviets have dropped their INF preconditions and have even agreed to negotiating on INF. Burt believes that they have accepted

our linkage on offense and defense, and that the magnet that drew them into the talks was the strategic defense initiative. In short, they have accepted the Umbrella Talks without the phrase. Burt expressed the view that the Soviets are sobering up in the post election period and have agreed to pursue other open issues as well, such as exchanges. Jack Matlock added that Chernenko's oral congratulations to the President were very positive. <sup>5</sup>

Fred Ikle noted that the focus of the letter was on militarization of space and that this was comparable to the period in 1970 when the Soviets got the US to agree that we would conclude an ABM Treaty first while we sought a freeze on offensive arms.

Jack Chain argued that this was a very positive development. Ron Lehman cautioned that while the new Soviet formulation can be read by us to accommodate our position, it remains completely compatible with the Soviet position of July requiring preconditions including an ASAT moratorium. Lehman expressed the view that it is in our interest to get negotiations going but it is not in our interest to agree to preconditions. Ron Lehman argued that we had made a mistake in July by attempting to negotiate a detailed agenda. This only encouraged the Russians to demand preconditions and made us more vulnerable for pressures from Congress and our Allies. Ron Lehman expressed the view that our objective should be to get talks underway with a minimum amount of prenegotiations. Burt expressed agreement. With respect to the text, Burt noted that the words "what" and "between" were missing from Page 1 and that this was an unofficial translation. A formal translation is being prepared. JP indicated that Secretary Shultz, Secretary Weinberger, and Director Casey had read the letter and Art Moreau was permitted to take a copy to the Chairman of ICS. IP indicated that Shultz and Bud

McFarlane have talked to the President that our focus should be on a joint announcement which could be made on Wednesday.

Burt indicated that the message had been brought in by Mr. Isokob. Isokob had been very brief and very buoyant, stating that he was "very pleased" and that "for the first time in four years, we may be in business." Perle commented that the most significant part of the letter was the sixth paragraph where the linkage was not clear and where preconditions were implied. Art Moreau added that INF was included, but Paul Nitze noted that the Soviets used their term of art, namely, medium range systems. Jack Chain indicated that they had dropped their insistance on preconditions.

Nitze argued that we would want to talk about arms control in the context of world issues and the overall state of relations but Burt and Adelman disagree. Lehman commented that it was not clear that the Soviets had backed off preconditions and that one should expect in a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko the Soviets would press to urge as much of their July package as they could.

JP passed out a draft joint statement to be worked and cleared for a SACPG meeting, again early on Wednesday. Burt noted that an AP story originating out of Yugoslavia suggested that Shultz has been invited to go to Moscow. In response to a JP question, there was agreement that we might expect a Soviet answer on our joint statement on Tuesday so we should plan on the announcement being made Wednesday. NSC was tasked to prepare guidance for a backgrounder probably to be given by Bud McFarlane, and Qs and As. Burt would prepare draft messages for the Allies. From a Public Diplomacy point of view, the emphasis

should be "no comment" and we should develop a "short call" list for Congress.

Conversation turned to the specifics of the joint statement. Ken Adelman suggested that the Soviets want to go to talks with a clear agenda and Paul Nitze emphasized the importance of getting agreements and ground rules that are to our advantage. Lehman responded that it is our advantage to get the negotiations going without too much negotiation on specifics so as to avoid preconditions. Nitze agreed but added that we needed to put down a marker to make it clear that we are not accepting as an agenda the Soviets interpretation of their letter. Perle stressed again that the Soviets would try to get a handle on SDI/ABM and then focus on a nuclear freeze as they did in 1970. Burt agreed. Lehman commented that, more specifically, they would focus on an ASAT moratorium immediately in January. Perle asked if a Presidential letter could be proposed. JP suggested they should work the statement first and only after that should we prepare a Presidential letter.

Ikle noted that the Soviet Union offered us an option of Moscow or a third country. JP stressed Geneva in consideration of the symbolism of returning to the talks and consideration of the bad symbolism of going to Moscow. Burt emphasized that the Soviet Union wanted to go to Moscow and the fact that they are making this gesture would help Shultz to meet with Chernenko himself. Lehman suggested that it is important that we get the talks established with a minimal amount of preconditions and argued in favor of a third country, especially Geneva. Lehman offered a compromise that we suggest to the Soviets that the foreign ministers meet in Moscow in January to begin talks which would end up in Geneva. Burt, Adelman, and others countered that this was too complex.

Chain argued that we should alter the statement to indicate that Shultz and Gromyko would meet to agree to arrangements or to facilitate the beginning of talks. This was rejected on the grounds that we would want to make clear .<sup>7</sup> Perle proposed the phrase "to that end" so that it was made clear that the Soviets had no negotiating mandate in January. Burt countered that we might want to leave that implication in order to attract the Soviets. It was agreed that we would leave the phrase in, but that a second option would be that we would drop the phrase altogether. It was agreed that Burt would present the agreed statement to Shultz this afternoon, once a decision had been made as to location and date.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/18/1984-11/20/1984. Secret; Sensitive. An unknown hand wrote: "Bob [Linhard]—Close Hold," "Draft," and "Ron—Bob L has cy" at the top of the page. The unknown hand put brackets around Linhard's last name. No final version of the minutes has been found. Handwritten notes, likely Lehman's, correspond to this typed draft. (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In a PROFs note to Poindexter on November 18, McFarlane wrote: "On the announcement I would like for you to convene a very <u>restricted SACG</u> (I've dropped the word "Policy" to change the acronym) consisting of you, Chain and Burt from State, probably Ikle and Perle from OSD (I will have informed you after talking to Cap as to who he wants to work the issue, Doug George or Bob Gates (your call), Art Moreau and Ken Adelman plus Paul Nitze, Ron and Jack. On specifics, Cap will have a problem with cloaking all of the issues—START, INF and Space—as 'negotiations'. I think we ought to be able to finesse this by simply using George's alternative formulation in his memo

to the President which states that the foreign ministers will meet to address all the arms control issues. It would be good if that meeting could be convened early your time so that we have something out here for approval and release by noon. Many thanks." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985)) For the Shultz memorandum, see Document 312.

- <sup>3</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 313</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 304</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> November 21. The draft is in <u>Document 312</u>.
- <sup>7</sup> Blank is in the original.
- <sup>8</sup> On November 22, McFarlane made the official announcement: "The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko will meet in Geneva on January 7 to 8." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book II, p. 1834)

## 315. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT
My Meeting with Sokolov November 19

Sokolov came in at my request at 3:30 p.m. today, and I gave him a copy of the draft text of a joint communique approved this morning by the President. I added that we are proposing Geneva as the venue for your meeting with Gromyko. I pointed out that our text was brief and factual, and drew on the language of Chernenko's message. I told him we wished to move quickly in order to release a text before there were leaks and distortions, if possible by Wednesday, so that we would appreciate a response to our proposal by tomorrow.

Sokolov said the Soviets can move quickly when the will is there, but he had two questions:

—Would there be an answer from the President to Chernenko's message? I assured him there would be, although precise timing was as yet unclear.

—Was Moscow excluded as a venue? I replied that our preference was for Geneva.

On substance, Sokolov said he of course had no instructions, but on a personal basis he would suggest drawing on the Chernenko message to add language defining the objective of your meeting with Gromyko, along

the lines of "In order to have a mutual understanding of the objectives and subjects of such negotiations." We should anticipate that the Soviet response will include such a suggestion—which should not raise a big problem for us. On the way out, Sokolov explained to Tom Simons that he had asked about the Moscow venue because the Soviets are thinking in terms of having at least the initial meetings alternate between capitals, i.e. along the same lines as you. Tom replied that I had accurately stated our position on venue.<sup>5</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons; cleared by Palmer. Forwarded through Armacost. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.
- <sup>2</sup> See footnote 4, Document 312.
- <sup>3</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> November 21.
- <sup>5</sup> According to telegram 345921/Tosec 180011 to Shultz, November 21, Sokolov provided Burt with the following Soviet draft text: "The Soviet Union and the United States have agreed to enter into new negotiations with the objective of reaching mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space arms. In order to reach a common understanding as to the subject and objectives of such negotiations, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George P. Shultz will meet in on January 7–8, 1985." (Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840013–0458; blank is in the original) For the final text of the November 22 announcement, see footnote 8, Document 314. In Moscow

the same day, the Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman also announced that talks would begin in January in Geneva. (Dusko Doder, "Moscow Optimistic About New Arms Talks," Washington Post, November 23, 1984, p. A20)

## 316. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 19, 1984

SUBJECT
SDI and the Prospects for Arms Control

Nobody yet knows the full potential of the President's SDI initiative. What we do know, is that the Soviets are concerned that U.S. technology in strategic defense could undermine the nuclear assets (and political influence) Moscow has purchased at great cost over the past twenty years. This Soviet apprehension may offer the best chance to restore a serious arms control dialogue. Eventually, of course, we will face tough decisions on whether to proceed with it or trade some limitations on it. In either case, however, it is essential in the meantime that we maintain a positive public posture on the merits of the potential contribution SDI can make to our security.

I am concerned that we are at the beginning of a period of negotiating with ourselves over SDI. The Democrats in Congress are certain to oppose the program in every aspect. For now, the political attractiveness of fighting against the "militarization of space," a new and expensive defense program, not to mention preserving the ABM Treaty, will be too strong for Democrats to resist. House Democrats, as well as Senate Democrats and many Senate Republicans, have only resisted the temptation to oppose all things military on those occasions when there has been overwhelming public support for a given initiative. Grenada, for example.

The Administration, therefore, should avoid making public statements that question the feasibility or desirability of SDI, or framing the issue publicly as one of using SDI only as a "bargaining chip." Such statements will likely begin to erode public support for the program. They will only put us on weaker ground in the domestic debate. Congressional opposition will likely center on the technical arguments, i.e., how feasible is SDI, how many Russian missiles are too many, how much SDI is worth exchanging for a certain reduction in Russian missiles, etc. Conducting the debate on this terrain will likely open the door to a series of compromises of the Aspin/Pressler variety while the Soviets sit back and wait. The public, at best, will lose interest in this new, complicated issue, preferring to leave it to the "experts." At worst, they will be persuaded by the cost/benefit arguments advanced by the Democrats, and the program will be undercut.

The best arguments we have going for us are the kinds of arguments the President has been making—for example in the second debate.<sup>2</sup> These arguments have a strong public appeal.

It is not in the interest of arms control that the SDI program be undermined. Even from the point of view of those who may want to trade some limits on SDI, it is essential that the program survive or else the whole offense/defense bargain with the Soviets will collapse.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 11/15– 30/84. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Kaplan and Kagan. Kaplan initialed the memorandum for Rodman. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials also appear on the memorandum, indicating he saw it on November 19.

<sup>2</sup> Reagan and Mondale fielded several questions related to SDI during their October 21 Presidential debate. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, pp. 1601–1602 and 1606.* 

## 317. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, November 20, 1984

I found the attached [less than 1 line not declassified] interesting because it highlights the extent to which the Soviets will go to defeat our Strategic Defense Initiative. I believe defeat of SDI has become their fundamental arms control objective. You will also note in the penultimate paragraph their desire to see the replacement of certain U.S. officials—including, obviously, yours truly—as another way of gaining their objective. While this goal seems to be denied to them, I imagine they will continue to try on all fronts to block our strategic defense plan.

I would appreciate it very much if you would send the attached paper to the President.

Sincerely,

Cap

#### Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Defense Intelligence Agency<sup>2</sup>

Washington, November 20, 1984

1. SOVIETS TRY TO PRESSURE US INTO SPACE TALKS (S/[handlingrestriction not declassified]

REF: (S/[handling restriction not declassified] CIA [number not declassified], 15 Nov  $84.\frac{3}{2}$ 

After his return from Moscow in late October, First Secretary Rogov of the Soviet Embassy in Washington discussed several issues [less than 1 line not declassified]. The question of space talks dominated his comments, which he probably expected to be relayed to the US Government.

The Soviet diplomat contended Foreign Minister Gromyko's impression was "negative" about his September meeting with President Reagan. Gromyko believed Reagan was interested in holding space talks but not on substantive issues. Moscow insists, according to Rogov, that unless space talks materialize, nothing else is important enough to negotiate. Space talks could "pull along" other negotiations that were halted. He also said Moscow will watch national security appointments in Reagan's second term; unless the US makes personnel changes, the Soviets have little hope of "doing business."

Rogov threatened that Soviet policy toward the US could get worse. He thinks, however, that US hostility toward the USSR has reached rock bottom and Washington is moving into a more pragmatic, less ideological stance. Thus, Moscow still sees the possibility of fruitful space negotiations. Rogov admitted that space tests and R&D already underway could not simply be abandoned; but a range of space weapon issues, in which only limited R&D had occurred, could. The USSR was ready to negotiate on this range without demanding the elimination of concepts and research.

COMMENT: The Soviet campaign against a US space program, including a strategic defense, is intensifying.

Rogov's comments reflect some aspects of this multifaceted effort.

The Soviets are trying to entice the US with hints that discussions on START and INF-related forces can eventually be held, if the US agrees to space talks on their terms. Although Rogov does not refer to these terms, other Soviet statements indicate they expect a US moratorium so long as the talks go on. Thus, they can hold hostage the development of US strategic defenses and ASATs. Rogov's threats that superpower relations will deteriorate further are aimed at putting the US on the defensive, so that Washington will make concessions to Moscow.

Rogov's remarks also reflect Moscow's demand for the appointment of US officials whom it views as more ready to compromise than incumbents in key positions dealing with arms control. This point has been made by other Soviets, notably by members of Moscow's Institute of the USA and Canada to prominent American visitors. The Soviets clearly have their own candidates. They are frustrated that their successful techniques of the 1970s are failing with the current US administration.

The defeat of a US strategic defense in whatever mode—traditional ABM or as part of SDI—has overwhelming priority for the Soviets. They are concerned that such a US capability would undercut their strategy based on a preemptive first-strike potential. Moscow's obsession with SDI stems from its fear that decades of investments in its strategic offensive forces would be jeopardized. [1 line not declassified]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1984, 4001158. Secret. Weinberger wrote "Bud" next to

McFarlane's name on the memorandum. In a note on a covering memorandum, Kimmit wrote: "Per RCM, Weinberger memo only put in 11/30 PDB. RMK 11/30." Reagan initialed another copy of the memorandum on December 2, indicating he saw it. (Ibid.)

- <sup>2</sup> Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
- 3 Not found.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Documents 286</u> and <u>287</u>.

### 318. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State 1

Moscow, November 27, 1984, 1527Z

15040. Subject: Looking Toward Geneva.

- 1. Secret—Entire text.
- 2. As we make our preparations for Geneva, I wanted to make a few points which may be more apparent here than in the Washington fray.
- 3. The jury is still out on why the Soviets have come back to arms control as quickly as they have. I doubt they expect early or dramatic progress, and they can hardly believe that a second Reagan administration will be more susceptible to pressure than the first. On the other hand, the Soviets presumably know that they will need some degree of credibility if they are to reap the public affairs benefits of having returned to the negotiating table in the first place. This suggests they may ultimately be more willing to bargain seriously than the last time around. Time will tell.
- 4. As welcome as their willingness to talk is, however, it brings to an end the free ride we have had for the past year on arms control policy. From now on, much more public scrutiny will be focused on our positions, and the Soviets will regain great latitude to manipulate public opinion at our expense. Unless we are careful, in short, the Geneva meeting could result in our loss of the tactical high ground on arms control which we have held since they broke off negotiations last November.

- 5. The best way to prevent this is to ensure we have a credible substantive brief when we sit down across from Gromyko January 7. The language of last week's joint announcement was broad enough to allow for a wide range of outcomes. The best from our standpoint would be an agreed framework and set of objectives for follow-up talks. I believe this is an achievable goal, but it will not come easily. Having turned a fresh page, we stand at a crucial point not unlike Glassboro or Vladivostok.
- 6. The problem—as has been made clear to me in my discussions here with Gromyko and in Soviet media commentary on the Geneva meeting<sup>5</sup>—is that the Soviets remain highly skeptical that we will be prepared to negotiate agreements they can live with. Gromyko will therefore be determined in Geneva to commit us in advance to principles governing future negotiations, and even the outcomes of such negotiations, which will guarantee Soviet desiderata. Unless we can find some means of reconciling such an approach with our own preference for defining agenda and procedural questions, the Geneva meeting could well end in stalemate amid Soviet charges that we are seeking simply to "talk about talks".
- 7. To avoid this,—and to maximize chances that whatever negotiations flow from Geneva will achieve results—we will need to be prepared to give Gromyko a fairly clear, cogent idea of where the process we have in mind may lead in specific areas. This doesn't mean we should telegraph our negotiations strategy or positions. It does mean that, as regards strategic arms, for example, we should be able to sketch convincingly our views of the parameters of an equitable agreement. Giving Gromyko something concrete to focus on could well make it easier for him to give ground on such "procedural" issues as the shape of future agenda,

which might otherwise become bogged down in semantic arguments (a la "militarization" vs. "demilitarization" of space). More important, it would preempt charges that our approach was not a serious one.

8. I realize that a decision to be more concrete on the substance of our positions will not be an easy one to make in Washington, and that whatever course we choose will be the subject of spirited bureaucratic debate. I only hope we can do a better job of keeping that debate in house than we have thus far. When the Soviets are able to read in detail who is doing what to whom in our internal struggles over policy, they are able to fine tune their negotiating positions and propaganda for maximum effect. As the saying goes in bridge, "one peek is worth a dozen finesses". Gromyko will be a tough enough adversary in Geneva without our playing from an open hand.

#### Hartman

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I (01/05/1985-01/07/1985); NLR-362-1-35-14-5. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room. A stamp indicates McFarlane saw the telegram. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, I think Art is way off base in this cable. See my note next page. JP." See footnote 2, below. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on the Department of State copy of this telegram, Burt wrote: "Mr. Secretary: I wanted to be sure you had seen the cable Art sent in on the Geneva talks. He gave it relatively wide distribution in an effort to be helpful around town. Art asked today if it would be useful for him to come back at this point for consultations. He could be here as long as you thought necessary up to December 17. His conversations

around town have been quite useful in the past, and his being here would probably have value now. I will get back to Art in a few days after we have had time to discuss this." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, November 1984, #39)

- <sup>2</sup> Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Why does it have to be public. The whole point of Pres. talks proposal was that they be private. If the Soviets won't agree to that, there is little chance of success—*unless* we can get some intelligence ahead of time on what they are after thru a private channel. JP."
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>footnote 8, Document 314</u> for the official announcement.
- <sup>4</sup> Lyndon Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin met at Glassboro State College in Glassboro, New Jersey from June 23 to 25, 1967. Ford and Brezhnev met in Vladivostok November 23–24, 1974, to discuss arms control.
- <sup>5</sup> See Document 313.

# 319. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 27, 1984

SUBJECT
Strategy for Your January Meeting with Gromyko

We have sent you separately a paper describing the approach we recommend the United States adopt next year on nuclear and space arms control. This step-by-step approach—which you originally approved in preparation for the never-held September meeting in Vienna—remains, we feel, the most effective means of interrelating our various arms control and defense objectives in these fields.

Securing Soviet acceptance to such a new framework for US-Soviet negotiations will obviously require more than the two-day session between yourself and Gromyko currently scheduled for Geneva. In this memo we thus address preparations for the conduct of a succession of encounters with the Soviet Union on these issues. In addition, we have attached talking points for your use with the President that set forth the rationale for our proposal.  $\frac{3}{2}$ 

#### The Soviet Approach to Geneva

The Soviets have so far only consented to discuss the subject and objectives of new negotiations, and they remain extremely skeptical about our intentions. As Gromyko's

meeting with Art Hartman demonstrated, the Soviets are suspicious that we are only interested in the appearance of an arms control dialogue. It is likely that they will want to ascertain whether the U.S. has serious, substantive ideas that could plausibly be the basis for an agreement before they agree to resume formal negotiations. The Soviets are unlikely to commit themselves to a continuing dialogue unless they are convinced that we are prepared to address seriously the full range of their concerns, including limitations on space weapons. Gromyko's objective, therefore, will be to secure some measure of agreement regarding the priorities and objectives for new arms control talks.

We therefore expect Gromyko to pursue in Geneva certain familiar Soviet themes. Specifically, he is likely to seek:

- —some modification in NATO's INF deployment program, if not a total withdrawal of all cruise and Pershing II missiles, then at least a moratorium on future deployments;
- —U.S. agreement that the object of ASAT negotiations should be a ban, as opposed to limits on ASATs, as well as a U.S. commitment to cease ASAT testing upon the opening of negotiations;
- —a U.S. commitment to negotiate limitations on the SDI that reinforce or go beyond those contained in the ABM Treaty, as well as on ASAT systems; and
- —more broadly, an agreed formulation on the principle of "equality" which bolsters the Soviets' claim for compensation for the capabilities of U.S. allies.

#### The U.S. Approach

As the Geneva meeting approaches, we will be under growing political pressures from many quarters. There will be rising public and Allied expectations of early results, while other pressures will intensify for the Administration to "hang tough" on our existing positions. The best way to deflect such pressure is by putting forward serious, concrete ideas from the outset that offer the basis for an agreement with the Soviets that would be in our security interests.

We should look at the Geneva meeting as the kickoff for a renewed negotiating effort. We will want to demonstrate that we are indeed serious about negotiations on these issues and are ready to move forward toward a mutually-acceptable agreement. Thus, we will want to describe for the Soviets the implications of what we have in mind—not only conceptually, but in terms of its concrete impact on the two sides' forces and programs.

Specifically, we will need to illustrate for the Soviets the possibilities inherent in our step-by-step approach: a first-stage accord limiting ASAT testing for three years and beginning reductions in offensive nuclear arms; to be immediately followed by negotiations on longer-term arrangements in both these areas. Such an approach should have several attractions for the Soviets:

—The proposal for a first-stage accord on nuclear arms—designed as the President told Gromyko, to "begin the process of nuclear arms reductions"—is a clear signal that we will not, in this initial stage at least, seek the major restructuring of Soviet strategic forces that characterized our START proposal.

- —The offer of a temporary halt on testing of current ASAT systems, tied to this first-stage nuclear arms accord, is evidence that we are willing to negotiate meaningful limitations in the space area.
- —U.S. expressed readiness to include INF systems in the package (either as an integral element or as part of some parallel arrangement) would demonstrate U.S. flexibility on this most neuralgic of Soviet concerns.
- —Making the relationship between offensive and defensive forces a topic for consideration in the second stage of negotiations holds open for the Soviets the possibility of substantive negotiations over SDI at some future point.

Despite its attractions, we must also recognize that a new U.S. approach along these lines will require substantial revision in the way both sides have traditionally approached these various issues. Thus, we must not expect that the Soviets will be prepared to react immediately to our thinking on the inter-relationships among these issues.

#### Tactics for Geneva

Optimally, you would like to gain Gromyko's agreement in Geneva on a mandate or an agenda for formal negotiations, to begin shortly after the Geneva meeting. More realistically, however, the Geneva discussions should be viewed as the first in a series of ministerial meetings that will lay the groundwork for formal talks. These follow-on sessions could best be held in Moscow and Washington. In the former you could expect to have access to Chernenko. In the latter, the President could again participate directly in the dialogue.

You raised the question of the *composition of your party* for the Geneva meeting. In our view, it would be a mistake to include representatives from all the other agencies. This would set a bad precedent for meetings with Gromyko, and would risk turning the Geneva session into the sort of sterile set-piece exchanges that have characterized the START and INF talks to date. There is, of course, a precedent for including an NSC representative among your party, and if Bud McFarlane wants to send Ron Lehman in addition to Jack Matlock, this would be acceptable. If a special representative has been named by the President by the time of the Geneva meeting, he could be a member of your party as well, just as U.S. SALT negotiators participated in meetings with Gromyko in the past. But otherwise, we strongly recommend that you not go beyond the traditional support from within the Department.

In the longer term, we will need to consider whether a series of meetings between yourself and Gromyko could be usefully supplemented by discussions between speciallydesignated representatives. So far the Soviet reaction to the term "umbrella talks" and to the concept of special negotiators has been skeptical and generally negative. There are probably several reasons for this: They may be concerned that once we achieve the appearance of negotiations we will lose interest in substance. In addition, Gromyko wants to control both the pace and content of our dialogue, and to communicate as directly as possible with key U.S. decision-makers. Moreover, the Soviets' experience with U.S. negotiators in recent years has not led them to believe that such individuals can either shape U.S. policy in important ways, or even necessarily represent it in an authoritative and reliable manner. Finally, they may reserve their position until they know who the U.S. envoy would be.

It seems likely, therefore, that the Soviets will continue to put off any definitive decision on the designation of special representatives until they gauge the results of one or more meetings between yourself and Gromyko. Thus, while we may want to include our representative among your party for Geneva, we should recognize that the Soviets may not agree to appoint a counterpart until a concrete negotiating agenda is agreed upon.

#### Preparing for Geneva

As noted above, we should seek to be in a position at Geneva to set forth our step-by-step negotiating framework in conceptual terms, and to lay out the specific elements of our first-stage proposals for reductions in offensive forces and limits on ASAT testing. While you would not, of course, reveal our bottom line in your presentation to Gromyko, the goal would be to give the Soviets a clear understanding of the impact of the constraints we have in mind. Thus, we would want to have internal USG agreement on our specific objectives by the time of the Geneva meeting.

Although the President briefly raised with Gromyko the concept of an interim agreement, our approach remains highly controversial with the interagency community. Indeed, members of the NSC staff have asserted that U.S. policy in this area is undecided, and have told us that no special weight should be attached to these remarks by the President to Gromyko.

The Geneva meeting is still six weeks off, but some of this time will be occupied by your trip to Europe, and the Christmas holidays. We may want to consider whether it would be desirable to notify the Soviets in advance of our intentions. This would allow for a more considered reaction

by Gromyko in Geneva. Given the time constraints, however, and the formidable bureaucratic hurdles we confront, this may not be possible.

In the forthcoming interagency discussions we can expect the following positions to emerge:

—OSD will strongly oppose our step-by-step approach, probably arguing that all we should do is go back to the Soviets with, at best, slightly modified versions of our current positions on START and INF. They may, alternatively, argue for an approach to Geneva focused upon securing Soviet agreement to a broad set of principles for arms control. These principles will be the same as those which shaped our START positions, and will thus not be especially attractive to the Soviets. OSD will oppose any limitations whatsoever on ASAT as well as SDI. Finally, if they perceive the President moving toward our approach, OSD may well come forward with some new, attractive, plausible, simple but wholly nonnegotiable proposal for nuclear and space weapons, akin to the "zero option." 6

—ACDA is also likely to oppose agreements that would place meaningful limits on space weaponry, and thus will be hostile to State's overall approach, although ACDA's views on strategic arms may parallel our own. We must also expect ACDA to come forward with some version of "arms control without agreements" in the INF and ASAT fields.

—JCS may be sympathetic to elements of the State position and perhaps to the approach as a whole. We should not, however, expect visible support from the

Chiefs, especially given the certain opposition to our ideas by OSD.

—The NSC staff is already arguing that we need to base new US-Soviet arms control negotiations upon a mutual recognition of the inevitability of a shift from an offense-dominated to defense-dominated strategic environment (a highly questionable assumption on technical grounds alone, at this early stage of the SDI). Once the Soviets accept the inevitability and, indeed, desirability of strategic defenses, a new arms control framework for the 1990s can be designed. Your task in Geneva, according to this view, will be to begin the process of Soviet conversion. (In reality, the Soviets have not the slightest incentive to "legitimize" our SDI program, and will not therefore accept it as a premise for arms control. Any such effort with them will prove to be a sterile waste of time, at best, and could undercut our ability to engage the Soviets in serious bargaining over offensive arms reductions.)

#### Presenting the Case for Our Approach

There are several strong arguments you can use in arguing for our proposal with the President, and subsequently with the Allies and public. Above all, we will want to emphasize the important military benefits flowing from even the firststage accord we envisage:

—In addition to forestalling the accelerating erosion of the existing arms control regime, our first-stage accord would, for the first time ever, actually reverse the nuclear arms buildup.

- —It would limit the number of strategic warheads to below current levels, and reduce the number of Soviet missiles and bombers by 30 percent.
- —It would cut the number of Soviet heavy ICBMs by 20 percent and overall missile throw-weight by 25 percent.
- —It would represent a reduction by 20 percent from the Soviet warhead level projected for 1988 and 50 percent from that projected for 1995 (in the absence of any constraints).
- —The proposal would not adversely affect SDI research, and protect long-term options; indeed, without constraints on warhead growth, the task of defending against a Soviet ballistic missile attack will be even more formidable.
- —It would allow *all* ongoing U.S. strategic modernization programs to continue, subject to the numerical ceilings of the first-stage accord.
- —The three-year ban on ASAT testing would impede Soviet development of systems that would pose a significant threat to high-value U.S. satellites, while leaving open our longer-term options in the ASAT field.

In presenting our new step-by-step approach to the Soviets, we will want to stress the less ambitious initial cuts it implies for their strategic forces and the trade-offs it embodies between areas of relative advantage. In order to highlight the positive and significant nature of the initial accord we are seeking, we might begin speaking of these as the "START I" negotiations.

We also believe that we should consider seeking agreement with the Soviets that our common objective should be to conclude a first-stage accord in 1985. Such a timetable is feasible. Committing to it publicly will, or course, put pressure on both sides. But the history of arms control and US-Soviet relations over the past twenty years suggests that results seldom come, and accords are seldom achieved, except under the pressure of such deadlines.

Clearly we have our work cut out for us. In addition to arguing our position through the interagency process over the coming weeks, it will be important for you to continue your discussions on these issues with the President. In these discussions we believe you should argue that early progress toward a new arms control regime is urgently needed, in view of the erosion of existing arrangements, and that such progress is possible if the U.S. offers concrete proposals at the Geneva meeting. Indeed, given Chernenko's uncertain physical and political health, the period during which progress can be made, before a new succession crisis hits the Soviet Union, may be brief.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Tefft, Vershbow, Dobbins, and Markoff (PM/SNP) on 11/24; cleared by Pascoe, Palmer, J. Gordon (PM), A. Kanter (PM), W. Courtney (P), and Timbie. Vershbow initialed for Dobbins, Markoff, Pascoe, Palmer, Kanter, Courtney, and Timbie.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 267</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The talking points are attached but not printed. On the afternoon of November 28, Shultz met with Reagan to discuss these issues. (Reagan Library, President's Daily

Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary for that day: "Met with Geo. S. re the upcoming arms reduction talks. We agree that since Chernenko has talked as I have of total elimination of nuclear weapons that should be our goal in the negotiations." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 401)

- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 313</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 4, Document 289.
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>footnote 2</u>, <u>Document 2</u>.

<sup>7</sup> In a November 8 memorandum to Reagan, Adelman advocated for "arms control without agreements." He wrote: "in simple terms, under this approach, we and the Soviets would take measures to enhance the strategic stability and reduce nuclear weapons in consultation with each other, without necessarily consummating them in a signed agreement. Those measures could be enunciated as national policies and could be confirmed in mutual understandings or exchanges." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) Adelman outlined his position in the The Wall Street Journal on November 12 (David Ignatius, "Reagan Official Stresses 'Basics' In Arms Talks," The Wall Street Journal, November 12, 1984, p. 29), and in more detail in the Foreign Affairs Winter 1984/85 issue. In a November 13 memorandum to Shultz, Burt argued: while "some informal steps are potentially very useful," "Ken's approach would be seen and, in fact, would become an excuse for not even attempting to achieve negotiated agreements. This would not only endanger prospects for arms control in areas where agreements are possible. It would also risk throwing away past agreements and negotiating history, including very important agreed definitions and understandings." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive

and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, November 1984 Super Sensitive Documents) In his memoir, Shultz explained that Adelman "had shown me an article he had written and proposed to submit to *Foreign Affairs*, and I had told him that would be 'very unwise.' This was a topic for internal discussion. He went ahead and published it anyway. It was outrageous that one of the president's appointees should argue in public for a major policy shift without putting it first to the president. This was a presidential-level decision, and the article sent an erroneous signal that the president was not interested in arms control negotiations." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 496)

# 320. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, November 28, 1984

SUBJECT

CIA Analysis of Soviet Arms Control Policy and How to Prepare for the January Talks

I believe that the CIA report prepared for the SACG is basically sound in its analysis of the Soviet attitude toward specific issues, and also in its description of the basic thrust of Soviet policy. However, I believe it is weak on the predictive side for two basic reasons:

—By treating Soviet arms control policy largely in isolation from other issues confronting the Soviet leadership, it neglects the possible impact of internal Soviet factors on overall arms control policy.

—While describing accurately the Soviet reaction to past U.S. proposals, it does not really address the question of the role any future U.S. proposals might play in the Soviet decision-making process. (An understandable omission since we have not yet decided what sort of proposals we will make.)

Domestic Factors and Soviet Arms Control Policy

While the Agency is doubtless right in observing that no Soviet leader is likely to see it in his interest to push for policies agreeable to the U.S., and also that economic

considerations have not in the past had a noticeable impact on Soviet arms control policy, both of these issues deserve more searching examination.

—It seems clear that, important as the military is to the Soviet leadership, its overriding priorities at the moment are issues related to the succession and issues related to management of the domestic economy—and society as a whole. They are doubtless struggling over resource allocation for the five-year plan beginning in 1986, are working to revise the Party statutes for the first time in decades, and must have a Party Congress by February, 1986.

—It is difficult to predict exactly what impact new U.S. proposals would have on the debates on these issues, and on which issues various aspirants in the succession struggle would choose to use. Major changes in the past—for example, Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech $^3$ —have never, to my recollection, been predicted by foreign intelligence agencies, including our own. While I do not profess an ability to make such predictions myself, experience tells me that it is *not* wise totally to discount the possibility in advance.

—Certainly, no Soviet leader will wish to appear pro-U.S., nor will any argue that *necessary* military expenditures give way to non-military ones. These are truisms and require no particular insight to state. There may well be an argument over which military expenditures are necessary, however. And if we suppose that the issues are discussed not simply as pro or anti-U.S., or as necessary guns versus desirable butter, but in a much more complex policymaking environment, possibilities emerge. For example, what about an American proposal which offers the prospect of alleviating some of the pressing domestic concerns? Or

the consideration that whatever the sacrifices they make, they may not be able to keep up with the U.S. technologically should there be no agreed restraint on U.S. options?

—Although the whole Ogarkov affair is still murky,<sup>4</sup> it is very likely that it was related both to succession maneuvering and to resource allocation questions. Clearly the Soviets are wrestling with a very real dilemma. There is no way they can be sure we will not achieve a technological breakthrough which leaves them behind in some key area, and they are unable to do *all* things at once. There are, therefore, more potential Soviet incentives for a more controlled development of technological change than are apparent in the CIA analysis.

#### Impact of U.S. Proposals

One important factor which the CIA study could not address is the potential impact on Soviet policymaking of U.S. proposals. The "key judgments" in the paper might lead one to conclude that *no* responsible U.S. proposal is likely to be successful. This could be right, but it is not necessarily the case. For the fact is that our proposals, if offered in the proper way—confidentially and initially without publicity—will themselves be factors influencing Soviet policy decisions. If there is something in them for the Soviets, then there will be those tempted by them, not because they want to do us a favor, but in their own self interest.

For this reason—and a number of others—I believe we should take Art Hartman's observations seriously (TAB I).<sup>5</sup> As he points out, the resumption of negotiations by the Soviets will require us to present proposals which

ultimately are defensible both at home and among the Allies. Otherwise we risk losing the high ground we have occupied for the past year.

Unfortunately, I do not see emerging from the interagency process the sort of comprehensive thinking that will be required for this. The sort of proposals State is toying with seem to me simultaneously too much and too little: too much in the sort of specifics which could handicap us in future negotiations, and too little as regards definition of what our overall objectives are. So far as DOD and ACDA are concerned, I have noted even less in the way of realistic ideas. I believe it is clear that the interagency process cannot produce the sort of proposal we need. Even if it miraculously should, the ideas would probably leak before we took them up with the Soviets, which would militate against serious Soviet consideration.

#### What We Need for Geneva

We need to engage the Soviets in a frank discussion of the *objectives* of our arms reduction efforts over the next four years. The purpose would be to develop the "road map" the President spoke of in his UNGA address. The initial step should be to try to get some general agreement on where we want to arrive; mapping the course over the terrain could be a job for the umbrella talks to follow. One of our objectives in the initial meeting should be to get Soviet agreement on these talks by special representatives of both sides.

This will require, in the first instance, decisions by the President of what our objectives are, and then decisions regarding the best intermediate steps to achieve them and finally, the way our initial proposals should be formulated

to attract serious Soviet attention. It will be imperative to develop these plans with a very small circle of advisers with absolute security against leaks.

Given the long history of negotiations on many of the separate issues and the relatively frozen attitudes which have developed on both sides, our effort will have a better chance of success if we can come up with an innovative conceptual framework: one that will allow both sides to claim a fresh start. For us, this would have the advantage of accentuating the specific Reagan stamp on our approach; for them it could provide the means to finesse (at least initially) some of their more persistent hang-ups with our proposals up to now. This, of course, cannot be done simply by fiddling with proposals now on the table (though these of course involve real issues which must be addressed). It will require, at a minimum, recasting our approach in a framework which at least looks different. We need an approach which does not look like a return to 1972 detente; they need an approach which does not look too much like a return to the Geneva of 1983.

#### **Modalities**

For obvious reasons, we normally give more thought to substance than to modalities and tactics. However, I cannot stress too much the vital role that appropriate modalities play in successful implementation of a sound strategy. In the past, the U.S. has frequently handicapped itself by using tactics which doomed its proposals to failure—or had the effect of diluting them and delaying implementation.

The Carter-Vance proposal of March, 1977, is a classical example of using counterproductive tactics. There were two basic mistakes in the tactics used then: Carter went

public with his new proposals before they had been discussed with the Soviets; and the proposals were suddenly presented to the Soviets without any advance discussion. The combination of these two factors (plus Soviet annoyance at a noisy human rights campaign) caused immediate, emotion-laden Soviet rejection, and doomed the deep cuts idea for the balance of the Carter Administration. (One of our major achievements, by the way, has been to gain Soviet acceptance of the idea that there must be substantial cuts in the future.)

We should absorb the lessons of the past and make sure the mistakes are not repeated. This means, in regard to our upcoming talks, the following:

- —We should not actually name publicly our special representative for the umbrella talks until the Soviets have accepted the idea and have been informed of the person involved. (Since this will be a form of diplomatic negotiation, we should go through a quasi "agrément" process in advance, to make sure both representatives are acceptable to both sides.)<sup>8</sup>
- —We should take extraordinary steps to make sure that our proposals do not leak before they are presented to the Soviets, or even thereafter for a reasonable period of time (say, a couple of months).
- —We should make some effort to convey to the Soviet leadership, entirely privately and informally, the drift of our thinking, in advance of submitting formal proposals. Unless we develop a mechanism to do this, it is more than likely that we will soon find ourselves in an acrimonious public dispute which will greatly complicate our ability to manage Congress, the Allies and the Soviets simultaneously.

—We should not expect to be able to work out agreed approaches in a series of meetings of the foreign ministers. These meetings may well be desirable for a number of reasons, but unless they are supplemented by informal, preparatory discussions—both by special representatives on arms control issues and by broader informal discussions—progress will be slow, if it occurs at all.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Arms Control—USSR (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. In a December 1 covering note to Shultz on another copy of this memorandum, McFarlane wrote: "George: Attached is a very thoughtful memo from Jack Matlock. I must ask that you protect Jack on this and not share the memo with others. As an aside Jack is truly one of the most thoughtful men I have ever met on the Soviet Union. I agree with Jack's views with the exception of one idea on the last page [see <a href="footnote8">footnote8</a>, below]. But I send this along in the hope that after you have read it we might be able to discuss whether/how we might try to implement some of his ideas. Bud." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 21 (2 of 4).

<sup>2</sup> The CIA report was not found. See <u>Document 323</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A reference to Khrushchev's February 1956 "secret speech" which denounced Stalin's harsh policies and tactics and led to uprisings in Hungary and Poland.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 270</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Tab I is not attached. See <u>Document 318</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> See <u>footnote 7, Document 267</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Documents 156 and 157 d.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> An "X" appears in the margin on another copy of this memorandum, indicating the point McFarlane disagreed with. See <u>footnote 1</u>, above.

## 321. Note Prepared in the White House Situation Room $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, November 29, 1984

Kremlin Desires Backchannel Link with Washington

[1 paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

- According to Chetverikov, the request for a backchannel message had been made by representatives of Chernenko's office. Chetverikov stated that messages relayed through unofficial channels were becoming increasingly important to the Soviet leadership.
- Dobrynin said he viewed the present as the most crucial time in recent U.S.-Soviet relations, and suggested that all forms of communication be pursued to assure continuation of a warming of relations between the two nations.

Dobrynin suggested that improved U.S.-Soviet relations were largely due to Secretary Shultz's effort to facilitate arms talks.

- The Soviet ambassador said Shultz's work has brought about a marked change in attitudes by Soviet leaders toward the U.S. administration.
- The source noted Dobrynin was considerably optimistic over the prospects for a second term for the President—in stark contrast to the ambassador's dismal attitude prior to the President's re-election.

Dobrynin also outlined the current protocol when calling on top leaders in the Politburo, i.e., call on Chernenko first and ask him about the advisability of meeting with Gorbachev et al.

- Dobrynin stated there was considerable animosity between Chernenko and Gorbachev due to worldwide speculation about the Soviet succession issue.
- Dobrynin speculated that Chernenko might be offended if any invitation to visit the U.S. were extended to any ranking Kremlin leaders without first inviting Chernenko—who will decline but suggest officials who would be willing to travel to Washington. (C)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (11/27/84–12/04/84); NLR-748-25A-42-3-0. Confidential. This note is based on reporting from the CIA on November 27. Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Bud, You probably saw this last night. One of the dangers we face in not taking them up on this is that the Soviets may begin to think we are not serious. JP."

### 322. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, November 30, 1984

### MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT C. McFARLANE

After meeting with Shultz on the afternoon of November 29, Nitze placed a call to McFarlane to debrief on that meeting. McFarlane returned the call at Nitze's residence in the evening, but the latter was out. The telephone conversation was finally completed on the morning of November 30. The main points are as follows:

—Nitze said he had been asked by Shultz to help prepare him for his meeting with Gromyko. Shultz also asked Nitze to accompany him to Geneva for the January 7-8 meeting. Nitze said he would be prepared to help the Secretary in any way he could prior to the Geneva meeting as well as aid Shultz during the meetings with Gromyko.<sup>2</sup>

—McFarlane said he was happy Nitze had agreed to undertake the job; McFarlane was confident the President would also be pleased.<sup>3</sup>

—McFarlane outlined his thinking on scheduling in Presidential preparation for the Geneva meeting: today was to be a discussion on Soviet long-term objectives; perhaps Wednesday (December 5) there could be discussion on Soviet immediate objectives at Geneva. (Nitze suggested there should also be discussion of US objectives for Geneva in the context of possible Soviet proposals, e.g., what do we want?—McFarlane agreed). Without tying specific agenda to specific meeting dates, McFarlane suggested December

10 and 17 for discussion of "format" or "process" as well as substance. There would have to be subsequent meetings where McFarlane hoped to get Presidential decisions on substance as to INF, START and space. 4 McFarlane opined that most of the work in this regard had been completed; there remained, however, decision as to how to handle the offense defense relationship. 5

—McFarlane thought the best approach for offense/defense relationship would be to impress on Gromyko the usefulness of strategic defense vis-a-vis strategic offensive weapons; this would keep SDI alive and provide US leverage in continuing negotiations. McFarlane was having a paper prepared in this regard. 6

—Nitze questioned that approach. He referred McFarlane to his memo critiquing the "gang of four" article on SDI: McFarlane said he had seen Nitze's memo and approved of it. Nitze then went on to say that one of the foundations of the ABM Treaty was to prohibit a nationwide defense and to guard against "breakout" to provide such defense. One of the ways to hedge against this breakout was to place severe restrictions on long-lead-time items—namely large-phased array radars, which take five to ten years to build, and to prohibit mobile ABM interceptors and engagement radars. Moreover, the ABM Treaty was to be accompanied by a parallel treaty of indefinite duration.

—Now, Nitze said, these foundations of the ABM Treaty have become of uncertain validity; the Krasnoyarsk radar certainly appears to be usable as part of a base for nationwide ABM defense (if not explicitly so), the Soviets have built ABM interceptors which, if not wholly mobile, are then readily transportable, and no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive systems has been negotiated.

- —Nitze said our approach should be to challenge the Soviets on this offense/defense relationship. If they want to join us in "fixing" this problem and revalidating the foundations of the ABM Treaty, we should do so even if it means forgoing some aspects of SDI.
- —McFarlane said he did not disagree with Nitze's approach. Nitze replied that McFarlane's original approach had not seemed consistent with his; who was preparing McFarlane's offense/defense paper? McFarlane replied Nitze should talk to Ron Lehman; Nitze said he would do so.
- -McFarlane would give Lehman a "heads up."
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972–1989, Lot 90D397, 1984. Secret; Sensitive. There is no drafting information on the memorandum of conversation. "Only copy" is typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the first page.
- <sup>2</sup> In a memorandum of conversation of the meeting on November 29, Nitze wrote that Shultz wanted "someone with background and expertise" in arms control and "in whom he had confidence to help him in preparing for his meetings with Gromyko in January as well as to be with him during those meetings. Shultz believed Nitze to be that person and asked Nitze to join him. Nitze said he would be glad to help in preparing for the Geneva meetings and be present during the meetings to aid the Secretary in any way." (Ibid.)
- <sup>3</sup> See footnotes 5 and 6, Document 308.
- <sup>4</sup> In the November 29 memorandum of conversation with Shultz, Nitze wrote: "Shultz implied he was getting a little nervous over Geneva and how preparations would come

out. He implied the interagency community may come up with a game plan, but he was not sure it would be consistent with the objective the President had articulated —to get meaningful arms control agreements." See footnote 2, above.

<sup>5</sup> In the November 29 memorandum of conversation with Shultz, Nitze wrote: "Shultz then enumerated several questions which needed to be addressed in preparation. How to space out the two days; arms control/bilateral issues; the talks, social occasions, communique. Soviet view—what is Gromyko likely to come with? Questions and proposals to determine whether the US is prepared to come to a conclusion on space." See <u>footnote 2</u>, above. <sup>6</sup> Not found.

<sup>7</sup> See attachment to <u>Document 343</u> and <u>footnote 2</u> thereto.

## 323. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, November 30, 1984, 1:45-2:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Defense and Arms Control Objectives

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

OSD:

Deputy Secretary William Taft

CIA:

Director William J. Casey Mr. Douglas George

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN:
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

ICS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION: Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION: Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

### Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting by discussing our schedule for dealing with preparations for the Geneva talks. We would begin by updating the foundation of information upon which we would build our approach. Today we would discuss the Soviet strategy on arms control and look at the status of Soviet forces and what we expect them to look like in the future. On Wednesday, we would focus more specifically on US objectives in January in contrast to Soviet objectives. Following that, we would review substantive options including questions of how to approach START, INF, space systems, and related issues. We will also look at how to present the United States' view of the relationship of offense and defense. We will stress how strategic defenses can be stabilizing and "why they ought to learn to love defense." He noted that our basic analytical work is complete on START and INF and that our thinking on space had come a long way. He indicated that the participants would receive a decision paper only after we had conducted these foundation meetings. He then turned to CIA Director Casey who introduced Mr. Doug George, noting that Mr. George's presentation had been developed along with Mr. Larry Gershwin. (S)

Mr. George introduced his presentation using a series of viewgraphs. The presentation would describe the Soviet approach to arms control talks, taking into account military considerations, arms control policy, political considerations, and economic considerations. He would then brief conclusions of the CIA paper that had been prepared for today's session. He turned to the question of Soviet offensive systems, noting that the Soviet Union has over 2,500 SNDVs and has a vigorous development and deployment program underway. He noted that the centerpiece of Soviet offensive systems is the large MIRVed

ICBM force, especially the heavy missiles such as the SS-18, and he noted that the Soviet Union has a follow-on missile under development for each of their existing types including the SS-18. He stated that the Soviet Union is removing SS-11s, apparently to make room for the addition of new ICBMs, probably the SS-X-25. He noted that the Soviet Union will replace most of its strategic offensive systems in the early-to-mid 1990s, addressing survivability through mobilized ICBMs such as the train-mobile SS-X-24 and the land-mobile SS-X-25. In addition to greater emphasis on survivability, the Soviets will place greater emphasis on diversity, especially in developing a modern bomber force which includes the B-1 equivalent BLACKJACK bomber and the modern AS-15 air-launched cruise missile. He noted that the Soviet Union will continue its build-up of SS-20 missiles and deployments of the SS-21, SS-12 mod 2, and SS-23 in Europe. He stressed that 1985 is a year of decision for the Soviet Union, based on the schedule of their five-year plans. He pointed out that the Soviet Union can live within the SALT II limits for at least another year, but because of their hot production lines, are well positioned to move beyond those limits in the future. Mr. George illustrated this portion of his briefing with photographs of the BACKFIRE and the SS-20 TEL. (S)

Mr. George continued his briefing by focusing on strategic defense. He noted that the Soviet Union desires to preserve its near-monopoly in strategic defense capabilities; he noted that recently the Soviet Union has been upgrading the Moscow ABM system and has the potential for widespread ABM defenses in the 1990s. It has improved its air defenses and indeed, the Soviet SA-X-12 surface-to-air missile blurs the differences between air defense and ABM. Mr. George stressed that the Soviet Union is doing vigorous research on direct energy and anti-submarine warfare technology. In ASW they are using their manned space

mission. He noted that at the present time they have some difficulty countering cruise missiles and advanced bombers, especially Stealth weapons. (S)

Mr. George then turned to a discussion of the Soviet space program, which is large and involves many programs including the Soviet space shuttle. He noted that the Soviet Union has an operational ASAT interceptor which can be launched in as little as sixty minutes after preparations begin. He noted that the Soviet Union has an advanced SDI program of its own, but would likely also respond to the American SDI program with greater resources and offensive counter-measures, including decoys and missile hardening. (S)

Mr. George then turned to the strategic challenge which US programs present to the Soviet Union. The Soviets, he said, are afraid that US gains will erode the advantages which they have achieved. He stated that the Soviet Union has a launch-on-warning capability which the P-II puts in jeopardy. He stressed that the Soviet Union recognizes that no amount of capital that the Soviet Union can invest would permit them to compete successfully with the United States in terms of SDI, because of their inability to develop modern computers at the rate at which they are being developed in the United States. Stealth, B-1, the cruise missiles, the Pershing II, all present problems for the Soviet Union. (S)

He then turned to Soviet arms control objectives. The Soviet Union wants to continue to negotiate but wants progress on Soviet terms. SALT I and SALT II accepted the status of the Soviet Union as a superpower equal, but the Soviet Union retains as its goal compensation for all of the forces of all its opponents, e.g., the British and French. Their goal is to protect their strategic gains while delaying

the US strategic response and especially to undercut ICBM modernization and SDI. Mr. George noted that ASAT is the stalking horse for SDI. Mr. George noted that Moscow remains committed to the principle of "equality and equal security," which means that they will continue to focus heavily on the INF issue, particularly this year when the Belgian and Dutch deployment decisions are pending. He noted that Soviet leaders plan numerous visits to include a visit by Chernenko to Paris this year and that these will be used for the propaganda purpose of stopping the US INF deployments. He also said that it was quite possible that the Soviet Union would manipulate its SS-20 bases in order to get the Dutch to pause in their decision on deployment of ground-launched cruise missiles. (S)

Mr. George emphasized that the Soviet leadership has agreed on a new course for US-Soviet relations but that Chernenko or his successor will have little leeway to alter the thrust of Soviet strategic programs and arms control policies. The Soviets do not expect major agreements soon, but will use the arms control process to pursue political goals. One can expect the Soviet Union to be very active in trying to influence US policy through allies, our publics, and the Congress. They may well prove quite sophisticated in exploiting differences within the West and in encouraging restraints on US defense spending. Moscow also hopes to inhibit US actions elsewhere, such as in Nicaragua. In Geneva, Gromyko will have a political agenda of setting the stage for the Soviet European visits in early 1985, and his announced goal will be to halt the arms race, especially in space. Gromyko's substantive agenda will focus on stopping SDI through an ASAT moratorium and trying to get an INF moratorium as well. He will be looking for unilateral restraint by the West but will attempt to use SALT II as the point of departure in the strategic area, and again will focus on British and French systems. On

modalities, the Soviets probably will have a plan for Geneva but they are likely to expect the US to take the lead in proposing modalities. (S)

Mr. George then turned to economic factors influencing Soviet behavior. Despite difficult economic times, the economic situation is not likely to cause the Soviet Union to forego strategic programs or make concessions. On the other hand, they have an interest in slowing down the pace of strategic arms competition; in particular because they cannot compete with the United States in an open-ended high-technology competition such as would be associated with SDI. (S)

In conclusion, Mr. George noted that the Soviets appear to have achieved successful re-entry into strategic arms control talks. He noted that they believe the process is beneficial to their interests, although they have stated that they do wish to achieve agreements. Clearly, they view the talks as a means to influence US and Allied behavior. These talks in the next year take place as the Soviet Union is deciding on the size, composition and capabilities of forces planned for the 1990s. The Soviet Union looks to arms control to slow down US technological development, while it protects advantages they have achieved. The Soviet Union can live with SALT II for at least another year, and they are well positioned to go beyond its limitations in the near future. (S)

Mr. George then repeated that the Soviet Union is gearing up for a major public affairs battle, that their emphasis on ICBMs has not changed, and that they are well positioned to go beyond existing agreements in both offensive and defensive systems, and that they have a vigorous space program. He noted that the Soviet Union had just launched their own version of the KH-11. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that it is strategic defense that gives the United States its leverage on the Soviet Union and may prove to be our very best response. (S)

General Vessey emphasized that the Soviet Union gets a tremendous amount of military leverage from its ICBM force and it is important that we develop a counter to that. At the same time, he noted that the Soviet Union is developing diverse strategic forces such as the United States has done. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* suggested that we should set aside the detailed discussion and focus on the "big picture." He called upon the President to recall his policy of commitment to a military force structure which the Soviet Union would respect. He noted that the President had in 1980 drawn the nation's attention to the window of vulnerability, and he noted that the American people can see that we have a program. However, he noted that we are still faced with problems in resolving the threat. For example, our problem in getting Congressional support for MX. He noted that today, the Soviet Union has 6,000 ICBM warheads to our 2,000, and all of ours are vulnerable. The Soviet Union has done all that it could to derail the President's efforts, but we have tried to get everyone to recognize the trends. The President's program in arms control has been to restore a stable balance, but we still have a long way to go, even though we are better off than we would have been had we continued the policies of four years ago. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* stated that as bad as it is today, it is going to get worse, and asked what that means for arms control. He stated his view that either you must persevere in getting offensive reductions, or you must defend the United States. It is imperative that the Soviet Union understand that.

What the Soviet Union wants is high levels of re-entry vehicles and no defenses for the United States. Mr. McFarlane stated his view that the notion that you must choose between arms control and the strategic defense is nonsense. Strategic defense gives us the capability to restore stability in this century. The other point about SDI is that it permits us to move away from emphasis on nuclear weapons, and this is most appealing to publics. SDI is defensive and it is non-nuclear. (S)

The President asked whether or not the Soviet Union fears our economic capability. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* responded saying that this was different from World War II and that in World War II Congress was on our side. (S)

General Vessey noted that the Soviet Union has a greater military and industrial base but pointed out that we have the lead in high technology. (S)

Secretary Weinberger added that SDI is the key, and that we don't have the time to mobilize an industrial base the way we did in World War II. (S)

The President said that he had one other question. He wondered whether or not deterrence would be enhanced if we made clear to the Soviet Union that we might launch-under-attack, but wondered whether we had the warning capacity to be certain that we would have warning and that we would not be caught by surprise. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that there were certain gaps in our radar coverage. (S)

*General Vessey* added that the gaps referred to attack by SLBMs. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* said that we had no ability to rely on launchunder-attack because we do not have the kind of attack assessment capability that we would need to rely on such a policy. (S)

Director Casey noted that launch-under-attack would make SDI look very good indeed. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that submarines are very close to our shores and would make it very difficult to execute. (S)

General Vessey indicated that the JCS felt it was difficult to rely on launch-under-attack. (S)

Ambassador Nitze asserted that launch-under-attack is a policy of weakness. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* again stressed that we don't have the right kinds of capabilities for such a policy. We don't have the ability to distinguish between attacks on military facilities and attacks on our cities. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that SDI was the best response to the Soviet threat. (S)

Ambassador Rowny stated his belief that a Soviet attack would be against our missile bases. (S)

The President interjected that the Soviet goal is to protect the motherland while developing military power that they can use to blackmail the West. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested that we consider the implications of the briefing. The Soviet Union has developed an impressive array of ballistic and cruise missiles. There is an asymmetry. Theirs are much more

survivable and they have a big production base. The Soviet Union doesn't have the political problems of deployment that we have. The United States must deal with the problems of the Congress and the social-environmental problems. These all give the Soviet Union an advantage. Therefore, it is important that we get a respectable arms control agreement. We are, however, faced with a dilemma: the Soviet Union is interested in stopping SDI, as Mr. McFarlane and Mr. George have pointed out; they want to stop the R&D component which we want to protect. Mr. Shultz indicated that SDI is being referred to as leverage, but if there is a lever there, nobody seems to want to pull it. He believes that the basic answer to a defensive system is to flood the system and to overwhelm the defense with an offense. And that is our problem. Mr. Shultz indicated that if we don't limit the offense we can't have a defense, but if we press for the defense now, the Soviet Union won't agree to limit the offense. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that the Soviets could flood and overwhelm traditional defensive systems but SDI is a system that would be in space that can't be flooded, and that is the reason that we should proceed with it. (S)

General Vessey noted that in the future both sides will have to deal with offenses and defenses but also we must take into account the fact that there is an asymmetrical target base. (S)

Director Adelman agreed that there was an asymmetry between US and Soviet forces and asked, "How do you put a stop to a strategic build-up when we want 5,000 warheads and they want 10,000 warheads?" (S)

General Vessey indicated that we do have a leverage to handle such an issue. (S)

Ambassador Rowny stressed that we do have leverage for trade-offs in our START proposals. (S)

Secretary Shultz interjected that we need something to trade. (S)

The President noted that he had another meeting to attend, and Mr. McFarlane concluded the meeting. (S)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting was held in the Situation Room. On November 30, Reagan wrote in his diary: "An N.S.P.G. meeting about forthcoming arms talks with the Soviets. I made it plain there must be no granting of concessions (one sided) to try & soften up the Soviets." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 402)
<sup>2</sup> This was the first of four NSPG meetings scheduled to plan for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva and the subsequent arms control negotiations. The next meeting was on Wednesday, December 5. See <u>Documents 326</u>, 331, and 334.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Not found. See <u>Document 320</u>.

## 324. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 1, 1984

SUBJECT Shultz and Geneva

I understand that you have spoken with Secretary Shultz after his Wednesday meeting with the President and I understand there may have been another meeting on Friday. I did not know of these meetings and thus the following information may be OBE. This information is not based upon the existence of a single "deep throat" in State, but is based on rather extensive discussions with a number of State officials. I am confident that it is fairly accurate, but I would caution that it represents the understanding of the Department as to what their Secretary believes—not necessarily his exact views.

Secretary Shultz has been concerned about his role in Geneva and his role in the preparations leading to Geneva. He wants strong personal involvement and has said that he will go to the President to get it. His view is that he should be given a complete substantive package to present to the Soviet Union in Geneva. He does not favor a prior presidential announcement as at Eureka, but he does want an approved, formal package. He believes strongly that Geneva is a Foreign Minister's meeting and that it should not involve any real delegation and is not happy about ideas of a special envoy. Rather he believes that he should be given extensive flexibility to reach agreement on a

Vladivostok-type package, the outlines of which he would negotiate himself with Gromyko. Agreement on the agenda and objectives, in his view then, is outlining the package and setting up subsequent technical negotiations simply for the completion of the basic package. Indeed, he has spoken of the possibility of keeping all major substantive negotiation within a series of Foreign Ministers meetings until a basic substantive package has been agreed to, thus, possibly delaying the actual beginning of regular negotiations in Geneva.

Shultz's own view is that our basic proposal should be along the lines of Option  $3^{5}$  namely, agreement to a 3 year ASAT moratorium in exchange for an interim agreement placing a cap on ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs and using the Soviet SNDV numbers. He is prepared to pay lip service to protecting SDI, but does not believe in the program. He received what he believed was a very negative briefing on SDI from Jim Thomson at the recent Rand Conference on US-Soviet relations and was disappointed in Jim Abrahamson's recent SDI brief, commenting "Is that all there is?" He believes that emphasis on defense by the US will only provoke an offensive response from the Soviet Union and looks at SDI as a source of leverage more in the sense of a "bargaining chip" to be traded away rather than a factor influencing Soviet behavior. He is not that much concerned about the details, but he was very upset that we are not moving quickly to make a decision by December 10th on some detailed package.

Shultz has never liked the Interagency Process even though State chairs nearly all the groups. He believes that flexibility is reduced and good ideas are sandbagged. He has tolerated the SACPG and SACG because he has believed that they have forced decisions which are stalemated in the Interagency Process. He holds some

resentment that junior officials debate some of the great issues in the SACG, but at the same time believes that the SACG is a good handholding exercise so that other Departments and Agencies can know that their views were expressed. He does not believe that the SACG should be the fora for selling his ideas. His own view is that as Secretary of State and spokesman on arms control, he is most effective when he deals with the President directly. Still, he does not believe that he should constantly have to take up these issues with the President. Thus, Jack Chain's effort to take your instructions on U.S. objectives and turn it into an Option 3 decision paper<sup>8</sup> was apparently based on specific instructions from the top of the State Department which in turn is said to be related to the Secretary's displeasure at the reports he received about Monday's SACG.

Shultz was unhappy after receiving his briefing on Monday's SACG particularly about 3 points. It was reported to him that you had stressed (1) calling the Soviets to task for leaving the talks originally, (2) not getting into substantive negotiations during the Shultz/Gromyko meeting in Geneva, and (3) selling the Soviet Union on the idea that SDI is good for them. My own memory and notes indicate that this is a significant distortion of your focus and tone, but the fact that the distortion has taken place does point to some of the important issues where, in the end, you may decide to differ.

With respect to the first point, because Shultz believes that we need to break the ice with the Soviets in a single bold stroke with major movement toward a new, compromise position, he is not anxious to revisit disruptive issues. He will not likely want to mention old talks much less even suggest that we "resume" those old talks. Whereas, it might be possible to gain some negotiating flexibility and

leverage by raising a number of "compliance" issues such as the Abalakovo Radar during the Geneva Talks, the current State approach dictates minimal discussion of compliance so as not to disrupt the climate necessary for movement on their big package which does not address compliance issues.

On the second point, Shultz does not like the idea of umbrella talks but tolerates the concept because the President is associated with it. State's view is that such discussions can be done by exchanges of experts, perhaps with panels of Assistant Secretary level people. In any case, Shultz's view is that umbrella discussions should not really lead to an agreement on the outlines of a package, but rather follow once we have a breakthrough. He has no objection to laying out American thinking to Gromyko, but he doesn't want such discussions to take too much time away from negotiations on a specific package.

The third point illustrates the real problem. Because Shultz does not believe that there is much to SDI, he doesn't think we should spend too much time and effort protecting it if we can use it to get an interim agreement on offensive arms. He doubts that the Soviets are interested in what role defenses could play in enhancing stability in the future. He will make the argument, but not devote too much time to it. Shultz recognizes that he is isolated within the Administration on this issue, but he believes that he has the complete support of his own building for his package and truly believes that the President has agreed already to the concept of trading off an ASAT moratorium for an interim agreement on offensive arms. Thus, believing that he has won on the moratorium issue. Shultz views further discussion of that issue as basically handholding on SDI, but he is afraid that in the process of this handholding his desire to get instructions to put down a comprehensive

package along the lines of Option 3 might be undercut. There is some evidence that he has become increasingly hostile to SDI as it is viewed as an obstacle to his package approach. His concern about our last SACG has resulted in visible concern about the direction in which you are headed. In each and every effort taken on the new "Objectives" paper, State has fought hard to put in either reference to the revised Option 3 or a placeholder for insertion.

I appreciate your PROFs note on your thoughts on how to proceed. Before Monday's NSPG, $^{10}$  I will detail for you some further thoughts in that regard.

- ¹ Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84-12/2/84-12/2/84. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. "No log" is typed at the top of this memorandum, indicating it was not entered into the NSC system. In a covering note to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "Bud, Attached is an 'eyes only' on Shultz's views of Geneva. Also, we are preparing a package on the Geneva decision-making process. Attached is a first draft of a schedule. While we work the decision-making paper, you may find this useful. It doesn't deal with the punchline, however,—how we finalize the position & what it is. Ron."
- <sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan and Shultz met at the White House on Wednesday, November 28 from 1:34 to 2:20 p.m. See <u>footnote 3, Document 319</u>. Although no record of a similar meeting on November 30 has been found, Shultz attended two meetings at the White House that day: the morning national security briefing and an afternoon NSPG meeting on preparations for the Geneva

meetings. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) See Document 323.

- <sup>3</sup> On May 9, 1982, Reagan gave the commencement address at his alma mater, Eureka College. He used this speech to announce his intention to initiate "formal negotiations on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms, START, at the earliest opportunity." For the full text, see, *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 99 ₽.
- <sup>4</sup> See footnote 4, Document 318.
- <sup>5</sup> An interagency working paper for the possible Vienna meetings, prepared during the summer, included three options. Shultz and the Department of State supported Option 3. An NSC staff compromise led to a paper on Option 1½. See <u>Document 277</u> and <u>footnote 5</u>, <u>Document 291</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> James Thomson, a nuclear physicist and former member of Carter's National Security Council Staff, was Vice President of RAND's research division, Project AIR FORCE. Shultz gave a speech on U.S.-Soviet relations at the opening of the RAND Center at UCLA in October. See footnote 4, Document 296.
- <sup>7</sup> Not found. Lieutenant General James A. Abrahamson was Director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization.
- <sup>8</sup> In a November 29 memorandum, Chain distributed a "draft of the strategy for Geneva paper tasked at the November 26 SACG meeting" for use at the December 5 NSPG meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 11/29/84–12/2/84–12/2/84) In a memorandum to McFarlane on December 1, Kraemer, Lehman, Linhard, and Matlock forwarded the paper and wrote: "a special interagency group working under General Chain has completed the discussion paper at Tab C focused on US and probable Soviet objectives at the January 7/8 Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva. In

addition, the paper takes up some of the chief elements of U.S. arms control policy concerning specific arms control areas and contains a brief, and controversial, section on the proposed process in Geneva and beyond. The bulk of the paper (Sections II–V) reflect some 14 hours of interagency meetings featuring intense deliberations and occasional compromises." (Ibid.) See also <a href="Document 325">Document 325</a> and <a href="footnote">footnote</a> 4 thereto.

<sup>9</sup> November 26.

 $\frac{10}{10}$  December 10.

# 325. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) and the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Chain) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 4, 1984

SUBJECT

NSPG Meeting on Preparations for Geneva, Wednesday December 5, 1:00 pm, Situation Room

### Setting and Objectives

The NSPG will convene to continue discussion of our strategy for the Geneva meeting. The focus of meeting will be the attached SACG paper, which is the first of a series of papers designed to lay the basis for Presidential decisions on your position at Geneva. The contents of the paper are summarized below. Your goals for the meeting should be:

- —to indicate that we are satisfied with the paper, and believe it provides useful *preliminary background* to inform decisions later this month on our strategy for Geneva;
- —to stress the importance of expediting work on the more important papers setting forth *concrete options* that you could present at Geneva; and
- —to reiterate our view on the critical importance of *substance* to the success of the Geneva meeting, and

to challenge the prevalent view that making a proposal would represent a U.S. concession.

SACG paper: "Strategy for Geneva"

The interagency paper (tab 1), produced in a week of marathon drafting sessions chaired by Jack Chain, was reviewed by the SACG on Monday.<sup>4</sup> It has five sections:

- I. An OSD-drafted opening section describes our *arms* control objectives over the next ten years. Following our comments, this section has been revised to reflect the fact that, while we hope to deploy strategic defenses in the 1990s, it is too early to determine whether such a shift in the basis of deterrence will be possible. Thus, our near-term objective should be to protect long-term SDI options, engage the Soviets in a conceptual discussion of the potential role of strategic defenses, while pursuing further reductions in offensive arms. The concluding part of this section ("Where we want to be three years hence") is generally consistent with our option (see page I-3 and 4).
- II. A CIA-drafted section describes the *Soviet* approach to *Geneva*. The paper makes the point that the Soviets will be looking for substance from us before engaging in serious talks. It notes that while they have cast space arms control as the most *urgent* task, they continue to see nuclear arms reductions as the most *important* question.
- III. Section III is a brief rendition of *consensus* objectives for Geneva (engaging the Soviets in

serious talks, follow-on Ministerial meetings as necessary) and general U.S. arms control goals.

IV. Section IV is a straightforward catalogue of the "elements of U.S. arms control policy." This section reviews our current positions on strategic forces, INF, ASAT, SDI, nuclear testing, CW, CDE/MBFR, ostensibly to set forth the "building blocks" for Presidential decisions. Issues where we might reconsider our current position are identified at the end of each sub-section, but no agency views are indicated.

Despite our amendments, the section comes down fairly hard against the possibility of devising concrete ASAT limitations that would be in the U.S. interest (a view we do not share). It also does not consider combined options, such as our own offensive arms/ASAT package.

V. Section V describes in preliminary terms *how you* would structure the Geneva meeting. The discussion here is fairly rudimentary. We will be providing you our detailed thinking on this in an internal memorandum.<sup>5</sup>

### Work Program

Attached at tab 2 is the timetable for further interagency work presented by Bud McFarlane at Monday's SACG.<sup>6</sup> The goal is to complete substantive work by December 21, with a paper on substantive options ready for the President at that time.

The big question mark is whether there will be adequate opportunity to develop concrete options within the

interagency process. Most of the upcoming series of papers to be drafted seem to side-step this task, focusing on the separate building blocks that will go into our position, but without tying them together into a coherent negotiating position for you to take to Geneva. As a matter of interest, the attached SACG paper included a section on options in its first draft; however, Bud directed that this section be expurgated.

Thus, we recommend that you emphasize that need to assign higher priority to drafting an options paper well in advance of the December 22 deadline for completing substantive work. You will also, of course, need to meet privately with the President and Bud McFarlane to make the case for our recommended approach.

Talking points are attached, which cover four areas:<sup>7</sup>

- —*SACG paper:* good first step, but real options paper needed.
- —SDI/Offense-Defense Relationship: should explain to Soviets our view that defenses could be beneficial in future, but not expect to "sell" Moscow on SDI now.
- —*ASAT arms control:* State believes there are limited approaches which are in our interest, and which could provide leverage for offensive arms reductions.
- —Overall Objectives for Geneva: Without substantive ideas, won't be able to engage Soviets in serious bargaining, and could lose public-diplomacy offensive.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret; Sensitive; King. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Markoff, and J. Gordon (PM). Forwarded through Armacost. A stamped notation reading "GPS" appears on this packet, indicating Shultz saw it. McKinley's handwritten initials are on the top of the memorandum, indicating he saw it on December 4.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 326</u>. The NSPG met on November 30 to begin these discussions; see <u>Document 323</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> The paper is attached but not printed. It is summarized in this briefing memorandum as well as during the December 5 NSPG meeting.
- <sup>4</sup> November 26. See <u>footnote 8, Document 324</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> An undated memorandum from Burt to Shultz noted: "Gromyko is coming to the Geneva meeting with his tactics and goals fairly well thought out. Having decided to reverse their failed 'no-negotiations' approach, the Soviets now presumably feel they are positioned to profit in Geneva regardless of the U.S. position. In fact, the decision to come back via the 'new negotiations' route was probably sold to the skeptical in Moscow precisely on that basis. At the same time, they are emphasizing a desire to return to 'détente,' and probably recognize that reaching arms agreements could facilitate this and perhaps slow US and NATO defense programs." (Department of State, EUR Records, Arthur Hartman Files, Lot 03D314, US-Soviet Relations 1985)
- <sup>6</sup> The timetable is attached but not printed.
- <sup>7</sup> The talking points are attached but not printed.

## 326. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, December 5, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

SUBJECT

**US-Soviet Arms Control Objectives** 

PARTICIPANTS

The President

The Vice President

THE VICE PRESIDENT'S OFFICE:
Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

OSD:

Deputy Secretary William Taft

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UN: Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick

JCS:

ADM J. D. Watkins

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION: Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION: Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. James Baker, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman, II

### Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, indicating that our purpose is to discuss US and Soviet objectives for the arms control process that will begin in January in Geneva. The Senior Arms Control Group has prepared a paper on this subject. Mr. McFarlane indicated that it would be useful to summarize key points of that paper. He said that we should first come to understand our long-term objective. We are meeting with the Soviet Union in order to begin the process of reducing nuclear arms and also to begin the process of discussing how we can in the years ahead use strategic defense to make the world safer. He indicated that SDI is most likely to be successful in achieving greater stability if the United States and the Soviet Union conduct a dialogue which would continue through the transition to the use of strategic defenses. He cautioned, however, that during that process we must protect our SDI options and in particular avoid unilateral restraint and moratoria. He reminded everyone that SDI is not only important to our future, but it provides a hedge against a Soviet breakout of the ABM Treaty. He indicated that a major public affairs program on SDI is essential to explain to people that this is a prudent, sensible and moral program. He noted that one of the options before us is to look at smaller steps in the reductions of offensive arms but before we decide what specific approaches we should take, we should have a clear understanding of Soviet objectives. He noted that the Soviets will seek to put the onus on us in order to make the U.S. grant concessions. The Soviets will test us to determine whether or not we will agree to concrete limitations on space weapons and will try to draw out new proposals. They will attempt to protect existing Soviet advantages and superiority while preventing the U.S. from gaining advantages for its technologies. In particular, they will try to stop SDI R&D. Clearly, their top priority will be

to seek limitations on SDI through a moratorium on ASAT. They will probably argue that we must agree to limitations on space systems first. They will attempt to avoid compliance issues in this forum and are unlikely to show great flexibility on offensive systems. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to the overarching US interests in the Geneva talks. Our goal is to get a useful process going and to achieve formal negotiations on offensive systems while we discuss the relationship of defense to offense. We must protect and support our options to shift to greater reliance on defense, and we must seek equal and reduced levels of offensive arms, while protecting options for our modernization program. In summary, our objective is to enhance stability by altering the existing imbalance through our own programs and through arms control. Mr. McFarlane noted that we would deal with issues of format and specific issues of substance in subsequent meetings, including a review of our approaches to START, INF, umbrella talks, and space. (S)

Director Casey interjected that we should also review certain difficulties associated with verification. He stressed the importance of the discussion of offense and defense, and noted that either we must teach the Russians to like defense, or else we must prepare our publics very carefully. He noted that defense is the only alternative to getting stabilizing reductions. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that he had come to this meeting more prepared to listen than to speak, but he thought he should raise some important questions. Is our agreement to discuss defense an agreement to negotiate on defense, and isn't it the case that the Soviet Union already likes defense because they have a large air defense network, and it is clear that defense of the homeland is

dear to the Soviet Union. They are likely to say that they already know that defense is important. Mr. Shultz added, "I am the person who is going to do the talking, but I don't know what it is that I am supposed to say. We need to find some things that both sides are prepared to talk about." (S)

The President stated his belief that we and the Soviet Union may be coming together more than many people realize. He noted that we have never believed that we would find ourselves at war with Russia except to defend ourselves against attack. We have to look at defensive measures just the way the Soviet Union does; we have to look at civil defense and air defense and ABM. He noted the significance of the Moscow subway to civil defense. The President noted that everything they have says that they are looking at a first-strike because it is they, not we, who have built up both offensive and defensive systems. He noted that we could build on the Soviet preoccupation with protecting the homeland by making clear that we have no intention of starting a nuclear war, that it is our view that they may want to make war on us. We have no objections to their having defenses, but we have to look at defenses for ourselves and we need to look at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons. He indicated that relative to the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, an initial reduction of 1,000 is meaningless. He noted that both sides have indicated that they would like to get rid of nuclear weapons entirely, but they are afraid of SDI. We must show them how defenses are not threatening. The President noted that the Soviet Union is ahead of us in ASAT capability and indicated that we should first talk about getting rid of these offensive arms like this F-15 ASAT. We must make it clear that we are not seeking advantage, only defense. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* stated that stability is the theme that we must develop, and we must make clear that we are looking to defense to counter offensive systems and we must talk with the Soviet Union because it would be helpful to have an agreement on how we can proceed towards this goal on both sides. (S)

Secretary Shultz applauded the President's notion of setting our goal of zero nuclear weapons. He believes that it is important that the President said that, and we must move towards the basis for the elimination of nuclear weapons. He indicated that his instincts tell him that unconstrained offensive systems can overwhelm a defensive system and therefore without constraint on offense, there can be no successful SDI. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* noted that stability is a Western concept and it is imperative that we not forget that we need to deal with the Soviet effort to gain superiority. (S)

The President interjected that it would be silly if we go into these talks without being realistic. He noted the quotation which is attributed to Brezhnev in Prague, namely, that the Soviet Union has gained a great deal from detente and that therefore, in 1985, the Soviet Union should have its way around the world. The President doubted that they had in mind Pearl Harbor but rather expected that they believe that they would be so powerful that they could coerce us into achieving their objectives peacefully. (S)

Admiral Watkins indicated that we must work hard to prepare for strategic defenses. They are an important hedge against verification and compliance difficulties and they provide the basis for greater stability and reductions in arms controls. He indicated that it is the time now to articulate our approach to SDI, and to make a statement

that makes clear the role SDI plays in achieving stability. We must make certain that SDI is not made analogous to ASAT. We need to have SDI well underway. There is a solid case for SDI, but we will always have problems in dealing with public opinion on space and ASAT. We must link research on SDI to making nuclear weapons obsolete. (S)

The President again interjected that it was important to link research on SDI to making nuclear weapons obsolete. He noted that we are behind in ASAT, which is the ability to knock down satellites, but we are willing to negotiate the end of ASATs because they are offensive weapons. SDI is a non-nuclear defensive system. The President wondered still whether or not we could give them the technology. (S)

Admiral Watkins cautioned that ASAT, Stealth technology and SDI are all inter-related; that we must move carefully. The F-15 system is not the answer to the military's prayer, and the MV could be given up, from a military point of view, but it must be remembered that this is closely related to SDI. (S)

The President asked again if we couldn't distinguish between offensive and defensive systems, and perhaps limit ASAT as an offensive system. (S)

*Mr. Meese* interjected that the technology is the same; a treaty on ASAT testing could kill both ASAT and SDI. (S)

*Director Casey* noted that we must focus on the difficulties of definition and verification in space arms control. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that we could try to limit testing to just those existing systems and to try to protect our research and development. (S)

Admiral Watkins responded that an ASAT moratorium would inevitably create difficulties for SDI. (S)

Deputy Secretary Taft stressed the importance of our making the case for SDI and its role in maintaining the peace, and that we should do nothing in the negotiations which would prejudice the development of SDI. (S)

Director Adelman stated that the elimination of nuclear weapons should not be considered a near-term goal; rather, we should focus on the goal of reducing the number of nuclear weapons. However, an important question is, how ambitious should our arms control objectives be? How deep should the reductions we seek be, and how much verification should we require? On SDI he noted that Congress had cut our program by one-third, down to a level of spending below what had been planned even before the President's speech. Adelman stressed the need to mention the goal of reinforcing deterrence as we know it. (S)

*The President* noted that SDI gives us a great deal of leverage on the Soviet Union. (S)

Mr. McFarlane indicated that the Russians may bet that the United States cannot sell its SDI program. We need to get support for strategic defenses. (S)

The President responded that we could start by cancelling our subscriptions to the Washington Post. (S)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 8</u>, <u>Document 324</u> and <u>Document 325</u>.

## 327. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 7, 1984

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I met for an hour today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to discuss preparations for the Geneva meeting. I began by emphasizing the seriousness with which you and I are preparing for the meeting, noting that while we don't underestimate the difficulties, we are ready to move ahead as rapidly as possible.

Dobrynin gave me the list of the Soviet delegation. It will consist only of Gromyko, his deputy Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Karpov (their seasoned arms control negotiator), Foreign Ministry specialist Obukhov, and Gromyko's interpreter. I told him that I would be bringing a large group with me to Geneva to be available for consultations there, but that my negotiating team in the meetings would include Paul Nitze and not be larger than theirs. While the Soviets had earlier said Gromyko wanted to leave on the afternoon of the second day, Dobrynin told me that Gromyko now is prepared to remain for a meeting that afternoon (January 8th) if it would be useful.

On substance, Dobrynin said Gromyko is planning to concentrate primarily on arms control and does not want a lengthy discussion of the overall relationship. However, when I suggested that V-E Day events in Europe might be the kind of bilateral issue that would be worth discussing, he seemed to welcome the idea, noting that Moscow was also reviewing this issue and it might be worth some

preliminary discussion even before Geneva. Dobrynin also inquired about the status of any replies to the two outstanding Chernenko letters. I told him we were working on responses. Your reply to Chernenko's November 15 letter on the overall relationship arrived later in the afternoon and we passed it to Dobrynin's deputy Sokolov. Sokolov.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84–12/13/84); NLR-748-25A-43-7-5. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House Situation Room on December 8. Reagan initialed the memorandum on December 11, indicating he saw it.

<sup>2</sup> See attachments to <u>Documents 307</u> and <u>310</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Chernenko's letter was dated November 17. For Reagan's reply, see <u>Document 328</u>.

## 328. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko<sup>1</sup>

Dear Mr. Chairman: Washington, December 7, 1984

Our two countries have now announced the beginning of new negotiations on the whole range of questions concerning nuclear and outer space weapons,<sup>2</sup> as you proposed in your letter of November 17.<sup>3</sup> The common ground reflected in your letter and mine of November 15<sup>4</sup> encourages me to hope for substantial progress in the difficult task we are undertaking together. Let me comment briefly on those areas where there appears to be a coincidence of views.

First, we agree on the objective of eventually liquidating nuclear arms, as you put it. It seems to me that this common objective should stimulate and guide the effort to begin the process of reducing these arsenals.

Second, we agree on the need to negotiate what you call resolute and immediate practical measures to move forward on the real issues we are facing. Such measures, and, in particular, good results in the negotiations we have now agreed to undertake, would have a positive impact on the world situation and our relations, as you say. As Secretary Shultz and I explained to Foreign Minister Gromyko here in Washington, the suggestions which I made in my United Nations address were developed to meet this need, and I recalled them in my letter for that reason.

Third, having referred in my letter to the fact that space weapons and offensive nuclear arms are "inherently related," I was struck by your statement that "there is an organic, and I would say, objective relationship between these issues." I believe it will be important, as we proceed, to seek better understanding of precisely how they are related, in order to permit productive negotiations.

George Shultz will go to Geneva prepared to negotiate a mutual understanding on the subjects and objectives of follow-on negotiations. I therefore hope that the Geneva meeting will set in motion negotiations which will result in mutually acceptable agreements to begin reductions. This is a crucial first step toward the objective of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons and ultimately eliminating such weapons entirely. The Geneva meeting will begin the process. It must deal with procedural issues, but I believe it important that we also get down to real substance.

Secretary Shultz will have concrete ideas to present in Geneva. I hope that you share my view of the urgent need to focus on the substance of the critical issues to be covered, and that Foreign Minister Gromyko will be prepared to explain your own thinking on strategic and intermediate-range weapons and on outer space as well. I would envisage following up on the January session during subsequent meetings between our Foreign Ministers. This could assist us in moving the negotiations forward quickly.

I have recently designated Mr. Paul Nitze to work with George Shultz as he prepares for the meeting in Geneva. Depending on the results of the Geneva meeting, we might find that it would be useful for Mr. Nitze to meet periodically with a counterpart from your side to develop specific proposals or resolve problems in the various arms control negotiations underway at a given time. This is a

matter that can be discussed during the January meeting, but if you have any immediate thoughts on the idea, I would of course welcome them.

I hope that our agreement to begin arms control negotiations will have a favorable effect on our efforts to achieve progress in other areas of our relationship. As I noted in my letter of November 15, I think it could be useful for both our countries to establish a more intensive dialogue on regional issues, including regularized meetings at the policy level. Similarly, more active cooperation in the cultural, economic and scholarly fields, and to expand contacts between our peoples, would be of mutual benefit, and is worthy of our best efforts. In this latter connection, I am encouraged by the Soviet Union's expressed readiness to join with us in discussions designed to lead toward meetings of the joint commissions established under our bilateral cooperative agreements in the areas of agriculture, housing and the environment. And here I should say once again that steps by the Soviet Union to resolve outstanding problems in the humanitarian field could have a positive impact on our effort to improve relations in every other area.

In closing, let me state as strongly as I can my personal commitment to make the results we have agreed to seek as productive, as concrete and as beneficial as possible. I intend to give my personal attention to the arms control negotiations that our Foreign Ministers will seek to launch in Geneva. I will wish to use our correspondence to discuss particularly difficult issues with you, and I hope you will feel free to do the same.

Sincerely,

**Ronald Reagan** 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, USSR: General Secretary Chernenko (8491237). Secret. Burt forwarded a draft letter to Shultz on November 28; Matlock made some revisions. McFarlane forwarded the revised letter and a memorandum from Shultz to Reagan on December 7. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984) According to an information memorandum to Shultz on December 7, Burt delivered the letter for Chernenko to Sokolov later that afternoon. (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984–12/07/1984))
- <sup>2</sup> See footnote 5, Document 315.
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 308</u>.
- $^{5}$  See <u>Documents 286</u>, <u>287</u>, and <u>288</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> On December 5, Reagan announced: "At the recommendation of the Secretary of State, I have today asked Ambassador Paul Nitze to serve as adviser to the Secretary for the Geneva talks. Ambassador Nitze has a long history of distinguished service to his country, and I am very pleased that he has accepted." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1984, Book II, p. 1866*)
- <sup>2</sup> In a December 3 information memorandum to Shultz, Burt provided an assessment of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations and the agenda: "With careful development, the bilateral agenda can continue to provide a steady base for the relationship as we tackle more difficult problems in these other areas in the months to come." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 12, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (12/05/1984–12/07/1984))

## 329. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 8, 1984

I attended several lengthy meetings today with the Secretary and our State Department working group on the upcoming Geneva arms control talks. The group is composed of Paul Nitze, who has been named as the Secretary's special adviser and who will be attending the talks with him, as well as Mike Armacost, Rick Burt, and Tack Chain. We went over several papers that had been prepared, primarily by Nitze, on the relationship of offense and defense, which is rapidly becoming the key idea behind a new approach to arms control.<sup>2</sup> The Secretary is obviously trying to build on two ideas of the President's. The first is that it would be desirable to do away entirely with nuclear weapons. The second is that the way to get there is through a strong defense, namely the SDI program. These are radical ideas in view of the fact that deterrence. and specifically mutual assured deterrence, has been the reigning doctrine since the advent of intercontinental nuclear weapons.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on December 10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> For the final version of Nitze's paper see <u>Document 343</u>.

## 330. Paper Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency 1

SOVM-84-10200X

Washington, December 10, 1984

Assessment of a Recent Unofficial Soviet Statement on Defense Spending SUMMARY

[4½ lines not declassified] knowledgeable Soviet officials—albeit probably not privy to the tightly held actual cost data—are concerned about the impact of the defense burden on the overall Soviet economy. Neither official gave precise figures, instead they couched their statements in terms of general orders of magnitude. Consequently, it is impossible to compare directly our estimates of Soviet defense costs with the number they implied. Moreover, the wording used [less than 1 line not declassified] leads us to believe he intended a broad definition of defense burden that would include the costs of activities indirectly supporting defense and not counted in our conventional estimates of Soviet defense spending. [portion marking not declassified]

[Omitted here is the remainder of the paper.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (12/05/84-12/16/84); NLR-748-25A-43-8-4. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Prepared in the Defense Spending Branch, Econometric Analysis Division, Office of Soviet Analysis. Reagan initialed the paper on December 12, indicating he saw it. In an undated handwritten cover note to Poindexter, Matlock wrote: "The attached analysis is worth a quick glance, since it deals with an interesting

comment by a Soviet 'scholar' which would indicate that the CIA may have been *underestimating* the real impact on the Soviet economy of the Soviet defense effort. I have personally long thought that this was the case, and that the Agency, relying greatly on Soviet *published statistics*, underestimated the real impact. Since much of the latter is *qualitative*, it is difficult to quantify in the statistical terms the Agency uses. Jack." Poindexter wrote in the margin: "Thanks. I gave this report to the President yesterday. I agree with you. JP." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (2/5)

## 331. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, December 10, 1984, 2-3 p.m.

**SUBJECT** 

Discussion of Geneva Format and SDI (S)

**PARTICIPANTS** 

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

JCS:

ADM J.D. Watkins

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, U.S. INF DELEGATION Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, U.S. START DELEGATION Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II

#### Minutes

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, noting that we had discussed previously U.S. objectives for Geneva and our defense program as well as Soviet objectives and their program.<sup>2</sup> Today we would be getting down to specifics concerning the first of two baskets of outcomes, namely, what do we want in the way of continuous negotiations. The second basket, substance, will be dealt with next Monday when we go over the nuts and bolts of START, INF, ASAT, etc.<sup>3</sup> The paper for today's discussion presents six options on format although these options can be reduced to a number of guestions. 4 Do we want separate START and INF negotiations or should they be merged? What shall we do about Space—negotiations or discussions only? Should Space issues be dealt with separately or merged with START and INF? Should we combine everything together in one large negotiation, perhaps having separate working groups? How do we deal with the objectives of Umbrella discussions? Should we view these as "Umbrella Talks" or perhaps "Stability" talks? In discussing format, we must remember that the US/Soviet announcement gives us some guidance. 5 The meeting in Geneva is to set the subject and objectives and we should remember that we and the Soviets have agreed to the "new negotiations" in general terms. In the short term, our objective is reduction of offensive nuclear arms. Our long term objective is the elimination of nuclear weapons. (S/S)

The *President* interjected: Yes, that's right. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane continued, noting that we would discuss the significance of SDI after our discussion of format. Turning to Option 1 (separate START and INF and Space discussions only), Mr. McFarlane noted the advantages and disadvantages. As advantages, Mr. McFarlane noted that

Option 1 would not reward the Soviets for their walkout, could build upon established delegations, would be easier, would be better for Allied consultations, and would give us an opportunity to exchange views without committing to negotiations on Space. As a disadvantage, Mr. McFarlane noted that it would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and would draw charges of bad faith, perhaps even a walkout because the Soviet Union is under the impression that we had agreed to new negotiations which include Space negotiations. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that we should take the Options one at a time and noted that he didn't think that Option 1 would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. The *President* asked Secretary Shultz his view. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz responded that the Soviet Union would be upset if there were no space negotiations at all. Indeed, they believe that that is what we had agreed to. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that we can deal with Space but we must look out for preconditions, especially moratoria. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz said that we need to consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might walk out of these talks and we must consider our response. He added that he would hate to go to the meeting having to reach an agreement—we should avoid a walkout but be prepared to try again if we don't reach an agreement. (S/S)

The *President* noted that Chernenko and Gromyko had quoted his words supporting the goal of the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. *Mr. McFarlane* noted they have agreed to negotiation on "nuclear and space arms." First of all, they have agreed to negotiations and we must

hold them to that. Second, this includes negotiations on space arms. (S/S)

The *President* asked if, on space arms, we couldn't discuss only offensive and not defensive arms. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that it is important to talk about the relationship of offensive and defensive arms but that ASAT could be defined so broadly that SDI would be impossible. The *President* asked again whether we could oppose the offensive systems that attack satellites while protecting defensive systems. *Secretary Weinberger* responded that we should discuss all of these issues but we must recognize that the Soviet Union will call for a moratorium on ASAT in order to undercut SDI and our efforts to get reductions in offensive systems. He reminded everyone that the Soviet Union has an ASAT system whereas the United States does not. (S/S)

Director Adelman raised three problems with an ASAT moratorium: first, any SDI deployment would be an ASAT, therefore, SDI research could be hurt; second, the Soviet Union has an ASAT already tested; and third, ASAT arms control involves extremely difficult verification and defense issues, all of which means that the Soviet Union will retain an ASAT capability. He concluded that there are not many areas in space arms control in which we want to negotiate. The real incentive for Space talks comes from publics, Allies, and in providing trade-off incentives to the Soviets. (S/S)

The *President* noted that we don't need SDI if the Soviet Union agrees to zero except for security because of verification uncertainties. The *President* then suggested that we move on to the other options. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane recommended that the discussion move directly to Option 4 which deals with the question of START and INF merger and provides a negotiating forum for space. He noted that a START and INF merger has been finessed in our discussions of Umbrella Talks. The disadvantages of a merger are that it makes negotiations more complex, could result in undue influence by the Allies in negotiations less central to their interests, and might permit the Soviets to divide us from our Allies through proposals to trade off START and INF issues. (S/S)

The *President* stated that the Soviet Union cannot justify not counting the SS-20. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger responded that with a merger, the Soviet Union would focus more on the British and French systems. He noted that the SS-20 is mobile and with the removal of just one of its warheads, could strike the U.S. Secretary Weinberger sought to turn the discussion to Option 5, a combined negotiation, noting that it was complex and might bring great pressure on defensive systems. (S/S)

The *President* returned to discussion of INF, noting that the Soviets have warheads in Eastern Europe and that the Allies requested our deployments. (S/S)

*Mr. McFarlane* noted that under the Soviet definition of strategic systems, they consider our systems in Europe strategic, but do not consider their systems, which cannot hit the U.S., strategic. The *President* responded by pointing out that the P-II is really for our Allies. *Director Adelman* noted that the SS-20s were not, in fact, in Eastern Europe but could reach all of Europe, that SS-12s, 22s, and 23s (*sic*) have been moved into Eastern Europe. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz added that the SS-20 was a terrific weapon, that we need to deal with these issues and that we need to manage our Allies. The *President* told Secretary Shultz that he should be on guard for what the Soviets want and what we want. Secretary Shultz responded that substance and procedure are interrelated. He noted that the Soviet Union has many advantages in offensive systems and that those advantages are unlikely to diminish. Soviet forces are destabilizing and threatening and we need to get some limitations on that threat. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that, therefore, we cannot exclude SS-20s. The *President* asked whether or not there was a consensus on Option 4, perhaps going in with Option 2. *Secretary Shultz* responded that Options 2, 4 and 5 are similar and that they involve Space negotiations and would inevitably involve separate working groups. *Secretary Shultz* noted that Option 2 and Option 5 would be quite similar as long as there is someone over all to deal with all the questions and make tradeoffs. (S/S)

Ambassador Rowny agreed that there was much to be said for opening with Option 2 and then having Option 4 as our fallback position. Secretary Weinberger said that Options 5 and 6 would be difficult to manage, stressing that we need to find out what the Soviet Union wants. He believes that formal negotiations are acceptable but we need tight rules. Ambassador Rowny noted that Gromyko would bring his START representative, Ambassador Karpov and Deputy Obukhov, but not anyone from INF. Secretary Weinberger said the question is do we want to deal with procedure only or do we have to deal with substance. (S/S)

Admiral Watkins stated that the Chiefs were united in the view that we should keep space negotiations separate because Option 5 would give the Soviets too much of a

handle on SDI. The Chiefs could support a merger such as Option 4 but would prefer to keep START and INF separate. We should consider a procedure merger before a merger on substance. (S/S)

Director Casey stressed that we must protect our intelligence assets and the Soviet ASAT talks present a specific danger for sensitive sources and methods. He noted that during the talks in Helsinki in 1979 and 1980 (sic), special rules were established including no use of non-secure phones and no post-plenary sessions. He noted that Ambassador Buchheim had carefully protected U.S. intelligence interests. He added that SDI should be dealt with in the offensive negotiations. (S/S)

Director Adelman agreed with this point and with the suggestion that we go in with Option 2 because of the concern over complexities and Allied consultations, but Option 4 is acceptable. He believes that Umbrella Talks should continue at the Foreign Ministers level. He stressed that the Soviets had mentioned "medium range" systems in their proposal and this means that we can hold them to this. (S/S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that we need Umbrella Talks to discuss what Heads of State had agreed, namely, that there is an organic relationship between offense and defense and other issues. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger interjected that discussion of these organic relationships was mainly something we needed to do internally. (S/S)

The *President* interjected that we need talks which can eliminate suspicions, noting that he is willing to admit that the USSR is suspicious of us. (S/S)

*Mr. McFarlane* noted that our presentation for the January 7 meeting must include a discussion of offense and defense and how to achieve a more stable world in the future. Both sides must reconsider the postwar history of strategic defense. We must explain the role of defense, both to the publics and to the Soviets. We must discuss why we agreed in the past to mutual vulnerability; namely because we had no other option and because we lacked confidence in defense. That is why the ABM Treaty constrained defense. Our view then was that vulnerability was not only desirable but that basic assumption would reduce pressures to insure offensive arms. In SALT I, we expected a limitation on offensive arms that would leave both sides vulnerable to counter city attacks but not vulnerable to first strike counter-military attacks. Instead the Soviet Union has invested heavily in achieving a first strike capability and has worked on improving defenses as well. Not only were our assumptions wrong, but circumstances have changed and now technologies are available to increase the possibilities of defense. We must review the foundations of our thinking, indeed, we may be where the Russians were 15 years ago, looking at defense. (S/S)

Director Adelman noted that the Soviet Union is not abiding by the ABM Treaty. Adelman again suggested that we go in with Option 2 and fall back to Option 4 with Secretary Shultz continuing general discussion at the Foreign Ministers' level. Secretary Weinberger agreed. (S/S)

The *President* noted that life in the U.S. was too good for anyone to consider starting a war and joked that he hoped life doesn't get so boring in Russia that they would consider starting a war. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger stressed that we must focus on reducing offensive systems and reminded everyone that the ABM Treaty was supposed to make it unnecessary for the massive Soviet buildup in offensive systems. (S/S)

The *President* agreed that there should have been reductions in weapons in conjunction with the ABM Treaty. Secretary Weinberger added that now there had been a breakthrough in defense technology and that we have moved away above the old systems of defense that were 50% effective and ground based. The *President* interjected that we are now talking about non-nuclear systems. Secretary Weinberger said that we are talking about non-nuclear systems that are very popular because people can understand about destroying weapons and not people. (S/S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that even if we had never heard of SDI, we would have had a problem—the American people don't like land-based missiles and this presents a military problem. We need another solution other than simply building up land-based missiles. (S/S)

The *President* turned to Secretary Shultz and said that he wanted to make sure that Shultz had the Brezhnev quotation from Prague in which he said that because of detente, by 1985 the Soviet Union would have their way in the world. They were wrong. *Secretary Shultz* agreed. (S/S)

The *President* noted that the situation today is like a duel between two gunfighters. Our policy of MAD could get us both killed. It is just too dangerous. The President added, however, that that is the situation today and asked whether or not deterrence would be strengthened if we told the Soviet Union that we would not wait out an attack. *Director Casey* suggested that that was what the Soviet Union would say. *Director Adelman* noted that all warning

systems would have to be fool-proof. *Mr. Meese* said that is if you are talking about launch on warning (LOW), but what we are talking about is launch under verified attack (LUVA) which is quite a different thing. (S/S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the Soviets know that this might be an appropriate response. Director Adelman quoted Paul Nitze in saying that this was a policy of weakness, a policy that we would adopt only if we were driven to it. Mr. McFarlane raised the question of whether attack assessment capabilities were sufficient for a LUVA policy and concluded that we would meet on Monday on the specifics of the negotiations. (S/S)

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/15/1984 (2). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared by Lehman. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
- <sup>2</sup> See Documents 323 and 326.
- $\frac{3}{2}$  December 17.
- 4 The paper was not found attached to any of the preparatory materials for the December 10 NSPG meeting. However, in a December 9 memorandum to McFarlane, Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman wrote: "We have received the revised version of the SACG 'format issues' paper for Monday's NSPG. General Chain has circulated it through SACG members to the NSPG principals for their reading prior to the meeting." Attached to this memorandum were talking points for McFarlane's use during the meeting, which note: "the paper examines six alternative formats: Separate START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; —Separate negotiations on START, INF and Space; —Merged START and INF negotiations and discussions only on Space issues; —Merged START and INF

negotiations and separate formal negotiations on Space; — Merger of all three subjects (START, INF and Space) into one formal negotiation; and —Continuation of Umbrella Talks—overarching discussions from which individual negotiations could be spun off later when appropriate." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/09/1984-12/11/1984))

- <sup>5</sup> See footnote 6, Document 314.
- <sup>6</sup> As several different U.S.-Soviet negotiations were ongoing at that time in Helsinki, Casey's reference is unclear.
- <sup>7</sup> Robert W. Buchheim served as U.S. Commissioner on the U.S.-Soviet Standing Consultative Commission from 1977 to 1981.

## 332. Memorandum for the Record by Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council Staff 1

Washington, December 13, 1984

SUBJECT Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, Lehman Conversation

Following the December 10 NSPG,<sup>2</sup> Paul Nitze indicated that Secretary Shultz wanted me to join in on a meeting with Bud. Shultz began describing a concept for dealing with Geneva. The basis of his concept which he called the "Christmas Tree" was to begin with general discussions which would lead to the formation of branches. Shultz indicated that Nitze had prepared a short paper on the basic presentation and asked Bud to take a look at it. Nitze noted that it was the same paper that he had given me earlier. I responded that it was similar in focus to ideas which Bud and I had discussed. Nitze said that this was because it had been my idea and that he had simply fleshed out what I had told him. I responded that it was close to our thinking but that there were some problems with the approach.

Shultz added that we need a program for dealing with the Allies and Congress and we need a Public Diplomacy strategy. We need to know in advance what we will say in Geneva to the press. Shultz had wanted to take Nitze to Europe with him for consultations but it was more important for him to stay here with Jack Chain to complete the work that must be done. Shultz indicated that Nitze had been talking with various officials around town and he hoped that by working with Cap and the Chiefs, we could get a consensus. Bud responded that would be very constructive and that the whole purpose of the SACG was

to make certain that everyone was heard and that we could draw from best ideas. Bud noted that we were working on clear decisions on objectives for Geneva and instructions which set boundaries on what should and should not be done. Such instructions should be to the President by January 1. We will have to deal both with format and with substance to include tradeoffs and incentives. We need to know how and when to deal with Shultz' proposals.

Shultz indicated that the magnitude of Soviet buildup provides us with major incentives to reduce and with respect to START and INF, mutual threats provided them an incentive to come back to the talks, however, we have more incentives to come back than they do. The Soviets have studied defense longer than we have. Shultz could imagine a very good defense compatible with little offense but we have to reduce the offense otherwise we could never do defense. The President was correct in pointing out the value of new technology but if we are not careful, SDI will only encourage the Soviets to build up in ways that we cannot match. SDI also doesn't address defense of their airbreathing systems. I responded that possible high leverage defenses could permit the defense to negate even very large forces. Shultz said that could be true but that in Geneva, we need to find a way to present SDI that doesn't exacerbate the problem. He indicated that he thought Paul's paper could do that by focusing on immediate and long term goals that would protect R&D but not deployments. I responded that we must be very careful with such phasing because it could result in undercutting the SDI program. I thought we could work these problems if we were careful but we must not lose sight of our objectives. Bud commented that I should work with Paul to improve the paper. Attached is a copy of Paul's draft with my immediate comments.3

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum for the record is unsigned. In a covering memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "Attached for your information is a Memorandum for the Record of our conversation with Paul Nitze with a copy of his paper that I have annotated."

<sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 331</u>.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{3}{2}$  The attached paper is a draft; the final version is printed as  $\frac{1}{2}$  Document  $\frac{3}{2}$ .

# 333. Memorandum From Ronald Lehman of the National Security Council to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) (McFarlane)

Washington, December 13, 1984

SUBJECT Conversations with Paul Nitze

During a discussion of Geneva formats,<sup>2</sup> Paul Nitze indicated to me that he could serve for only three or four days every few months and for that reason, would not be able to head a permanent combined negotiation. He admitted that Shultz favored Option 5,<sup>3</sup> a combined negotiation, but pointed out that Shultz had not objected during the last NSPG when the President noted that there seemed to be something of a consensus to go in with Option 2 (3 different talks) and fall back to 4 (merge Start and INF and have a different space negotiation). Nitze said that Shultz's reluctance may have been related to the difficulty of finding someone to head the combined talks. Nitze made clear that, because of his wife's health, he would not be available. He believes that he has made that very clear to Secretary Shultz and to you.

Nitze had met with Ken Dam to review a list of possible candidates for formal space talks. Paul flashed the list in front of me pointing out that no one was satisfied completely with anyone on the list. Some of the names had checks by them, but it was not clear what that meant. He noted specifically that Ed Rowny is supported by the President, but was not on the list. Paul noted that Bill Hyland was on the list, but considered very far down (no

check), and that Larry Eagleburger was on the list but "uncertain" (no check). Bob Buchheim had been ruled out for health reasons.

Beyond that, the names I can remember are John Tower (check?); Warren Zimmermann, former DCM in Moscow (check); Roger Kirk, FSO (check); Mike Glitman, MBFR (check); John Woodworth, OSD representative to INF (check); Brent Scowcroft (check); General Lew Allen, Ken Adelman (check); Jim Goodby, CDE (?); Dave Emery (check); Hal Sonnenfeldt (check), Johnny Foster, TRW (?); Bob Plunkett, Hughes Aircraft; General William Y. Smith (?); and about five others. Paul noted that my name was on the list, and I saw that there was a check by it.

I pointed out to Paul that option 5, more than with options 1 through 4, requires a very distinguished negotiator, someone of his stature. Again, he responded adamantly that his wife's health would not permit it. This may explain in part why he has not been pressing for early establishment of formal negotiations. His own participation is enhanced, absent his ability to chair formal negotiations, by continuation of the talks at the ministerial level because this is likely to be periodic rather than continuous.

Prior to my private discussion with Paul, Bob Linhard and I joined Paul and Jack Chain in a discussion of Paul's Offense/Defense paper. We offered a few changes having to do with leak-proofing it on the issue of the circumstances under which we might "strike the first blow," and offered to send further changes over in writing (Tab A).<sup>5</sup>

We then had a discussion of some basic substantive questions which Paul and his group had not answered. We pointed out to Paul that the Soviets are not opposed to defense, or even ABMs, per se. Rather they are focusing on space which gives them a handle on our ASAT and key SDI elements such as boost-phase kill and exoatmospheric intercept, while not interfering with their predominately ground-based BMD. I pointed out to Paul that it is the Soviet Union, not the United States, which is now in the best position to break out of the ABM Treaty. Citing the Beecher interview, I noted while it is imperative that we link offense to defense, there is a possibility that the Soviets might be willing to agree to expanded ground-based BMD, as long as space-based BMD research were further restricted. Clearly, it is the space-based technologies which give us the most military and negotiating leverage and it is in space that we can most easily compete with the Soviet Union.

((Note: Paul has himself indicated that he falls into that school which is most comfortable with ground-based systems and once said to me that he thought we might look at temporary limitations on space systems in order to reach agreement with the Soviet Union. It was for that reason that Bob and I thought it wise to stress the importance of protecting space options in order to protect the President's vision and US leverage.))

I explained to Paul that while it is likely that the Soviet Union would attack SDI as a threat to the ABM Treaty, it was not at all implausible that the Soviets might offer, at some point in our negotiations, a compromise designed to exploit differences within the US. I gave a hypothetical example. While it is wise for us to address the offense/defense relationship by talking near-term versus far-term, with the near-term focus on compliance and limiting offensive arms and the long-term focusing on transition to defense, the Soviets could give us a package which does that in a way harmful to SDI. Suppose for example the Soviets said that for the near-term both sides

will agree to tighten up the ABM Treaty to include much tighter restrictions on space R&D contained in a protocol that would expire in 1990, and a commitment not to deploy nation-wide or space systems contained in a protocol which would expire in the year 2000. Furthermore, suppose that they agree that we should re-establish in the near-term the relationship between offense and defense, as called for in the ABM Treaty, but require that we do it not by any significant reductions in existing offensive forces, but rather by increasing ground-based defenses of limited areas such as capitals and ICBM fields. Their approach to the Krasnoyarsk radar compliance question would then be to make it legal as part of an expanded ABM deployment made legal by amendment to the treaty. Such a proposal would look very attractive to those in the US who want to get us started with interim defenses, especially the ICBMs. However, it could work against the US in a number of ways. First, it is the Soviet Union, not the United States which is in the best position for near-term, ground-based ABM deployments. Second, effective use of BMD for ICBM survivability requires an MX and could be helped by improved basing modes not yet available. Third, keeping offensive forces at high levels is easier for the USSR than for the US and reduces the usefulness of ground-based BMD to us. Fourth, such a package would simply result in diverting funds and political support away from the high technology approaches to defense in which we excel, and push us toward the need for more traditional BMD deployments which are both expensive and politically controversial.

Bob Linhard was very successful in reminding Paul of the different legal and social problems we face with respect to land-based deployments of anything. He noted that political guerilla warfare and socio-environmental challenges stand in the way of any extensive deployment of small mobile

missiles or ground-based BMD. This does not mean that we cannot do such things, but it does mean that it is important to us to avoid placing ourselves at a competitive disadvantage during the transition to defense.

I pass all of this on to you simply because I know you have given a great deal of thought to these issues and may be faced with near-term decisions that have enormous impact on the future. We remain available to talk to you about these and other issues.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/13/1984. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. McFarlane wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "Good work Ron."
- <sup>2</sup> See Document 332.
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 4, Document 331.
- 4 In a personal note on December 12, Dam wrote: "I had an interesting luncheon today with Paul Nitze and Jim Timbie to go over ideas about negotiators for the upcoming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union and to discuss Nitze's general philosophy with respect to arms control negotiations. Nitze's main substantive point was that he was opposed to interim agreements, or indeed even a permanent agreement, that did not go all the way that we wanted to go in achieving reductions. His view is that the United States made a very serious mistake in entering into the offensive weapons interim agreement in 1972 and we should not make that mistake again. In fact, he went so far as to argue that SALT II was defective in large measure because the 1972 agreement left us in a position of inequality." (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985)

- <sup>5</sup> See <u>Document 343</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> William Beecher, "Soviet Softening on Arms is Seen," *Boston Globe*, October 25, 1984.

# 334. Minutes of a National Security Planning Group Meeting $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, December 17, 1984, 11 a.m.-noon

SUBJECT

Discussion of Substantive Issues for Geneva (S)

**PARTICIPANTS** 

The President

The Vice President

The Vice President's Office:

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy

STATE:

Secretary George P. Shultz

OSD:

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger

CIA:

Director William J. Casey

JCS:

General John W. Vessey, Jr.

ACDA:

Director Kenneth Adelman

CHAIRMAN, US INF DELEGATION:

Ambassador Paul H. Nitze

CHAIRMAN, US START DELEGATION: Ambassador Edward Rowny

OMB:

Alton Keel

WHITE HOUSE:

Mr. Edwin Meese, III

Mr. James Baker

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane

NSC:

Dr. Ronald F. Lehman II

#### **Minutes**

Mr. McFarlane opened the meeting, noting that it was one of four or five meetings in preparation for the Geneva talks in January. Previous meetings had dealt with US objectives and Soviet objectives and the format of the talks. The last meeting dealt with questions of whether to keep START, INF and Space issues separate, or whether to merge all or some of them. Today we would be dealing with a discussion of the substantive content of the Geneva talks, to include START, INF, Space, and the relationship between offense and defense. Our immediate objective is to set into motion formal negotiations and discuss the relationship between offense and space generally. The Soviet Union will try to prevent US SDI research and will urge various moratoria. They will seek to get commitments from us in advance not to develop SDI. The question before us, therefore, is how to sustain SDI, especially with publics, in the face of sustained pressure from both the Soviet Union and the Congress. Thus, the Soviet Union is returning to the talks because they have seen the success we have had in getting through the President's modernization program, including MX, TRIDENT, and SDI. They also have come back to the table to block the Belgian and Dutch INF deployments. They expect to block those deployments by being at the negotiating table. They believe that there is an impulse on the Left, perhaps in the Congress, to stop programs and have a moratorium, as long as the superpowers are talking. They fear that the deployments will upset the talks. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to the specific recommendations, recalling that in START we have sought deep reductions to the level of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads and to stress movement away from destabilizing systems, particularly emphasizing the importance of slow-flying systems such as bombers, as opposed to fast-flying

ballistic missiles. He noted that in the past year we have done an enormous amount of work and that in Geneva we may wish to be in a position to discuss the trade-offs between areas of US and areas of Soviet advantage, i.e., between fast-flying and slow-flying systems. He noted that Ambassador Rowny has done much work in this regard. For Geneva, Secretary Shultz will need instructions which permit him to discuss our ideas on trade-offs. (S)

Mr. McFarlane then turned to a discussion of INF. Again, he raised the question of the Belgian and Dutch deployments and the important role that Ambassador Nitze has played. Mr. McFarlane noted that we have a solid position and that we are prepared to agree to any number between zero and 572. He noted that our current proposal has demonstrated our flexibility in our readiness not to deploy our complete entitlement under an equal global ceiling in Europe. In agreeing to reduce both P-II and GLCM, and in our willingness to discuss aircraft limitations, these all addressed Soviet concerns. (S)

Mr. McFarlane made clear that the most difficult issue would be space. There is a close relationship between ASAT and SDI research; unfortunately, we have had the statements by Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Mitterrand in France accusing us of over-arming and of needing to avoid the space arms race. He noted that both France and Great Britain have independent nuclear deterrence based on SLBMs and they are afraid that SDI will be viewed as negating their independent forces. There is a genuine ignorance of what SDI is all about. He reminded everyone of the importance of stressing our interest in a non-nuclear system. We need to make the case for SDI not only to our Allies but to the American people and to the Russians themselves. He noted that we have been living under a concept of deterrence based on the threat of massive

offensive retaliation. For twelve years, really longer than that, this concept of deterrence has continued, but has been influenced by certain assumptions which are no longer true. First is the assumption that we can't build effective defenses. The second was the notion that if we agreed to limit defensive systems, we would be able to get limitations on offensive systems. The third was an assumption that the Soviet Union would limit their defensive systems as well. Fourth, there was a commitment that neither side would seek unilateral advantage over the other. However, that commitment has been violated by the Soviet Union in a guest for both offensive and defensive superiority. In defense they have continued to modernize their ABM system and air defense system; indeed, two of their air defenses, the SA-10 and the SA-12, may be dualcapable. They have also built an ASAT system. Therefore, it is imperative that we make the case that Soviets have violated these basic premises and therefore they must reduce offensive systems or else we will have no choice but to deploy defenses. In addition, however, we must persuade the Soviet Union that it is good to deploy defense, to move away from our total reliance on offensive systems. We must recognize that the Soviet Union will not take easily to this view, so we must show them that we are headed in the right direction. He indicated that we all agree on the necessity of putting down a marker on SDI. He concluded that in the next week or two we would be making decisions on the substantive issues. (S)

The President interjected at this point. He wanted to put something forward without pride of authorship concerning what had been said by Mitterrand on outer space. The President had been reading what Gorbachev and Thatcher had been saying. The President stated his belief that the US and USSR should join in discussions of ASAT and weapons in space that can be directed at earth, such as

nuclear weapons. His goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and he believes that we are not saying anything that they have not also said recently. He noted that SDI is the main target of the Soviet Union in Geneva. He stated his belief that they are coming to the table to get at SDI, and that we need to stay with our SDI research program no matter what. He stated his belief that international control for world protection might be possible at some point with SDI, and that SDI would help alleviate the dangers associated with the impossible job of verification. He noted, for example, that someone like Qadhafi could develop nuclear weapons and perhaps smuggle them into the United States. Therefore, he said, we would need a wide range of measures to handle the threat of a covert nuclear weapon, to ensure that outlaws or other nations cannot gain advantage. He noted that people now understand how to build nuclear weapons and that you cannot make mankind unlearn what it already knows. He referenced the test flight recently of an SS-X-24 with ten warheads. He again emphasized that there is no price on SDI and we must be frank with the Soviet Union on the need to go down the path towards defense, to eliminate nuclear weapons, but clearly we are not going to give up SDI. (S)

Secretary Shultz agreed that defense is important and added that it is important even if you don't have the elimination of nuclear weapons. He even cited an example where nuclear weapons are eliminated but conventional systems exist. He noted that we must also deal with cruise missiles and bomber defenses and expand our program beyond the current SDI effort. He reminded everyone that he had just spent 2½ hours with British Foreign Minister Geoffrey Howe and that Howe had the same views as Mrs. Thatcher. Nevertheless, he indicated that his meeting with NATO Foreign Ministers had gone extremely well and that

he had used the formula that Paul Nitze had developed.<sup>5</sup> He was confident that we would have no difficulty in persuading people of the value of SDI if we put the right twist on it, as he had done at NATO, where he said that nobody gave him a counter-argument. The Secretary welcomed Bud's emphasis on public diplomacy and noted that we have agreed on a forum which includes ASAT and weapons in space. He noted that there is an overlap between ASAT and SDI, and this means we must be careful. He noted also that Geneva is going to be a public diplomacy event, whether we like it or not. Some one thousand reporters are expected to be there along with the anchor people from the three networks. The State Department reporters are very unhappy because they will not now be the primary reporters for their news services. Shultz's view is that there actually will not be much of a story for them in Geneva because we will hope to keep some element of confidentiality. He noted that we must be prepared that the meeting may break up, and we must be ready, right there immediately, to deal with this situation. We need to sound an appealing note to protect ourselves from a possible Soviet walkout. Therefore, we need to lay out our position guite clearly. It must have content, and we must go beyond a "bull session." He recognized that there is a lot of content in the area of offensive systems negotiations, but also that there is content in the space area. He agreed that it is important to bring up the issue of how we will be evolving towards defenses. We must go out and make clear our position. (S)

The President interjected that we must stress that in a context of the Soviets' having already said that they want to give up nuclear weapons, if they walk-out of Geneva because of SDI, we can emphasize that they are not serious. We must be prepared to make clear to the American people that this is a system which does not kill

people; that it would free the world from the threat of nuclear weapons. Again, he stressed the importance of SDI to deal with the problem of verification and again noted that SDI could be put in international hands to protect the whole world. He stated his belief that the Soviet Union will have difficulty walking out when we have made a sound case. (S)

Secretary Shultz suggested that we should not assume failure; that would only lead to failure. Instead, we need to look at our position so that we are not afraid of failure. (S)

Director Casey noted that we must be ready nevertheless for the prospect that they will put us on the defensive and even walk out. (S)

Secretary Shultz responded that we have the basis for avoiding that possibility if we make the right decisions. (S)

Mr. McFarlane noted that there is in existence a public diplomacy plan being prepared by the NSC staff and that the central element is the so-called SDI bible. This book would be available within a couple of weeks and would be made public before the negotiations in Geneva. He added that public speaking engagements will help us in our effort to promote SDI and that the President should give a speech on SDI sometime after the Geneva talks and address it in the State of the Union message as well. Mr. McFarlane said that it was important that everyone get out on the stump to speak for SDI. (S)

*Mr. Meese* indicated that we must distance the space issue from the SDI issue, that they are not the same, and that the President's idea is not simply a space question. (S)

The President added that we are looking to see what these technologies can do. (S)

Mr. Baker indicated that there was confusion about SDI along the lines which had been discussed that morning. (S)

Secretary Weinberger stated that there is confusion about SDI because many people have not examined the issue carefully and because of the Soviet disinformation campaign. He stressed that ours would be a non-nuclear system. He noted that we don't have SDI technology available yet, but we need to work on it. Some people say that it is expensive, but Secretary Weinberger expressed his view that it would not be as expensive as all of the offensive systems that we would need, absent SDI. It might cost one-tenth as much. Many people are not aware of the consequences of not having defenses. He believes that SDI is in the same position with respect to negotiations as was the Pershing-II. The Soviet Union fears it and will do everything they can to encourage delay and to try to stop the program. Instead we have to make the case that SDI will even encourage reductions. (S)

The President indicated that he had been reading about the phenomenon of nuclear winter, and of the volcano Timbora which erupted in 1816, creating a cloud which created winter conditions—snow and ice—around much of the world there was no summer. Nuclear winter ought to encourage reductions. (S)

Director Adelman indicated that nuclear winter should also increase support for SDI. Also, SDI is important to prevent horrible consequences from an accidental war, such as described in the novel Fail-Safe. He agreed that it was important to distinguish SDI from space, and that we could do that by negotiating rules of behavior for anti-satellite

systems and satellites themselves. That gives something to us to negotiate about. Our theme would be that we need to make the world safer through the controlled use of space, that negotiations along these lines were better than doing nothing. He then noted that the Defense Department had generated some interesting statistics noting that since the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union has spent more money on defense than on offense, while the United States spent six times as much on offense as on defense. (S)

Mr. McFarlane interjected that we still don't have an ICBM in the ground. (S)

The President built on that theme, noting that many of those who are for the small ICBM now will turn against it after they have killed MX, when they hear complaints about missile trains and missile trucks moving around the United States. He can imagine what the environmental complaints would be. That is another reason why we must have SDI. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that the Soviet Union has the mobile SS-X-24 and SS-X-25, and that the Soviets have come close to stopping the mobile Pershing-IIs and GLCMs, and indeed have not given up trying to stop them. They are continuing to try to stop our MX system, despite the fact that they have three or four similar new missiles. He made clear that the Soviet Union will try to blame us for a breakup in the talks if we don't agree to give up SDI. He also said that we must be careful about ASAT. The Soviet Union has an ASAT system, and they are trying to prevent us from developing one. If we have a moratorium, our scientists will drift away from the project and we will become further and further behind. A moratorium is bad, and in any case, it is not verifiable. With respect to space, he said that we should take the affirmative position, that

we are going ahead with SDI and that we are not going to be stopped. He argued that we should be prepared to talk about permissible changes to the ABM Treaty and concluded by saying that there are worse things than signing a bad agreement, and that it is no victory to sign a bad agreement. (S)

The President interjected that he had been talking with a number of experts who are critical of SDI, and they all seem to think that it is a nuclear weapon. We need to explain to them that it is not a nuclear system we seek. (S)

Secretary Shultz questioned whether SDI was truly a non-nuclear program. (S)

Secretary Weinberger noted that certain types of terminal defense based on older technologies were still nuclear, but that he hoped to move beyond these. (S)

Director Adelman said that terminal defense could be nonnuclear but that the older systems were nuclear. (S)

Ambassador Nitze asked what about EXCALIBUR?<sup>8</sup> (S)

Secretary Shultz said that he had thought that some of these systems were nuclear. (S)

Secretary Weinberger said that the defenses against ballistic missile systems that were space-based were intended to be non-nuclear. (S)

Director Adelman noted that some of these space-based systems might be powered by nuclear reactors. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that we must stress that these are systems to defend the United States. He is often asked whether we are defending cities or weapons and his answer is that we are defending the United States by destroying the weapons. (S)

Ambassador Rowny noted that we are not talking about putting nuclear weapons in space, only nuclear reactors. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* stated that in fact that was not the case, that approximately \$200 million was in the DOE budget for EXCALIBUR, which involves a nuclear explosion in space. (S)

Secretary Weinberger responded that this was not the kill mechanism. (S)

*Mr. Meese* said that Secretary Shultz was correct, and that we did not want to prematurely limit the technologies involved. (S)

Secretary Shultz indicated that he had thought that there were nuclear weapons involved.

Secretary Weinberger said that what we were seeking is a non-nuclear system, i.e., non-nuclear kill. (S)

*Mr. McFarlane* indicated that we can describe the program as heavily focused on non-nuclear systems. (S)

*Secretary Weinberger* made clear that our theme must be to reduce offensive systems as we evolve towards defensive systems.

The President interjected and turned to Secretary Shultz, noting that we should get the Soviet Union to agree to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and then throw this commitment back at them if they stand in the way of strategic defenses. (S)

The President stated his desire to get this process of reductions going. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that we might make progress in INF towards reductions if we would begin with a proposal of equal reductions on each side. (S)

The President responded by noting that the Soviet Union had been continuing to build up their forces. (S)

Secretary Weinberger indicated that what we are in favor of is not equal reductions but reductions to equal levels, and asked Paul Nitze if he meant reductions to equal levels. (S)

Nitze responded that he indeed meant equal reductions. (S)

The President interjected that he thought proportional reductions were acceptable. (S)

The Vice President asked the President if he had not in fact proposed to Gromyko proportionate reductions. (S)

The President said that it seemed to him that if we were willing to live with 572 for us and over 1,000 for the Soviets, then we ought to be able to live without equal numbers on both sides. (S)

Mr. McFarlane commented that we are looking for a definition or approach that makes a compromise look better; e.g., the Pershing-II has one warhead on its launcher; the GLCM has four warheads on its launcher; and the SS-20 has three warheads on its launcher. We are looking for a formula which might describe an equal reduction in launchers that would also result in a equal warhead outcome. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that that was correct. (S)

The President stated his view that we needed to emphasize the idea of elimination of nuclear weapons and in the end, the zero option for INF would be a great step in that direction. (S)

Ambassador Nitze indicated that we may need to make specific proposals to the Soviet Union. It would be useful if we could make general statements, even if we don't present specific proposals. For example, we could say that we would accept in principle equal reductions even if we don't give them the details. (S)

Director Adelman made a similar point, arguing that we will need a response to charges that we are not serious about negotiating on space issues either. (S)

Secretary Shultz said that it is important that we not get into the lingo of simply protecting SDI; we need to word it in the right way, as, for example, Paul Nitze has suggested. He indicated that we need to find a way of defending SDI without appearing inflexible. (S)

The President interjected that whatever we do, we must be resolved among ourselves that SDI is not the price for reductions. (S)

Secretary Shultz noted that the problem of MIDGETMAN and railroad cars had made one thing clear, and that is that arms control is important to the United States. He stressed that we must reach arms control agreements because it is not clear that we can contemplate an unrestrained race with the Soviet Union. We need reductions and we need to trade for them; they won't come for free. (S)

Mr. McFarlane indicated that we would prepare instructions for a decision by the President over the next couple of weeks and that Mr. Casey would prepare a presentation on the problems of verification. (S)

*Director Casey* said that verification has been built up as an absolute, and we need to prepare public opinion for what it is that we are likely to achieve. (S)

The President concluded with a joke about an American in the Moscow subway who, when shown the beautiful marble work, asked, "Where are the trains?" He was given no answer but only more demonstrations of the beauty of the marble. Finally, after asking, "Where are the trains?" several times, his Soviet counterpart responded, "What about the Negro problem in the South?"

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/22/1984-12/27/1984. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. A set of handwritten notes of the meeting, likely Lehman's, are in the Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/14/84-12/20/84. Another set of handwritten notes of this meeting are in the Reagan Library, Fred Ikle Files—Arms Control, 1983-1985. In his diary entry for December 17, Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.P.G. meeting again on our negotiating posture in the upcoming meeting with Gromyko & the arms talks. I believe the Soviets have agreed to the talks only to head off our research on a strategic defense against nuc. wpns. I stand firm we cannot retreat on that no matter what they offer." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 408)  $\frac{2}{2}$  For previous NSPG meetings on preparations for the Geneva talks, see Documents 323, 326, and 331.

- <sup>3</sup> On December 18, the *New York Times* reported: "British spokesmen were quoted in some news reports this morning as saying that Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher shared the views of a high visiting Soviet official, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, that weapons in outer space should be banned. President Francois Mitterrand criticized the American program, calling it overarming, and said France supported talks to prevent the militarization of space." ("Reagan Confers on Arms Talks," Special to the New York Times, December 18, 1984, p. A1) Thatcher and Gorbachev met at Chequers on December 16. When Thatcher visited Reagan at Camp David on December 22, she reported to him her impressions of Gorbachev and the content of their meeting, as well as her ideas about SDI (see Document 337). In telegram 47853 from Paris, December 17, the Embassy reported on Mitterrand's December 16 television interview, in which he stated: "the West's goal should be to seek stability at the lowest possible level, and this US proposal" meaning SDI, "is moving in the opposite direction." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840806-0125)
- <sup>4</sup> Shultz recalled in his memoir: "On the way to the annual meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels, I stopped on December 11 at Chevening, the British Foreign Office's country estate in Surrey." He continued: "We arrived in the evening as fog enveloped the mansion. Geoffrey Howe welcomed me and soon squired me into the library, showing me an autographed first edition of Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and a note from Benjamin Franklin describing his stay at Chevening. My staff went to the nearby village for a pint at the local Frog and Bucket while Geoffrey and I reviewed Soviet affairs." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 506)
- <sup>5</sup> The morning of December 12, Shultz traveled from Chevening to Brussels to meet with the NATO Foreign

Ministers, where discussions of his upcoming meeting with Gromyko and U.S.-Soviet relations continued. In his memoir, he wrote: "I found the Europeans relieved that a U.S.-Soviet relationship was in the offing, but they revealed little confidence that we could make progress on any arms control initiative. SDI baffled them. I disagreed politely with my colleagues. I could sense that a new era in East-West relations was possible—not only because of the changes that we were inducing in the Soviet Union, and which their own foundering political and economic system was imposing on them, but because of the realities of the 'information age.' I outlined the U.S. approach to the Gromyko meeting, promised full consultation as we proceeded, and welcomed their advice. The communiqué stressed the allies' 'determination to continue [INF] deployments' in the absence of a 'concrete negotiated result' and welcomed the Gromyko meeting as part of an effort 'to bring about an improved East-West relationship.'" (Ibid.; brackets are in the original.)

<sup>6</sup> The White House released a pamphlet, "The President's Strategic Defense Initiative," on January 3, 1985. The full text is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, pp. 65-72.

- <sup>7</sup> Reference is to the 1962 novel by Eugene Burdick and Harvey Wheeler.
- <sup>8</sup> Excalibur was a vital component of the SDI research program. The April 1985 issue of the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* described it: "the most publicized third-generation program is the H-bomb-boosted X-ray laser, code-named 'Excalibur.' Part of Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, Excalibur has been most actively boosted by Edward Teller, who has been campaigning for defensive nuclear weapons for more than two decades. Excalibur—named, appropriately enough, after a mythical sword—is being crafted by Teller's protégés at Lawrence Livermore."

(David Morrison, "Energy Department's Weapons Conglomerate," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, April 1985, pp. 33–34)

# 335. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 21, 1984

SUBJECT Chernenko's Letter of December 20

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin came in this evening to give me another letter to you from Chairman Chernenko. As you will see from the attached Soviet Embassy translation, its tone is positive and it looks toward the Geneva meeting.

The main substantive point that emerges from the letter is the centrality of space arms control for making headway on arms control generally. Chernenko says that the "emergence and deployment of strike space systems would make it impossible to conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms." I noted to Dobrynin that both you and Chernenko now have talked about the desirability of eliminating nuclear weapons. I added that you take this issue seriously and said that if both sides agreed on this as their goal, this would create a new setting for arms control negotiations. Then I asked if Chernenko is serious about taking "radical steps" to eliminate nuclear weapons.

Dobrynin responded by saying "basically yes." He said the goal is clear, but the road will have to be charted by Gromyko and me in Geneva. He continued that this also raises the question of how the three aspects (space, INF, START) are going to be treated, in particular whether the U.S. is willing to negotiate on outer space or will continue to pursue its "cosmos phantasy."

You will also note in the letter that Chernenko says they are prepared to go ahead with talks on regional issues, and also agrees on the importance in moving ahead on bilateral issues in the relationship as well.

### Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Chernenko to President Reagan<sup>2</sup>

Dear Mr. President: Moscow, December 20, 1984

First of all I would like to express gratification with regard to the agreement reached between the USSR and USA to enter into negotiation on nuclear and outer space arms.

The meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko and George Shultz set for January 7–8 is to play an important role in putting these negotiations on track as a practical matter.

An opportunity is opening now both for the straightening out of Soviet-American relations and the improving of the international situation as a whole. This opportunity should not be lost.

Recently you have spoken on more than one occasion, also in your letters of November 16 and December  $7^3$  and earlier in your conversation with Andrei A. Gromyko, in favor of moving along the road leading eventually to the liquidation of nuclear weapons, completely and everywhere. We, of course, welcome that. The Soviet Union, as is known, as far back as the dawn of the nuclear age came out for prohibiting and liquidating such weapons. We also made specific proposals as to how it could be achieved. At that time, given the goodwill on the part of the

US, it would have been, of course, much easier, than it is now, to resolve the task of liquidating nuclear weapons. But even today it is not yet too late to start practical movement toward this noble objective.

To continue the accumulation of nuclear weapons, to multiply their types and kinds, to expand the arms race to new spheres—means moving away from the said objective rather than nearing it. What is required is different—to reduce on a mutual basis the nuclear weapons, to block securely all the channels of the arms race and to forego forever futile attempts to seek unilateral advantages.

The forthcoming new negotiations which will encompass both the issue of the non-militarization of outer space and the questions of the strategic arms and medium range nuclear systems in Europe, can and, we are convinced, must become a major step along this road. There exists between those weapons an organic relationship which requires to have a comprehensive approach to discussing and resolving the relevant issues.

In my letter to you of November  $17^5$  I noted the objective fact that the key link in this whole chain is the question of strike space weapons, and to be more precise, the question of neither side having such weapons. To be quite frank: emergence and deployment of strike space systems would make it impossible to conduct serious negotiations on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms.

What is involved here is precisely this kind of relationship between these issues. And I must say clearly that the statements coming from the White House, and in the most recent days, too, with respect to the intention to continue the implementation of the earlier announced space plans regardless of the negotiations, are not encouraging at all. Quite to the contrary.

It depends on the outcome of the Geneva meeting of the Ministers whether from the outset a constructive orientation will be given to the negotiations on nuclear and outer space arms. In other words, whether they will be given correct guidelines in the form of an agreed understanding of the subject and objectives of those negotiations.

Andrei A. Gromyko will be prepared to conduct a substantive discussion with Secretary of State George Shultz of all the questions pertaining to the task set before them. That will require, of course, addressing also the content, in principle, of those questions, while their detailed consideration will, naturally, be the task of the negotiations that will follow.

It is important that such negotiations begin without unjustified delays and without unnecessary intermediate stages, and the main thing is that both sides have constructive positions at the negotiations themselves. This is precisely our approach.

In connection with the thought contained in your letters, Mr. President, regarding the desirability of a more intensive dialogue between our two countries on regional problems, I would like to reaffirm that the Soviet Union is in favor of looking jointly for peaceful ways to a just resolution of the existing international, including regional, problems. Our countries can—we are convinced of that—interact with benefit for themselves and for other peoples, in the interests of removing the dangerous hotbeds of tension and of preventing the emergence of such new hotbeds in various regions of the world. In such context we

are prepared to exchange views at various levels both on the Middle East and other regional problems.

Quite consonant with our intentions is also your statement in favor of revitalizing bilateral Soviet-American relations, including the resumption of the work of the joint commissions on cooperation in various economic scientific and cultural fields, which were set up some time ago. So far only the first steps in this direction have been taken, but if the artificial obstacles which were put on this road are removed, such cooperation would be of practical benefit to both countries, and, which is no less important, would facilitate the improvement of the relations between them in the political field as well.

In conclusion I would like once again to express the confidence that there exist opportunities for a turn for the better in the relations between the USSR and the USA. To translate those opportunities into reality all that is necessary is to have the political will and realistic approach, the willingness to resolve all the issues in the spirit of equality and mutual account of the legitimate interests of the sides. It is all the more so when it comes to the building of confidence, lowering of the level of military confrontation, also in Europe, and, generally, cessation of the arms race and joint steps aimed at strengthening the peace.

Sincerely,

K. Chernenko

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents. Secret;

Sensitive. According to a December 21 covering memorandum from Burt to Shultz, the letter was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Palmer. A typed note indicates the package was "Delivered to WH Sit Room at 2100 hours per S/S."

- <sup>2</sup> No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The text of the letter, translated from Russian, was provided by the Soviet Embassy.
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>Documents 308</u> and <u>328</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Documents 286</u> and <u>287</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> See <u>Document 310</u>.

# 336. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Chernenko<sup>1</sup>

Dear Mr. Chairman: Washington, December 21, 1984

In response to your letter of November 16,<sup>2</sup> I want you to know that I, too, believe that an escalation of tension serves no one's interest and that such an escalation, if continued, would inevitably affect relations between our two countries.

Our policy toward Nicaragua is clear. We will not sit by idly while the Sandinista regime, aided by the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other states which maintain close relations with your country, provides materials and other support to insurgent and terrorist groups in the region. Neither can we and other countries whose interests are affected fail to be concerned by the massive and destabilizing amount of weaponry which Nicaragua itself has acquired or by the presence of large numbers of foreign military advisors. It is particularly clear that recent arms shipments to Nicaragua have exacerbated an already tense situation. The supply of advanced weaponry or large quantities of weapons gives Nicaragua a substantial offensive potential against its neighbors and constitutes a threat to peace in the area.

A subject of grave concern to us in recent weeks has, of course, been the question of combat aircraft for Nicaragua. As we have informed the Soviet Union on several occasions, the acquisition by Nicaragua of jet fighter aircraft would be unacceptable to the United States. I was therefore pleased to see from your letter that

malicious designs involving shipment of Soviet combat aircraft to Nicaragua are not part of Soviet policy, and welcome this clarification as a useful step forward in our relations.

I agree with you that the Nicaraguan people, as all people, must be given the opportunity to live in peace and exercise their inalienable rights. The Sandinista junta, therefore, owes it to its citizens and to the international community to fulfill the commitments which it undertook in its July 12, 1979, statement to the Organization of American States. It is unrealistic to expect other interested states to have full confidence in Nicaragua's intentions until those commitments are observed.

I wish to reaffirm to you my strong conviction that the Nicaragua problem should be resolved in the context of a negotiated settlement. The Contadora group of nations has defined the problems of the region and has made substantial progress in developing a treaty to meet these concerns. I applaud these efforts and give them my unqualified support. In the period ahead, we should know whether they will succeed. Much will depend on Nicaragua's willingness to moderate its behavior of the past five years. I am sure that you join me in the hope that the Contadora effort will bear fruit. It is clearly in both our interests to see reduction, rather than escalation of tensions in Central America.

Sincerely,

**Ronald Reagan** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, US-USSR Summits, E.3, President/Chernenko Correspondence (2/2).

No classification marking. Shultz sent Reagan a first draft of this letter with a covering memorandum on December 3. The letter went through several rounds of revisions by the State Department and the NSC Staff. In a memorandum forwarding both the revised letter and Shultz's memorandum to Reagan on December 17, McFarlane wrote: "Shultz has sent over a memorandum recommending that you reply to the letter, keeping this subject separate from your correspondence regarding the Geneva meeting and other subjects. I agree with George's recommendation, particularly since I believe that Chernenko's letter gives you an opportunity to reiterate in the most authoritative fashion the unacceptability of supplying jet aircraft to Nicaragua which could be used for combat." Reagan approved the recommendation to sign the letter to Chernenko. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Head of State Correspondence (US-USSR) December 1984)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 307</u>.

<sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 303 and footnote 7, Document 304.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> In the statement, the Sandinista junta declared its intention to seek a peaceful transition toward a democratic Nicaragua. The text of the Junta's message was transmitted in telegram 184216 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, July 16, 1979. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790321-1203)

### 337. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Camp David, Maryland, December 22, 1984, 10:40-11:10 a.m. and 11:20 a.m.-1:25 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (U)

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

The President
The Vice President
Secretary Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane
Ambassador Price
Assistant Secretary Burt
Peter R. Sommer, NSC
Mrs. Thatcher
Ambassador Wright
Robin Butler, Principal Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher
Charles Powell, Private Secretary to Mrs. Thatcher

## PRIVATE MEETING: THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. THATCHER, PLUS NOTETAKERS:

After exchanging pleasantries, *Mrs. Thatcher* praised the President's reelection, calling it a fantastic victory. She asked him how it felt to win by such an overwhelming margin. *The President* said it was an honor to win by such a margin and joked that someone had said there is only one thing he could ask for from Santa Claus—it was Minnesota, the only state he had lost. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher emphasized that the President's victory was even more impressive given that he had so significantly changed U.S. policies. Such a wide victory was an endorsement of the President's policies and a clear call for a continuation of these policies. She was pleased the President was keeping his same foreign policy, noting it

made no sense to break-up a good team. *The President* agreed and observed that many serve at considerable personal and financial sacrifice. (U)

Turning to Gorbachev's visit to the UK, Mrs. Thatcher said he was an unusual Russian in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes. His wife was equally charming. The Prime Minister noted that she often says to herself the more charming the adversary, the more dangerous. Over the private lunch at Chequers, she had raised a number of pointed questions. She asked Gorbachev why the Soviet Union denies its people the right to emigrate. She had underlined that the West simply cannot understand or accept the Soviet policy of refusing people the right to leave. She contrasted the Soviet policy with the situation in the West, where many countries have had to stop people from coming in. Gorbachev replied that 89 percent of those who applied for permits to leave receive them. Noting that she had no way to cross-check Gorbachev's statistics, she told the President that Gorbachev's claim clearly conflicted with information she receives from British Jewish groups. She commented that she had further suggested to Gorbachev that it was a sign of weakness to feel the need to keep one's people in. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher contrasted Gorbachev with Gromyko, whom she observed would have sharply replied that emigration was an internal matter and not open for discussion. Gorbachev was not willing to debate the point, but he did allow her to discuss it without cutting her off. He also avoided the usual Soviet reaction of citing lengthy positions of principle. The Prime Minister said she also questioned Gorbachev about the Soviets providing financial assistance to Britain's striking miners. Gorbachev replied "this has nothing to do with us." Mrs. Thatcher, however, observed

that in a centrally controlled system like the Soviet Union there is no way funds could pass to British trade unions without government knowledge. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then expanded on what she called the government's total control of the Soviet economy. She had the impression that Gorbachev, like Andropov, was an advocate of economic reform and was willing to slacken government control over the Soviet economy. Gorbachev was clearly worried, said the Prime Minister, about the Soviet Union's poor economic performance. She had made a point to contrast Soviet control over its economy with the free societies in the West, where a number of governments have recently been elected because of their promise to restrict government interference in domestic economic affairs. Despite Gorbachev's professions about lessening government control, in reply to her question about how does a Russian factory decide how much to produce, he said, "we tell them." (C)

Indicating she wished to reiterate what she had told the Vice President over breakfast, *Mrs. Thatcher* underlined that she told Gorbachev there is no point in trying to divide Britain from the United States. This ploy will never succeed.

Britain is part of the Western Alliance of free nations and the Soviets should drop any illusions about severing Europe or Great Britain from the United States. She also told Gorbachev that she and the President have known each other since long before they assumed their current positions and dividing Europe from America is simply "not on." (C)

Gorbachev had made a special effort, said *the Prime Minister*, to cite Chernenko's name as a source of authority

for his remarks. She then turned to what she had told Gorbachev about the Geneva talks. She emphasized that the Soviet Union and the West had entirely different ways of life and government. You don't like ours, we don't like yours. But it is in our common interest—indeed it is our duty—to avoid a conflict. We in the West, including the United States, accept that there can only be real security through military balance. She had underscored to Gorbachev that the Soviets must rid themselves of the belief that the U.S. is not sincere about disarmament. Gorbachev had replied that even public documents now show that the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union with nuclear weapons in the 1950's. Mrs. Thatcher said she had replied, "of course the U.S. had targeted the Soviet Union who was preaching a political credo of world communism what else did they expect?" And she asked Gorbachev rhetorically if it wasn't true that the Soviets targeted the U.S. during that same period and continued to do so now. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher then contrasted the Soviet Union with the U.S. which had not used its great nuclear monopoly in the immediate post-war years to seek expansion. The U.S. is a former colony and knows what it is to be dominated by others. There is no other example in history of a great power using its military strength so sparingly to advance political goals. She had also emphasized to Gorbachev that the President is an honorable man who sincerely wants to improve relations with the Soviet Union. She was struck that when she mentioned that the President had sent a personal handwritten letter to Brezhnev shortly after assuming office, Gorbachev did not appear familiar with it. She made a point of telling Gorbachev that the President had put his heart and soul into his letter and after months of silence received only a pro forma typed reply. Again, Gorbachev did not react. (C)

The President said he was pleased that, without exchanging a word in advance, Mrs. Thatcher had taken the same line with Gorbachev as he had followed in his September meeting with Gromyko. He had spoken about the communist desire to dominate the world. In reply, Gromyko suggested that the Soviets had acted with constraint since they could have, but did not send a mass of men into Western Europe after World War II. The President noted that in reply he had referred to Stalin's remarks that there would have been no victory without the U.S. The President also referred Gromyko to quotations from Lenin and Stalin about world domination by communism. This time, Gromyko did not reply but quickly changed the subject. (C)

Turning to the Geneva talks, the President said since the Soviets had fared so poorly in recent months in the propaganda battles associated with disarmament talks, he feared that they were looking at Geneva as mainly a propaganda forum. This is one of the reasons they launched such an attack against what has become commonly known as "Star Wars." He emphasized that Star Wars was not his term and was clearly not what he had in mind. He continued that there has never been a weapon for which another weapon against it had not been developed. Therefore, in view of all the advances in technology, he asked for a study of new defensive systems. Its aim would strictly be to strengthen deterrence. So far, initial research has been promising and, as he had stated many times, if it proves successful he would be willing to put this new technology into international hands. The President said we are not violating the ABM treaty and have no intention of doing so. The new Strategic Defense Initiative also had a moral context. We must search for ways to build a more stable peace. Our goal is to reduce, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons. Chernenko now claims that this

is also a Soviet goal. We have told them if they are really serious about reductions, we are ready. Gromyko had told him, said the President, that we cannot continue to sit on two mountains of weapons. The President said he replied, "let us then begin to lower and eventually eliminate these mountains." (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that Gorbachev had implied returning to Geneva was not an easy decision for the Soviets. He also indicated the Soviets would come to Geneva with serious proposals. The President replied, "we hope so." She continued that she had emphasized to Gorbachev that Britain supports the U.S. SDI program and told him it was not linked to a first strike strategy. (C)

The President continued that he was simply amazed how closely Mrs. Thatcher's remarks to Gorbachev had accorded with what he told Gromyko. He had made similar points, said the President, on immigration restrictions, underscoring that these restrictions make it especially difficult for the U.S.—with its many political groups with ties to the old country—to improve relations with the Soviets. He had made it clear to Gromyko that he could better deal with the Soviets with the support of the American people. The President then returned to his concern that the Soviets will use the Geneva talks primarily as a propaganda forum. He hoped, however, that the Soviets would treat these talks seriously; as he had told Gromyko the U.S. and the Soviet Union have a joint responsibility to see that war does not happen. (C)

Mrs. Thatcher noted that she had a special interest in learning more details about the U.S. SDI program. Gorbachev had told her "tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons." He suggested if you develop SDI the Russians would either develop their own,

or more probably, develop new offensive systems superior to SDI. General Keegan (former head of USAF Intelligence), whom she had seen several times, had informed her about Soviet advances and she was interested in learning more about SDI. *The President* noted it was time to join the others at Laurel Lodge. (C)

The private meeting ended at 11:10 a.m.

### Expanded Session in Laurel Lodge

In opening the expanded session, the President said he thought it would be appropriate to quote a remark the Queen had made to him during the course of the campaign. When the Queen was in Canada and he was in Michigan, the Queen had called to say she was sure there will never be a a wider divide between the U.S. and Great Britain "than the river that currently divides us." Smiling, the President and Mrs. Thatcher both agreed with the Queen's remark. (U)

Noting that it was her first visit to Camp David, *Mrs. Thatcher* said it was marvelous to be here and a privilege as well. She said she and the President had discussed at some length her impressions of Gorbachev. It is clear that basic Soviet policy has not changed, but Gorbachev was both willing and able to openly discuss and debate issues. He did not cry or complain when she discussed the human rights situation within the Soviet Union. She had emphasized to Gorbachev that it would be a futile effort to try to divide Great Britain from the U.S. We have a common heritage and are part of the same Western Alliance system. (C)

The Prime Minister continued that Gorbachev had spent an inordinate amount of time on SDI. He had asked me to tell

the President to stop the militarization of outer space. She had replied that Britain supports the U.S. SDI research effort and it was the Soviets who had been the first to develop an anti-satellite capability. The West was also trying to keep up with Soviet research into laser weapons. She had told Gorbachev that there must be balance in research and the U.S. SDI research program must go ahead. (C)

Saying he wished to extend Mrs. Thatcher a special Christmas welcome to Camp David, *the President* said he was pleased with Mrs. Thatcher's support for the oft misunderstood SDI program.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Thatcher, 1984. The morning private meeting took place in the Aspen Lodge. The expanded meeting and working lunch took place in the Laurel Lodge. Reagan wrote in his diary entries for December 22-23: "Sat. dawned clear & bright which was fine because P.M. Margaret Thatcher was coming in for a visit. I met her in a golf cart & took her to Aspen where she & I had a brief visit in which I got a report on her visit with Gorbachev of Soviet U. In an amazing coincidence I learned she had said virtually the same things to him I had said to Gromyko. In addition, she made it clear there was no way the Soviet U. could split Eng. away from the US. Then we joined the others—Ambassadors, Shultz, McFarlane, Bush, et al at Laurel for a plenary meeting & working lunch. Main topic was our Strategic Defense Research ('Starwars') I believe [we] eased some concerns she had." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 411)

- <sup>2</sup> Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16. See <u>footnote 3, Document 334</u> and <u>Document 341</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> Raisa Gorbacheva.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Documents 286</u> and <u>287</u>.

# 338. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Casey to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President,

Washington, December 22, 1984

Bud has asked that I provide you with some of my personal observations on the upcoming Shultz-Gromyko talks in Geneva. As I have indicated in a separate and more detailed memo to you,<sup>2</sup> I am convinced that verification will be a pacing factor in any future strategic arrangement with the USSR and has to be an integral piece of our planning. I want, in this memo, to focus on the instructions that George will be taking with him and on what we can hope for when it comes to prospective arms control negotiations.

We have had no direct reporting on what Gromyko will propose, or be prepared to offer, in response to any US proposals at Geneva. Senior Soviet officials, including Politburo member Gorbachev, have indicated that Moscow views any agreement on strategic nuclear arms as largely dependent on some agreement on space weapons. Chernenko said, on 26 November, that the demilitarization of outer space and the reduction of nuclear arms were interconnected questions. Chernenko told visiting British Labor Party officials in early December that Moscow was particularly interested in an ASAT test freeze. These are really all primarily meant to get at the SDI program. US space technology worries the Soviets. [3½ lines not declassified]

Because the Soviet Union is so intent on stopping US SDI efforts, Gromyko is likely to push for an agreement on the

demilitarization of space and a reaffirmation (or expansion) of the 1972 ABM Treaty. Gromyko is also likely to take a tough position on INF issues, even though the Soviets no longer make the removal of US missiles from Europe a precondition for the January talks. Reporting indicates that the USSR wants to take UK and French forces into account and that recent "counterdeployments" by Moscow in Eastern Europe could be designed to set the stage for a mutual moratorium on further US and Soviet deployments.

The principal objective Gromyko will be tasked with in Geneva is to find out whether there are any real prospects for constraining those US programs—and in the first instance, this will be SDI—that the USSR is most concerned about. He will, of course, also be seeking details of our policy positions but not really expecting to be able to delve very deeply into those kinds of niceties.

Renewed negotiations in the year ahead will be conducted while Soviet military planners are making decisions that will determine to a significant degree the capabilities, size, and composition of the USSR's strategic forces in the 1990s.

- —We already see evidence of programs aimed at more survivable weapons systems through increased mobility and more flexible and sophisticated operational planning.
- —The Soviets will not let any arms control agreement slow their research and development efforts, nor will they accept an agreement which would prevent a significant level of force modernization.

Soviet military planners must contend with various ongoing or projected military efforts by the US and NATO that

challenge the USSR's ability to continue to meet its strategic force objectives in the 1990s. These challenges include: MX, the small mobile ICBM ("Midgetman"), Trident II missiles, the B-1B, Stealth bombers, Pershing IIs in Europe, and the SDI. These new programs, now underway or planned, pose major challenges to Soviet political and military strategy. From the Soviet perspective, if the planned US strategic and intermediate force programs go forward, there will be an erosion of the gains the Soviets have made during the past ten years, even as they deploy new offensive and defensive systems of their own. The Soviets obviously hope some, or all, of the new US weapon systems will be delayed, or not go forward at all, without the Soviets having to give up much, if anything of real significance, in arms control negotiations.

A salient feature of Soviet arms control policy in the years ahead will be its emphasis on trying to delay or undercut the US SDI program. We do not believe they will offer a major concession to halt the SDI program as long as it remains in the research stage and is strongly susceptible to unilateral US restraint.

Moreover, [less than 1 line not declassified] warn Soviet leaders about the prospect of further strain on the technology sector of their economy, and additional competing resource demands stemming from a prospective open-ended high-technology arms competition with the US (especially SDI). Soviet interest in slowing the pace of this competition through arms control negotiations is likely to increase with the slowdown in their economic growth.

The Soviets will replace most of the weapons in their strategic offensive forces with new or modernized weapons by the early-to-middle 1990s. These weapons are now being deployed, are in flight-testing, or are in preflight

development. Major features of the Soviet strategic force of the early 1990s will include:

- —Continued reliance on the ICBM force as the backbone for intercontinental strikes and on the SS-20 force for meeting nuclear mission requirements on the periphery.
- —Significantly greater survivability, including more warheads on submarines, and deployment of roadmobile and rail-mobile ICBMs.
- —Major improvements in manned bombers and deployment of long-range, land-attack cruise missiles.

The Soviets will significantly improve the capabilities of their strategic defensive forces over the next ten years:

- —Vigorous pursuit of advanced defensive technologies (directed energy, antisubmarine warfare).
- —Increased emphasis on air defense to counter bombers and cruise missiles that fly at low altitudes and those that have very small radar cross sections.
- —Continued research and development efforts that give the Soviets the potential for widespread ABM deployments during the next decade.

In particular, Moscow will not agree to steps that would significantly detract from the key elements of Soviet nuclear strategy: counterforce strikes against enemy nuclear forces and limiting damage to the Soviet homeland. Thus, deep reductions in the Soviet ICBM force, especially heavy ICBMs, remain unlikely. A realistic appraisal of our arms control prospects has to conclude that large enough

reductions in Soviet offensive weapons to make the world significantly safer is not likely to occur as a direct result of the arms control efforts in the near-term; rather, we must look at this as a long-term proposition at best.

You are likely to encounter great pressure from the public and from within the US Government to offer up your SDI research program in order to demonstrate US seriousness. You ought not to yield to this pressure; I believe it is vital to pursue SDI research for all the reasons you have previously stated. In my view, it would be a tragic mistake to abandon the SDI research program, or to restrict necessary development or testing, in order to get an arms control accord with the Soviets. There is no way such concessions on SDI can produce reductions in Soviet offensive forces of commensurate value in long-term stability and safety.

But I do think we could reach an agreement, when George meets with Mr. Gromyko two weeks from now, on scope and format matters.

The Soviets have forewarned us that they will be looking for some solid agreements out of Geneva, not just an exchange of views. What this means is that they will press us to sign up to some declaration or communique which prejudges the future negotiations in terms of their own rhetoric; e.g., "offensive force agreements based on equality and equal security," meaning some inclusion of UK and French systems, and "prevention of the militarization of space."

We should resist such one-sided gambits at all costs because we shall, for political reasons, find it far more binding on us than on them as the actual negotiations proceed. In fact, we should bluntly call them on their penchant for vague but prejudicial language which does not conform with realism; e.g., that "prevention of the militarization of space" by itself is not a realistic goal as the world now stands.

We are not ready to engage in substantive negotiations in January; if agreement can be reached on the scope and objectives of these new negotiations, we are going to have to reconsider the details of our positions for these new talks.

I believe that our principal concern in the format area will be how to ensure that negotiations on offensive and defensive forces remain in tandem. We need to be certain that the Soviets cannot force the pace of negotiations in areas where the US possesses actual or potential strengths, while they manage to draw out the negotiations in those areas where they possess strengths that represent principal US concerns. Therefore, my sense is that what we ought to be seeking is a single set of negotiations for offensive (START and INF) and defensive (air defenses and ballistic missile defenses) systems so that the two can, to the extent possible, be kept in harness. I would prefer that ASAT negotiations be kept separate [4 lines not declassified]. But this may not work and I can foresee ASAT being tied in directly as well. The worst thing of all would be to have a separate forum where SDI, or SDI and ASAT together, is the only subject.

If we agree to space talks with ASAT and SDI, in a forum apart from other offensive or other defensive missiles (as it is implied we may do in the December 18 paper that I just saw entitled "Geneva Roadmap"),<sup>5</sup> we will have given the Soviets a propaganda and negotiating edge of immense value.

There appears to be a distinct preference in our bureaucracy for three separate tables for intercontinental, INF, and space issues, or perhaps for two tables; e.g., offensive and space, or offensive and defensive. As among these, there is much to be said for the latter. As Paul Nitze argues it will tend to make SDI a less accessible target and bring out in negotiations on defensive weapons the large superiority the Soviets now have in air defense, some of it possibly adaptable to ballistic missile defense, as well as ballistic missile defense itself.<sup>6</sup>

We ought to weigh carefully the merits of delaying the splitting of these negotiations into separate tables until the political and substantive thrust of the whole process becomes clearer, on both sides. The Soviets will have a much easier time of keeping multiple tracks in political tandem than we. They will work hard to exploit the inevitable divergence of interests among the supporting casts behind these separate tables on the US side.

There is a case to be made for keeping one umbrella process going under Nitze, perhaps with periodic meetings at the foreign minister level, and one coherent management process back home until we have decided what specific agreements are really feasible and are able to table drafts or at least very specific proposals on the separate issues. Then separate tables can be set up.

I think that the broad message George should be taking with him to Geneva is one of continuing US willingness to be serious, flexible and ready to negotiate in good faith. That is what the American people hope for, what the Congress expects, and what our European Allies want. The Soviets have no intention of rolling over and playing dead because they have, in essence, been forced to return to the negotiating table. But they are probably on the fence with

respect to whether or not they believe that the US intends to approach these talks with an intent to produce some type of real agreement. It is in our mutual interests to strengthen the perception within the USSR and throughout the world that we are "serious."

Still, there is no guarantee that either the 7-8 January talks, or those that follow, will be productive. To keep the Soviets from getting the rhetorical high ground, we should be prepared to go somewhat beyond a discussion of how we see things. For this purpose we might have at hand in Geneva a general but substantive set of propositions that state what we shall be driving for in the subsequent negotiations, inviting but not insisting that the Soviets sign up to them in Geneva, but using them in any case as a way of dealing with Soviet generalities.

I hope this has been helpful to you. By the middle of this next week, about 26 December, I may send you some additional thoughts on Paul Nitze's concept of the offensive-defensive relationship that we should be striving for, and perhaps other ideas as well.

Respectfully yours,

William J. Casey

<sup>1</sup> Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 88B00443R: Box 16, Folder: DCI Memo Chron (1–31 Dec '84). Top Secret; Sensitive. In a covering note to McFarlane, Casey wrote: "The attached is in response to your request, of 20 December, for my views on the upcoming Geneva Talks. There is a copy for you, as well as the original for the President." The words

- "GENEVA TALKS" are typed and underlined in the upper right-hand corner of the page.
- <sup>2</sup> Not found.
- <sup>3</sup> During his trip to England, Gorbachev addressed the House of Commons on December 18, stating: "The Soviet Union has recently advanced an initiative for holding talks with the USA on a package of issues concerning nuclear and space armaments. On the basis of this initiative, an agreement has been reached with the U.S. administration to start entirely new talks which would embrace the question of non-militarization of space and the questions of reducing nuclear arms, both strategic and medium-range. All these questions are to be considered and resolved in their interconnection. Of key importance in all this is prevention of a space arms race." (Telegram 27684 from London, December 19; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840812-0145) In telegram 16110 from Moscow, December 19, the Embassy provided the following analysis: "Gorbachev has made the clearest public statements to date that nuclear arms control in the upcoming US-USSR negotiations depends on space arms control. This signal of Soviet priorities is consistent with other public and private statements. Gorbachev states the issue categorically, referring to the need 'to prevent an arms race in space,' without indicating specific limitations on space weapons which might allow progress in the nuclear area. Behind statements of Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders lies concern over the possibility of a U.S. breakthrough in defenses against ballistic missiles which could be facilitated by tight restrictions on offensive strategic weapons." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840811-0619) 4 Casev's December reference is incorrect. British Labor
- Party leaders Neil Kinnock and Denis Healey met with

Chernenko and other Soviet leaders on November 26. In telegram 15032 from Moscow, November 27, the Embassy reported that during these discussions, Chernenko stressed the connection between space and offensive nuclear weapons reductions: "Chernenko told Kinnock that the Soviet Union favors good relations with the United States and an end to the arms race. For that reason, it had agreed to 'negotiations on the whole complex of mutually related questions concerning the non-militarization of space and the reduction of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear weapons." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840756-0667) In telegram 15002 from Moscow, November 27, the Embassy reported: "The Soviets, particularly Chernenko in a written statement which he read, said that they considered the first session to be quote talks about talks unquote. They indicated their principal interest was to head off the competition in space, concentrating on an ASAT test freeze. Healey said that the Soviets also now see the logic in treating all offensive weapons (INF and strategic) together." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D840755-0802) <sup>5</sup> In a December 19 memorandum, Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman informed McFarlane that the SACG, under quidance from McFarlane, developed a "Geneva Roadmap Paper," which was distributed for discussion at the December 20 SACG meeting. (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Chronological File, Chron File 12/19/1984) The Geneva Roadmap Paper is attached but not printed.

<sup>6</sup> See Document 343.

## 339. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Vessey) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

JCSM-350-84

Washington, December 22, 1984

SUBJECT Geneva (S)

(TS) The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe we need a clear, consistent strategy for the upcoming talks in Geneva. Our approach should strive for significant reductions in offensive nuclear forces, particularly in those forces which are the most destabilizing. Our position should protect our own capability to conduct those actions essential for our own defense, including continued modernization of our strategic forces and your Strategic Defense Initiative. As the Joint Chiefs of Staff stressed to you last week, <sup>2</sup> strategic modernization, arms reductions, and a shift to strategic defense are integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy. These essential elements of an effective nuclear deterrent will deny the Soviets the confidence to either attack or coerce the nations of the free world.

(TS) To achieve these goals we must gain and maintain the moral high ground going into Geneva and coming out of Geneva, no matter what the results in Geneva may be. This is especially important since the Soviets use arms negotiations as one component of an integrated diplomatic, military and propaganda strategy. We will, in effect, be negotiating with our allies, our public, and the Congress as well as with the Soviets during the talks. We must maintain Congressional and allied support. We must not allow the

Soviets to create a situation in which either strategic modernization or SDI is delayed through Soviet negotiating tactics and resultant false public perception.

- (TS) It is clear that the Soviets fear the renewed interest in national defense which you have set in motion. They will, therefore, seek to curtail or eliminate United States' strategic defense efforts while continuing their own massive program. To defuse this, we should use the negotiations, particularly those concerned with space, to discuss the entire offense-defense relationship. We should reaffirm that SDI has never been intended to place in space nuclear weapons which could be brought down upon the world population. And we should continue the efforts begun this week by Secretary Weinberger to set forth a clear explanation that strategic defense initiatives offer a defensive shield with long-term benefits for ourselves and our allies.<sup>3</sup>
- (TS) Because we consider the preservation of your Strategic Defense Initiative to be essential, we wish to make certain the links between ASAT and SDI are well understood. Substantive limits on ASAT will inevitably affect SDI, since SDI will have the intrinsic capability to destroy satellites. Since SDI, in its current phase, is essentially an R&D program, and since the technologies involved are highly similar, limitations on ASAT could inhibit early development of SDI alternatives. This argues for extreme caution in accepting any specific agreements on ASAT.
- (TS) In the short term the free world's continued security depends on completing your strategic modernization program. In the long-term the Strategic Defense Initiative offers the vision of a safer, more stable world. To achieve our goal through these short-term and long-term

objectives, it is essential to act now and seize the public diplomacy high ground. We must explain to the allies and to the American people the wisdom of our present course and the necessity of approaching arms control, strategic modernization and strategic defense as integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

#### John W. Vessey, Jr. General, USA Chairman

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Geneva Prep III—December 1984 "Geneva —NSDD Instructions" (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; King. A copy was sent to Weinberger. In a handwritten covering note to McFarlane, attached to another copy of the memorandum, Vessey wrote: "Bud—The JCS views in response to your 20 Dec memo. I have sent a copy to Cap. Jack." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 12/21/1984-12/26/1984) <sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with the JCS in the Cabinet Room on December 18 from 11 a.m. to 12:08 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) No record of this meeting was found, but Reagan noted in his personal diary: "A meeting with the Joint Chiefs re our mil. force compared to that of the Soviets. In strategic weapons when the Soviets refer to maintaining stability they mean superiority & they have it. More & more I'm thinking the Soviets are preparing to walk out on the talks if we wont give up research on a strategic defense system. I hope I'm wrong." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 409)

<sup>3</sup> During the December 17 NSPG meeting (see Document 334), McFarlane noted that the NSC Staff was working on a public diplomacy plan for SDI. During a press conference on December 19, Weinberger stated: "I think it's vital that we continue to pursue the research program on which we're now embarked to see if we can't hold out a far better future for mankind." He continued: "the strategic defense initiative of the kind we're planning will be equally effective and perhaps can secure earlier success in dealing with intermediate range missiles than strategic range weapons. There's not the slightest possibility that America would be decoupled from Europe by the pursuit of this vital initiative.'" Gwertzman, who reported on the press conference in the New York Times, commented: "Mr. Weinberger's strong defense of what the Administration refers to as the 'strategic defense initiative' what others call 'Star Wars' weapons came as Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the high-ranking Soviet official, was warning on a trip to London, that Moscow was giving priority in next month's negotiations with the United States toward negotiating a curb on development of defensive weapons in space." (Bernard Gwertzman, "Weinberger Calls U.S. Space-Arms Effort 'Vital,'" Special to the New York Times, December 20, 1984, p. A7)

## 340. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 24, 1984

SUBJECT The Geneva Talks

I believe Geneva offers some hope that we can secure genuinely useful agreements with the Soviets; but there will also be considerable risks for us at Geneva.

Everything depends upon the ultimate attitude and goals of the Soviet Union, and these will be very hard to discover, at least in the early phases of the negotiations.

The opportunities that we hope for at Geneva would develop if the Soviets have indeed concluded that (a) they cannot achieve a sufficient degree of military superiority to enable them to impose their will on the world; and (b) if they conclude that, at least for now, the best policy for them to pursue is to try to strengthen their economy and the quality of life for their people, and thus to reduce significantly the major increases and strength they have added every year to their military.

However, it will I think, be some time, probably several months or perhaps even a year or more into the negotiations before they would disclose any such intentions, or express any willingness to reduce significantly their offensive systems.

I believe it is more likely that they will continue to test us by any one of a number of means, including demanding either a moratorium or a permanent ban on anti-satellite weapons, and either a moratorium or a permanent ban on any more work on space-based strategic defensive systems as the price of either their remaining at the talks, or willingness to discuss offensive systems, etc.

The Soviets believe that they can always win in negotiations with "impatient democracies". They know that our press and the great bulk of the so-called "arms control community", as well as most of the columnists, commentators, etc., measure success in negotiations by whether or not we get an agreement. These same groups are strongly against our insisting on any position by us that might block "an agreement", no matter what are the contents of an agreement.

There is a remarkably revealing paragraph in Tom Wicker's column which appeared in the New York Times on Friday, 21 December.<sup>2</sup> I attach the column, but the critical paragraph comes after Mr. Wicker's comments that our Administration has "insisted publicly that it has always sought balanced and verifiable arms control agreements". Mr. Wicker then goes on to say "Within the Administration, however, a powerful faction—possibly Mr. Reagan himself has been suspicious of arms control on principle; some officials fought hard to establish U.S. negotiation positions that would be either unacceptable to the Russians or, if accepted would yield advantage to the U.S." In short, we stand convicted of this serious offense of supporting agreements that would be of advantage to the U.S., presumably unlike the Soviets who have only the broad world interests at heart.

This impatience of democracies and the natural desire of most negotiators to achieve a "success", that is "an agreement", will be played upon by the Soviets. They will, I am sure, try to make us appear both stubborn and "lacking sincerity" as we maintain our positions that we should not give up the SDI or agree to banning or moratoria on antisatellite weapons.

That is why I think it is so critically important and beneficial that you, and others in the Administration, have said that the Strategic Defense Initiative will not be given up, that it offers the most, indeed the only, hope of any of the strategic arms proposals; that it is not designed to protect any particular target, but is designed to destroy weapons and not people; and that it is not the militarization of space, but on the contrary, the use of space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts.

In other words, we should put them in the position of trying to block the one system that offers hope of a nuclear free future to all mankind.

Incidentally, I think it is most important that we continue to present and discuss the Strategic Defense Initiative in terms of seeking "a thoroughly reliable defense against Soviet missiles whether of intermediate range or of strategic range."

Any discussion of "setting our goal aside" while we work to develop an interim system to "protect our missiles", or to "protect our cities" simply gives substantial comfort to those many opponents of Strategic Defense who say it cannot be done at all.

The conventional wisdom insists on knowing whether we are trying to protect our cities or our missile systems, and builds a lot of specious arguments as to what the Soviets would then do to *their* plans, etc. I think we should insist at all times that we are trying to destroy Soviet missiles *before* they get near *any* target, and we are trying to

protect the world by *destroying* Soviet missiles *before* they get near any target. That is our goal. It may be we can deploy that kind of system on a phased basis if our research so develops, but anything short of our goal is indeed only a piece of the ultimate system we want. We should not allow our energies or the momentum, or indeed the great public support which I am convinced SDI now enjoys, to be diluted or diverted into anything less than securing the ultimate goal.

As you know, and as the Joint Chiefs have mentioned to you many times, there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need to secure a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense Initiative. Therefore, it is vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons, either as the Soviet price for continuing the discussions or for any other purpose.

Also as you know from various briefings, there are other compelling reasons for not agreeing to what will undoubtedly be as a general rule the Soviet demand for a ban or a moratorium on ASAT or related weapons. I am always most reluctant to give up anything the Soviets make a special point of demanding we give up such as the Pershing, and SDI and ASAT are no exceptions to my general rule.

I firmly believe that only if we are strong, united, and completely determined about the above positions, will we bring home to the Soviets that they cannot block our Strategic Defense Initiative, and that they will then conclude, probably several months later, that it is indeed in their interests to discuss seriously, and ultimately to agree to, major reductions in offensive systems.

On offensive systems, I believe we can and should present, at a very early stage in the negotiations, proposals continuing the pattern of your past proposals on both the intermediate and strategic range weapons that call for sharp reductions down to equality at much lower levels by both sides, and that we argue strongly for effective verification.

I have read Bill Casey's very good paper on verification, and we are working to produce studies of the kind called for by Bill, that in effect will tell "how much cheating by the Soviets can we accept." Nevertheless, I think both substantively and as part of our attempt to retain the moral high ground in the court of world opinion, we should continue to seek, publicly and strongly, on-site verification, recognizing it is certainly not a perfect or a fool-proof method of verification, but far better than relying on satellite photography. We could also suggest on-site verification by international teams of observers, or other ways of improving on-site and other verification methods.

The critical point of all of these recommendations is to urge as strongly as possible that we not be an "impatient democracy" playing into the Soviet hands by being unable to hold out long enough for worthwhile agreements.

There were many so-called "victory celebrations" when SALT I and SALT II were agreed upon, but it is very important to bear in mind the lesson that neither those agreements, nor the ABM agreement, nor indeed any other agreement with the Soviets, have slowed the growth of Soviet military power. They continue to deploy far more than we, measured by numbers, varieties, continuing modernization and improvements of short, intermediate, and long range missile systems, and they continue their

major attempts to defend themselves by all available systems, as they have for the past two decades.

I personally want, more than anything else, to secure agreements that are genuinely verifiable, and that make major reductions in offensive systems so that we can secure deterrence at vastly lower levels while we pursue the goal of achieving the thoroughly reliable strategic defense you proposed nearly two years ago that would be effective against intermediate as well as long range missiles.

We must constantly emphasize the nobility, and the morality of that goal, and the hope it offers the world.

Cap

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Not found attached. Reference is to Tom Wicker, "A World Concern: Focus on Geneva Arms Talks," *New York Times*, December 21, 1984, p. A35.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See <u>footnote 2</u>, <u>Document 338</u>.

# 341. Memorandum From Peter Sommer of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, December 24, 1984

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Mrs. Thatcher: Gorbachev

During the private, te^te-a`-te^te session, Charles Powell the British notetaker passed me the attached paper outlining Mrs. Thatcher's impression of Gorbachev and Soviet attitudes toward the Geneva talks (Tab A). Mrs. Thatcher made a number of these points during the private talks, but the British paper is more specific and goes into greater detail than Mrs. Thatcher did with the President.<sup>2</sup>

Powell enjoined me not to give the British paper wide circulation within the USG. The British paper contains such interesting points as "Gorbachev made much of the difficulties the Soviet Union had faced in deciding to go to Geneva" and "he claimed the Russians would be ready to come to Geneva with serious new proposals."

#### RECOMMENDATION

That you review the British paper:3

#### Tab A

Paper Prepared by British Prime Minister Thatcher<sup>4</sup>

Undated

#### MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN: GORBACHEV

I spent about five hours with Gorbachev last Sunday. <sup>5</sup> He gives the impression of confidence and authority. He is relatively open in manner and intelligent. He is affable and has some charm and humour. He listens carefully to what the other person says. He talks readily and, in contrast to the stultified manner of Soviet leaders, does not just stick to prepared statements. He picks up points made in discussion and responds to them. He was clearly not used to the sort of rigorous questioning which he got from me on things like human rights in the Soviet Union and Soviet payments to our mine-workers' union. But he kept cool and avoided the usual Soviet reaction of reciting lengthy positions of principle. He went to great pains to invoke Chernenko's name frequently in discussion as a source of authority for his remarks. I certainly found him a man one could do business with. I actually rather liked him—there is no doubt that he is completely loyal to the Soviet system but he is prepared to listen and have a genuine dialogue and make up his own mind.

I got the impression that in some ways he was using me as a stalking horse for you. He questioned me very closely on American motives and intentions for the Geneva talks and was clearly interested to obtain a first hand and informed impression of you and your main colleagues and of your policies. At the same time, he was on the look-out for possible divergences of view between us which might be exploited to Soviet advantage. I made it absolutely clear to him that we are loyal members of the Alliance and right behind you.

On the substance of my talks with him—and those which Geoffrey Howe had the following  $day^{\underline{6}}$  —the most striking point was the amount of time devoted to the threat of an

arms race in outer space. His line was that if you go ahead with the SDI, the Russians would either have to develop their own or, more probably, develop nuclear weapons that would get past your SDI defences. He made much of the role of the ABM treaty as the key stone to arms control negotiations and said that if events proceeded to the point where the ABM treaty was irrevocably undermined, the prospect of any further agreements thereafter would be minimal.

He was not very precise on the scope of the negotiations which he expected to emerge from the Geneva meeting, but *seemed* to expect them to cover space, strategic nuclear weapons and INF. He made much of the difficulties which the Soviet Union had faced in deciding to go to Geneva.

On the other hand, he showed a keen awareness of the penalties of spending yet more resources on defence and agreed with the concept of achieving balanced security at lower levels of weapons. He claimed that the Russians would be ready to come to Geneva with serious new proposals and referred to Chernenko's remark that the Soviet Union would be ready to agree to the most radical measures. He appeared at one point to be saying that the SDI was simply an attempt by the United States to establish a bargaining position and that if that was the case, the Soviets could play the game and bargain as well as anyone. But the over-riding impression left was that the Russians are genuinely fearful of the immense cost of having to keep up with a further American technological advance and are therefore prepared to negotiate seriously on nuclear weapons if they believe that you are politically committed to reductions.

I left him in no doubt that we did not see SDI in the same light as he does: still less did we see it as linked in any way

to a US first strike strategy. I stressed your profound sincerity in the search for balanced arms control and a reduction in nuclear weapons. I warned him of trying to drive wedges between the Allies: we were at one on this issue.

These were the main points which arose in his talk with me. He also saw Geoffrey Howe the next day and I understand that Geoffrey will be sending George Shultz a message giving his impressions and details of other steps which they discussed in rather more formal surroundings.<sup>7</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Reference 12/20/84-12/24/84. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Matlock and Lehman.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 337</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> McFarlane did not check the Approve or Disapprove options.
- <sup>4</sup> Confidential.
- <sup>5</sup> Gorbachev met with Thatcher at Chequers on December 16. See <u>footnote 3, Document 334</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> Howe and Gorbachev met for formal talks on Monday, December 17.
- <sup>7</sup> Howe's report of his meeting and impression of Gorbachev was sent in telegram Tosec 200005/377159 to Shultz, December 24. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N840015-0118)

## 342. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Weinberger to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT The Geneva Talks (U)

- (TS) In my memorandum to you of December 24,<sup>2</sup> which concerned broad policy themes, I did not address several narrower issues with which I know you will be concerned. One point in my earlier memo, however, is worth repeating: because of the major link between anti-satellite weapons and the capabilities we may ultimately need for a thoroughly effective Strategic Defense, I know of no potential ASAT limits, including moratoria, that would not also significantly and negatively affect our SDI.
- (TS) Here are some thoughts on the more immediate issues you face in preparing for Geneva:
- (TS) 1. Soviet Violations. Our efforts to elicit Soviet compliance with arms control agreements will be seriously set back, unless we reinforce our position that the Soviets cannot expect to continue "business as usual." I believe we should stress to the Soviets at Geneva that we are very seriously concerned about the expanding pattern of Soviet violations and the problems that this poses for the negotiation of new arms control agreements. The Soviets should be put on notice that there are limits to our tolerance of such activities.
- (TS) Indeed, Soviet violations bring home the point that any arms control agreement will entail risks for the United States. This is because, as their behavior proves, the

Soviets are unlikely to be deterred from military activity merely because they would be violating agreements. Verifying Soviet compliance with our START and INF proposals will be exceedingly difficult; we cannot prevent some forms of Soviet cheating, even with the most stringent verification measures. But most of the difficulties we would face, we face now under SALT II; at least our current proposals would improve on SALT II by requiring militarily significant reductions in offensive nuclear forces and attempting to tighten up some of the existing verification loopholes, such as the SALT II provision allowing the Soviets to encrypt part of their missile test data. Alternatives to the current U.S. proposals, ostensibly designed to solve our verification problems, will not solve those problems but could lull us into falsely believing that Soviet military capabilities have been limited.

- (TS) 2. Procedural Objectives. For now, I believe we should be more concerned with establishing the appropriate structure, venue and timing for future negotiations, and less concerned with substantive negotiating issues. Our immediate procedural objectives for the January meeting should be to seek Soviet agreement on the establishment of three separate negotiating fora: (1) on reductions of strategic offensive arms; (2) on limitation of intermediaterange nuclear forces; (3) on the offense/defense relationship and military uses of space. There is particular merit in having separate negotiations on strategic and intermediate-range forces; separate talks will help us carry out more effective consultations with our Allies, who have a special interest in intermediate-range forces, and who understand and support our position as it evolved in INF.
- (TS) I do not think it is necessary, for our purposes, to have an agreed statement with the Soviets setting forth the precise purposes and objectives of these various fora. If the

Soviets insist, however, then the objectives should be stated substantially as follows:

- (1) To reach a long-term agreement on the reduction of strategic offensive forces to agreed, equal, far lower levels, in a manner that enhances strategic stability;
- (2) To reach an agreement limiting intermediate-range nuclear forces to the lowest possible agreed equal levels;
- (3) To reach understandings on:
  - the relationship of offensive and defensive forces (both ground-based defenses and space-based defenses against aircraft/cruise missiles and against ballistic missiles);
  - the use of space for military purposes so as to enhance strategic stability by fostering conditions conducive to preventing the military uses of space for offensive purposes (including uses by ICBMs);
  - a possible phased move to greater reliance on strategic defenses and lesser reliance on offensive forces, including the eventual abolition of nuclear weapons. Your SDI proposal actually could accomplish this, and so it must not be given up.
- (TS) The main Soviet objective will be to halt or severely constrain our SDI program. They have elected to approach the task through a combination of a concerted propaganda campaign against "the militarization of space" and specific, unverifiable proposals, the effect of which would be to halt or cripple our SDI without limiting their ballistic missile defense. Therefore, we would make a grave mistake if we accepted any procedural arrangements that might help the Soviets hold arms reduction agreements hostage to

"progress" on stopping our SDI, or our willingness to delay or stop work on ASAT, just as we would make a mistake to convey any impression that SDI is only a "bargaining chip" for obtaining offensive force reductions.

- (TS) 3. *Things to Avoid*. Given our overall objectives, I believe we should:
- (a) Avoid any commitments, either on form or substance, that would foreclose or hamper the possibility of a transition by both the United States and the Soviet Union to a strategic relationship dominated by defensive rather than offensive forces;
- (b) Avoid creating inflated expectations about the pace or scope of future negotiations; those expectations inevitably lead to such situations as Congress' holding the Peacekeeper hostage to "progress" in negotiations;
- (c) Avoid any understanding with the Soviets or any agreed statement indicating a U.S. willingness to halt or modify our SDI research program, to accept restrictions (beyond those already contained in the ABM Treaty) precluding the eventual deployment of SDI types of ballistic missile defense systems, or to cancel scheduled tests of the ASAT MV;
- (d) Avoid accepting any agreed statement suggesting that space is not now militarized (by ballistic missiles), or implying that possible uses of space are of greater, or equal, concern with offensive forces;
- (e) Avoid a moratorium on ASAT testing.
- (TS) Any moratorium on ASAT testing will restrict our ASAT more than the Soviets' because of the state of our program (it is still in development), whereas they have already

proven their system. Furthermore, ASAT limits of virtually any type will limit our SDI program; and the more restricting those limits would be on ASAT, the more they would also restrict SDI, and some of our other activities.

- (TS) 4. *Things to Seek*. There are several modest but useful steps we might take to try and reach some early agreement with the Soviets, in order possibly to create a more conducive climate as we tackle the harder issues. For example, we could:
- (a) Pursue your proposal to establish a dedicated U.S.-Soviet communications channel for the exchange of military-technical information. The negative Soviet response to our earlier proposal on this point can be attributed to the strained political environment; they might react differently were the atmosphere better. Moreover, when dealing with those in Congress who advocate more far-reaching proposals, we might want to be able to state the Soviet view on our more modest proposition.
- (b) Follow up your offer in your UNGA speech of September 24 for an exchange of experts at each other's nuclear test sites to measure directly the yields of nuclear weapon tests. We could attempt to begin this exchange by inviting the Soviets to send a team of experts to our Nevada Test Site.
- (c) Seek agreement on additional confidence building measures such as more detailed notification of, and even exchange visits to, our respective maneuvers and troop exercises, etc.

Cap

- $^{\underline{1}}$  Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984–01/01/1985 (3). Top Secret; King.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 340</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 6, Document 308.

## 343. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, December 27, 1984

SUBJECT Strategy for Geneva

#### Central Concept

We need a clear central concept to guide our planning for the Geneva meetings and subsequent negotiations—and our program for handling Congress, Allies and publics. I suggest the following:

For the next five to ten years our objective should be a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms as well as stabilizing the relationship between offensive and defensive nuclear arms, whether land-, sea-, air- or space-based. We should even now be looking forward to a period of transition, beginning possibly five or ten years from now, to effective non-nuclear defensive forces, including defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition should lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A nuclear-free world is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree.

US Objectives for Geneva

Our strategy should aim to keep the Soviets on the defensive at both the private and public levels:

- —We want to put the onus on Moscow to negotiate seriously by setting forth ideas that could form the basis of meaningful agreements.
- —And we want to deny them any basis to charge in public that we had no constructive ideas to present at Geneva, and were unwilling to consider any limits on space arms.

Proceeding from the above, our specific objectives at Geneva are twofold:

- —Looking to the future, we want to begin to engage the Soviets in a dialogue on the possibility of a shift away from "mutual assured destruction" to a more stable situation in which both sides rely more on defenses and in which nuclear arms are significantly reduced and, eventually, eliminated.
- —In the near term, we want to establish a productive negotiating process that will, for the first time, begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms. We would like to open formal negotiations at an early date, but further meetings with Gromyko and/or special representatives may well be needed before we are able to identify enough common ground on which to begin serious give-and-take.

In the long run, these goals are mutually reinforcing: the effectiveness of SDI technologies may depend on our ability to reach agreements that reverse the Soviet offensive build-up; this will constrain them from trying to overwhelm future US defenses.

In the near term, however, there will be tension between these two goals. The Soviets have set as their top priority the "prevention of the militarization of outer space"—which means stopping SDI as well as ASAT. They will link progress on nuclear arms reductions to progress on limiting space weapons; in bargaining over nuclear arms they will almost certainly resist substantial reductions in order to hedge their bets against future US defenses.

We can still hope to accomplish important objectives in renewed negotiations with the Soviets. We may have a window of opportunity to make progress toward agreements that would be in our interest and a big improvement over SALT II. The Soviets, while trying to pressure us in the public arena, will also want to explore the possibilities of achieving mutually beneficial agreements. They likely see negotiated limitations as a way of slowing our strategic programs, and gaining the political and economic benefits that would come with improved East-West relations. For our part, we have a strong interest in preventing the Soviets from gaining the strategic arms advantages that would probably emerge absent any limitations.

Thus, I think we should devote our energies to negotiating agreements that will begin reducing offensive nuclear arms. Broad limits on space weapons are not in the US interest because of SDI. However, in the event it is needed to secure Soviet agreement to offensive arms reductions, we should be prepared to negotiate short-term limits on anti-satellite systems that would have only a minimal impact on our SDI research program.

US Ideas for Geneva

#### **Format**

The foregoing objectives could be pursued in a variety of negotiating fora. The important thing is that we avoid a "space" only forum in which the sole subject matter is SDI and ASAT, issues on which we will be on the defensive. I suggest I be authorized to tell Gromyko that we want to address defensive arms, whether based in space or elsewhere (including Soviet defensive nuclear systems) as well as offensive nuclear forces, regardless of basing. As a result of the exchange in Geneva, I would expect there to emerge a general formulation on the order of "defensive and space arms" if there are two negotiating fora, or "nuclear and space arms" if there is a single, combined forum. I would like to be authorized to accept either formulation.

#### The Offense-Defense Relationship

The most difficult and important subject for us to handle at Geneva may be the discussion of the relationship between offense and defense in the nuclear area as we see it evolving over time. The following approach would allow us to lay down a marker with the Soviets that both sides should consider the possibility of increased reliance on defenses in the longer term, while deflecting Soviet attacks on SDI by raising their actions that have undermined the ABM Treaty (a full version of this presentation is attached).<sup>2</sup>

I would begin by making clear to Gromyko that we have no aggressive intentions against the USSR but are concerned by the expansion and modernization of their nuclear forces, which force us to keep up our capabilities. Under today's conditions, each side has incentives to act quickly and

decisively with its military power, particularly in a crisis—a very unstable situation.

I would remind Gromyko how we tried in 1972 to address this problem by establishing a regime limiting both defensive and offensive capabilities, but the assumptions underlying that regime have been undermined. On the defensive side, the Soviets have done things we believe are not consistent with the ABM Treaty. More importantly, the comprehensive agreement on offensive arms that was to accompany the ABM Treaty has not been achieved.

I would tell Gromyko that, at least for the near term, we are ready to work with the Soviets to restore the regime that was thought by both sides to be our common objective in 1972. I would stress that SDI is a research program—consistent with the ABM Treaty—and note that in the long term we should recognize that, as we seek to eliminate nuclear weapons, both sides may have an interest in pursuing new defensive technologies. Such a relationship would be more stable than the current one.

#### Substance

In addition to presenting the conceptual basis for the US approach, Geneva is also an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviets—as well as Congress, Allies and western publics—that we are, as you have stated many times, prepared to negotiate seriously and constructively. To this end, I should be in a position to preview for Gromyko the general direction in which we are prepared to go in new negotiations. This would follow through on your pledge to Chernenko in your December 7 letter that I will have "concrete ideas" to present at Geneva. 3

Thus, I would want to begin laying out an approach that would lead to agreements that begin reducing nuclear arms. This approach would build on the ideas you approved for my Stockholm meeting with Gromyko last January, but which I chose not to lay out because he was unprepared for serious negotiations.

In specific terms, I would like to be authorized to indicate US readiness to move forward in several areas:

- —On START, I would like to test Soviet seriousness by suggesting the "common framework" for reductions you approved last January. This would combine elements of the two sides' previous positions—limiting missiles and bombers together, as the Soviets prefer, in return for their agreement to the real reductions we seek in destabilizing ballistic missile capabilities.
- —On INF I would also like to indicate a readiness to consider new approaches consistent with the basic concerns of the US and our allies. One possibility, which would reduce SS-20s while allowing substantial US deployments, would be equal percentage warhead reductions from current Soviet global levels and from planned US European levels, with the US having equal rights on a global basis.
- —On space, I would make clear that we are not prepared to accept any new constraints on potentially stabilizing SDI technologies. I would point out to Gromyko that SDI is at present a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty; if, at a future time, testing or deployment of systems not now permitted by the Treaty were contemplated, it would be a matter for negotiation. I would express a readiness to

negotiate seriously on space issues, but point out that space is just one aspect of a broader "defensive and space arms" question, and that existing Soviet defensive systems—particularly nuclear defensive systems—need to be addressed as well. If appropriate, I would also like to be in a position to reiterate your September suggestion to Gromyko that we consider short-term limits on ASAT testing in conjunction with Soviet agreement to limits that begin reducing nuclear arms.<sup>4</sup> (In order to minimize the impact on SDI, I believe such limits should be restricted to existing US and Soviet ASAT systems.)

#### Attachment

Paper Prepared by Paul Nitze<sup>5</sup>

Washington, undated

### A SUGGESTION AS TO HOW TO PRESENT THE OFFENSE-DEFENSE INTERACTION TO GROMYKO

#### A. General Considerations

The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the US would initiate military action against the USSR or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. We hope the USSR comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the US or its allies.

The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. We expect that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.

#### B. Tendencies toward Myopia

But it is hard to understand why the USSR places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The US is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities. Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory. Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

#### C. The Dangers Inherent in the Current Situation

This is a dangerous situation. It is one we must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

#### D. Offense-Defense

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, we hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each of us. It was accepted that each side

should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in the direction I have outlined. As one looks at the situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

You would agree, I am sure, that both sides have today substantially greater offensive nuclear capabilities than we had in 1972.

And on the defensive side, you at least have also continued to improve your capabilities. You have done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and you have also taken steps we believe may not be consistent with it.

The ABM Treaty rested on the agreed assumption that the principal limitation should be the limitation on Large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification. It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground. It was further agreed that other systems, such as anti-aircraft systems, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line

between AA defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous. Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.

Today all of those assumptions appear questionable. The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnovarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense. The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. We have seen it erected and made operational in about a month. The SA-10 and SA-X-12 antiaircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain RVs in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between AA systems and ABM systems. You are pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities, and most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.

For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place. The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. Ours are. Yours should be. If either side ever wishes to amend the

Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In our view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.

Our concurrent SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. Your country has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed even if we wanted to.

For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations. At the same time, we both recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. We believe that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides. It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To us high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and highconfidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offensedefense relationship. We recognize that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution. While the possibilities of such a development could be realized in the fairly distant future, we are

prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms.

#### Rationale:

The approach outlined above positions the Secretary to defuse SDI as an issue by linking it to our concerns regarding Soviet defensive programs and compliance with the ABM Treaty and the absence of a comprehensive agreement limiting offensive arms, i.e., it is unreasonable for the Soviets to press for new constraints on SDI—a research program permitted by the ABM Treaty—when the assumptions, letter and intent of that agreement are not being lived up to. (This, by the way, may be a more productive manner to raise our concern about Krasnoyarsk than as purely a compliance issue.) It is unlikely the Soviets will be ready to comply with the ABM agreement in this manner, which we can use to counter their anti-SDI efforts.

At the same time, this approach raises the possible transition to a defense-dominant relationship in the long run as something which both sides would be interested in and that we are prepared to discuss.

This approach, particularly the linkage of our view on SDI to Soviet compliance with the assumptions and letter of the ABM Treaty, will also prove useful in defusing SDI with publics, Allies and Congress, as well as refocusing their attention on our concerns about Soviet compliance with the ABM agreement.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive; King. According to another copy, the memorandum was drafted by Vershbow and Pifer; cleared by Nitze, Gordon, and Courtney. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Sensitive and Super Sensitive Documents, Lot 92D52, December 1984 Super Sensitive Documents)
- <sup>2</sup> Nitze drafted this presentation on the relationship between offense and defense. On December 7, he sent Lehman a draft, and the NSC Staff reviewed the paper. Shultz, Nitze, McFarlane, and Lehman discussed the paper and other approaches for Geneva in a meeting on December 10 (see <a href="Document 332">Document 332</a>). On December 15, in a memorandum to McFarlane, Lehman wrote: "The paper is intended to be a guide to our initial presentation in Geneva and does not reflect all of the factors related to offense and defense which we must take into account. My own view is that distinguishing between the near-term and the far-term will help up greatly by increasing pressure on the Soviets and by reducing political pressures on us." (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks Background Notebook)
- <sup>3</sup> See Document 328.
- <sup>4</sup> See Document 286.
- <sup>5</sup> Secret; Sensitive; King. The SACG was scheduled to meet December 26 to discuss Nitze's paper. In a December 24 memorandum, Lehman, Linhard, and Kraemer informed McFarlane: "Based on your guidance, the Chain group did draft a paper evaluating the Nitze idea. The paper was reviewed at a Chain Group IG on Saturday [December 22] and then circulated to SACG principals later that afternoon." They continued: "The paper is a reasonably good effort. One issue that has surfaced is how integral to

the Nitze idea of shifting to an emphasis on defense (vice space) is the focus on *nuclear* defensive systems.

- "—Nitze feels that it is unlikely that the Soviets will agree to a focus on limiting *nuclear defenses* and that we should be prepared to fall-back to a characterization of this area as a discussion of 'defenses'—or if ultimately necessary, 'defenses and space.' He feels that the nuclear spin is necessary to get the Soviets to move from their position (space only) and join us in agreeing to discussions about defenses. Once talks began, he would return to press a primary U.S. concern for limiting nuclear defenses and tactically use this throughout the talks.
- "—Some (OSD) feel that the US focus on <u>nuclear</u> defenses should be maintained from the very start of discussions (with no fall back to discussion of defenses—and certainly not to 'defense and space') to provide maximum protection to non-nuclear SDI options.
- "—Others (perhaps JCS) like the idea of the shift to defenses but don't like the focus on <u>nuclear</u> systems. They are concerned that we will unnecessarily alienate those who support nuclear SDI options (i.e., Teller), and that we may be foreclosing such options prematurely.

"It would be useful to explore this issue a bit on Wednesday to make sure we fully understand how principals feel about *both* the attempt to shift to an offense/defense formulation *and* the tactic of focusing on limiting nuclear defenses." (Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, SACG 12/14/1984–12/24/1984)

# 344. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, December 28, 1984

**SUBJECT** 

Geneva and Beyond: Your Discussions with Secretary Shultz

Following our brief chat this afternoon regarding your going to Geneva and your dinner with Dobrynin, I have the following thoughts which you may wish to consider as you think through your discussions with Secretary Shultz next week. (I am sharing them *only* with John Poindexter, and of course will not mention them to anyone else.)

#### Your Participation in Geneva Meetings

—Although, so far as I can recall, it is unprecedented for the President's Assistant for National Security to attend a meeting with the Soviets not chaired by the President or himself, I believe the Secretary's action in inviting you is a good thing and that your presence will add a lot to the meeting if your role is properly defined.

—The fact is that you know the arms control issues more thoroughly than anyone else in the USG, and furthermore, have discussed them in greater depth with the President, so that you are in the best position to know his mind.

—It is precisely the latter, the President's intentions, which the Soviets will be looking for, and your

comments will carry great weight in this regard.

- —The Soviets are likely to interpret your participation as either (1) an indication of the President's seriousness and commitment; or (2) a sign that there is division in the USG and that the Secretary must be watched.
  - —We need, therefore to make sure that they draw the first rather than the second conclusion. (The presence of a large, multi-agency delegation at Geneva, though not at the actual table, tends to encourage the second.)
  - —To do this, it will be important that you play a prominent role in the conversation, but one in complete harmony with what Shultz has to say.
  - —I believe, therefore, that you should have a clear agreement with the Secretary regarding who covers what, and that you should aim to present roughly 40% of the U.S. position in terms of time actually spent speaking.
- —As soon as you are sure you will be going, the Soviets should be notified. This will give them an opportunity, if they choose, to add a senior official to their delegation. (They may have trouble, however, deciding just *who* is an appropriate counterpart, so we should give them as much time to think it over as we can.)
  - —The notification can be done most rapidly by Secretary Shultz telephoning Dobrynin to say that he has persuaded you<sup>2</sup> to go, and that he would appreciate his notifying Gromyko. (He should not suggest any change in the Soviet delegation, since

they will make up their own minds on this in any case.)

#### The U.S. Delegation

—We must make every effort to keep our group at the table as small as possible. We have already been told that Gromyko's group will be five plus interpreter (Gromyko, Karpov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin, Obukhov and Sukhodrev). We should make every effort not to exceed this.

—On our side, Shultz, you and Nitze provide the core. We can add two more and still be in balance with the Soviet side.

—At the risk of seeming self-serving, I would also suggest that my presence would be useful in several respects: I am the only one of our group who knows Russian well and can detect nuances left out of the translation (or asides which may not be translated). Additionally, I have observed Gromyko at some 40 or 50 meetings over a 12-year period and can provide some historical perspective to his approach and mannerisms. Finally, my presence would underscore—in a perhaps minor, but significant sense—your status as co-interlocutor, along with Shultz. The others will be *his* subordinates, and you should have a member of your staff at the table as well.

—This leaves one slot, and I believe it should be filled by Hartman. This is important both for protocol (since Dobrynin will be there) and to maintain the reciprocal status of our Ambassador in Moscow. If he is excluded, then the Soviets will tend to disregard him as an *interlocuteur valable*.

#### Scheduling the Work

—The presence of a large U.S. delegation, many not participating in the talks, as well as the horde of media representatives will greatly complicate budgeting the time of the participants. There will be an immediate requirement after each session to prepare a report to the President, to brief the full U.S. delegation, and to decide on next steps. After the final meeting, the Secretary must also brief the press. Since there may be only 2–3 hours between the morning and afternoon sessions, you might wish to discuss with the Secretary what procedures will be followed to ensure that everything gets done in an orderly fashion.

—I would suggest that the Secretary plan to caucus with meeting participants immediately after each session in order to assign work responsibilities and also to decide whether any aspects of the meeting should *not* be conveyed to other members of the U.S. delegation. (Though I doubt this will prove necessary, there should be a fail-safe mechanism to ensure that those in the room are aware of any details which should not be discussed with colleagues.) Alternatively, the rule could be established in advance that *only* the Secretary and you will brief *anyone* until written guidance has been prepared and approved by the two of you.

—I would also recommend that sufficient time be left following the last meeting to get all ducks in a row before Shultz's departure. I believe that a second session on the 8th is a virtual certainty, and am concerned that a departure early that evening could unnecessarily compress the time available to wrap up everything. In addition to briefing the press, you and the Secretary will have to devote time to deciding in detail on the content of the briefings Nitze will provide the Allies at Brussels, and we

should make sure that time is available for due reflection before everyone rushes off.

#### Your Trip to London

- —The idea of your stopping by to brief Thatcher on SDI is an excellent one, assuming that a private meeting with her can be arranged.
- —The only potential problem I can see is that, if your trip to London is widely known, it could give some offense to the other Allies, who might assume that the purpose is to give her preferential treatment in briefing on Geneva.
  - —It will be difficult to keep the London trip secret, since it will be known that you were with Shultz in Geneva, and that you did not return with him. (His arrival at Andrews will presumably be covered by the media.)
  - —A possible alternative would be for you to brief Thatcher on the way to Geneva—which could possibly be done without attracting public attention—and even if it did, would be less likely to cause offense to the other Allies than a private meeting just after Geneva. This would require an appointment on Saturday the 5th and departure for London the night of the 4th. Such a schedule would allow you to arrive in Geneva the night of the 5th or the morning of the 6th to participate in any last-minute discussions with Shultz before the Monday meeting.

Beyond Geneva: A Confidential Channel

- —Dobrynin was right in his comments to you at his dinner that we need a private channel if we are to make any real progress in resolving important problems with the Soviets.
- —However, we should continue to refuse it if it involves Dobrynin alone. This simply gives the Soviets too many advantages. A reciprocal arrangement, however, could be most beneficial to both sides.
- —If the Soviets are serious about negotiating, they will accept a reciprocal arrangement, despite their obvious and understandable preference for an arrangement which gives them access to our policy makers and denies us the same to theirs.
- —Ideally, we should arrange to use both our Ambassadors in this capacity, with each having access comparable to the other. Achieving this should be an operational objective for 1985.
  - —At present, however, this will be difficult to arrange, since our Ambassador does not speak Russian, and to be effective these contacts should be one-on-one. (Several potential Soviet interlocutors know little English and those who have some rarely speak and understand it well enough to use it confidently without help.)
  - —In the interim we might wish to consider a discreet offer to resume the conversations started earlier this year, but not pursued since March. $\frac{3}{2}$

Beyond Geneva: Organizing for Coordinated Negotiations

—Although Nitze is now installed to keep an eye on the arms control process, I still feel that we will be in a better

position to see that the overall relationship with the Soviets is pursued vigorously, consistently and with appropriate discretion but effective public diplomacy, if a senior officer is designated at State to coordinate and supervise the whole process and report directly to the Secretary. I have previously offered some ideas on this,<sup>4</sup> which you might wish to discuss with Shultz if you find them reasonable.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron December 1984 (5/5). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Not for System. Sent for information.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The phrase "persuaded you" was underlined twice, likely by McFarlane.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Matlock is likely referring to his March 14 meeting with Menshikov. See <u>Document 195</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 320</u>.

## 345. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Palm Springs, California, December 30, 1984

SUBJECT Preparations for Geneva

We have reached the climax of our preparations for Geneva. As a footnote, looking back on other preparations during the Nixon and Ford Administrations, this has been by far the smoothest. This hasn't had anything to do with me; it has been the consequence of your willingness to invest a substantial amount of time in listening to opposing viewpoints among your Cabinet officers as they arose, and providing firm guidance on your thinking. This means that today we have put behind us virtually all of the problems. It is true that a few remain but I expect we can resolve these here in Palm Springs. (S)

As you know, we have two purposes at Geneva. First, we want to get Soviet agreement to open formal talks within a month or so on the entire family of nuclear arms control issues; in short, to establish the format or procedures under which we will do business in the coming months. Second, we want to begin a process of education and persuasion with regard to your view of how together we can agree on a road which will lead us toward less reliance on offensive systems and more on defensive systems. This latter goal represents a truly historic initiative. For a generation the world has lived under the surreal notion that we are better off being unable to defend ourselves under a balance of terror. Your concept of changing that

has provoked enormous public interest and criticism. But there is no question that you have the moral high ground with the American people. In order to assure that we keep it that way, we have been preparing a "public affairs blitz" involving your speaking to the nation, and a widespread campaign involving dozens of spokesmen inside and outside of government who will carry the gospel into the 14 major media markets in the next three months. I intend to meet with the network news directors next week to state plainly that this issue is of such historic importance as to warrant a truly vigorous national debate and that you have directed me to make available to them our full cooperation in presenting our rationale and technical concept (within obvious limits). As a separate but related matter, you have thrown the left into an absolute tizzy. They are left in the position of advocating the most bloodthirsty strategy— Mutual Assured Destruction—as a means to keep the peace. (TS)

In helping you to reach final decisions, it seems to me that two stages are in order. First, last week at the conclusion of our work, I invited your Cabinet officers to submit their final views to you. This was as much to assure that everyone felt comfortable that they had been heard and to help to minimize guerrilla press warfare. Those views are attached. There is nothing particularly new in them but I would recommend that you scan the highlighted portions. I should call to your attention Bill Casey's rather bearish memo on how verification problems are going to grow worse in the years ahead (Tab 4). That is not central to the Geneva work, but is an issue we must give quite a lot more attention to in the months ahead and I have set work in motion to do this. (TS)

The second stage will be your actual review of a Decision Directive which I will have ready for you tomorrow morning. In it I have tried to capture compromise positions which will minimize the margin of disagreement between Cap and George. I have sent it to George today in draft and will try to get it to Cap as soon as he arrives tomorrow. $^4$  (TS)

There is one important change in the game plan we are proposing, Mr President. It concerns our preference for the forum in which we talk about strategic defense. Under the Soviet formulation, "Preventing the Militarization of Space" we would be left on the defensive with the entire focus being on our space research while they get off relatively scot free. But, as you know, they have had a far more ambitious "defensive" effort underway than we have for the past 15 years. It just so happens that most of theirs has been on ground-based air defense and ground-based ABM systems. All of us think it would be far wiser not to agree to "space talks" but rather to broaden the scope to deal with "nuclear defensive systems." This would put the Soviets in the box since they have a number of ground-based nuclear defensive systems, while most of our research is on nonnuclear systems. It would enable us to point out publicly that the defensive balance favors the Soviets rather dramatically. In sum, instead of proposing three fora— START, INF and SPACE—as we discussed three weeks ago, we now propose that you approve our proposing two nuclear offensive (which would encompass both START and INF), and nuclear defensive—negotiations. (TS)

After you review these two documents—this package containing the views of your Cabinet officers—and the draft decision document I will send you tomorrow morning, I would appreciate the opportunity to meet with you tomorrow (Monday $^5$ —tentatively set for 11:00 a.m.) to get your reactions. Then if you wish, you could also meet with

George and Cap on Tuesday morning before signing the directive. I am at your disposal. (TS)

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-4-7. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)
- $\frac{2}{2}$  The memoranda are not attached but are printed as  $\frac{2}{2}$  Documents 338, 339, 340, and  $\frac{2}{3}$ .
- <sup>3</sup> See footnote 2, Document 338.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 348</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> December 31. See <u>footnote 2, Document 346</u>.

## 346. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Palm Springs, California, undated

SUBJECT

Geneva Arms Control Talks, January 7-8, 1985—Decision Package

#### *ISSUE*

Whether or not to approve the attached Decision Directive setting the context and providing specific instructions for Secretary Shultz and the US delegation at the forthcoming talks in Geneva.

#### **BACKGROUND**

In preparation for the January 7–8, 1985, US-Soviet arms control talks in Geneva, the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) and the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) have deliberated in a step-by-step process leading up to the decisions to be made by you on instructions for the US delegation headed by Secretary Shultz.<sup>2</sup>

The attached package provides the major elements necessary to your decision as follows: Tab A—A Draft Decision Directive (prepared by NSC staff on the basis of the above deliberations); Tab B—Views of Agency Principals; Tab C—Summary of START, INF, and ASAT Arms Control Studies (prepared by SACG).<sup>3</sup>

DECISION DIRECTIVE (TAB A) The proposed National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) provides the overall national security and arms control context, as well as specific objectives and instructions for the Geneva talks. It provides our best recommendation on how, on a consistent basis, to resolve a number of interrelated issues, and it provides a coherent approach. It is this NSDD (Tab A) that we are asking you to review and approve. The other elements of this package are intended to provide you the counsel of your principal advisors and to inform you of the status of interagency work as you consider the NSDD.

VIEWS OF PRINCIPALS (TAB B) Views on substantive issues in Geneva are as follows: US/Soviet Objectives. All principals and agencies agree that hard bargaining lies ahead in Geneva in the search for constructive US/Soviet dialogue and that the priority US arms control objectives there should be both the resumption of negotiations on nuclear arms reductions and protection of the Strategic Defense Initiative. They agree with US intelligence assessments that Soviet priorities in Geneva are to block SDI and limit US ASAT capability by bans or moratoria and, in addition, to block further NATO INF deployments while avoiding Soviet reductions. They agree also that the Soviet Union will pursue a vigorous propaganda campaign aimed at publics, our Allies, and to Congress.

START and INF. There is general agreement among agencies and principals that the baselines, tradeoffs, and flexibilities inherent in the current US positions (as spelled out in the SACG's summary paper at Tab C) offer a sound basis for future talks. However, for START, Secretary Shultz seeks additional authority to table a controversial "common framework" package he privately developed a year ago for use in his meeting with Gromyko at the

Stockholm Conference (CDE), but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work. Also for START, Ken Adelman proposes that if the Soviet Union "seems serious," we should express willingness to agree to higher levels of warheads (7,000 v. 5,000) and a specific tradeoff of limiting heavy bombers plus heavy missiles to a total of 400 on each side, with no more than 200 of these to be heavy missiles. For *INF*, both Shultz and Adelman propose to change from the US position of insisting on equal global limits and rights to a concept of equal *percentage* reductions in *deployed* Soviet missiles globally and planned US European deployments, so long as an equal global ceiling is retained. In addition, Adelman (and Paul Nitze) favors renewed consideration of the walk-in-the-woods formula which would eliminate any US Pershing II missiles and which is opposed by all other agencies.

ASAT. The Interdepartmental Group could not come up with any limitation proposal (whether short- or long-term) that was agreed to be verifiable or compatible with SDI research or the US national interest. However, the Secretary of State believes that a "temporary" testing moratorium might be appropriate, and the Director of ACDA believes that talks on limiting "incidents in space" may be appropriate and that after substantial additional US ASAT testing has taken place, it might become possible to consider a future ASAT testing moratorium.

Format. Almost all believe it appropriate to consider proposing a division of talks in Geneva into discussion of offensive systems, on the one hand, and defensive systems on the other hand, regardless of basing mode, with space not designated as a separate category. However, Ambassador Rowny prefers to discuss all strategic defense-related issues within the START framework.

Verification and Compliance. Most principals (e.g., Weinberger, Casey, Vessey, and Adelman) raise these as areas of special concern impacting upon Geneva.

#### Individual views are as follows:

- 1. George Shultz. Secretary Shultz's comprehensive memorandum generally reflects interagency views developed through the Senior Arms Control Group process, and by Paul Nitze, concerning objectives and offense/defense format. However, Shultz differs substantially from others' views in recommending: (1) that the US be prepared to negotiate "short-term" limits on testing existing ASAT systems that would aim to have "only a minimal impact" on our SDI research program; (2) a START "framework" package he initially proposed privately to you a year ago, but which was opposed by other agencies and was subsequently overtaken by additional interagency work; and (3) consideration of equal percentage US and Soviet reductions in deployed INF missiles.
- 2. Cap Weinberger. In two memoranda, Secretary Weinberger expresses profound concern about Soviet violations of arms control agreements and counsels patience and persistence in the talks focused on deep, equitable, and verifiable reductions in offensive weapons. He particularly stresses that the US should not give up the SDI or agree to bans or moratoria on anti-satellite weapons. On SDI he urges that it be presented as the best hope for mankind and for arms control; as designed to protect not any particular target (such as missile bases or cities), but as a reliable shield to protect all; as destroying weapons, not people; and as causing not the militarization of space, but as using space to keep the earth free of nuclear holocausts. On ASAT he shares the concern

expressed by the Joint Chiefs that there is a major link between anti-satellite weapons and the development of SDI capabilities, and that it is therefore vital that we not accept any bans or moratoria on ASAT weapons. Concerning verification, he stresses the importance of on-site inspection and international observer teams and other cooperative measures as a means of providing verification assurance not available from satellites.

- 3. John Vessey. On behalf of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Vessey expresses the importance of approaching strategic modernization, arms reductions and a shift to strategic defense as integrated components of our deterrent nuclear strategy. The Chiefs consider the preservation of SDI to be essential and stress the inherent links between ASAT and SDI research. They point out that substantive limits on ASAT will inevitably affect SDI (since SDI will have the intrinsic capability to destroy satellites). Further, since the technologies involved are highly similar for ASAT and SDI, limitations on ASAT could inhibit the early development of SDI alternatives. The Chiefs cite these facts as arguing for extreme caution in accepting any specific limits on ASAT. The Chiefs support the proposed offense/defense format.
- 4. Ken Adelman. ACDA Director Adelman joins an emerging consensus on seeking two sets of talks, one on offense (with separate working groups on START and INF), and one on defense, which Adelman believes could be "coordinated" by Umbrella discussions. On START, however, he proposes to consider raising the warhead limit from 5,000–7,000 and a specific heavy bomber/heavy missile tradeoff, a concept derivative of an idea studied earlier but not used. On INF he proposes the "walk-in-the-woods" formula rejected by all other agencies and joins Shultz in considering possible equal percent reductions rather than equal levels for

deployed Soviet and planned US missile forces. On space and ASAT, he also goes beyond the general consensus by supporting space "rules of the road" or "incidents in space" negotiations and by supporting consideration of a possible future ASAT moratorium following further US tests.<sup>7</sup>

- 5. Ed Rowny. START Negotiator Rowny strongly supports the current START position as a basis for sound negotiations on offensive arms reductions and generally shares the consensus of other principals and agencies concerning the US approach to the Geneva talks. However, he strongly opposes the consensus of others who favor proposing future negotiations divided into fora on offensive and defensive arms. For reasons cited in his memorandum, he believes it wiser and safer to set the basic categories as those of "nuclear arms" and "outer space arms," respectively, with the latter category to be negotiated only upon prompt Soviet resumption of START and INF negotiations. Additionally, he proposes to keep strategic defense-related items within the framework of START (wherein missile and bomber defense issues and the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty have been the subjects of prior discussions).8
- 6. *Bill Casey*. Director Casey, in the first of two memoranda, points to severe limitations upon existing and prospective National Technical Means (NTM) in assuring compliance with arms control agreements, limitations which are increased by Soviet deception practices, missile mobility, and new offensive technologies. He thus concludes that verification will be a pacing factor in any future strategic arrangement with the USSR and must be an integral (and even more important) part of our planning. In a second memorandum, Casey assesses Soviet objectives and programs, noting that while the Soviets are determined to block SDI and to constrain US strategic modernization

programs, they will not accept significant arms reductions, nor let any arms control agreement slow their own research and development efforts, nor accept an agreement preventing a significant level of Soviet force modernization. Casey strongly urges you to resist pressure from the public and within the US Government to offer up the SDI research program or to restrict necessary development or testing in an effort to get an arms control accord, since he believes there is no way such concessions on SDI can produce reductions in Soviet offensive forces of commensurate value in long-term stability and safety. He also counsels against any concessions (in a Geneva communique following the Geneva meeting) on including UK and French systems or on accepting Soviet definitions of "prevention of militarization of space."

SUMMARY OF START, INF, AND ASAT ARMS CONTROL STUDIES (TAB C) In summary, the interagency positions for these three areas are as follows: START

- —Ceiling of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads;
- —Ceiling of 850-1,250 deployed ballistic missiles;
- —Ceiling of 400 heavy bombers, including Backfire;
- -Maximum of 20 ALCMs per heavy bomber;
- —Throw-weight limit on ballistic missiles either direct, or through an acceptable Soviet offer, or indirect (2,500 ICBM warhead subceiling, and 210 heavy/medium ICBMs, including no more than 110 heavy ICBMs); —Willingness to trade off between areas of US and Soviet interest and advantage; Build-down of ballistic missile warheads and heavy bombers; and —Study of alternative approaches.

—Five US criteria include: (1) equal rights and limits; (2) US/Soviet systems only; (3) global limits; (4) no adverse effect on NATO's conventional deterrent capability; and (5) effective verification; —Zero US/Soviet LRINF missiles is preferred outcome; — Interim equal global limit on warheads and launchers; —Possible limits on specific LRINF aircraft;

—Consider not offsetting entire Soviet global LRINF missile deployment by US deployment in Europe; — Distribute future US reductions from planned Pershing II and GLCM levels appropriately; —Accept an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads; and —Study of alternative approaches.

#### **ASAT**

—The President's March, 1984, report to Congress reported on a one-year interagency examination of five potential ASAT arms control approaches and concluded that: (1) ASAT and SDI technology overlap is pervasive and any effective ASAT limitation would restrict SDI aspects; (2) no verifiable, equitable, and consequential limitation that does not restrict SDI has been discovered; (3) an ASAT test ban would impact on SDI schedules and costs and leave Soviets with an ASAT advantage; and (4) while a comprehensive ASAT ban is clearly not feasible or in the US interest, the Administration would continue to seek to develop specific limits on specific systems.

—Subsequent to the above report, agency views diverged sharply on the feasibility and impact of

possible ASAT limitations, with some (Defense, JCS, and CIA) holding to the above views and with some (State and ACDA) believing a "temporary" testing moratorium (State) or a future moratorium and "incidents in space" talks (ACDA) could be considered.

—During the summer, three sharply contrasting alternative approaches to discussion of space arms control issues were considered by agencies, with very strong disagreements reflecting different agency views.

#### Recommendations

In view of the above considerations, I recommend:

That you consider the proposed Decision Directive at Tab A on the context and instructions for the Shultz-Gromyko meeting in Geneva, giving it your final approval (with appropriate revisions, if required) following further discussion with principals.

That you review the messages from principals at Tab B.

That you review, as time permits, the summary of START, INF, and ASAT arms control studies at Tab  $C.\frac{10}{}$ 

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Ronald Lehman Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks—Background #2 01/01/1985–01/03/1985. Top Secret. Sent for action. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) The memorandum is

unsigned. In a December 28 memorandum, Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman forwarded to McFarlane this memorandum and a "proposed decision package for the President's use in making final decisions and in providing instructions to the delegation for discussion of arms control issues in Geneva on January 7 to 8, 1985." They continued: "The cover memorandum from you to the President outlines the contents of each of the three major tabs and portrays the fundamental consensus and differences of principals and agencies on the substantive and procedural issues resolved in the Decision Directive." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]).

<sup>2</sup> The package (see <u>footnote 1</u>, above) was likely used during Reagan's December 31 meetings with McFarlane, Shultz, and Weinberger to finalize the plans for Geneva. In his diary, Reagan wrote: "This New Year party at Lee & Walter Annenbergs house is tradition. It's also become my once a year golf game. With all the socializing, had time for meetings with Bud, George S. & Cap pinning down approach George will take with Gromyko in Geneva Jan. 7 & 8. Then Jan. 2nd it was back on A.F.1 & the White House." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 412) In his memoir, McFarlane wrote of the Geneva preparations: "In California, I had a long session with the President to go over this material and then moderated sessions with Reagan, Shultz and Weinberger. On the afternoon of New Year's Eve, we met at Sunnylands, the estate of Walter Annenberg, founder of TV Guide and a well-known philanthropist and friend of Reagan's. We sat in the library, and everyone was in casual attire. Cap, predictably, wanted the line held on one or two levels of force, but the arguments were not shrill, and within 24 hours we had all come to an agreement on the

language to be approved by the President as the instructions Shultz would carry to Geneva to negotiate with the Soviets." (McFarlane, Special Trust, p. 303) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "The struggle now centered over my instructions for the upcoming Gromyko session in Geneva. While the focus would be on the scope and structure of renewed arms control talks, the underpinning, I persuaded the president, should be the substantive positions we had developed in 1983 on INF and the flexibility worked through on START over the past year but never presented to the Soviets. Beyond that, we had a philosophy to present about the emerging strategic reality and the need for a shift of emphasis toward defense. The final product—16 tightly packed pages—was discussed carefully with the president on December 31. Cap Weinberger, Bud McFarlane, and I were present. Cap argued. Bud and I met his points. The president approved the document, which carried the recommendations of all three of us. I finally had the negotiating room I needed." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, pp. 510-511) <sup>3</sup> Tabs A. B. and C are not attached but are summarized in this memorandum. Tab A, NSDD 153, is printed as Document 348.

- <sup>4</sup> See Document 343.
- <sup>5</sup> See <u>Documents 340</u> and <u>342</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 339</u>.
- <sup>2</sup> Adelman's December 26 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, NSDD (National Security Decision Directive) & Talking Points [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva] (1/2).
- <sup>8</sup> Rowny's December 28 memorandum is not attached. A copy is in the Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Arms Control Talks I 01/01/1985-01/07/1985 (1).

<sup>9</sup> See <u>Document 338</u> and <u>footnote 2 thereto</u>.

<sup>10</sup> There is no indication of Reagan's approval or disapproval of the recommendations but see <u>footnote 1</u>, <u>Document 348</u>.

### 347. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

SUBJECT Instructions for the Geneva Talks

Following our session yesterday,<sup>2</sup> I had a two-hour meeting with Cap and George to review the draft instructions.<sup>3</sup> On the whole it went well, although George is concerned that he is not given sufficient authority to advance new proposals in the START and INF areas. Cap is leary of getting too detailed with new ideas at Geneva since it will reward the Soviets for walking out. George recognizes the problem but believes that if the Soviets walk out again and we have not presented some sign of flexibility, our own press and congress will criticize our "lack of seriousness," and perhaps impose conditional authorities on our systems (e.g. MX) unilaterally. (S)

To try to meet the threshold of what it takes to appear reasonable but without giving anything of consequence away which could be better used later, I have expanded the sections on START and INF (pp. 13–14). My purpose is to spell out just what is meant by the "tradeoffs" you told Gromyko we would be willing to talk about in START. I have simply stated that we can envision trading some of our advantages in Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs) for their agreement to lower levels of ballistic missiles. I don't get into specific numbers, although even that would be within the bounds of what we have already committed to. (S)

With respect to INF, I have added a reference at the end of the paragraph authorizing a rhetorical example of how we might provide a face-saving way for the Russians to reduce to an equal level of warheads. This would be through the adoption of "equal percentage cuts." Under this concept both of us would cut launchers—not warheads—by the same percentage. Since they have three warheads on each SS-20 launcher, they would end up cutting more warheads than we would. We must be careful in pursuing such a course since not all "equal percentage cuts" would be in our interest. For example, our GLCM launchers have 4 warheads each. I have added a cautionary note to the instructions as well so that your delegation will be careful in this regard. (S)

With these changes and a few other editorial changes which Cap suggested (and which are marked in red in the left margin), I expect George and Cap to be comfortable with the instructions. (S)

We will join you at 4:15 today to go over this final draft prior to your reaching decisions. Both of them have copies of this new draft. $^4$  (S)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Chronological File, Sensitive Chron 1985; NLR-362-7-38-3-8. Secret. Sent for information. According to the President's Daily Diary, McFarlane was with Reagan in Palm Springs from December 29 to January 2. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 2</u>, <u>Document 346</u>.

 $<sup>\</sup>frac{3}{2}$  The draft NSDD was in the decision package prepared by Kraemer, Linhard, and Lehman. See <u>footnotes 1</u> and  $\frac{3}{2}$ , <u>Document 346</u>.

<sup>4</sup> See <u>footnote 1, Document 348</u>.

### 348. National Security Decision Directive 1531

Palm Springs, California, January 1, 1985

### INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING IN GENEVA

The Situation Today. We find ourselves at a unique point in the history of U.S.-Soviet relations. In 1981, we embarked on two major efforts. First, we initiated a military modernization program determined to reverse a long period of decline and apparent unwillingness in this country to invest in our own security in the face of the unprecedented Soviet military buildup of the last decade or more. This modernization program was specifically designed to garner sufficient strength to ensure Western security through deterrence and to provide the incentives necessary to cause the Soviet Union to join us in negotiating significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals of both sides. Second, we committed ourselves to seeking equitable and verifiable agreements which would increase stability and security, reduce the risk of war, and lead to significant reductions in nuclear arsenals. (C)

Over the past four years, the United States has been able to sustain support for its strategic modernization program. With continued resolve, this program promises to restore the nuclear balance between the Soviet Union and the United States by the end of the decade. During this same period, with a firmness of purpose, the NATO Alliance stood solidly with us. Despite an unprecedented Soviet propaganda campaign, NATO began the deployments of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles necessary to modernize NATO's LRINF missile force and

redress the balance in this area also. At the same time, we offered a range of concrete proposals to the Soviet Union aimed at permitting each government to move to much lower levels of both strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. (C)

In response, the Soviet Union has focused primarily on intimidation to move us off our sound course, including implied threats, blatant attempts to drive wedges between ourselves and our allies, and the abandonment of ongoing negotiations. However, it is now clear that these efforts have failed. This has been an important factor in influencing the Soviet Union to alter its approach and agree to join us, once again, in negotiations aimed at reducing nuclear arms. While the Soviet Union can be expected to continue its extensive propaganda efforts, we must hope that the opportunity for real movement is better today than in previous years. (C)

The Soviet Union and SDI. Another important factor influencing Soviet behavior, especially in returning to nuclear arms reduction negotiations, is the Soviet desire to block our Strategic Defense Initiative as soon as possible. The Soviet Union knows that the SDI represents a major U.S. resurgence of interest in strategic defense. The USSR has long had a vigorous research, development and deployment program in defensive systems of all kinds. In fact, over the last two decades the Soviet Union has invested as much overall in its strategic defenses as it has in its massive strategic offensive buildup. As a result, today it enjoys certain relative advantages in the area of defenses. The Soviet Union will certainly attempt to protect this massive, long-term investment. (C)

The Soviet Union fully recognizes that the SDI program—and most especially, that portion of the program which

holds out the promise of destroying missiles in the boost, post-boost, and mid-course portions of their flight—offers the prospect of permitting the U.S. technologically to flank years of Soviet defensive investment and to shift the "stateof-the-art" in defenses into areas of comparative U.S. advantage. This is one of the reasons that the primary Soviet focus has not been on attacking the idea of the increased contribution of defenses to deterrence, which lies at the heart of the SDI program; but rather, on "preventing the militarization of space." While the Soviet Union may also be concerned about other potential "space weapons" programs, in large part, its focus on space reflects an attempt to confine future U.S. defensive activity within more traditional areas which are consistent with the longterm pattern of Soviet investment and where the Soviet Union now holds a competitive advantage. (C)

The U.S. Rationale for SDI. For our part, we approach SDI from a different perspective. (C)

For the past twenty years, we have based our assumptions on how deterrence can best be assured on the basic idea that if each side were able to maintain the ability to threaten retaliation against any attack and impose on an aggressor costs that were clearly out of balance with any potential gains, this would suffice to prevent conflict. The notion of the costs needed to deter aggression have changed over time. For example, we have moved away from simply holding at risk significant portions of Soviet industry and population. Today, we don't target population. Instead, our current strategy focuses on being able to deny basic Soviet war aims by destroying the forces and leadership needed to exploit aggression. Nevertheless, our basic reliance on nuclear retaliation, provided by offensive nuclear forces, to deter aggression has not changed over this period. (C)

This basic idea—that if each side maintained roughly equal forces and equal capability to retaliate against attack, stability and deterrence would be maintained—also served as the foundation for the U.S. approach to the SALT process. At the time that process began, the U.S. concluded that offensive deterrence was not only sensible, but necessary, since we anticipated that neither side could develop the technology for a defensive system which could effectively deter the other side. The ground-based, terminal, anti-ballistic missile systems then under consideration were both expensive and uncertain, and attacking ballistic missiles during any other phase of their flight was technically infeasible. Further, we lacked the basic computational capability to process the information needed guickly enough to manage a defense against a large number of inbound warheads. (C)

Today, however, the situation is different. Emerging technologies offer the possibility of defenses that did not exist before. Of equal importance, the trends in the development of Soviet strategic forces, as well as the problems of Soviet deception and non-compliance with existing agreements, will, over the long-term, call into question the fundamental assumptions upon which our current strategy is based. (S)

The Soviet Union's relentless improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, steadily attacks the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. Further, it is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of

its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership—ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of superhard bunkers to protect its leadership—thus further eroding the effectiveness of our offensive deterrent. (S)

These trends indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence will likely lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for several decades. (C)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, which includes all the actual deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. It provides a powerful deterrent to any Soviet decision to rapidly expand its ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. (U)

However, the overriding importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis of deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic competition. This need not lead to a decisive U.S. unilateral advantage—and that is certainly not our goal.

However, if the promise of SDI is achieved, the Soviet advantage accumulated over the past twenty years at great cost will be largely neutralized. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems—systems which do not threaten anyone. (C)

The Expected Soviet Approach. Over the next year, the Soviet Union may wish to shift its tactics and offer the prospect of a better U.S.-Soviet relationship in return for constraints on specific U.S. programs. However, no matter how the rhetoric may soften as the prospect of renewed negotiations looms, we should expect to be tested in different, more subtle, but just as serious ways. As a minimum, the Soviet Union will certainly continue to attempt to exploit any vulnerabilities they perceive to undermine public, allied and Congressional support for the general U.S. approach and for specific U.S. positions. (S)

The Soviet Union will likely continue to emphasize its theme of desiring to "prevent the militarization of space." In doing so, it will attempt to block advanced technologies associated with SDI in an attempt to confine defensive developments to areas of Soviet advantage and, thus, to slow the entire thrust of the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Soviet Union will also propose restraints on U.S. antisatellite capability to inhibit or block related SDI technologies. Finally, it will likely continue to resist U.S. attempts to negotiate deep reductions in existing offensive forces, especially ballistic missiles and warheads. (S)

Expected Soviet Approach in Geneva. At the upcoming meeting in Geneva, there is a possibility that the Soviet Union will seek to be very reasonable and will take the opportunity offered by the meeting to lay the groundwork for serious negotiations in a range of areas. The U.S.

delegation will be prepared to encourage the Soviet delegation to do so. On the other hand, we should anticipate that the Soviet Union desires, at that meeting, to get an agreement on modalities and the procedures for subsequent negotiations, as well as on the subject and objectives of those negotiations, that protects existing Soviet areas of advantage and, consequently, prejudices U.S. long-term interests. The Soviet Union has already launched a sophisticated propaganda campaign designed to support this goal. (S)

The U.S. Approach. For our part, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows.

- 1. We will continue to pursue the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to reduction of existing nuclear arsenals, and to seek other complementary means (including cooperative and confidence-building measures) of enhancing stability and reducing the risk of war. (S)
- 2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the ASAT/SDI program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)
- 3. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. To support this approach publicly, the following paragraph can be used to characterize to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics the basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing at the Geneva meetings and in subsequent negotiations. (C)

"During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon an increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree." (U)

Specific U.S. Goals for the January Meeting in Geneva. The following are the specific U.S. goals for the meeting between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in January.<sup>2</sup> (C)

- 1. Establish, without concessions or pre-conditions, a sustained, formal negotiating process with the Soviet Union on offensive nuclear arms which would permit us to pursue our goal of achieving deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. (S)
- 2. Keep START and INF issues substantively separate, and preferably procedurally separate if possible. (S)

- 3. Shape the nature of future discussions or negotiations in other areas to support U.S. interests by:
  - a. proposing negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums as appropriate;
  - b. avoiding a "space only" forum;
  - c. specifically protecting the SDI program and, thus, the promise offered by SDI; and
  - d. providing for future discussions about the longterm maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)
- 4. Keep the Soviet Union on the defensive at both the private and public levels with special attention to:
  - a. keeping the onus on Moscow to resume serious negotiations; and
  - b. denying the Soviet Union a sustainable basis for charging that a "failure" of the Geneva meeting was the responsibility of the U.S. (C)
- 5. Avoid public negotiation with the Soviet Union. (C)
- 6. Lay the groundwork necessary in the discussions with the Soviet delegation to provide the basis for later garnering public and Congressional support for the U.S. position. (S)

Addressing the Offense/Defense Relationship. Early in the discussions, the U.S. delegation will provide to the Soviet delegation our conceptual thinking about the

offense/defense relationship. This presentation is critically important since it sets the stage for the U.S. proposals about format, object and substance which follow. It also should permit the U.S. to preempt Soviet charges about the U.S. SDI program by citing the record of Soviet actions which have called into question the fundamental assumptions underlying the ABM Treaty and which have contributed to the growing instability in the current situation. (S)

This presentation should make the following points:

- —The United States has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact unless it or its allies were to be directly attacked. The U.S. hopes the Soviet Union comparably has no intention of initiating an attack on the United States or its allies.
- —The United States is determined to assure itself and its allies of a high-quality deterrent to an attack by anyone on our vital security interests. The U.S. expects that the Soviet Union intends to maintain a similar capability.
- —It is hard to understand why the Soviet Union places so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. The U.S. is forced thereby not to neglect its own offensive and defensive capabilities.
- —Perhaps the explanation is to be found in the fact that each side looks at the nuclear strategic situation primarily from the viewpoint of its own security. Each

must assume that at some time a situation may arise in which the risk of war in the immediate future cannot be dismissed. In that situation each side will carefully analyze what it must do to deny the other side a meaningful military victory.

—Under today's conditions and those of the foreseeable future, both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation which could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely.

—This is a dangerous situation. It is one the U.S. and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.

—In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the U.S. hoped that both sides would be able to agree on measures which would be helpful to the security of each nation. It was accepted that each side should have rough equality in the aggregate power of its nuclear weapons systems, that if defensive capabilities were to be limited, there should be comparable limitations on offensive capabilities, and that limitations should preclude break-out, circumvention or failure to adhere to the letter and spirit of the limitations agreed upon.

—For a time it appeared that we had made some progress in that direction. As one looks at the

situation today, it appears that U.S. anticipation of such progress may have been illusory.

- —Since that time, your building program—in both offensive and defensive systems—has violated any reasonable sense of strategic balance.
- —And on the defensive side, the Soviet Union at least has also continued to improve its capabilities. It has done everything permitted by the ABM Treaty, and it has also taken steps we believe are almost certainly not consistent with it.
- —The ABM Treaty rested importantly on the limitation of large Phased-Array Radars; these radars took five to ten years to build and were easily identifiable. The limits on such radars would assure each side against break-out or circumvention in less time than would be required for the other side to take offsetting actions.
- —Allowance was made for early warning radars, but these were to be on the periphery, outward looking and should not be defended, and for radars required for space track and for national technical means of verification.
- —It was also agreed that ABM interceptors, launchers, and radars should be non-mobile, non-transportable, i.e., fixed to the ground.
- —It was further agreed that other systems, such as air defenses, should not be given ABM capabilities, i.e., that the line between air defenses and ABM defenses should be kept clear and unambiguous.

- —Finally, it was agreed that the ABM Treaty should be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty on offensive nuclear forces of indefinite duration to parallel the ABM Treaty; it was hoped that such a treaty could be agreed in two years, and certainly within five years.
- —Today all of those assumptions appear invalid.
- —The five Soviet early warning radars and the Krasnoyarsk radar (which appears to be identical in physical characteristics to those for detecting and tracking ballistic missile RVs) can, if interconnected, provide a base for a nationwide defense.
- —The SH-08 ABM system with its Flat Twin radar seems to be transportable. The United States has seen it erected and made operational in a relatively short period of time.
- —The SA-10 and SA-X-12 anti-aircraft systems seem to have a capability against certain ballistic reentry vehicles in an intercontinental trajectory, thus blurring the distinction between air defense systems and ABM systems.
- —The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.
- —And, most importantly, there has been no treaty of indefinite duration on offensive arms to parallel the ABM Treaty.
- —For the immediate future the United States wishes to work with the Soviet Union to restore and

strengthen the regime for stability which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective. We must negotiate the follow-on effective limitations on offensive systems called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972, in order to remove the inherent instability in the present and projected array of offensive systems on both sides, and we must reverse the erosion of the ABM Treaty which has taken place.

- —The research, development, and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The U.S. SDI program is. The Soviet program should be.
- —If either side ever wishes to amend the Treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed.
- —The U.S. SDI research program is fully consistent with the ABM Treaty. The Soviet Union has had a large SDI program of its own for some years. We do not believe that either country wants at this time to ban the research and concept development permitted by that Treaty. We doubt an effective ban on such activities could be designed, even if desired.
- —For the long run we should have bolder and more radical objectives. Both sides seem to be agreed that with respect to nuclear weapons as a whole, the objective should be their total elimination. This should be worldwide and agreed to by all nations.
- —Whenever research validates that a defensive technology can make a contribution to strengthening

deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.

- —At the same time, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union recognize that we must find a safe path down the road of reductions toward disarmament. The U.S. believes that during the transition from reliance on the retaliatory capability of massive forces of offensive arms it could be extremely useful to move toward a more and more effective defense on both sides.
- —It appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security than equal and high-confidence vulnerability to every manner of nuclear strike by the other side, and could produce a more stable offense-defense relationship.
- —The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation could play an important role in creating and sustaining such a more stable, less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution.
- —The United States also recognizes that, as Mr. Chernenko recently noted, there is an organic relationship between offensive and defensive forces. While the possibilities of a development as I have just described could be realized in the fairly distant future, U.S. is prepared to initiate a continuing

discussion with the Soviet Union now, not only on future roles for strategic defense, but also on other steps we can take to enhance strategic stability while reducing nuclear arms. (S)

The Issue of Negotiating Fora. While we should seek that negotiating approach which gives the United States the best possible negotiating leverage, in order to reduce pressure for concessions and agreement to preconditions, the immediate tactical objective of the U.S. is to obtain from the session in Geneva an agreement to begin formal negotiations on terms which do not prejudice the United States and its allies and key defense initiatives such as SDI and INF deployments. To achieve this objective, we should characterize agreement on basic negotiating structure(s), title(s), short statements describing the subject of the negotiations/discussions, starting date(s), and location(s) as a basic and necessary first step and measure of the seriousness of our mutual purpose. (S)

a. *Structure*. With respect to negotiating structure, basic U.S. objectives are: (1) to enter negotiations on nuclear offensive forces while keeping START and INF issues substantively separate, and, preferably procedurely separate as well; (2) to propose corresponding negotiations on nuclear defensive forces, which complement those on offensive nuclear forces, with space weapons being included in both forums, as appropriate; (3) to avoid a "space only" forum; and, (4) to provide a forum for future discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (S)

The preferred U.S. negotiating structure would consist of three formal fora: separate START negotiations and INF negotiations (with these two negotiations addressing nuclear offensive forces); and negotiations on nuclear defensive forces. In addition, the U.S. would also prefer to supplement this negotiating structure with agreement to begin ongoing discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. This structure would permit us to build upon the work previously accomplished at START and INF as quickly as possible while establishing a new negotiating forum to deal with nuclear defenses and a new discussion forum to deal with related issues of concern to both sides. (S)

Should the Soviet Union not agree to this approach, the U.S. Delegation is authorized to alter the U.S. proposal along the following lines and in the following order of U.S. preference:

- 1. Separate negotiations on START, on INF, and on defensive forces with the latter to include nuclear and non-nuclear defenses. In this latter category of negotiations, the U.S. would continue to focus its efforts to constrain nuclear defenses.
- 2. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and nuclear defensive forces. Under this structure, the U.S. would seek separate START and INF subgroups to keep START and INF issues substantively separate,
- 3. Separate negotiations on nuclear offensive forces and on defensive forces.
- 4. A single negotiation on nuclear forces including nuclear offensive and defensive forces and related issues. (S)

Each of the above should also protect the U.S. desire for a forum for continued discussions about the long-term maintenance of stability, the offense/defense relationship, and the transition to deterrence based on the contribution of defenses. (C)

b. *Titles*. The preferred titles for such negotiations are implicit in the descriptions provided of the preferred negotiating structures. (C)

The Soviet Union will desire to include "space" in the title of one of the established fora. The word "space" should not appear in the description of any negotiations or discussions in a manner prejudicial to the U.S. For example, negotiations entitled Offensive and Defensive/Space Arms would be unacceptable. The title "Nuclear and Space Arms" for a single negotiation would be undesirable, but acceptable as a last resort if the Soviet Union insists on the word "space". (S)

Difficulty with respect to titles could be resolved by avoiding agreement on specific titles, referring only to the locale such as "Geneva Talks." (C)

c. Describing the Negotiations/Discussions. The preferred U.S. short descriptions of the negotiations are also implied in the discussion of structure. In descriptions of agreed fora, the delegation is authorized to include reference to space in a manner which does not single out space and which makes clear that space issues apply to both offensive and defensive systems. For example, descriptions of separate negotiations on offensive forces and on defensive forces which described as subjects of the separate negotiations "nuclear offensive forces" and "strategic defenses and space arms", respectively, should be avoided in favor of formulations such as "strategic and

intermediate-range nuclear arms, whether based on earth or in space" and "defensive arms, whether based on earth or in space." (S)

Other formulations which are *not* acceptable include the following:

- —formulations which accept the Soviet definition of strategic arms, i.e. weapons capable of hitting Soviet territory by virtue of their location rather than their range, including third-country as well as intermediate-range systems;
- —formulations which accept Soviet demands for compensation for third-country forces; $\frac{3}{2}$
- —formulations which exclude non-European based INF systems from limitation, which accept limitations on our carrier-based aircraft or other dual-capable aircraft with a radius of action less than that of the F-111, or which remove shorter-range INF ballistic missiles from at least collateral constraints;
- —formulations which accept a substantive merger of START and INF;
- —formulations which would imply that the relationship between offensive and defensive systems can only be addressed in the defensive forum or that space can only be addressed in the defensive negotiations;
- —formulations which accept the Soviet objective of "preventing the militarization of space", which restrict the subject matter to just the space issues of SDI and ASAT, which imply the necessity of additional restrictions beyond those in existing treaties and

agreements on US activities in outer space, or which prejudice U.S. freedom to pursue SDI and ASAT; and,

- —formulations which use the SALT II phrase "equality and equal security." In recent weeks, some Soviet statements have used a different formulation, "equality with due account taken of the legitimate interests of parties." While not preferred, this formulation is acceptable in the context of a general agreement which meets other primary U.S. objectives. (S)
- d. *Starting Dates*. The US should seek the opening of formal negotiations during the month of March, preferably between March 5 and March 19. Selection of these dates is not essential, but is useful to permit preparation, delegation selection, and consultations with allies and the Congress. (C)
- e. *Location*. The US should seek a common location for all formal negotiations, preferably in Geneva. Separate locations could be acceptable in the context of an overall package which meets primary U.S. objectives. (C)

Substantive Presentations. We are on record as being prepared to engage in substantive discussions during the Geneva meetings, and to have concrete new ideas to present at that time. Our intended presentation on the U.S. concept of the offense/defense relationship certainly provides the basis for substantive discussion; and our proposal to open negotiations on nuclear defensive systems and to continue discussions on stability are specific, concrete new ideas worthy of note. (C)

During the discussion of negotiating fora, the Soviets may attempt to initiate discussion on the substance of the negotiating approaches the U.S. would intend to use in various fora or they may present substantive proposals of their own. In general, discussion of the substantive aspect of future U.S. negotiating positions should await the beginning of formal negotiations. Agreement to preconditions or substantive concessions for the purpose of reaching agreement to begin formal negotiations is not authorized. To the extent possible, we should attempt to maintain the best possible climate for entry into the formal negotiations or, if agreement is not reached on formal negotiations, to protect our leverage for continued discussions. In addition, we must be prepared to protect ourselves against Soviet accusations that the Geneva talks failed because the U.S. had nothing new to offer. (S)

The following guidance is provided on the treatment of the substantive detail associated with various issues. (C)

a. *START*. On START, the delegation should stress the basic flexibility and reasonableness of the elements of the current U.S. START position—flexibility which could not be implemented in the face of the Soviet departure from Geneva. In addition, the delegation should indicate U.S. readiness to move beyond where the last round of START talks were left in Geneva and to explore trade-offs between relative U.S. and Soviet advantages. (S)

With respect to START trade-offs, the delegation is authorized to indicate to the Soviet Union that we have extensive flexibility with respect to both structure and content of the trade-offs, so long as the outcome meets our basic standards with respect to equality, verifiability, stability, significance, and alliance security. In the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to propose trade-offs and, in doing so, consider the use of asymmetrical limits and/or different aggregations of the

elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

As an example of the above, the delegation is authorized to suggest that, recognizing the Soviet Union's preference for certain types of forces, the U.S. is prepared to consider a trade-off between their areas of advantage and ours. The delegation can explain that one way this could be achieved is by adding to the current U.S. proposal a specific limit on the number of air launched cruise missiles permitted to each side. The U.S. limit would be well below the number of such missiles that could be deployed on the U.S. bomber force if the Soviet Union were to agree to commensurate reductions in the destructive capability of their ballistic missiles. However, in recognition of the Soviet preference for ballistic missiles, the corresponding limit on Soviet air launched cruise missiles would be lower than that permitted the U.S. (S)

The delegation should stress that this is one example, that the U.S. has additional ideas, and that the U.S. is prepared to use these ideas to meet both Soviet and U.S. concerns in the context of formal negotiations. The delegation should again reemphasize the point that, in the context of such negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to consider the use of asymmetrical limits and different aggregations of the elements of an agreement in an effort to reach a satisfactory outcome. (S)

b. *INF*. The delegation should stress to the Soviet Union that major progress in negotiations across the board and in areas of interest to both sides would prove easier if an early breakthrough were possible in the area of INF. The delegation should also stress that we and our allies remain committed to our basic standards for evaluating an INF agreement:

- —equal rights and limits expressed globally, with no export of the SS-20 threat from Europe to Asia;
- —no compensation for British and French nuclear forces;
- —no reduction in NATO conventional force capability; and
- —effective verification. (S)

At the same time, the delegation should point out that we have demonstrated flexibility and have sought to address Soviet concerns. We believe that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September, 1983, U.S. proposals which would have provided for an equal global limit under which the United States would have considered not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. 4 At that time, the United States also indicated its willingness to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The delegation should stress that within these basic principles, and in the context of formal negotiations, the U.S. is prepared to show considerable flexibility with respect to formulation and trade-offs. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through equal percentage reductions on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment—224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). (S)

In introducing the equal percentage reductions example, the delegation should take care not to indicate to the Soviets any acceptance of the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions per se. When used in situations where there is not a beginning balance, or where there is not agreement that the reductions will ultimately lead to equal levels of forces (as is the case in the U.S. START build-down proposal), equal percentage reductions do not lead to equal force levels. If applied in different contexts, the principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions could damage U.S. interests. If pressed for an endorsement of the general principle of equal reductions or equal percentage reductions, the delegation should note that while the U.S. cannot endorse the general principle, the LRINF missile issue has some unique features that, in the interest of making progress on this important issue, may make the use of the certain specific equal percentage reduction approaches acceptable to the United States and its Allies within the limited context of the LRINF missile agreement under discussion. (S)

c. Space Arms Control. In response to initiatives from the Soviet Union involving space arms control, the U.S. delegation should remind the Soviet delegation that an extensive body of international law and treaties exists with respect to space, including the Outer Space Treaty and the ABM Treaty. Further, the delegation should point out that it is the Soviet Union which has the largest number of warheads which would transit space; it is the Soviet Union which has an existing ASAT system, and it is the Soviet Union which has a deployed ABM system which can attack objects in space. The delegation should explain that the United States is prepared to consider Soviet proposals related to space during the course of formal negotiations. However, because issues involving space cannot logically be separated from the major areas to which they relate, we are only prepared to deal with these proposals in the context of nuclear offensive and defensive negotiations as appropriate to each. (S)

- d. *ASAT Limitations*. The U.S. will not propose substantive ASAT initiatives at this time. If pressed by the Soviet Union for agreement to an immediate ASAT moratorium, the delegation should point out that, as the U.S. has consistently made clear, while the U.S. will not agree to such a proposal as a precondition for negotiations, in formal negotiations on the full range of nuclear arms control issues, the United States is prepared to consider areas of mutual restraint which might be negotiated in the context of a broader range of agreements which would provide for stabilizing reductions in nuclear arms. (S)
- e. *Other Areas*. In other arms control areas (e.g., nuclear testing, MBFR, CBW, CDE, CD, and the full range of U.S.-proposed confidence building measures), the delegation is authorized to restate, reaffirm and explain the U.S. positions in each of these areas as appropriate. The delegation should stress the need and the U.S. desire to make progress, where possible, across this full spectrum of issues. (S)
- f. *Verification and Compliance*. The delegation should stress the importance the United States attaches to effective verification of, and compliance with, arms control agreements. Further, the delegation should note that, for this reason, we have proposed specific verification, inspection and confidence building measures and have sought to have the Soviet Union resolve our very serious concerns about Soviet non-compliance. (S)

In addition, the U.S. delegation is authorized to draw upon current guidance on arms control related issues, as supplemented by this directive, to respond as necessary and appropriate, within the terms of such guidance, to serious Soviet proposals or use such guidance in countering the development of a situation which could

create a serious setback for the United States in its effort to gain support among allies and within the United States. (C)

## **Ronald Reagan**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Linhard Files, Shultz-Gromyko— January 1985 [Final NSDD—Geneva Instructions 01/01/1985] (1). Secret. According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan was in Palm Springs, California, from December 29 to January 2 (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) so presumably signed the NSDD in Palm Springs. Reagan also initialed at the top of the first page. In a January 1 PROFs note, McFarlane wrote: "At the conclusion of a one hour, forty-five minute meeting with Cap, George and me, the President approved the instructions for Geneva subject to a few minor edits." McFarlane listed the changes, which were incorporated into this final version. McFarlane instructed: "With these changes, the President has signed it. Please have a smooth prepared but do not distribute it." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSDD Package, 12/31/1984-01/01/1985 (1) In an undated handwritten note to Reagan on "Aboard Air Force One" stationery, likely written during their January 2 return trip to Washington, McFarlane wrote: "Mr. President, This is a 'smooth' version of the NSDD you've already signed after your meeting with Cap and George Jan 1 at Annenberg's. Could you please sign this 'original'. It is a verbatim reprint. Bud."

<sup>2</sup> Shultz and Gromyko were set to meet January 7–8, 1985 in Geneva.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> During the previous INF negotiations, the Soviet delegates argued that British and French systems should factor into reduction totals. The U.S. countered that they

had no control or negotiating power over the systems of their NATO Allies.

<sup>4</sup> NSDD 104, "U.S. Approach to INF Negotiations—II," September 21, 1983, laid out these proposals. Documentation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. V, European Security, 1977–1983 ≰.

## 349. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 2, 1985

SUBJECT Gromyko's Brief for Geneva

In preparing ourselves for Geneva, I thought it would be useful to put ourselves in the Soviets' shoes. Accordingly, before leaving for my wedding in Rome, I asked my Soviet experts to do a mock memorandum from Gromyko's own experts to him on strategy for the Geneva meetings. Attached is the result of this effort. I have had a chance to review and comment on it, and have added my own comments. I believe you will find it both informative and entertaining.

In undertaking this project, we contacted former Gromyko advisor (and subsequent defector) Arkadiy Shevchenko, <sup>2</sup> to learn how Gromyko's position for a meeting such as Geneva is actually developed. Shevchenko told us that Gromyko tends to work out a basic strategy on his own, without sharing his full thinking with his staff. Before a Ministerial meeting, he traditionally sends a memorandum to the Central Committee setting forth the position he intends to take in general terms, together with the texts of any formal statements he intends to make. Gromyko generally works out in advance the fallback positions to which he will be prepared to move in the course of a meeting. He decides on his own, often on the spur of the moment during the meeting itself, if and when to use these fallbacks.

In the package of draft talking points for Geneva that we provided prior to your departure for California, you have a set of contingency points for responding to arguments and proposals that Gromyko may advance. $\frac{3}{2}$ 

#### **Attachment**

Mock Memorandum for the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs 4

"Moscow," December 31, 1984

SUBJECT Your Meeting with Shultz

With Comrade Chernenko's November proposal, we have abandoned our policy of shunning dialogue with the United States on the central arms control issues and made a strategic decision to reengage the Americans in negotiations. Our earlier policy, while administering the necessary shock treatment to some forces in the West, did not prove effective enough to halt the deployment of new US missiles in Western Europe. Having regained the initiative on Soviet-American arms control negotiations, we are now better positioned to achieve our objective of blocking US efforts to reverse the trends in the correlation of military forces and achieve superiority through the deployment of a large-scale, space-based ABM system.

The fact of Soviet-American negotiations has already raised expectations in the West of early progress, and this will by itself lead to Allied and Congressional pressures on the US Administration to adopt realistic positions in the talks. Our policy should therefore proceed, as in the past, on two tracks: using active measures and diplomatic contacts with healthy forces in the West to reinforce these pressures; while at the same time making a serious test in the

negotiations themselves of US readiness to move toward mutually acceptable agreements.

As is well known, the Americans have proven extraordinarily skillful these past four years in using propaganda as a device for avoiding realistic negotiating positions and for sustaining funding for new weapons programs. Thus we must be vigilant in guarding against any repetition of our experience of 1981–1983, in which the Americans used the facade of the Geneva negotiations to implement the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe. In concrete terms, this means that the USSR should resist the opening of formal negotiations unless and until there is concrete evidence that the Americans are prepared to address our concerns in a serious and equitable manner.

As their response to our June 29 Vienna Talks proposal illustrated, the Americans' priority objective at Geneva will be to reach agreement at the earliest possible date on renewed talks in separate fora on strategic and mediumrange nuclear forces. They will try to avoid any commitment to serious negotiations on space weapons, and to steer the agenda of any space forum away from discussion of their "Star Wars" defense system toward, at best, cosmetic constraints on anti-satellite systems. Your goal is to foil this strategy, and specifically:

- —to secure US agreement to negotiations on space arms whose "subject and objectives" are consistent with our concept of preventing the militarization of outer space;
- —to consent to new talks on offensive nuclear arms only after having received satisfaction on space weapons;

- —to determine, once and for all, whether the Americans are prepared to accept a ban on spacestrike systems or, at a minimum, a ban on antisatellite systems;
- —to ensure that new negotiations on offensive nuclear arms take place in a forum or fora clearly distinct from the previous Geneva talks, and with an agenda that has been altered to take into account the deployment of new US medium-range missiles and our own counterdeployments;
- —to determine whether the US has abandoned its pursuit of unilateral Soviet nuclear disarmament and does, in fact, have new proposals consistent with the principles of equality and equal security;
- —to ensure that the responsibility for a possible failure to reach agreement at Geneva on the subject and objectives for new negotiations clearly lies with the US.

## Setting

Your meeting follows a year in which, on the one hand, American propaganda and diplomatic statements have claimed that the US favors arms control, while on the other hand, the pace of the US military build-up has continued to accelerate: Pershing II and GLCM deployments continue to proceed in the UK, FRG and Italy; the first of thousands of long-range ALCMs have begun to be deployed on US heavy bombers, while work proceeds on the B-1 and "Stealth" bombers; despite Congressional pressures, the MX program continues, and new first-strike missiles (Midgetman, Trident II) are in active development; and

hundreds of nuclear-armed SLCMs have begun to enter the US naval fleet.

Most importantly, despite US denials, it is clear from the US defense budget that President R. Reagan has decided to lay the basis for deployment of a large-scale ABM system in space. To camouflage US intentions, the US has launched a hypocritical, slanderous campaign regarding alleged "violations" of existing agreements by the Soviet Union.

In his meeting with you in September, and in his letters to Comrade Chernenko, President Reagan has sought to put a positive face on these contradictory actions, resorting to the traditional "positions of strength" logic of the arms race. It is, of course, possible that his expressions of interest in reaching arms control agreements are sincere—most American Presidents want to leave a "peacemaker" legacy for the historians. Moreover, in his meeting with you he seemed to have a greater grasp of arms control issues than we anticipated.

But the fact remains that the US Government is deeply divided, and that the competing schools of thought documented by American journalist S. Talbott in his book *Smertel 'niye Proiski* remain entrenched in the Departments of State and Defense. There is no evidence that the President has decided to overrule the opponents of arms control headed by C. Weinberger and R. Perle in favor of the realistic forces headed by G. Shultz and R. Burt. If anything, the evidence points the other way:

—Although R. Reagan, in his meeting with you, broached the idea of an interim agreement that would constrain ASATs while beginning a process of reducing nuclear arms, this proposal was not reaffirmed in subsequent communications with

Chairman Chernenko, and seems to have been contradicted by US public statements since then.

- —Despite repeated hints since your Stockholm meeting with G. Shultz that the US has "new ideas" on strategic arms reductions, these ideas have never materialized. According to S. Talbott, the President's approval for the so-called "framework" proposal—which might have provided the basis for an agreement—was rescinded after Stockholm once the Pentagon discovered the State Department's gambit.
- —Recent efforts at manipulating the US press by a "senior Administration official" (R. McFarlane), as well as speeches by C. Weinberger and others, have conveyed the clear message that the US is committed to deployment of its "Star Wars" defense system, and is not prepared to put it on the bargaining table in new negotiations.<sup>7</sup>
- —Perhaps most importantly, despite encouraging rumors that circulated in Washington immediately following the US elections, there have been no personnel changes in the arms control policy apparatus. Among the President's senior arms control advisors remain R. Lehman, formerly R. Perle's senior deputy, and K. Adelman, who has just published a notorious article advocating "Arms Control Without Agreements." §

Your interlocutor at Geneva, G. Shultz, is a man of good will, according to Ambassador Dobrynin, but we should not overestimate the differences between his views on dealing with the USSR and those of President Reagan or C. Weinberger. In any case, his flexibility is likely to be severely constrained, as the entire "Senior Arms Control

Policy Group" will be traveling with him to monitor his behavior. Moreover, Shultz has appointed P. Nitze as a Special Advisor on arms control: while Nitze was an energetic and intelligent interlocutor for Comrade Kvitsinskiy in the medium-range missile negotiations, he is also the spiritual father of the infamous Committee on the Present Danger and, as such, close in outlook to the Pentagon.

Thus, the prospects for the Geneva meeting are not bright. You should be prepared for hard bargaining over the subject and objectives of new negotiations. It is very possible that the Americans will not be prepared for talks on terms that we can accept, and therefore that we will not be able to announce agreement on the opening of formal negotiations at Geneva. Given the Reagan Administration's demonstrated capacity to hoodwink the American public and its overseas allies as to its true aims and purposes, it is not advisable to exclude the possibility of another meeting at foreign ministers' level sometime in the future. But you should be prepared to defer agreement on a date for another meeting if you judge the American position to be wholly without substance.

## Our Strategy

Lack of progress at Geneva may work to our advantage: If we can convince Western publics and US Allies that the US refused to follow through on its November 22 commitment to begin serious negotiations on space arms, then pressures will grow in the weeks following Geneva for the US to take a more reasonable stance. In fact, it is possible that the US Congress will do some of our work for us, curtailing funds for ASAT and SDI, as well as MX and other strategic programs.

To ensure that this is the case, we should coordinate the efforts of our propaganda apparatus and those of the fraternal countries in order to expose the duplicitousness of US policy and to refute the likely charges that the USSR has set preconditions for beginning talks. (The Warsaw Pact summit in Sofia, now scheduled for the week following the Geneva meetings, will provide an occasion to set forth the agreed line we expect our allies to follow.)

At the Geneva meeting itself, this means that you should take a resolute stance at the level of principle, while showing just enough tactical flexibility to keep the onus on G. Shultz to come forward with ideas that meet our concerns. Thus, your position should be based on the following elements:

—The *central message* you will want to get across is that the Soviet Union is now ready for serious negotiations, that we have made a forthcoming gesture in proposing the Geneva meetings, and that it is therefore incumbent on the United States to make the first move on substance.

—As your *basic themes*, you should stress how US plans to deploy a space-based ABM system are the principal threat to peace and strategic stability, that preventing the militarization of outer space is the most urgent question before us, and that US refusal to negotiate seriously on space arms will render pointless efforts to negotiate reductions in nuclear arms.

—On *outer space arms*, you should press for acceptance of the goal of banning all space-strike systems, and denounce US attempts to establish a more vague or narrowly-focused agenda as inadequate, and as a cynical scheme to deceive public opinion.

—We must recognize that we are unlikely to get a US commitment to stop its "Star Wars" program in its tracks, although we should try to create as many obstacles as possible. Thus, as a fallback, you should be prepared to accept a negotiation whose stated objective is to ban ASAT systems (and does not explicitly address space-based ABM systems), but only on the following conditions:

—that the US publicly reaffirm the commitment it made to British Prime Minister M. Thatcher that it will continue to adhere to the ABM Treaty and that any changes will be a matter for negotiations;

—and that the US renounce all plans to deploy nuclear arms in space.

—If the US is not prepared to agree to anything but the most general formulation of subject and objectives for space negotiations, you should withhold agreement to beginning new offensive arms negotiations.

—On *offensive nuclear arms* per se, you should stress the unacceptability of previous US proposals, and the need to respect the principle of equality and equal security. Any formulation of subject and objectives for offensive arms talks should at least implicitly reflect this principle, and avoid language that would imply a change in our principled positions on forward-based and third-country systems, or on the geographic scope of limits on medium-range systems.

—You should also make clear that US Pershing II and GLCM deployments have altered the strategic situation, and that any future agreements should have as their objective restoring the balance through removal of these new US first-strike weapons; in that context, Soviet

countermeasures could be withdrawn, and SS-20s reduced to the level of British and French systems consistent with previous proposals. As a first step, you should propose an immediate freeze on US deployments and Soviet counterdeployments.

—By the same token, you should state that, absent US agreement to remove its Pershings and GLCMs, the USSR would have to reconsider its offer in START to reduce strategic forces to 1800 launchers. (Ultimately, we may decide to enter into an agreement that would formally permit some US deployments to remain; there is no reason to reveal any flexibility on this question, however, until there is evidence that the US is prepared to address our concerns in other respects.)

—On format for new negotiations, the Americans will likely seek separate fora to address nuclear and space arms; in the case of the former, they will seek to reconstitute the Geneva "START" and "INF" negotiations that they torpedoed through deployment of Pershing II and GLCM in Western Europe. Your position should be that it is impossible to treat offensive nuclear arms and space-strike systems in isolation from one another; they are organically linked, and thus should be addressed in a single framework.

—If, however, the Americans prove willing to accommodate our concerns on the subject and objectives of space arms negotiations, you could as a gesture of good will agree to separate fora for nuclear and space arms. In this case, however, you should make clear that agreements cannot be reached in the former absent achievement of a ban on space-strike systems in the latter.

—You should also resist the reestablishment of separate negotiating fora to address strategic nuclear arms and medium-range systems in Europe. This would contradict our principled position that US deployments made the previous Geneva talks impossible, and obscure the fact that we are commencing *new* negotiations.

—Again, however, if the American position on space arms negotiations is reasonably forthcoming, you should be prepared to suggest flexibility in fora for nuclear arms negotiations, as long as the agreed subject and objectives make clear that the agenda is different from that of the former Geneva talks.

*In short,* you will want to make clear that the Soviet Union has made a decision to reengage the United States in negotiations, but at the same time hold out as long as possible to see what concessions can be squeezed out of the Americans.

#### Non-Arms Control Subjects

G. Shultz has suggested that time be set aside to discuss topics other than those agreed on in the November 22 joint statement. You have deflected this suggestion, but he may raise it again, since he undoubtedly feels pressure to say he has raised humanitarian issues with you. You should make a judgment at that time as to whether such discussion at Geneva would be to our advantage.

—On the one hand, it is sure to be unpleasant, and the Americans tend to advertise exchanges on such topics to deflect attention from their unwillingness to treat the arms race seriously. —On the other hand, having no discussion on these topics weakens G. Shultz personally. Allowing relations in these areas to move forward with some normality in fact focuses attention on the abnormal situation in the disarmament field resulting from the American search for military superiority.

## Press Handling After the Meetings

We will want to issue a TASS Statement providing our postmortem assessment as soon as possible after the meetings, since the Americans are likely to try to shape the Western press's accounts through a "backgrounder." Such a statement would emphasize that the Soviet Union came to Geneva prepared for radical steps, but the Americans did not, and announce whatever follow-up meetings may have been agreed.

In the event the meeting ends with matters at a complete impasse, you might want to consider holding a press conference in order to make clear that the failure of the meeting was the result of US intransigence, and to encourage other western governments and publics to put pressure on the Americans to rethink their position.

#### Informing the Central Committee

If you agree with the approach outlined above, we will turn the preceding points into a memorandum to the Central Committee informing them of the approach you intend to take at Geneva.  $\frac{10}{2}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (1/1/1985–1/17/1985); NLR-775–13–1–1–5. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on December 31, 1984; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Timbie, and Courtney. Forwarded though Armacost. A handwritten note in the margin reads: "Text same as State 004 (Tosec 200055)."
- <sup>2</sup> Shevchenko defected to the United States in April 1978, the highest-ranking official to leave the Soviet Union.
- <sup>3</sup> This draft of the talking points was not found; however, the final briefing book for Shultz is in Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985.
- <sup>4</sup> Secret; Sensitive; Czar. Drafted by Vershbow; cleared by Simons, Palmer, and Pifer. As Burt explained to Shultz in his covering memorandum, this is a "mock" memorandum by Vershbow who used the name A.A. Vershbovich of the fictitious "USA Department" as the sender of the memorandum.
- $\frac{5}{2}$  See <u>Document 310</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> Strobe Talbott's book, *Deadly Gambits: The Reagan Administration and the Stalemate in Nuclear Arms Control*, was published in September 1984.
- <sup>7</sup> See <u>footnote 3, Document 339</u>. See also Leslie Gelb, "Space Arms: The Choices: U.S. Bargaining Chip or Essential Defense," *New York Times*, December 26, 1984, p. A1.
- <sup>8</sup> See <u>footnote 7, Document 319</u>.
- 9 See footnote 8, Document 314.
- <sup>10</sup> Since this was a mock memorandum, Gromyko did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

# 350. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, January 3, 1985

**SUBJECT** 

Gorbachev Accepts Invitation to Visit U.S.

The attached report from Clair George (TAB II)<sup>2</sup> indicates that Gorbachev has accepted an invitation from a U.S. business executive to visit the U.S. during March-April, 1985.<sup>3</sup> It states further that the business executive was informed indirectly that during his trip he would like to meet privately with U.S. officials, but would not request such meetings through official channels because of the private nature of his trip. Finally, it specifies how the message should be answered: by Shultz indicating to Gromyko that he understands Gorbachev is planning a private trip to the U.S. and that he and other U.S. officials would like to invite him for discussions in Washington.

Though the report is not specific on this score, the business executive involved is obviously Dwayne O. Andreas, President of Archer Daniels Midland Co. and U.S. Co-Chairman of the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council (USTEC). According to Jim Giffen, President of USTEC—who contacted me when they returned from their trip to Moscow—Andreas extended the invitation to Gorbachev during their meeting with him in early December, at which time Gorbachev refused to commit himself, joking about American impatience when he was pressed for a reply.<sup>4</sup>

#### Comments:

- 1. The message conveyed appears authentic, and the manner of its conveyence is typical of the way the Soviets go about these things.
- 2. It would appear that, buoyed by the "success" of his visit to London, 5 Gorbachev moved quickly to pick up an invitation to the U.S., but did so in a way which permits us to propose whatever official level we desire. At the same time, it relieves us of the concern that a direct invitation to Gorbachev could be construed as an attempt to bypass either Chernenko or Gromyko.
- 3. It should also be noted that, in handling the invitation in this fashion, Gorbachev still retains some options. He could, for example, pull out if something goes wrong from the Soviet point of view, without having anything regarding the trip on the official record.
- 4. Nevertheless, his acceptance of the invitation is a signal that the Soviets expect some sort of agreement to negotiate arms control issues to emerge from the Geneva meetings. The Soviets are probably also aware that a visit at that time could affect Congressional consideration of MX and SDI funding—not to speak of scheduled ASAT testing. Given his performance in London, we can expect a much more articulate presentation of the Soviet point of view to the American public than we have had to face from senior Soviet officials in the past.
- 5. From an internal political point of view, this message is a solid indication that Gorbachev is at the moment riding high as heir apparent, and the leadership is willing to tolerate his taking on an increasingly high profile in foreign

travel. (Nothing could be higher profile than a trip to the U.S.)

6. Although we must be aware of the way the Soviets can use a Gorbachev visit to "humanize" and rationalize their policies with the American public, I believe that we really have no choice but to put out the welcome mat. (If word got out that we had turned off a desired visit, the impact could be devastating.) For that reason, I believe that you and Secretary Shultz should pass a message through Gromyko indicating that the President and other officials would be pleased to receive him when he visits. In fact, it would probably be desirable to indicate that if Gorbachev prefers to visit the U.S. officially, we would be pleased to arrange an official invitation. The advantage of an official invitation would be that it would act as some constraint on critical public statements.

There are potential problems with an official invitation, however. Gorbachev's closest formal counterpart on the governmental side is the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations committee. In order to head off a possible move to invite him to address a joint session of Congress (crazier ideas than this repeatedly emanate from the Hill!), it would be preferable to have the Vice President invite him. Still, the President should see him, and probably should give him treatment at least on a par with that accorded Gromyko last November. 6 Purists will object to according quasi chiefof-government treatment to a person who is, aside from his thin "parliamentary" cover, merely a senior Communist Party official. Nevertheless, the public and media will not see it this way—indeed, they will play it as virtually a summit meeting—and for this reason I believe we should not allow ourselves to be excessively hung up by protocolary considerations.

7. Finally, I would observe that, until we have worked out all the details with the Soviets, it will be imperative to keep this matter on the *closest possible hold*. Andreas, and perhaps Giffen, are already involved, outside the USG, but I believe we should not communicate our intentions to them until we have worked out the arrangements with the Soviets. The last thing we need is a lot of media speculation in advance.

#### Recommendation:

That the matter be discussed very privately with the President, the Vice President and Secretary Shultz, and if they concur, that the Secretary and you discuss the matter privately with Gromyko at Geneva, using the talking points at TAB  $\rm I.^{7}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, System IV Intelligence Files, 1985, 400005. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for action. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 3, 1984. In a handwritten cover note to Poindexter dated January 3, Matlock wrote: "John—this report reached me only this afternoon. I am not sure that either you or Bud have seen it. It is of sufficient importance and sensitivity that I think Bud should discuss it with the President—privately if possible—tomorrow. I believe that it should not be disseminated to members of the SACG at this point since it requires the most delicate—and confidential—handling— Jack."
- $^{2}$  Dated December 21, 1984; attached but not printed.
- <sup>3</sup> Andreas had written to Gorbachev on November 18, suggesting that he visit the United States to tour various agricultural operations and facilities in the spring of 1985. See Document 364.

- <sup>4</sup> Giffen met with Gorbachev on December 3 and gave him the letter from Andreas.
- $\frac{5}{2}$  See Documents 337 and 341.
- <sup>6</sup> On another copy of this memorandum, Matlock crossed out November and wrote "September" in the margin. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (1/4))
- <sup>7</sup> Tab I is not attached. McFarlane did not indicate approval or disapproval of the recommendation. No record was found of a discussion with Reagan, Bush, or Shultz. Shultz, however, raised the issue with Gromyko in Geneva. See Document 362.

## 351. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 4, 1985

SUBJECT

U.S.-USSR Economic Working Group of Experts Meetings in Moscow

#### Issue

Whether to approve a set of U.S. positions for the U.S.-USSR Economic Working Group of Experts meetings in Moscow (January 8–10) and to sign an NSDD which would establish specific guidelines for the U.S. delegation to Moscow.

#### **Facts**

In May 1984, you renewed for 10 years the U.S.-USSR Long-Term Agreement for Economic, Industrial and Technical Cooperation and approved resurrecting, under Article III of the agreement, periodic meetings of a bilateral working group of experts to exchange information and forecasts of basic economic, industrial and commercial trends. The meetings in Moscow scheduled for January 8–10 would be the first meeting of the working group of experts in six years. A major objective of these working level meetings is to determine if there are sufficient grounds for a meeting of the U.S.-USSR Joint Commercial Commission (JCC) which would be chaired on the U.S. side by Secretary Baldrige and on the Soviet side by Trade Minister Patolichev. The SIG-IEP has been responsible for

coordinating preparations for the working group meetings, identifying potential opportunities for expanding non-strategic trade relations with the USSR, and coordinating recommended agency positions for the U.S. delegation on five issues likely to be raised by the Soviets. In addition, it was agreed at the SIG that the U.S. delegation to Moscow should seek changes in discriminatory Soviet practices against U.S. firms.

The SIG-IEP concurred that the delegation should express a U.S. willingness to discuss possible resolution of five specific issues in the appropriate fora if there is a reciprocal Soviet willingness to improve prospects for expanded U.S. non-strategic exports to the USSR. These five issues are: the ban on Soviet furskins, a Cuban nickel certification arrangements, aeroflot landing rights, port access regulations, and the bilateral protocol tax treaty.

#### Discussion

The SIG-IEP has been effective in developing a consensus among the agencies on the positions the U.S. delegation should take on each of these five issues. Commerce, State, Treasury, NSC, Agriculture, Transportation, and USTR all concurred that the U.S. delegation should:

- Indicate to the Soviets a willingness to discuss options with the U.S. Congress to lift the furskins ban if the Soviets are prepared to improve business conditions and prospects for U.S. firms.
- Reiterate a recent Treasury offer to resolve the Cuban nickel certification issue.
- Indicate a U.S. willingness to begin discussion of civil aviation matters, but only after receiving a

favorable Soviet response to U.S.-Japan proposals on North Pacific safety measures, and with the understanding that any restoration of Aeroflot service would have to be part of a package offering a true balance of concessions for U.S. carriers.

- Respond to any Soviet inquiry on port access procedures by informing them of our willingness to discuss this question in our traditional maritime framework. (Transportation stressed that the Soviets must be told such discussions would have to encompass U.S. maritime industry interests.)
- Indicate to the Soviets a U.S. willingness to move forward on the unsigned 1981 tax protocol, but noting that changes may have to be made.

Defense did not provide specific views on these five issues. Instead, Secretary Weinberger sent a separate letter to Secretary Regan, in his capacity as Chairman of the SIG-IEP, expressing serious reservations about the merit of a U.S. trade mission to Moscow at this time. A number of valid cautionary points are made in Cap's correspondence in which he:

- Agrees with the general concept of promoting nonstrategic trade but strongly doubts that the Soviets are really interested in aspects of trade other than strategic technology and that they will seek to turn this non-strategic U.S. trade initiative against us.
- Claims that a U.S. trade mission to Moscow is likely to stimulate political pressures, particularly among the allies, for more strategic trade despite the stated objectives of this mission.

- Indicates that even the prospects of U.S.-Soviet trade talks has already triggered a reaction among our COCOM partners unhelpful to our interest in strengthening the COCOM process and enforcement measures against the diversion of strategic technology.
- Expresses strong support for the U.S. delegation taking a firm position on human rights issues in its meetings with Soviet officials in Moscow.

In the initial planning stages for these Moscow meetings, Commerce, with the support of some other agencies, was interested in actively promoting expanded sales of U.S. oil and gas equipment to the USSR. This objective is being aggressively pursued by the Soviets as well as the U.S.-Soviet Trade and Economic Council (USTEC). Over the course of the preparatory meetings, it was pointed out to Commerce that we are walking a very fine line in the energy area between expanding U.S. energy equipment sales to the USSR and preserving the integrity of our security-minded allied consensus on the strategic aspects of East-West economic relations including a strict limit on Soviet gas deliveries to Western Europe (to interrupt the Soviet strategy of dominating European gas markets while earning large amounts of hard currency), the termination of subsidized terms on credits, and an overall strengthening of COCOM. It was agreed that to avoid sending inconsistent signals to the allies and the USSR, oil and gas equipment will not be an area in which the U.S. should agree to an active program of trade expansion pending further policy clarification by you. My staff is now preparing a policy assessment of a comprehensive CIA study on the strategic implications of the Soviet energy strategy toward the West as well as other key aspects of East-West economic relations. Finally, a strong U.S. position on human rights issues has been formulated for inclusion in the U.S. delegation's discussion in Moscow. It should be recalled that controls on U.S. oil and gas equipment sales to the USSR have traditionally been linked to human rights conditions in the Soviet Union.

#### Recommendation

That you approve the U.S. positions on the five issues likely to be raised by the Soviets during the Moscow meetings (furskins ban, nickel certification arrangement, aeroflot landing rights, port access regulations and the protocol tax treaty). Commerce, State, NSC, Agriculture, Transportation, Treasury and USTR support approval. Defense takes no specific position.

That you sign the NSDD at Tab A which provides specific instructions and guidelines for the U.S. delegation to the Moscow meetings on January 8-10.2

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Roger Robinson Files, Chronological File, Robinson Chron January 1985-February 1985; NLR-487-11-29-3-5. Sent for action. Prepared by Robinson. Poindexter initialed the memorandum for McFarlane.
- <sup>2</sup> Reagan approved both recommendations. He signed NSDD 155, "U.S.-Soviet Economic and Commercial Relations," on January 4. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 155, [U.S.-Soviet Economic and Commercial Relations])

# 352. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Burt) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, undated

**SUBJECT** 

Your Meeting with Gromyko—Revised Scope Paper

#### Your Objectives at Geneva

The November 22 Joint Announcement characterizes the main purpose of your meeting with Gromyko as reaching "common understanding as to the subject and objectives" for new negotiations on nuclear and space arms.<sup>2</sup> Your primary goal is to reach agreement on the fora, dates and locations for the new talks and, if possible, on agreed formulations regarding the agenda for the talks. You will also present U.S. views on how to move towards a safer future.

While we should not be overly optimistic, it may be possible by the end of your two days with Gromyko to reach agreement on a joint communique announcing the opening of new negotiations. As part of that process, it will also be desirable to reach agreement with Gromyko on your next Ministerial meeting, preferably in Moscow. He is likely to be interested, so you will probably not be in the position of demandeur on this. The only variable is the timing of such a meeting: if we have failed to agree on formal negotiations, it should take place fairly soon after Geneva (late February); if we have succeeded, however, it could take place somewhat later (late March).

In any event, we will want to be in a position to secure Allied, Congressional and public support for our position in the succeeding weeks, when the campaign will move from the diplomatic to the public arena.

#### Tactics for the Geneva Discussions

You should structure your presentation in a manner which supports our objective of reaching agreement by the end of the two-day meeting on the initiation of formal negotiations. Gromyko is likely to take up considerable time with his opening presentations, which are likely to be longwinded restatements of familiar arguments and positions; translation time will slow the pace of the discussions further (our side will be equipped for simultaneous translation, but the likelihood that Gromyko will acquiesce in it is remote).

Although we may wish to explore the Soviet presentations, if we are to move beyond set-piece presentations to actual negotiation of a joint communique the second day, we will need to put our positions—on both format and substance—on the table at an early stage in the discussions. This will give the Soviets time to consider our ideas overnight and to obtain any necessary guidance from Moscow to negotiate agreed formulations of subjects and objectives for new talks that would form the basis of a communique. The sequence recommended below is designed to ensure this is the case. In brief:

—At the *first session*, you would present our conceptual thinking on the offense/defense relationship, using the approach developed by Paul Nitze.<sup>3</sup> Following Gromyko's initial remarks and your initial response to them, you would have the option of setting forth our opening position on the

format for negotiations (alternatively, this could be done at the beginning of the afternoon session—pros and cons are discussed below).

—At the *second session*, you would proceed from the discussion of format to a presentation of our substantive ideas on START, INF and defensive arms. In particular, you would highlight the positive new ideas embodied in your instructions:<sup>4</sup>

—readiness to go beyond where we left off in START through one or more of the following approaches: asymmetrical limits and/or new forms of aggregation, such as you suggested at Stockholm;

- —readiness to explore various approaches in INF;
- —readiness to address space-related issues in both offensive and defensive arms negotiations; and
- —(if Gromyko has raised ASAT) readiness to consider mutual restraints on ASATs in formal negotiations in the context of stabilizing reductions in offensive forces.

At the end of the session, following Gromyko's remarks and his reaction to our ideas, you would return to the format question with the aim of moving toward agreement on the fora for new talks (presenting our fallback positions as necessary).

—Day one will, hopefully, have ended with a mutual understanding of each side's position and the extent of its flexibility. At the *third session*, therefore, discussion would move from prepared presentations to real give-and-take. Your aim would be to nail down agreement on dates and locations—and to the extent possible, agreed subjects and

objectives—for new negotiations, to reach accord on another Ministerial meeting, and to negotiate the text of a joint communique. You would also exchange thoughts with Gromyko on how each side intends to portray the meetings to the press.

The text of any communique will obviously have to be worked out on the scene (your talking points include notional drafts reflecting different possible outcomes, and these could be fine-tuned the night of January 7, based on that day's discussions, and negotiated with the Soviets on January 8). At an appropriate time (either at the close of the Monday afternoon session or mid-way through the Tuesday morning session), you could suggest that one or two members of each delegation split off from the group to begin drafting a communique as a basis for final negotiation by you and Gromyko.

Depending upon the need for continued discussion on the communique or other issues, you would have the option of continuing in a brief session in that afternoon.

Issue: When to present our opening position on format?

As noted above, you have the option of presenting our opening position at the end of the first session Monday morning, or at the beginning of the afternoon session (your talking points currently reflect the latter alternative). There are advantages to both approaches:

—Presenting our ingoing formula on format (START, INF, defensive nuclear arms) in the morning would give the Soviets the lunch break during which to consider the proposal. With their reaction in the afternoon, we would perhaps be able to get into some give-and-take on negotiating fora, drawing on our fallback formulations as

appropriate, so that the first day's discussions would end with both sides' cards all on the table. This would maximize the chances for successfully negotiating a joint communique the second day.

—Holding presentation of our ingoing formula until the afternoon session on Monday would ensure that there was plenty of time during the morning for an exhaustive exchange at the conceptual level on the offense-defense relationship. Moreover, presenting our ideas on format and substance at the same time could give the Soviets a clearer picture of where we are prepared to go in offensive and defensive arms talks. This could make them more receptive to an offense/defense format than they would be if they had heard only the procedural aspects of our approach.

#### Non-Arms Control Discussion

It would be extremely useful to be able in the aftermath of the meeting to point to exchanges with Gromyko on non-arms control topics, to counter the public perception that arms control is the whole US-Soviet relationship. (The President has asked that you reiterate his simulated space rescue mission proposal in Geneva, and we have included this under your defensive arms talking points).<sup>5</sup>

The two most urgent issues are Hebrew teachers, which you discussed with Shamir, and Shcharanskiy, which Mike Armacost has discussed with his wife here. Gromyko has been alerted that you may raise V-E Day commemorations, and he may well be interested. This could provide you some leverage to get such issues discussed, but since a heavy focus on arms control is at least partly to the Soviet advantage, Gromyko has so far deflected your suggestion that time be set aside for such exchanges on other topics.

Discussion will therefore be short in any event, and the best format would be the "headlines" you and Gromyko used in September. After the first morning session covering the two sides' initial remarks on arms control, you will have the discretion of raising these non-arms control issues either at the second session that afternoon or at the third session on the following day at whatever point you believe it would be most appropriate.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981–1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow on January 5; cleared by Simons, Palmer, Pifer, Schwartz (PM/SNP), Chain, Nitze, and McFarlane. Palmer initialed for all clearing officials. This memorandum was the first document in the Secretary's briefing book for his trip to Geneva. The book also contains schedules and other papers to prepare for Shultz's meetings with Gromyko.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See footnote 8, Document 314.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 343</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 348</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Reagan made this proposal in his statement on signing into law P.L. 98–562, October 30, 1984, on cooperative East-West ventures in space. See *Public Papers: Reagan, 1984*, Book I, p. 1687.

## 353. Memorandum From President Reagan to Secretary of Defense Weinberger 1

Washington, January 5, 1985

SUBJECT JCS Views on NSDD-153 (U)

Bud McFarlane has provided me with General Vessey's memorandum to you concerning NSDD-153.<sup>2</sup> Throughout the preparations for Geneva, I have paid particular attention to the views of General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs. I continue to place great value in their opinions. And, for that reason, I thought it would be valuable to share with you my reactions to their memorandum. (U)

The original version of the NSDD which we initially discussed in California on December 31 did not contain the two examples in question. It was in the context of our follow-on discussion, that we reached the conclusion that we may need to be able to go a bit further than simply restating our current positions in START and INF. Only after discussing these additions with George, Bud, and you, did I approve that addition of the authorization to present the material cited by the JCS as examples of where the U.S. might be willing to go in the context of formal negotiations. (S)

The START example selected is an option that was suggested by Ed Rowny and that has been a part of our ongoing review since March 1984. Ed's proposal would have had us specifically propose limits on ALCM carrying aircraft as a means of limiting ALCMs. The JCS support limits on ALCM carrying aircraft, others oppose. When we included this example, we intentionally generalized the

idea a bit to talk about asymmetrical limits on ALCMs, without specifying how these limits would be imposed, so that we would not unnecessarily prejudge this issue.<sup>4</sup> (S)

With respect to the INF example, the JCS express concern that the decision to use this example may not have been made with a full awareness of the potential risks involved. We discussed the idea of equal percentage reductions at the last NSPG on Geneva held prior to Christmas. I was able to draw upon this fully in understanding the disadvantages, as well as the advantages, of this approach. (S)

Would you please assure General Vessey and the Joint Chiefs that I am aware of the concerns expressed to you. I am confident that our delegation is also extremely mindful of the pitfalls we must avoid. Nevertheless, I am willing to modify my earlier guidance (as below) to take their concerns into account. But I must say that in so doing, I believe we have substantially increased the risk of an unsatisfactory outcome. (S)

The following instructions substitute for guidance contained in NSDD-153.<sup>7</sup> (S)

—Delete the penultimate paragraph in subsection "a. START" on page 14 and replace with the following:

"Tradeoffs would involve an exchange between the area in which we hold an advantage (i.e., bomber systems) and the area in which they hold an advantage (i.e., ICBM systems). We can imagine a number of possibilities for specific tradeoffs between these areas and will be prepared to discuss them when formal negotiations convene."

—Delete the balance of subsection "b. INF" after the last sentence which begins at the bottom of page 14 and replace with the following:

"We can imagine a number of ways through which we could arrive at equal global limits. We have considered equal percentage reductions applied to launchers, adoption of various absolute equal limits, asymmetrical reductions, and many others. Each of these have problems associated with them. But drawing on the work we have conducted in the past year, we believe a solution can be found, and we will be prepared to discuss the possibilities when formal talks are convened." (S)

#### **Ronald Reagan**

¹ Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File. Top Secret; King. A copy was sent to Shultz. In a January 5 covering memorandum to Reagan, McFarlane wrote: "Mr. President, the plain facts are these. You, I, George and others have stated publicly that we will be going to Geneva with new ideas; that we will be flexible and constructive. If we arrive and simply restate our existing position without even an explanation of what we are talking about, we face the high likelihood that the Soviets will make that public, charge us with bad faith, and we will be held responsible for the impasse." Additional passages from McFarlane's memorandum are provided in footnotes below.

<sup>2</sup> For NSDD 153, see <u>Document 348</u>. In a January 4 memorandum to Weinberger, Vessey wrote that the Joint Chiefs "believe that the section in the negotiating instructions entitled 'Substantive Presentations' should not authorize the delegation to provide examples of US

flexibility in either START or INF discussions." (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC National Security Decision Directives, NSDD 153, [Shultz-Gromyko Meeting in Geneva, 01/01/1985]. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: on "January 5, we were on board USAF 972 on the way to Geneva. The press dubbed us 'the ship of feuds.' Just before takeoff, Cap had given me a memo from the Joint Chiefs saying I should not draw upon any material from our agreed START and INF negotiating positions with Gromyko. That was absolutely contrary to my instructions from the president, to which Cap had agreed. Cap was trying to use the chiefs as a way to narrow my authorized running room. It was too late." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 512)

<sup>3</sup> See Documents 347 and 348.

<sup>4</sup> In his memorandum to Reagan (see <u>footnote 1</u>, above), McFarlane wrote: "Concerning START, the idea of our willingness to discuss 'tradeoffs' is not new. Ed Rowny made that offer before they walked out. Since the walk-out, we have stated many times publicly that we are willing to discuss tradeoffs. You told Gromyko that we would be ready to discuss tradeoffs. Our objective, then, is to be able to explain in general terms what we mean by tradeoffs without giving anything away or rewarding the Soviets for walking out." He then agreed to new guidance on START (see <u>footnote 7</u>, below) and commented: "Anything less than an expression like this—which gives absolutely nothing away—will leave us wide open to a charge of bad faith and give the Soviets an enormous propaganda advantage."

<sup>5</sup> See <u>Document 334</u>.

<sup>6</sup> In his memorandum to Reagan (see <u>footnote 1, above</u>), McFarlane wrote: "With regard to the INF example, again, we are very mindful of the pitfalls of choosing a particular path toward 'equal global entitlements.' The NSDD explains those pitfalls in great detail so that no one on the delegation could have any illusions about it. But if we only

restate our current position, without even explaining how we might make it work, we will be terribly vulnerable. I believe that the instructions you approved which mention 'equal percentage reductions' as an example of how to reach equality, provide the best course. But I am willing to accept a more general formula." (See <u>footnote 7, below</u>.) He continued: "Again, this gives absolutely nothing away indeed; there is a possibility that they may get up and leave at hearing such a thin explanation of the results of a year's work which we have characterized as 'new ideas' and 'flexibility.' Consequently, I recommend reluctantly that you approve the modified instructions to incorporate these formulations." Reagan agreed with McFarlane's recommendations, as he initialed his agreement to send the "short note to Cap" that "provides modified guidance" based on the JCS recommendations.

<sup>7</sup> The changes are verbatim from Vessey's January 4 memorandum to Weinberger. See <u>footnote 2</u>, above.

### 354. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State $\frac{1}{2}$

Geneva, January 6, 1985, 2208Z

Secto 1010. For S/S only. Subject: Message for SecDef Weinberger From Richard Perle.

- 1. S—(Entire text).
- 2. Richard Perle delivered the message in para 3 to us for transmission to Weinberger.<sup>2</sup>
- 3. Begin text: To the Secretary of Defense From Richard Perle

Eyes Only for the Secretary.

Much of the time since departure, on the aircraft and since arrival, has been spent reviewing draft talking points. A meeting with Secretary Shultz and the delegation has just concluded. I would summarize developments thus far as follows:

—Tone of draft talking points struck me and some others as unduly defensive—too many claims to "seriousness" when it must be assumed that the United States is always serious. We protested too much. With revisions now adopted I believe that we have diminished that sense.

—Change to NSDD relieved the principal concern of the JCS. $^4$  As I think we must have all sensed, it would have been easy to mistake an "example" for a proposal; and, indeed, in one place in the State-drafted talking points the

"example" on INF equal percentage reductions was characterized as an "offer."

—In my view the talking points were breezy, almost casual, in laying out a cascade of fall-backs; and while all fall-backs were drawn from the NSDD,<sup>5</sup> the drafting of the talking points conveyed a sense of skipping lightly from one to the next at the slightest resistance from Gromyko. In strategy session with SecState I urged that we try hard to achieve our preferred option and move only reluctantly to fallbacks in the face of motion on the other side. I understand Secretary Shultz believes that we ought to "get all our points out early," which can, unless handled very carefully, mean virtual simultaneous setting out of our preference and our fallbacks. I did what I could to urge that

A the Soviets seldom make concessions except at the last minute hoping all the while that we will obviate their concessions by making ours first and

B if he insisted on laying out "all our points" at once we should at least indicate that Gromyko could not expect further U.S. proposals on structure and fora and would not agree to any others. The handling of this is now in Shultz' hands and, having heard all views, I am confident that he will exercise all his skill in presenting our preferences.

—In meeting with Shultz I raised the point that some of the talking points appeared to imply that we were willing to volunteer restraints on the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems based on new physical phenomena that go beyond our treaty obligations. I will be checking further into our obligation, under the ABM Treaty, to consult and amend the treaty before deploying new "exotic" systems. Meanwhile I urged caution. Soviets may well seek to elicit rather more than is in the treaty—for example a pledge to

consult that would appear to vitiate our right to withdraw under the supreme national interests provision.

—Finally, I believe there was a sense in the talking points now somewhat diminished, and in the delegation discussions, that we have somehow to entice the Soviets back by holding out the prospect of proposals more to their liking when the talks resume. The now deleted examples would have accomplished that; and groping by Shultz for a way of elaborating what the President has meant when he has said that we would be prepared to "consider" interim restraints in the context of formal negotiations is of the same nature. I believe that State tends to underestimate the Soviet interest in resuming negotiations. I hope that we do not appear so eager that they are tempted to press for substantive concessions in the belief that we would suffer unacceptably and they would not from a failure now in Geneva to reach agreement on a resumption of formal talks.

End text.

Shultz

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0117. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Shultz arrived in Geneva on January 6.
<sup>2</sup> Richard Perle was chosen by Weinberger to represent DOD in the Geneva delegation. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "With the large delegation accompanying me to Geneva, pressure mounted over the question of who would actually sit in on the meeting for our side. Rowny wanted in and muttered threats. Adelman was in an uproar because he wanted a seat. Cap wanted Richard Perle. If Perle was in, Burt had to be in. I talked it over with the president. I told

him that if we had ten or so people at the table, the message to the Soviets would be that we did not have our act together and that extras were there as 'political commissars.' The president and I decided that I would be joined at the table by Bud McFarlane, Paul Nitze, and Art Hartman and that Jack Matlock, fluent in Russian, would be there to take notes." Shultz continued: "Over the Atlantic. Richard Perle spent a long, long time visibly talking with Washington Post correspondent Don Oberdorfer in the back of the plane. This created a palpable tension all around, as everyone knew my instructions were that no one was to talk to the press except Bernie Kalb. After we arrived in Geneva, I called Perle to my room and told him he had violated my instructions and if he didn't like them, he could get on a plane and go home. He said he had not talked to Oberdorfer about arms control. I told him the rule is 'no contact' about anything. He said okay. That cleared the air. He turned out to be one of the most helpful members of the delegation." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph pp. 511-513)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> See footnote 1, Document 352.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 353</u>.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See <u>Document 348</u>.

#### 355. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 9:40 a.m.-1 p.m.

#### FIRST SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Ambassador Viktor Karpov Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Gromyko opened the meeting with the observation that he and the Secretary were well aware of the problems which require discussion, and that it was not clear whether time would remain toward the end of the discussions to touch on other questions. Accordingly, he proposed that they proceed to the business at hand with a presentation by each side of the way, in principle, the problem should be addressed. These presentations, which need not be long statements, could be followed by a give-and-take discussion to get at the heart of the matter. Would such a working approach be acceptable to the Secretary?

Secretary Shultz observed that the evolution of the meetings between the two of them had been good in the sense that they had taken on an increasingly conversational cast as time had gone by. He cited in particular the meetings in New York and Washington last September as embodying more back-and-forth interchange,<sup>2</sup> and added that he believed that this method provided the best opportunity for developing individual subjects and therefore agreed with the proposal.

Secretary Shultz then said that since he had material which had been discussed with and considered by the President in detail, he felt it was important to lay it out for Gromyko carefully and thoroughly. This would take some time, but he thought it would not be excessive under the circumstances, since it is easy to understand the importance of these questions.

With respect to Gromyko's introductory comment about the questions to be discussed, the Secretary agreed that they had come to Geneva to concentrate on arms control questions. But, as the President had said in September, in a sense all questions between us are interrelated. If, toward the end of the discussions, time remained to discuss other questions, they could take a look at them. We continue to have major concerns in the human rights area and he would draw Gromyko's attention to them here. Perhaps there would be a chance to develop these matters in greater detail, but he wanted to point out their importance to us at this time. Just as other major issues between us throughout the world, they have an impact on the overall relationship. In this connection, the Secretary continued, we had received word that the Soviets accepted the idea of discussions on the Middle East and this made us hopeful, since discussion of other matters would doubtless follow.

The Secretary then proposed that they get down to business with a discussion of arms control questions.

Gromyko responded that, except for the Secretary's mention of a possible discussion of what he called human rights issues, they shared the same view. He had no intention of distracting the attention of participants in the talks with a discussion of human rights, and assumed that this would not surprise the Secretary. Other than that, their views coincided, and if the Secretary had no objection, he would present the introductory Soviet statement.

The Secretary agreed.

*Gromyko* then proceeded to make his opening presentation, which contained the following points:

—The world's public has been anticipating these meetings with a lively interest. This is the case because people and nations throughout the world fully understand the importance of searching for ways to end the arms race, achieve disarmament and avert a nuclear war. The press does not indulge in exaggeration when it says that the eyes of the entire world are focussed on Geneva. People are hungry for news of a constructive nature.

—It is a truism that relations between the USSR and the U.S. are bad. The Secretary is familiar with the Soviet view of what had caused this situation and also with Soviet policy. He (Gromyko) had set these forth on behalf of the Soviet Government in earlier meetings with the Secretary and also in his recent meeting with the President. He saw no need to repeat what he had said previously on this subject.

—He wished to stress most emphatically that if we do not find ways to halt the arms race and end the threat of

nuclear war, it will be impossible to correct our relationship. If this is not done, our relationship will heat up and this will affect the situation in the entire world.

—The Soviet Union is in favor of a relationship free of vacillations and one based on equality, mutual regard for each other's interests, and respect for and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. These thoughts were dominant in the messages from General Secretary Chernenko to the President and Gromyko had made every effort to emphasize them in his meeting with the President.

—It is important to take a principled approach—a correct approach in principle—in resolving problems in our relationship. He wished to outline in total candor how the Soviet side viewed such an approach.

—The upcoming negotiations, if they take place—and the Soviet side believes they must take place—must have as their ultimate objective the elimination of nuclear arms. In the final analysis this goal must be achieved if we are to have real security in the world as a whole and between our two countries in particular. The world today is not what it was 40-50 years ago. It has changed with the appearance of nuclear arms. Not everyone seems to understand this, because if it were understood, the question before us would be resolved. Those countries which possess nuclear arms are in the best position to understand. Therefore, we must make every effort to move toward this ultimate objective. Otherwise we will find ourselves in a situation whereby nuclear arms come to dominate people and people will find themselves caught in an irresistible current which drags them along. Where this would lead is clear. Science, and indeed, not just science, but all reasonable people in positions of authority recognize what might occur if nuclear arms remain in existence and if the nuclear arms race

continues. No matter how strong the words are which are chosen to emphasize the importance of this problem, none are adequate to express the dangers of continuing the nuclear arms build-up. Only ignorant people—and there are fewer and fewer of these—and dishonest individuals could treat such statements as propaganda and not a true reflection of reality. Both the Soviet and U.S. Governments must know that this is the case. It is the first point of principle he wished to make.

—The second point regards how we should proceed, both here in Geneva and beyond-indeed how to conduct our relations in general. The principle of equality and equal security is of exceptional importance. It is absolutely essential at every phase in our consideration of the problem and at every stage in our discussion of it. Absolute equality and equal security merit repetition a thousand times. All agreements connected with the resolution of the problem before us, a problem of vital importance to both our countries and to mankind in general, must be based on this principle. If we follow this principle, neither your security nor ours will be damaged; the security of both our countries and of the whole world will rather be stronger. We believe that if both sides act in an honest way, it will be possible to comply with this principle and find solutions to the nuclear arms problem and to other problems. It is within the realm of the possible to find mutually satisfactory solutions. There is no place here for fatalism. All problems in the world are created by human beings, and it is up to human beings to resolve them. All problems existing today can be solved if our two countries proceed along the same path. And if we do, others will follow. He emphasizes this point because one frequently hears statements almost to the effect that there is no opportunity for people, or even governments, to affect the process. All too often, when the modernization and development of

arms are considered (and this is especially true of space arms), it is suggested that there is no possibility of intervening to block such developments, as if it is written in the stars that it must happen. It is suggested that there might be some discussion of limitations—as if militarization has to continue. But this is inconsistent with human logic and with human capacities and must be rejected. We must believe in the possibility of human beings resolving this problem.

—The third principle pertains to outer space. We must set the goal of preventing the militarization of space. Questions of strategic nuclear arms and medium-range nuclear arms must be considered in conjunction with the problem of preventing the militarization of space. In other words, questions of space arms, nuclear strategic arms and nuclear medium-range arms must be resolved in one single complex, that is, comprehensively, in their interrelationship. He wished to stress comprehensively, since this is dictated by objective circumstances, and especially the requirements of strategic stability.

—He noted statements by U.S. officials at various levels, including the highest, which emphasized the importance of strategic stability, and pointed out that the Soviets believe that strategic stability requires such an approach. If the forthcoming negotiations are to be put on a practical track from the outset, there must be a specific, joint understanding regarding their ultimate objectives.

—In the Soviet view, the first such goal must be the prevention of the militarization of space. That is, there must be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of space attack arms [space strike weapons], along with the destruction of those already in existence. Given such a

radical approach, opportunities would emerge for farreaching decisions in the other areas as well.

- —By "space attack arms" the Soviet Union meant space arms based on any physical principle [literally: "principle of action"], regardless of basing mode, which are designed to strike space objects, objects in space and targets on land, sea or in the air from space, that is, targets on earth. This includes anti-satellite systems and relevant [or "corresponding"—sootvetstvuyushie] anti-missile systems.
- —The second goal relates to strategic arms. Given a complete ban on space attack arms, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to a radical reduction of strategic arms accompanied by a simultaneous and a complete ban, or severe limitation, of programs to develop and deploy new strategic systems, i.e., long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs and new types of heavy bombers. However, all these measures with regard to strategic arms would be possible only if they were coupled with a complete ban on space attack arms.
- —Additionally, the problem of strategic arms cannot be resolved separately from the problem of medium-range nuclear systems, that is missiles and aircraft, because the U.S. systems deployed in Europe are strategic systems with respect to the Soviet Union. This was emphasized in the past, particularly during the negotiations where Ambassador Nitze headed the U.S. delegation. To the Soviet Union these are strategic arms, even though in the past, for convenience, they had been called medium-range systems, taking into account only their range.
- —The third negotiation would deal with medium-range nuclear arms. Its main aim would be an agreement to end the further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe

coupled with a simultaneous cessation of Soviet countermeasures. This would be followed by a reduction of medium-range nuclear systems in Europe to levels to be agreed. Naturally, British and French medium-range missiles must be taken into account in these levels. He then repeated "they must be taken into account," and observed that talk to the effect that the UK and France are separate states, that they should be disregarded and that their arms should not be counted in solving the question of mediumrange systems in Europe, did not impress anyone. Such talk did not make the least impression on the Soviet Union. The UK and France and their nuclear systems were on one and the same side with the U.S. This is true in fact as well as in formal, legal terms, no matter how the problem is addressed. Thus, at least in discussions with the Soviet Union, the U.S. should steer clear of the thesis that UK and French systems ought not be taken into account. Any talk along these lines is a waste of time.

—In summarizing the last portion of his statement, Gromyko reiterated the following. The problem of strategic arms and the problem of medium-range nuclear arms cannot be considered separately or in isolation from the problem of space arms, or more precisely, that of the non-militarization of space. The problem of strategic nuclear arms cannot be considered independently of the question of medium-range nuclear arms. All of this must be considered comprehensively [in one complex] if there is, in fact, a serious desire to reach agreement. The Soviet Union hoped that it could count on the U.S. Government's understanding of the Soviet position.

—Perhaps he was repeating it for the thousandth time, but the Soviet leadership would like to see serious progress toward agreement in order to reach the objectives which he had described at the beginning of his statement. Agreements must be based on respect for the security interests of both the USSR and the U.S. The entire world would give a sigh of relief if this could indeed be achieved. Moreover, the Soviet Union has no negative aims with respect to the U.S. It wants a fair and objective agreement that meets the interests of both countries.

—The Soviet Union wants to live in peace with the U.S.. The USSR is aware that from time to time responsible officials in the U.S. make statements to the effect that the USSR poses a threat to the U.S. The Soviet Union tends to think that individuals who make such statements do not understand the situation. However, these statements are made so frequently that we cannot rule out the possibility that those who make them may come to believe in them. After all, some people still believe in the devil. But we believe that common sense and objective reasoning, if it is followed by U.S. policy makers, can make agreement possible.

—Could a country with hostile aims present proposals on eliminating nuclear arms, on no-first-use of nuclear arms, and insist that other nuclear powers follow the Soviet example? Could such a country present a proposal on the non-use of force in international relations? Could such a country make proposal after proposal aimed at curbing the arms race, disarmament and improving Soviet-U.S. relations? The Soviet Union has presented many such proposals. A country with hostile designs would not present these kinds of proposals. Could such a country harbor evil designs toward the United States? Surely it could not. He wished to stress that the Soviet leadership and the entire ruling party of the USSR, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, had no hostile designs against the legitimate interests or security of the United States. The USSR does

not pursue such a goal. Judge our policies on the basis of our statements and our specific proposals.

—The Soviet Union intends to pursue this course at the forthcoming negotiations. However, if common sense does not triumph at these negotiations—and he was not speaking of the Soviet side—then, of course, the USSR would be forced—he emphasized would be forced—to take appropriate steps to protect its security interests. However, it is in our mutual interest not to follow such a path. It is in our interest to follow the path of striving for an objective agreement which, he was convinced, is possible provided both sides advance objective and justified positions. If this were not the Soviet desire, it would have been pointless to hold these meetings here. In that case, we would be simply rolling down to the abyss. But the Soviets believe that an objective possibility of agreement exists. He could not speak for the Secretary on these points, and invited him to speak for himself.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his comprehensive introductory comments, and promised to be equally brief in presenting his views.

First, he remarked that during Gromyko's visit to the United States, especially during his conversation with the President, Gromyko had used the phrase "question of questions." This had caught people's attention. He had defined it as whether we would move toward peace or toward confrontation, and, especially, whether we would be able to resolve the overriding question of nuclear arms. Gromyko had said, and the President had agreed—in fact, the President had said several times—that our goal must be the elimination of nuclear arms. This was repeated in the letters exchanged between the two heads of state.

The Secretary noted that Gromyko, in his arrival statement, had spoken about advancing along a path of radical reduction of nuclear arms and the goal of eliminating them. We share that goal. If, as a result of these meetings, we can agree on a negotiating format, we should instruct our negotiators to work toward that aim.

The Secretary pointed out that the President views this meeting as a major opportunity to launch a new effort aimed at reaching arms control agreements that enhance the security of both our nations. Our principal task is to look to the future, to establish a more efficient process and more effective negotiating approaches for addressing critical arms control questions. He hoped the meetings today and tomorrow can lay the basis for progress toward that end.

The President had directed that careful and thorough preparations be made for the meeting, and he had personally taken an intensive role in them. Accordingly, the Secretary thought it important to set forth the President's thinking carefully and in detail. He would go through the President's views of the strategic situation as it had developed in the past and as he saw it developing in the future. He would then deal with the question of subjects and fora for the future negotiations, if we can agree on them.

The Secretary said that he would begin by setting forth our views on the future strategic environment, including the relationship between defensive and offensive forces. He then made the following points:

—Gromyko would agree that, as the President had said, the U.S. has no territorial ambitions. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would initiate military action against the USSR or the

Warsaw Pact unless we or our allies were attacked. We hope that the USSR has no intention of initiating an attack on the U.S. or its Allies, and the Secretary had heard this in Gromyko's statement.

- —At the same time the U.S. is determined to maintain sufficient forces to deter attack against ourselves and our allies. This means forces of such size, effectiveness and survivability as to deny an opponent any possibility of gain from an attack. We expect that you wish to maintain similar capabilities.
- —We will maintain a sufficient deterrent with or without arms control agreements. However, we believe, as Gromyko said this morning with regard to the USSR, that the strategic relationship can be made more stable and secure, and that stability and security can be maintained at significantly lower levels of armaments, if this relationship is regulated through effective arms control. We prefer that path.
- —It is disturbing to us that the USSR has placed so much emphasis upon massive expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces, both offensive and defensive. In light of this, we are obliged to take some steps necessary to maintain our offensive and defensive capabilities.
- —This interplay between us does create a dangerous situation. So it is one we must address. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be defused.
- —In preparing for this meeting and for renewed negotiations, the U.S. has conducted a review of our past arms control efforts. While some worthwhile agreements

have been reached, our efforts in the area of strategic arms have not fulfilled their original promise in terms of constraining the arms competition and enhancing stability. We believe you would agree.

- —At any rate, in the late 1960's and early 1970's we negotiated measures that we hoped would be helpful to the security of each of us. Those constraints, as we reviewed the record, were based on three assumptions:
  - (1) with defensive systems severely limited, it would be possible to place comparable limits on strategic offensive forces, and to establish a reliable deterrent balance at reduced levels;
  - (2) the constraints on ballistic missile defenses would prevent break-out or circumvention; and
  - (3) both sides would adhere to the letter and spirit of the agreements.
- —These premises, as we examined the record, have come increasingly into question over the past decade.
- —Both sides today have substantially greater offensive capabilities than in 1972. Not only have the numbers of offensive weapons reached exceedingly high levels; of even greater concern, systems have been deployed on the Soviet side, in significant numbers, which have the capability for a devastating attack on missile silos and command and control facilities.
- —On the defensive side, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the ABM Treaty—this was not criticism, just an observation—it has exploited technical ambiguities, and has also taken steps which we believe are almost certainly not consistent with the ABM Treaty.<sup>3</sup>

—The viability of the ABM Treaty was based on several key assumptions:

First, that large phased-array radars would be constrained so as to limit potential breakout or circumvention to provide the base for a territorial ABM defense. Allowance was made for early warning radars, but they were to be on the periphery and outward facing.

Second, that ABM interceptors, launchers and radars would be neither mobile nor transportable.

Third, that the line between anti-aircraft and antiballistic missile defenses would be unambiguous.

Fourth, that the ABM Treaty would soon be accompanied by a comprehensive treaty, of indefinite duration, on offensive nuclear forces.

- —Unfortunately, today those assumptions no longer appear valid.
- —The Krasnoyarsk radar appears to be identical to radars for detecting and tracking ballistic missiles, and could serve as part of a base for a nationwide ABM defense.
- —The inconsistency of the location and orientation of this radar with the letter and spirit of the ABM Treaty is a serious concern, for it causes us to question the Soviet Union's long-term intentions in the ABM area.
- —We are also concerned about other Soviet ABM activities that, taken together, give rise to legitimate questions on our part as to whether the Soviet Union intends to deploy a wide-spread ABM system. The SA-X-12 anti-air missile is one element of our concern; it seems to have some

capabilities against strategic ballistic missiles, and thereby blurs the distinction between anti-aircraft missile systems and anti-ballistic missile systems.

- —The Soviet Union is pursuing active research programs on more advanced technologies, which have a direct application to future ballistic missile defense capabilities.
- —Most importantly, as to offensive nuclear forces, it has not proven possible to work out mutually acceptable agreements that would bring about meaningful reductions in such arms, particularly in the most destabilizing categories of such forces.
- —So, in our view, as we look back at that period when the strategic environment that we were hoping for was designed, we must say that the strategic environment has since deteriorated. But it is important to look today at the future. He therefore would offer some comments which would help Gromyko understand the conceptual and political framework in which we approach renewed negotiations.
- —For the immediate future we wish to work with you to restore and make more effective the regime for reliable mutual deterrence which, in 1972, was thought by both sides to be our common objective.
  - —We must negotiate "effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament" called for when we signed the ABM Agreement in 1972. We are prepared to negotiate constructively toward this end.
  - —We must reverse the erosion which has taken place of the premises assumed when we entered into the ABM Treaty.

- —The research, development and deployment programs of both sides must be consistent with the ABM Treaty.
- —You may argue that it is the U.S., and not the Soviet Union, that has decided to embark on the creation of a nationwide ABM system, including the deployment of defensive systems in space. Certainly, your comments imply this. Therefore, I wish to explain the U.S. position.
- —The President has set as a major objective for the coming decade the determination of whether new defensive technologies could make it feasible for our two countries to move away from a situation in which the security of both our countries is based almost exclusively on the threat of devastating offensive nuclear retaliation.
- —We believe both sides have an interest in determining the answer to this question. Indeed, your country has historically shown a greater interest in strategic defenses than the United States, and deploys the world's only operational ABM system.
- —A situation in which both of our countries could shift their deterrent posture toward greater reliance on effective defenses could be more stable than the current situation.
- —It could provide a basis for achieving the radical solution both our leaders seek—eliminating nuclear weapons entirely on a global basis.
- —Our effort to see whether this is possible is embodied in the Strategic Defense Initiative. This SDI is strictly a research effort and is being conducted in full conformity with the ABM Treaty.

- —No decisions on moving beyond the stage of research have been taken, nor could they be for several years. Such research is necessary to see if it would be possible to move toward a world in which the threat of nuclear war is eliminated.
- —Whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures. If either side ever wishes to amend the ABM treaty, then there are provisions for discussing that. In the U.S. view, such discussions should precede action by sufficient time so that stability is guaranteed. The Secretary repeated: whenever research validates that a defensive technology would make a contribution to strengthening deterrence, the United States would expect to discuss with the Soviet Union the basis on which it would be integrated into force structures.
- —The Soviet Union has been actively engaged for years in the sort of research being pursued under SDI.
- —The Secretary doubts that either side is prepared to abandon its research efforts now, before we know whether there are defensive systems that could enhance rather than diminish the security of both sides. We doubt an effective and verifiable ban on research, as such, could be designed in any event.
- —In the longer run, it appears that new technologies may open possibilities of assuring the security of both sides through a substantial improvement in our respective defenses. To the U.S., high-confidence defenses would appear to be a sounder approach to peace and security

than the current situation, and could produce a more stable environment.

- —The United States recognizes that arms control and other forms of cooperation would play an important role in creating and sustaining such a less threatening environment. We believe that the security interests of both sides could be served by such an evolution and obviously we would have to move in stages.
- —But we are prepared to initiate a continuing discussion with you now on the whole question of strategic defense (both existing and possible future systems), a discussion of reductions in offensive arms, and a discussion of the nature of the offense-defense relationship that we should be seeking to establish and maintain in the future. This was by way of saying that we fully agree about the relationship between offense and defense.
- —In the context of negotiations on offensive and defensive arms, we are also prepared to address space arms issues.
- —So we believe our negotiating efforts today and tomorrow should focus on the most urgent question before us: namely, how to begin the process of reducing offensive nuclear arms and enhancing the stability of the strategic environment.

The Secretary then turned to the way in which these comments lead us to suggestions regarding the subject and objectives of the future negotiations. Accordingly, he wished to offer comments on fora, subjects and objectives of the negotiations, as well as on their location and timing.

—With respect to offensive nuclear systems, he proposed that we begin where we broke off and capture the progress made in the START and INF negotiations. We believe that much good work was done in both sets of talks, even though many issues remained unresolved.

- —Moreover, while the issues involved are clearly related, we continue to believe it would be most practical to address strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces in separate fora.
- —Thus, we propose that we begin new negotiations on strategic arms reductions, and a second set of new negotiations on reductions in intermediate-range nuclear forces.
- —The subject of the first, strategic offensive arms—or, more precisely, intercontinental-range offensive nuclear forces—is fairly well established.
- —We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically, to use Gromyko's word, the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.
- —Thus, the subject of these negotiations would be reductions, radical reductions, in strategic offensive nuclear arms.
- —I propose that the objective of renewed talks be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of strategic offensive arms.
- —The second negotiation we envisage is on intermediaterange nuclear forces.

- —Here, too, I think our previous efforts revealed a common emphasis on reducing longer-range INF missiles, with the ultimate goal of their total elimination.
- —Moreover, we seem to agree that while systems in or in the range of Europe should be of central concern, any agreement must take account of the global aspects of the INF problem.
- —Both sides have proposed that certain INF aircraft and shorter-range missile systems be dealt with in some fashion.
- —We propose that the subject of the new talks be reductions in intermediate-range offensive arms.
- —The objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

The Secretary then turned to our ideas for addressing the other aspects of "nuclear and space arms" on which we agreed in November to begin negotiations.

- —In the early days of SALT I both sides agreed that a treaty limiting defensive arms should be paralleled by a treaty limiting offensive arms and vice-versa. For reasons including those the Secretary advanced earlier, we continue to believe there is merit in such an approach.
- —We understand that the Soviet Union believes that controlling weapons in space should be a priority matter. Gromyko had emphasized this in his presentation. We believe, however, that a forum permitting negotiation of defensive nuclear arms would be a more appropriate

complement to new negotiations on offensive nuclear systems.

- —In such a forum, we would be prepared to address the question of space-based defensive systems in a serious and constructive manner. Space arms questions could also be taken up in the offensive arms negotiations as well, as this might be appropriate.
- —But we believe that it is important to address questions relating to existing defensive systems based on earth, as well as potential future space-based systems, and to restore and revalidate the assumptions on which the ABM Treaty was based.
- —We therefore propose that we establish a third negotiating forum, in which each side could address aspects of the offense-defense relationship not dealt with in the two offensive nuclear arms fora.
- —In making this proposal, we have taken careful note of the concern you expressed in our September meetings about the possibility of nuclear arms in outer space. Gromyko had referred to this subject several times.
- —Given our shared objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons and the concerns you expressed, we believe that the negotiations should focus on defensive nuclear arms, including nuclear systems that would be based in space or detonated in space, as well as defensive nuclear systems based on the earth.
- —Thus we propose that the subject of this third negotiation be defensive nuclear arms. The objective would be agreement on measures to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and on steps toward the eventual elimination of all nuclear-armed defensive systems.

- —As to the formalities, the Secretary suggested that the location of all three talks be Geneva and that, as a matter of urgency, the negotiations should preferably open in the first half of March.
- —The most pressing task is to reach agreement on formal negotiations to address offensive and defensive forces. But the Secretary believed that it would also be useful to establish a senior-level process to complement the formal negotiations and to provide a channel for talking about broader problems. In these talks we might perhaps be able to provide the integrating process that Gromyko had referred to.
- —What we have in mind is to have more unstructured, conceptual exchanges on the maintenance of strategic stability and the relationship between offensive and defensive forces.
- —Continuing exchanges on these subjects between the foreign ministers should be part of this process. As the President has suggested, this might give some stimulation and act as an energizer to the negotiations. As he has further suggested, it might also be useful to have special representatives meet to address both conceptual and concrete ideas.
- —Senior representatives could also play an important role in clarifying each side's conceptual approach to the negotiations, as well as in exploring the details of specific proposals.
- —Moreover, as formal negotiations proceed in individual areas, senior representatives could meet periodically to help break logjams and coordinate our joint efforts in the various fora.

—We believe that the problem of getting control of the growing nuclear forces is of fundamental concern. Those countries with nuclear arms must take the leadership. Certainly, he would hope that we can make progress to prevent these systems from overwhelming our two countries. As Gromyko had suggested, if our two countries take the lead in this regard, others would follow. Gromyko had also said that the ultimate goal would be to eliminate nuclear arms. We had no reservations in this regard, though we recognized the difficulties involved.

—In this connection, the Secretary highlighted the importance of the non-proliferation regime and noted that their discussion in September 1982 had led to consultations on non-proliferation questions. From our standpoint, these discussions have been fruitful. However, further efforts are needed if we are to control nuclear arms, as we must—if we are to reduce them drastically and ultimately eliminate them.

The Secretary concluded by saying that he had described how we see future developments and had outlined our ideas for structuring the future negotiations. The Secretary remarked that earlier he promised to take as much time as Gromyko had. He had not quite fulfilled that promise, but considering the time devoted to interpretation, he thought that they had ended up about equal. The Secretary cited Gromyko's phrase about the need for respecting the security interests of both parties. He found this to be a very good phrase and intended to proceed on this basis. He also expressed appreciation for Gromyko's attempt to present his comments with as much precision as possible.

*Gromyko*, who had earlier waived translation from English to Russian, observed that the Secretary had just delivered a very important statement and asked for a translation so

that it could be given careful consideration. The Secretary's statement was thereupon translated in its entirety.

When the translation was completed, *Gromyko* observed that the statement was an important one dealing with fundamental principles, and said that he had two questions which arose from the Secretary's comment that at some stage the parties could enter into a discussion of the research the U.S. is doing and of ways it could be integrated into a system of strategic stability. His questions were: first, at what stage would this be discussed, and second, what specifically should be dealt with in the third forum, that is, the forum dealing with space matters, a forum to which we have not yet attached a label, because it is too early to do so.

Gromyko added that the Secretary's remarks on this subject had not been clear. The lack of clarity did not seem to be a linguistic problem but one rather in the U.S. position itself. What should be discussed in this third forum? Is this forum to discuss programs for large-scale space defense systems or not? And if this topic is discussed, what will be the angle of view applied? If your position is that space research programs are to be continued and sometime later can be discussed, then this is not acceptable. U.S. intentions to pursue such efforts were unacceptable, even though mention had been made that the U.S. might share some of the results. The Soviet position is that the topic should be discussed with the view of preventing the militarization of outer space. If this approach is taken, what is the point of such a large-scale program to develop ballistic missile defenses? What would happen if these two concepts collided? What would be discussed in this forum in that case? Perhaps this forum might hold only one meeting. What sort of negotiation

would that be? Where would that lead us? Since all three fora are interrelated, if the third forum bursts like a soap bubble, the other two would go down with it. It would be a different matter if the subject of the negotiations in that forum were to be the prevention of militarization of space. In that case, he could see the sense of that third forum.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to respond to his questions either then or after lunch, as he preferred. When the Secretary had done so, Gromyko would comment on other aspects of the U.S. position.

The Secretary promised to answer Gromyko's questions, but suggested that this be done after lunch since they were already running about an hour behind schedule. He also suggested, since time between meetings was useful to consider carefully and assess each other's comments, to move the afternoon meeting to 3:30 instead of 2:30, and put off the reception planned for the evening by one hour as well.

Gromyko agreed with this procedure.

Before departing, the Secretary said that he intended to say nothing to the press regarding the meeting and *Gromyko* stated that he, too, would follow a "no comment" policy.

The meeting adjourned at 1:00 P.M.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4)). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission. Brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See <u>Documents 284</u>, <u>286</u>, <u>287</u>, and <u>288</u>.

<sup>3</sup> The United States believed the Soviet Krasnoyarsk early warning radar system was a violation of the ABM Treaty, which allowed for a limited number of defensive systems in each country. Documents on these potential violations are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIV, Part 1, National Security Policy, 1985–1988 . <sup>4</sup> See *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. III, Soviet Union, January 1981–January 1983, Document 217 .

# 356. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House 1

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 1347Z

Secto 1015. For the President. Subject: Memorandum for the President on the Secretary's First Meeting With Gromyko, Monday Morning, January 7, 1985.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My First Meeting With Gromyko

- 1. We began our talks in what I believe was a constructive atmosphere with a three-hour exchange on strategic philosophy—on Gromyko's part—and a laying out in a very detailed form of our view of the strategic environment. Gromyko's manner was calm, businesslike and forceful. He read large portions of his presentation, indicating that these were agreed Politburo positions. He talked at all times as if the future negotiations were a fact but of course put great stress—as we expected he would—on the objectives and goals of such negotiations.
- 2. There was brief interchange on human rights at outset with me asserting their importance in the overall relation and Gromyko saying he would not discuss a matter of internal affairs.
- 3. My presentation of U.S. position closely followed agreed talking points (which we are sending separately in full) $^{2}$  covering:

- —Evaluation of strategic environment
- —Our view of the way it should evolve
- —Our view of subject and objectives of subsequent negotiations
- 4. For his part, Gromyko, after a long plea for negotiations as the only way to head-off catastrophe, set several general conditions or principles. We should agree on the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We should base negotiations on the principle of equality and equal security. The problems of strategic and intermediate forces cannot be settled in the absence of an agreement to prevent the militarization of space. Only this can strengthen strategic stability.
- 5. He went on to lay out specific goals for negotiations:

To prevent the militarization of space we must institute a ban on development, testing and deployment of attack space weapons and eliminate any weapons of that kind already deployed. He defined these weapons as anything based on any physical principle or basing mode to attack targets in outer space or from space to attack weapons on land, sea, in the air, or on earth. He included ASAT and relevant anti-missile systems.

6. On strategic arms, if there is a ban on space weapons, the Soviets are ready to accept radical reductions plus renunciation of new strategic systems, long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers. He added that INF cannot be separated from strategic systems because the systems we have deployed in Europe can hit the USSR and are therefore, by definition, strategic.

- 7. On medium-range missiles there should be a goal to stop U.S. deployments and stop Soviet counter-deployments, followed by reductions to new lower levels which must take account of UK and French forces. Strategic arms cannot be settled in isolation from medium-range arms.
- 8. Gromyko concluded by saying that all these matters are linked and must be considered together. We want, he said, fair and objective agreements. We want to live in peace with you. We harbor no evil designs.
- 9. In an unusual move, Gromyko asked for my entire threequarter hour presentation to be translated quote, because I understand it to be an important statement of principle, unquote.
- 10. Our preliminary conclusion is that the Soviets are driving for a single forum to discuss all subjects but perhaps with subgroups. On substance, there appears to be nothing new. We'll cable again after the afternoon session.

**Shultz** 

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985 Morning (1). Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, Hill, M. Bova (S/S), and K. Clark (S); and approved by Shultz.
<sup>2</sup> Not found.

## 357. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Geneva, January 7, 1985, 3:35-6:55 p.m.

## SECOND SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETINGGeneva, January 1985

### **PARTICIPANTS**

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Ambassador Viktor Karpov Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Shultz opened the meeting by saying that he would respond to the two questions Gromyko raised at the end of the morning session. The first question concerned when the U.S. expects to discuss how strategic defense-type systems could be integrated into force structures. In one sense, there is nothing concrete on this subject to speak of at this point because we do not yet have an outcome from our research. When we get to something concrete, or reach a development with potential operational characteristics, when and if the research of both sides demonstrates that there can be a system which could usefully contribute to moving away from reliance on

offensive weapons, then we could discuss the strategic defensive forces. In other words, the discussion would be triggered by the emergence in U.S. or Soviet research programs of something with that potential. The U.S. also would be prepared—even in advance of any such positive research development—to discuss the ways such systems, if they proved feasible, could contribute to the goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons, which is important in and of itself. This was the first question Gromyko had raised.

Gromyko's second question, the Secretary continued, concerned the subject matter of the third forum he had proposed, that of nuclear defensive systems. He expected this to be a forum in which both sides would feel free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems they wished to raise, including space-based or land-based systems, whether directed against weapons on the earth or in space. Nuclear offensive weapons in space are already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. Technical developments in recent years make it harder to draw certain distinctions between systems, for example, between ABM and air defense systems, between early warning, NTM, space track and ABM radars. Therefore, the U.S. believes there is much work to be done to reexamine, reevaluate and reinforce the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM treaty, as well as defensive systems in general. In addition, this would be an appropriate forum to discuss possible future arms, as he had mentioned earlier, and technical developments bearing on their future utility, to the ultimate objective of the total elimination of nuclear arms. The U.S. does not believe that research can be effectively or verifiably banned, nor does it believe that research which could, if successful, contribute positively to a reduction in the evils of war should be banned. This forum would be the appropriate one in which to raise

questions relating to space arms, including the space systems Gromyko had discussed this morning. He thought there was a full house here to occupy both sides.

The Secretary then said he wished to explain the essence of the idea he was trying to put across, since it related to his answer to one of Gromyko's questions. Gromyko had said that the questions being discussed here are interrelated. Although for the purpose of the negotiations these questions cannot be discussed all at once, the sides must find "bundles" of questions to discuss. In the end, of course, all these issues are interrelated, and he recalled that in a recent letter Chernenko had referred to the "organic link" between offensive and defensive weapons.

Secretary Shultz then said that what we have in mind is a concept of deterrence in which the greatest degree of stability and equal security is inherent. He suggested looking at two steps. First, to try to attain the strategic environment envisaged in the early 1970s—that is, reduction of offensive arms down to the levels contemplated at that time—and then, in light of technical developments, to look at the defensive environment. In the meantime, research proceeds on strategic defensive weapons; both the U.S. and USSR have such research under way. On the basis of U.S. research, he did not know what the answer would be, but if the answers are positive, he would envisage that the two sides would together try to create a regime with relatively greater emphasis on defense. Of course, if we are able to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely (and he hoped we would be able to) there would be less to defend against. But if a side feels it has a secure defense, it has equal security and stability in a less dangerous and less destabilizing mode. This is the concept on which the U.S. approach is based. It is not a concept that is being implemented now, but would emerge as time

goes on. The reductions in offensive arms to which Gromyko had referred must be consistent with this.

Gromyko said he would respond, taking into account the answers Secretary Shultz had given to his questions. He thought this would be useful so that the Secretary could more fully understand the Soviet attitude toward the American concept of a large-scale missile defense system. The U.S. calls this whole idea a defensive concept, but the Soviet Union does not share this view. The Soviet side sees it as part of a general offensive plan.

Gromyko then invited the Secretary to climb to the top of an imaginary tower and look at the entire situation through Soviet eyes. The Soviet line of reasoning is simple. Assuming the U.S. succeeds in developing this large-scale anti-missile defense, it will have created a shield against hypothetical Soviet missiles. U.S. assumptions of this threat are pure fiction and fantasy, but Gromyko would leave this aside for the moment. If the U.S. did have such a defensive system in place, it would have the capability to inflict a first nuclear strike against the USSR with impunity. One needs no special gift of perspicacity to understand this; it is clear almost to the point of being primitive. If the Secretary were to view this situation from atop the tower, he would reach the same conclusion.

The United States, Gromyko continued, reasons that the Soviet Union can also develop its own strategic defense. Then there would be two such systems, a Soviet and a U.S. one, and then both sides could consider how to reconcile and adjust them to each other and integrate them into the relative defensive complexes of both sides. But Gromyko wished to ask: why have these systems at all? After all, one side has nuclear arms and the other side has them too, so although it is possible to paralyze or neutralize these

weapons, why create a system to do so? Isn't it simpler to eliminate nuclear weapons themselves? Why should our two countries spend their material and intellectual resources developing such a system? Surely the reasonable solution would be to eliminate the weapons themselves. This is nothing more than the centuries-old question of the shield and the sword: Why have a shield to protect yourself from the sword if it is simpler to eliminate the sword? In speaking now of shields and swords, no one should be thinking of the weapons people used in olden times; the weapons now are terrible ones that threaten all humankind.

This, Gromyko stated, is the logic behind the Soviet reasoning. For this reason, the fact that the U.S. side calls its concept a defensive one makes no impression on the Soviet side. The U.S. must understand clearly that the USSR cannot be party, either directly or indirectly, to the development of such a system, either U.S. or Soviet. If the U.S. dismisses this reasoning and takes measures to develop such a system, the Soviet Union would decide on the counter-measures necessary to protect its own security. Gromyko wanted the U.S. administration to understand the Soviet position correctly. He was inclined to believe that Secretary Shultz understood this position.

Gromyko continued by stating that the U.S. seems to believe—indeed he would go further and say it does believe—that it would be able to create such a system and the Soviet Union would not, so the U.S. would be ahead. The U.S. thinks it would be in the dominant position and this tempts it. This is how the Soviet side sees the situation. The U.S. wants to gain advantage over the Soviet Union, and the defensive system if developed would be used to bring pressure on the Soviet Union. Let us not mince words,

Gromyko said, even if they are harsh ones: the system would be used to blackmail the USSR.

To be blunt, Gromyko added, this is not the right approach to take in relations between our two countries. It is not the path dictated by the interests of our countries and the whole world. If the U.S. does not change its line, the Soviet Union will reveal the full truth to its own people and to the whole world. He thought the U.S. government had surely noticed the restraint shown by the Soviet side in its official pronouncements on this issue, particularly with regard to these meetings in Geneva. However, if the situation makes it necessary for the Soviet side to comment in full on the U.S. line, it will do so. This is not the path that will lead to a peaceful solution on the basis of an accord between our two countries. As sure as we know that after the Geneva meetings both sides will return home and as sure as we know that tomorrow will be a new day, the Soviet side is convinced that the two countries will protect what they consider to be just and fair. Gromyko urged that the U.S. reappraise this concept which it has christened "defensive". There is nothing defensive in this concept, he added.

Gromyko continued that this would not mean that the U.S. would have to give in to the Soviet position. It would simply mean a change of U.S. policy in favor of peace. It would be in the interests of the U.S. as much as the Soviet Union. The U.S. has mobilized formidable official and propaganda resources in support of its policy. Practically every day one hears pronouncements by U.S. officials at all levels, as well as by members of the press, in defense of this concept. But all the U.S. is doing is taking some half-dozen arguments and juggling them around. One day, argument number one becomes argument number six, the next day argument number two becomes argument number three, and so on.

The U.S. changes the periods and commas, but the set of arguments is the same as it tries to prove that the concept is a defensive one. This is a non-viable concept and non-viable position.

Gromyko made bold to state that it gives rise to concern and alarm in Western Europe and in other countries, even those on remote continents. People today are not like they were 40 or 50 years ago, he said. Today they take to heart everything that bears on war and peace. Had the Secretary not noticed the mood of the world on matters relating to outer space? People want outer space to be a peaceful environment; they do not want the sword of war hanging over mankind's head and threatening space. Gromyko thought the U.S. should be aware of this and therefore he hoped the U.S. administration would take another look at the entire question of outer space.

Gromyko then stated that when he returned to Moscow after his last visit to Washington, he had reported in detail on his talks with the Secretary and with President Reagan in the White House. He informed his colleagues in the leadership, including Chernenko, what the President had said in their private conversation. He had, in fact, quoted verbatim from the President's words. Gromyko had told the President in response that he had spoken very good words but he wondered why the U.S. government made no changes at all in its practical plans for an arms race and in preparing for war. The President had not answered this question and Gromyko reported this also. All his colleagues liked the good words the President had spoken, but were disappointed that nothing positive was either done or promised to substantiate the words. This was the "political photograph" that he had brought back with him from his visit to Washington.

Since then, that is since September 1984, Gromyko continued, the situation had not changed, or had changed for the worse. Take, for example, outer space, which is of immense importance. The situation is also worse as regards medium-range nuclear weapons and in the arms race in general. The situation now is worse than it was in September, and in September it was worse than the year before. As the situation worsens, we sit at the table in Geneva and talk. People everywhere, even if they are not involved with politics, are aware that the problems under discussion here concern the fate of peace in the world. Let there be no false modesty—that is precisely what is at stake here. We are charged by our leaders to meet and exchange ideas on these questions. If there is a chance even to begin to turn this situation around, let us make use of this chance, because the situation today is worse than yesterday, yesterday was worse than the day before, and tomorrow will be worse than today. Perhaps the day would come when some political leaders will throw up their hands in despair, but we, the Soviets, will not be party to defeatism. We will continue to struggle to strengthen and preserve peace on earth.

Gromyko then asserted that it would be incorrect for the U.S. to construe his words as prompted by tactical or propaganda considerations. There is no room for propaganda here. We are talking here about high politics and questions of war and peace. Let us agree to discuss questions of outer space, the prevention of the militarization of outer space, strategic nuclear weapons and intermediate-range nuclear weapons (the Soviet side calls them medium-range weapons, but the name is not important). Let us agree upon the structure of negotiations and how to understand the interrelationship of the three elements, or triad. Let us decide how to breathe life into the negotiations.

As for the structure of the negotiations, Gromyko wished to address that separately. He had something more to add to his comments on what the Secretary had mentioned in justification of the so-called defensive concept. The Secretary had said that the Soviet Union almost has such systems now and is certainly working toward them. Secretary Shultz had stated that Soviet air defense systems are almost the same as the systems the U.S. plans to develop. While he did not choose to call this a distortion, it certainly is a mistake. Perhaps the Secretary's information is not correct; in any case there is nothing of the sort in the Soviet Union. Air defense systems carry out air defense functions and no others.

Gromyko continued, saying that Secretary Shultz often speaks of verification. Whenever there is talk of an agreement, understanding, or accord between the two sides, the U.S. always speaks of verification and monitoring. Gromyko supposed the U.S. did this in order to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet side, but there is no need to waste time in pressuring. The Soviet Union is in favor of verification, but it wants the degree and level of verification to correspond to the degree and level of the disarmament measure being considered. In the past, the U.S. has recognized this principle and on this basis the two sides have found a common language. Why is this principle unacceptable now? Gromyko called on all those present to consider this. He had the impression that the U.S. is afraid of verification since it always harps at length on verification, verification, verification.

The USSR has submitted a proposal that is now on the table in the U.S., West Germany, France, Britain and Italy, Gromyko added. This is the proposal for complete and general disarmament, coupled with a proposal for complete and general verification. The U.S. is prepared to discuss not

verification of disarmament and the elimination of arms, but verification of arms. The U.S. seems to think it is all right to produce ten times more weapons so long as there is verification. The USSR advocates disarmament and the elimination of nuclear and other weapons with complete verification. Once and for all, Gromyko stated, let it be known that verification does not frighten us in the least. Since we are speaking of various agreements, verification should be discussed for each one of them in a businesslike manner, without ascribing blame where blame is not due and without accusing a party were there are no grounds for accusation.

Gromyko then stated that a document had been submitted to the U.S. Congress (and the document came from the State Department) which alleges that the Soviet Union has violated some of its agreements. 4 The Soviet Union has not violated any agreements. He added that he had taken note of the language in which the document was couched, that is, that there were "apparent" violations or "doubts" about compliance. But this is not enough to accuse the Soviet Union of violations. The Soviet Union implements its agreements and does not violate them. If the sides conclude an agreement, the Soviet Union will adhere to it strictly. The U.S. should not charge the Soviet Union with something of which it is not guilty. He was discussing questions of principle here. He wished to touch on how the Soviet side envisages the structure of negotiations, assuming the sides can agree on holding them, but first he wished to give the Secretary a chance to respond.

Secretary Shultz said that he appreciated Gromyko's comments on the importance of verification and for his expressed readiness to provide measures for verification and make them consistent with the means and goals to be achieved. The questions he raised in regard to what is seen

as violations or misunderstandings highlight the complexity of these questions. This shows how important it is to discuss these developments, not only from the standpoint of violations but from the standpoint of what the sides can do to make the treaty regime clear and unequivocal. He raised this point now because this issue is so important. It is important because, if people have questions about compliance with obligations, they are likely to question the value of agreements in general. Therefore it is very important to answer these questions clearly so that the atmosphere of future relations is not poisoned.

The Secretary then returned to the beginning of Gromyko's comments about the central conceptual issues, since they are so important. Even if this meeting results in agreement on a set of negotiations, we must continue to work on the conceptual issues because they are of central importance. He would comment on the concepts and then would ask Mr. McFarlane to say a few words. After that, he would have a question to ask of Gromyko.

The Secretary continued by saying that perhaps his comment could be worded as follows: "Neither blackmailed nor a blackmailer be." He then invited Gromyko to climb to the top of the same tower Gromyko had imagined, and to look at the view before them. The two of them are men from Mars. When they look to the left, they see an impressive program of development of strategic and other nuclear programs. The drive, production capacity and destructive potential are most impressive. The two Martians cannot fail to notice that alongside this considerable effort in offensive arms, a comparable effort in defensive arms is underway—some of it legitimate in accordance with the ABM treaty, and some of it questioned in that regard. Taking into account the invasions of the Soviet Union in the past, it is not surprising that the USSR

is preoccupied with its ability to defend itself, but it still is an impressive display.

If the two Martians look to the right, the Secretary continued, they would also see an impressive offensive capability, as well as signs of renewed modernization of weapons. They could not fail to note that little attention is devoted to defense. And if they took a movie rather than a still photograph of this scene, they would remark that in the last three or four years someone had turned a light on this area, because now stirrings are visible. Although they are far behind what is seen on the left, they now understand that defense is important. The two Martians up on the tower would also observe on the left a certain amount of concern over the defensive activities starting on the right. They would not find this concern surprising because those on the left have much more experience with defense than those on the right. Having heard Gromyko's statement that a strong defense has offensive significance. the two Martians would observe together that the lower the offensive systems of each side, the less force there is to this argument. If the systems are reduced to zero, the argument loses its force entirely. The two Martians are struck by the fact that both sides are talking about drastic reductions. In this sense, the concept of a gradual evolution from offensive deterrence to defensive deterrence seems to create a less threatening rather than more threatening situation.

The Secretary then asked Mr. McFarlane to comment further on the President's concept of the role defensive systems could play in preserving strategic stability.

*Mr. McFarlane* stated that President Reagan had a number of influences and motives for proposing a research effort to determine whether defensive systems might be developed

which hold a promise of enabling us to move away from our historical reliance on offensive weapons to ensure deterrence. One of these came from his view of how the balance could become unstable by the turn of the century as a result of the nature of the offensive systems now being developed. Specifically, the emergence of offensive mobile and transportable systems, as well as cruise missiles, could lead us into a situation in which we are less certain of the characteristics and composition of systems on both sides. This would make a stable balance less stable.

Secondly, Mr. McFarlane continued, the President wished to find an alternative to offensive deterrence because of the Soviet Union's advantages in key areas, specifically ICBM warheads, which give the Soviet Union the capability to destroy the corresponding forces on the U.S. side which are essential for deterrence. The same asymmetry promises, through defensive systems on the Soviet side, to neutralize any retaliation the U.S. might undertake. The sum of Soviet programs in offensive and defensive arms undermines the traditional basis of deterrence that has existed for the past fifteen years.

Mr. McFarlane then pointed out that the psychological element was perhaps just as important in the President's mind as the military factor. Why should peace and deterrence depend on our ability to threaten someone else? Why not rely for peace and deterrence on weapons that do not threaten anyone? Since we are conducting research on essentially non-nuclear systems, this psychological factor is particularly relevant. Therefore the President decided to determine whether new technology could promise this. However, he made this decision with Soviet concerns about the appearance of a first-strike capability very much in mind. Surely, the development of defensive systems and their deployment while concurrently maintaining offensive

systems could present the appearance of an intention to develop a first-strike capability. This is not the plan of the United States. This is why the Secretary made clear at the beginning of this meeting that if the day arrives when any or all these technologies show that they can contribute to deterrence, the integration of these concepts into the force structure would be a subject for discussion with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union must agree that defensive systems play a role. Its own investment and success in developing defensive weapons are far advanced.

In sum, Mr. McFarlane pointed out, the President's view is that it is time for us to integrate defensive systems into the concept of deterrence in order to turn us to lesser reliance on offensive systems and greater reliance on defensive systems.<sup>5</sup>

Secretary Shultz then remarked that there was plenty of room to explore this deep and difficult question further, but he wished to ask some questions concerning something Gromyko had stressed in his remarks. In his comments in Washington and in his airport arrival statement in Geneva, Gromyko eloquently stated again and again that the Soviet Union is in favor of the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and of radical steps toward that goal. The Secretary's questions concerned the program Gromyko had in mind to achieve this goal. If such a program is to be implemented, there must be a concrete expression of it. He therefore posed a series of questions:

- —What kind of timing did Gromyko have in mind for the deep and radical reductions of which he had spoken?
- —How far did he propose we go before the other must be engaged in order to move to zero?

- —What if any changes must be made in the non-proliferation regime?
- —How would we treat the variety of nuclear weapons that are not strategic?

The Secretary then observed that if the goal of this meeting is to move toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons, as Gromyko had stated upon his arrival in Geneva, they must put an explicit program behind that objective. They must define a clear and concise program to reach this goal and they must establish at the negotiations a means to achieve it. What does Gromyko have in mind that lies behind this general objective?

Gromyko replied that the Soviet Union had submitted a proposal on complete and general disarmament to the United Nations. It had submitted a detailed proposal for a program of nuclear disarmament and it had also advanced a proposal on nuclear arms in the relevant forum in Geneva. However, the U.S. and its NATO allies had refused to consider these proposals. It cannot be said that the Soviet Union did not make these proposals; they are well known and they are known to all the governments concerned. This program requires no changes or alterations. What is needed is the desire to discuss this question.

Gromyko continued, saying that the Secretary had made a half-dozen references today to the complete elimination of nuclear arms. If the Secretary believes that the U.S., USSR, and other countries should strive to achieve this goal, this is good and the Soviet side welcomes such a statement. They are in sympathy with it and are impressed by it. Practical steps, however, must be taken to implement this goal.

Part of the problem is the question of non-proliferation, as the Secretary had mentioned. Secretary Shultz had asked what we could do jointly to reinforce the non-proliferation regime. This question must be considered within the context of the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union believes that the proliferation of nuclear weapons, whether horizontally or vertically, must be prevented. If we lead matters to the step-by-step elimination of nuclear weapons, this could lead to acceptance by all states of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If the U.S. and USSR can do that, he is sure that all countries would support it, including those that did not sign the NPT.

Both sides agree, Gromyko continued, that the question of non-proliferation is an important one. Non-proliferation must be ensured with no exceptions. He was gratified to note that the U.S. and USSR have almost always held the same view on this. Our two countries had created the treaty, and Gromyko recalled how he and then Secretary of State Rusk hung a map on the wall and referred to it when discussing specific areas. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was developed step-by-step through joint efforts. And so the policy of the U.S. and the Soviet Union coincides on this issue. However fast or however slow we work toward eliminating nuclear arms, the task of ensuring non-proliferation will remain an important one.

Gromyko then asserted that the Secretary had tried to substantiate his position that the new U.S. system is defensive. As Gromyko had already said, the Soviets are convinced that it does not pursue defensive aims, but rather is part of a broad offensive plan. He would not repeat this again because he had already said it. Mr. McFarlane had said that he, Gromyko, had talked about the threat of a first strike from the United States, but that the U.S. had no such intent. It would be going too far to ask the

USSR to rely on one person's word and conscience. In any case this thesis works both ways. This was his reply to Mr. McFarlane's remark. Mr. McFarlane had also said that nuclear technology is not connected with this concept. We know your side is talking more and more about non-nuclear technology. But the fact is that nuclear arms would be used whether or not some of the technology used is nuclear or non-nuclear. It makes no difference whether the technology is nuclear, or particle beams, or something else—this does not change the character of the system. It is important for you to understand our assessment of this.

Gromyko then turned to the structure of possible negotiations. He could not say more than *possible* negotiations because they are not yet in our pocket. He wished to speak of the objectives the sides should pursue in the negotiations. He had tried to explain this morning how all the issues are interrelated, that is, the issues of space weapons, strategic weapons and medium-range nuclear weapons. This would justify the establishment of three bilateral groups. Their work as a whole would embrace all three of these areas. Of course each group would have one area: one would deal with the non-militarization of outer space, one with strategic nuclear arms and one with medium-range nuclear arms.

Since the problems must be considered in their interrelationship, the three groups should meet jointly periodically to take stock of progress and to sum up the results of their work. Of course, it is difficult at this point to set up a precise calendar or schedule, but periodic joint meetings are necessary. The final result must also be a joint result.

There should therefore be a superstructure over all three groups, Gromyko continued. Each side would have a single

delegation or big group composed of three issue groups. They would look at where they stand, come to a conclusion, and then give recommendations to both governments. Each group would begin deliberations when the main content of its work is defined. All three groups together could begin work when agreement is reached on the main content of all three and on the aim of all three: space arms, strategic arms, and medium-range arms.

Gromyko then said that there must be an understanding on this point. If we begin work with our eyes closed we will get nowhere. We can reach agreement only when everything is acceptable to both sides. If this looks more complicated than previous negotiations have been, then perhaps that is true, but your policies on the space issue make it necessary.

In passing, Gromyko noted that some people in the U.S. have been saying, "We told you the Russians would come back to the negotiations and they did." He said he would not hesitate to call this propaganda. He did not wish to put the U.S. in an awkward position, but if need be the Soviet Union would speak its mind on this issue. What is being discussed here is not a resumption of previous negotiations. The negotiating table is a different one and the problems are not the same. Space has now appeared as a problem, and U.S. nuclear missiles deployed in Western Europe have created a new situation. So what we are speaking of here is the possibility of new negotiations, not resumption of the old ones. It is a cheap ploy to say: "You see, the Russians came back," and he would advise the U.S. side not to resort to such cheap ploys.

What he had said about the structure of possible negotiations, Gromyko continued, did not rule out agreements on separate elements of any of the three areas.

For example, he had in mind such things as a moratorium on testing space arms or certain confidence-building measures for strategic arms. Whenever such agreements deal with issues which are not organically linked to unsolved problems, they could enter into force without waiting for the final outcome of the negotiations. Otherwise implementation of agreements on separate issues would be postponed until an aggregate solution is found and negotiated. A comprehensive solution will be indispensable in that case. This relates to the possibility of reaching agreement on separate questions within each forum.

For the sake of clarity, Gromyko repeated: The Soviet side does not rule out the possibility of reaching separate agreements on some issues which go beyond the limits of these three areas. An example would be a commitment by all nuclear powers not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Another example would be a freeze of all nuclear arsenals. Here separate agreement is possible. A third example would be the entry into force of agreements previously signed, such as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. A fourth example would be the cessation of all nuclear testing, that is, a comprehensive test ban. At present the ban on testing extends only to three environments. At one time we were near agreement on a comprehensive test ban. He recalled that when the SALT II Treaty was signed by Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, Carter hosted a dinner during which he told Gromyko that he felt the CTB could be signed soon. These were trilateral negotiations involving the U.S., USSR and UK. Several points divided us, such as a question about monitoring tests in the UK, but Carter said we could reach agreement. Ask Carter, Gromyko said, he can confirm this. But afterwards the U.S. administration forgot about this conversation and no agreement was reached. Such an agreement if signed could be most promising.

Gromyko said he would now return to the issues at hand. Tomorrow they must take a look at where they stand, looking either from the tower or not, and reflect on what results would come from this meeting.

Secretary Shultz noted that time was running out and that people were waiting for them at a reception. But he had a question and a comment to make before ending. The question was whether he should consider what Gromyko had said about the structure of the negotiations to be a proposal.

Gromyko replied in the affirmative.

Secretary Shultz stated that his group would study this proposal carefully and would be prepared to discuss it tomorrow. He called Gromyko's attention to the fact that he had made a proposal this morning at the end of his presentation. He hoped Gromyko would study it carefully because it contains points similar to those in the Soviet proposal, although the Soviet proposal is more developed with regard to structure and relationship.

*Gromyko* replied that he had developed his proposal taking account of the Secretary's ideas. However, one point which they could not accept was the proposal to have meetings of special representatives or "wise men." In the past the U.S. called this an "umbrella" proposal. As Gromyko had already remarked to Hartman, umbrellas are very good against the rain.

Shultz interjected, "They also provide shade if the weather is hot."

*Gromyko* continued that if the Soviet proposal for three groups were adopted, each side could appoint anyone it wanted to guide their work. He could be a virtual dictator if

a side wished. Each side could appoint its wisest men for its own internal workings. Gromyko thought it most probable that on the Soviet side the head of one of the groups would be head of the whole delegation. This was the most probable solution, although a final decision had not been made. The normal mechanism that operates within any government would work as usual and, of course, the sides could always use diplomatic channels. Shultz and Gromyko would each have their advisers and right-hand men, and each would be free to designate his own wise man. This is an internal affair. Gromyko's preliminary thinking was that the man who would head the big delegation would participate in the negotiations. If the two sides set up a situation in which two, four, or six wise men worked in parallel, they might create the impression on the outside that the situation in the negotiations was unsatisfactory. The two, four or six wise men would be meeting confidentially, but this could be misleading in terms of public opinion and might be seen as a screen concealing the true state of affairs. This is unnecessary and would add an undesirable element because it would look as if work were proceeding on two different planes—the delegation on one hand and the wise men on the other. As for internal organization, this is a matter for each side to decide for itself. Gromyko was sure that both sides could find wise men, but from the point of view of principle, this was undesirable.

Secretary Shultz replied that his delegation would study these remarks and present its considered opinion tomorrow. By way of a preliminary comment he wished to say that he was not prepared to spin this question off into inner space where it would be conducted by itself and then return for review at some stage. Something so important and loosely defined must have constant interaction at high political levels in the two governments. He would want to

keep close track of the negotiations and would want a direct way to compare notes with Gromyko as to how they both assess developments. The effort to consider the relationship between these different sets of talks is a high political matter, not a technical one.

The Secretary pointed out that the phrase "non-militarization of space" is a difficult one for the U.S. First of all, outer space is already militarized. Secondly, neither side would want to dispense with some of the respects in which space is militarized, such as communications or NTM satellites. For this reason, this phrase causes a problem for the U.S. This does not mean that it would be difficult to include this subject in the forum. As he had stated this morning, it would be appropriate to discuss space arms, but there are other things to discuss too, in particular, land-based defensive weapons which have the potential of operating in space.

Secretary Shultz then said it would be necessary to give careful study to the way in which Gromyko put together these three sets of questions, which are in some ways separate and in some ways interconnected. He recognized that with or without a formal structure either side can pace the negotiations in one sector by what it wants in another. But he found it puzzling to establish in advance a ban on reaching agreement on something important that both sides might see as in their interest. He did not see why they would want to tie their hands in this manner. He would study this question carefully and respond to it and other questions tomorrow. He again drew Gromyko's attention to the proposal he had submitted today.

In conclusion, Secretary Shultz recalled that during World War II he had fought in the Pacific as a U.S. Marine. McFarlane was too young to have fought in that war but he

fought as a Marine in another war. There was a saying that was common when they reached this stage and cocktails were waiting: "Stack arms and let's get the hell out of here."

Thereupon, the meeting adjourned at 6:55 P.M.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Carolyn Smith. The meeting took place in the U.S. Mission.
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 355</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> The Treaty on the Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and the Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies was signed in Washington, London, and Moscow on January 27, 1967, and entered into force on October 10, 1967.
- <sup>4</sup> Presumably the October 10, 1984, report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. See <u>footnote</u> 11, <u>Document 159</u>.
- Shultz and I traveled with a small party to Geneva, Switzerland. I was anxious and expectant. We had reached a point where I felt our leverage was as great as it would ever be. I was confident that, after four years of increases, defense appropriations were going to start declining again. It was vital that we take full advantage of this optimal moment." He continued: "Shultz had carried most of the talks, which had been fairly routine with no surprises. But on this sticking point of the meaning of 'space arms,' I intervened. The Soviets were essentially attempting to exclude a huge category of their weapons systems—nuclear systems—from negotiations, while insisting on the inclusion of SDI, which was almost entirely non-nuclear. 'Let us be

clear,' I said. 'Are you willing to accept that the issue is what weapons are designed to defeat offensive systems, regardless of how they're based?' Gromyko's answer, in a nutshell, was 'no.' 'Well, then, we don't have a deal,' I said. 'That's out of the question.'" (McFarlane, Special Trust, p. 304)

<sup>6</sup> The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed in London, Washington, and Moscow on July 1, 1968, and entered into force on March 5, 1970.

<sup>7</sup> See <u>footnote 6</u>, <u>Document 31</u>.

<sup>8</sup> For discussions between Carter and Gromyko on the CTB, see *Foreign Relations*, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Documents 115 and 150 a.

# 358. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the White House and the Department of State 1

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0206Z

Secto 1018. For the President. Subject: Memorandum For the President of the Secretary's Second Meeting With Gromyko, Monday Afternoon, January 7, 1985.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

FROM: George P. Shultz

SUBJECT: My Second Meeting With Gromyko

1. Summary: We had another three-hour session this afternoon which began with my answers to Gromyko's questions on how we would handle space issues in a third forum. I was able to give, and Bud ably buttressed, a complete statement of your rationale for proceeding with SDI. This led Gromyko to a long and tortured response saying that they could only conclude that SDI was a prelude to a first strike strategy. I rebutted that position and also found an opening to state our strong view on the importance of verification. Both Bud and I tried to show how a defense integration with offense could at some point lead to greater strategic stability. I would have to say based on Gromyko's reaction that we struck out. He did, however, push on to outline in excruciating detail his plan for negotiation on all these issues. He outlined what he called an interrelated structure for discussing space, strategic arms, and medium range missiles which has a Rube Goldberg character about it. We will have to come up with

- a tactic for dealing with this later this evening. End summary.
- 2. The meeting began with my answers to Gromyko's two questions at the end of the morning session dealing with the timing of any discussion on SDI. I emphasized that we have nothing concrete at the moment since our research is not far enough along, although we would expect to discuss such matters with the Soviet Union when and if the research efforts of either side demonstrated that there can be systems which could usefully contribute to a transition away from reliance on the threat of massive destruction. Nonetheless, I went on, we are prepared to enter into discussions even in advance of any positive research developments on how such defense systems could play a role in enhanced deterrence.
- 3. In response to Gromyko's request for clarification of what subject matter the third forum we had proposed would address, I noted that we would expect it to be a forum in which both sides would be free to raise whatever issues relating to defensive systems it wished to raise, including those based on Earth or space or directed against weapons either on the Earth or in space. I observed that nuclear offensive weapons in space were already banned by the Outer Space Treaty. At the same time, I went on, recent technical developments had made distinctions harder to draw both between ABM and certain anti-aircraft systems and between radars for the purposes of early warning, National Technical Means, space track, and ABM. There was, I observed, a good deal of work to be done in reexamining and reinforcing the fundamental ideas underlying the ABM Treaty and defensive systems in general. Additionally, such a forum would seem to be appropriate for the discussion of possible future systems and technical developments as they might bear on our

eventual goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We did not think, I concluded, that bans on research could be verifiable or effective; indeed, if such research could contribute to lessening the dangers of war, it should not be banned.

- 4. I then gave a philosophical overview of how offensive and defensive systems related and drew the conclusion that the Soviets must agree since Chernenko said they were organically linked. I related this to assumptions of the early 1970's and the fact that we were both engaged in research in this area. I concluded by making the point that if nuclear arms are seriously reduced there is less to defend against and therefore an SDI role is more easily defined.
- 5. This led Gromyko to a long disguisition on how the Soviets view SDI as not defensive but offensive because it will become the basis for the first strike. He concluded that neither side needed SDI. We need to do away with sword and we don't need a shield, he said. We will not participate in the creation or justification of any such system. He called on us to end our SDI research program (we had already said that we would not do so, and why). If the U.S. creates it we will take measures to guarantee our own security, he said. He claimed they have been restrained in their criticism of SDI thus far but would really go to town on world opinion if we proceed. Therefore he urged us to reconsider. He digressed to say that he had reported faithfully to his colleagues the good words you had said to him, particularly in private in Washington, but they all want to know what this means in practice. Things today seem even worse than in September. He particularly denied that they had an important SDI program of their own. He said on verification that they are prepared to go for highly developed measures if an arms control agreement is really important and, by implication, the inverse.

- 6. I then gave a long pitch on importance of verification and our disappointment with past performance on their part. I then tried to contrast his view of our effort with what a neutral viewer might conclude: pointing to the sustained Soviet effort in both offensive and defensive fields and lagging U.S. effort. I again made the point that a serious reduction in offensive arms makes the argument on defensive effort leading to a first strike have much less force until nuclear weapons reach zero level when the argument has no force at all.
- 7. Bud gave an excellent presentation of your reasons for attempting to see through research on whether there is a role for defense to enhance deterrence. He emphasized the effect on deterrence if the offensive balance should become unstable through the growth of cruise and mobile missiles. Also that Soviet offensive and defensive programs could undermine offensive deterrence. He added the psychological problem of relying on massive offense versus systems that threaten no one. He also described why Soviets should have no fear of first strike.
- 8. I then asked a series of questions designed to get Gromyko to say how they would propose to get radical reductions. He was resoundingly unprepared or unwilling to give a credible response. But he went on to claim credit for a whole series of initiatives designed to make a more peaceful world.
- 9. Our final and most interesting exchange was on the structure of possible negotiations. He in effect proposed three fora—on space, strategic forces and INF—but gave it a complex overlay where a senior negotiator on each side would decide with his opposite number two questions: first, the terms of reference of each group; and, second, whether anything decided or negotiated in a particular group or fora

could be allowed to surface for decision by governments if its interrelationship with work in the other groups had not been approached. This is their way of applying the quote, organic link, unquote. Gromyko said that their senior man would also be the negotiator in one of the groups. Some things would not require the establishment of interrelationship, e.g. an agreement or moratorium on space weapons or certain CBMs in strategic talks. Anytime an agreement met the criteria it could be brought out and approved. At no time did Gromyko indicate that they had given up their demand that the objective for one of the fora was prevention of the militarization of space. He did say magnanimously that of course such matters as non-first use, freeze proposals, TTBT/PNE and CTB could be brought out and agreed at any time.

10. We ended with my expressing some skepticism that we could do this with any ambiguity remaining that we were proceeding with the third forum on the basis of their formula on the preventing the militarization of space. I also stressed that I would want to personally keep a close hand on any such talks as they proceed and would hope to have periodic reviews to move them along.

Shultz

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0159. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to Moscow. In his diary for January 7, Reagan wrote: "Only 1st reports from George S. & Bud in Geneva & not much to talk about. I'll try to remember 'no news' may be good news." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 414)

## 359. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State $\frac{1}{2}$

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 0305Z

Secto 1019. For S/S only. Subject: Message from Richard Perle to SecDef Weinberger.

- 1. (S-Entire text)
- 2. Richard Perle delivered the message in para 3 for transmission to SecDef Weinberger.
- 3. Begin text: To the Secretary of Defense Eyes Only From Richard Perle.

The hours since the first negotiating session have been spent evaluating the Soviet position and drafting additional material for Shultz.

My impressions are based on McFarlane briefing given to delegation following negotiating team's return from the Soviet Embassy, and while I believe his account was complete, I cannot be certain.

Gromyko was tough and demanding along expected lines. His emphasis on "preventing the militarization of outer space" was evident throughout. He sought to lay the foundation for Soviet insistence that the treatment of offensive arms is not only linked but actually conditional on the treatment of "space weapons."

Notetaker's account

On this point reads: ". . . it is impossible to consider the question of strategic arms and intermediate range missiles separate from the question of space weapons, and the demilitarization of space."

I think it clear that Gromyko's principal objective is to hold offensive weapon reductions hostage to agreement to negotiate [garble—far]-reaching limits, and ideally a total ban, on SDI (and most likely ASAT as well). I expect that the last issue to be resolved will be the agreed characterization of the "objectives" or "goals" of whatever negotiation deals with space.

The following "proposal" is taken verbatim from John Matlock's notes. But while the notes deal separately with (1) space, (2) strategic arms and (3) intermediate-range weapons, McFarlane's briefing stressed Gromyko's insistence on the inter-relatedness of the issues which Gromyko proposed as a "complex", saying that "all must be considered in one complex".

#### Begin quote:

#### I. Space (underline)

—A ban on development, testing, or deployment of "attack space weapons" and the destruction of weapons of this type which already exist.

—"Attack space weapons", to be defined as follows: space weapons based on any physical principle, regardless of the basing mode, which are designed to attack targets in space or to attack targets on earth (land, sea or air) from space. This includes ASAT's and relevant anti-missile weapons.

## II. Strategic Arms (underline)

If there is a complete ban on space attack weapons, the Soviet Union would accept a radical reduction in strategic arms and a complete renunciation, or strict limitations on, the development and deployment of strategic systems, including: long-range cruise missiles, new types of ICBMs, new types of SLBMs, and new types of heavy bombers.

#### III. Intermediate-Range Weapons (underline)

—At present, it is impossible to resolve the problem of strategic arms separately from the question of intermediate-range weapons, since those deployed in Europe are strategic in regard to the Soviet Union.

—The aim of the third set of negotiations, therefore, would be to agree on no further deployment of U.S. missiles in Western Europe, the ending of Soviet counter-measures, followed by reduction of intermediate-range nuclear systems in Europe to an agreed level. Those levels would take into account the medium-range missiles possessed by Britain and France. End quote.

As you will have observed there is not the slightest give in Gromyko's position on any of the three issues. Strategic arms are tied to a "total ban" on space weapons and the treatment of INF is unchanged from earlier Soviet positions: we would be left with zero (the French and British would use up our allotment) and the Soviets would merely reduce the level of SS-20s in Europe (last two words underlined). Shultz in discussing the morning found it remarkable that Gromyko was not interested in signs of movement from us on START or INF. So much for the theory that we needed to adopt new positions on START/INF to coax them back to the table.

In my view we should build on the inevitable division of subject matter into three distinct areas and, while picking up the Soviet notion of a "complex" of negotiations, stress the establishment of three "negotiating groups" without giving substance to the "complex" itself. While we will face a difficult negotiation over the characterization of the negotiating group that will deal with, in our formulation, "defensive nuclear and space arms," we stand a good chance of emerging with three entities while reducing the "complex" to an insubstantial concept. At least that is what we have urged Shultz and McFarlane to attempt.

In drafting language that would carry this approach forward we prepared several formulations, one covering, in a single short statement, the "Subject and Objective: New Negotiating Complex," and two others that deal with the subject and objectives of three negotiating fora. These are quoted below in order of preference:

#### Begin quote:

Subject and Objective: New Negotiating "Complex"

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive arms, intermediaterange nuclear arms, and defensive nuclear space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reductions of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version I)

The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the number and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate-range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

We propose that the subject of the third negotiation be defensive nuclear and space arms. The objective would be agreements on measures on Earth or in space to enhance the reliability and stability of deterrence, and to contribute to the use of outer space to ensure peace.

Subject and Objective: Three Negotiating Fora (Version II)

The subject of the first negotiation would be strategic offensive arms. We are prepared in step-by-step fashion to reduce radically the numbers and destructive power of such arms, with the immediate goal of enhancing the reliability and stability of deterrence, and with the ultimate goal of their eventual elimination.

The subject of the second negotiation would be intermediate range nuclear forces. We propose that the objective of such talks should be an equitable agreement providing for effectively verifiable and radical reductions in intermediate-range offensive nuclear arms.

We propose a third negotiation, the objective of which would be the achievement of equitable and verifiable controls on defensive nuclear arms, including military systems based on Earth or in space. End quote.

You will note that the only difference between versions one and two of the three negotiating fora formulations is found in the final paragraph. You should know that version two of the three negotiating fora formulation was proposed by me as a "fallback". Loathe as I am to propose fallbacks I believe that this protects our interests adequately and I succeeded in getting it adopted (by the advisory group).

I do not know how Shultz reacted to the versions above. They were hand-carried to him in the afternoon session. I will report further as soon as we are debriefed. (The session continues as I draft this message.)

I intend to resist vehemently any inclusion of the term "militarization of space" in any agreed statement. How far we travel down the path of burdening the forum in which space is discussed with language like "preventing the militarization of space", or dealing with such issues as "the militarization of space" and the like will become the crunch issue and I doubt that it will be resolved before the last minute.

Rick Burt has prepared a memorandum for the President which I have not seen.<sup>2</sup> As soon as I obtain it I will send any necessary comment by message. Best regards. End text.

Shultz

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001-0161. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

<sup>2</sup> Presumably the memorandum transmitted in telegram Secto 1018, <u>Document 358</u>.

## 360. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9:30 a.m.-noon

## THIRD SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETING Geneva, January 1985

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Dimitri Arensburger, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Ambassador Viktor Karpov Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Alexei Obukhov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Before proceeding with the formal meeting, the Secretary took Minister Gromyko aside and told him about U.S. concerns in the area of human rights. He named several individuals whose fate was of particular concern and mentioned repression of Hebrew teachers. Gromyko listened, but made no comments.<sup>2</sup>

*Gromyko* opened the formal meeting by suggesting that since they had no chairman, the discussions be conducted in a spontaneous manner which he found to be very good.

The Secretary said that the proposal submitted by Gromyko toward the end of the afternoon meeting yesterday was reasonable. In this connection, the first point he wanted to make was that having studied the Soviet proposal he could see that they were suggesting genuinely new negotiations. We accepted that it is new negotiations we are talking about.

Secondly, Gromyko had suggested that we proceed in terms of three different negotiating fora or baskets, or whatever they were to be called. The Secretary accepted that and viewed it as a kind of division of labor on the different subjects.

The Secretary's third point related to Gromyko's observation that the subjects to be dealt with in these three bodies were interrelated and that the three for constituted one complex. He agreed with Gromyko's statement that the issues are interrelated and, therefore, consideration of these three elements in one complex is acceptable to us. However, Gromyko had made the point that an agreement reached in any one of the three for awould not be consummated until there was final agreement—in effect, until there was agreement in all three. At the same time, Gromyko had provided some exceptions to that rule and the Secretary understood Gromyko's point; Gromyko had stated his view on the relationship between the different fora. The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. approach is different in that we are seeking agreement in each of the fora, and if an agreement which is considered to be mutually advantageous is reached in a given setting, we will be willing to raise it as something that should be considered for consummation. But, perhaps this falls within the category of the exceptions that Gromyko had identified.

The Secretary then pointed out that we do not feel that we should be bound by a self-denying ordinance and refuse to conclude agreements which are in our mutual interest. He understood the Soviet position, but was explaining ours.

Regarding the subjects and objectives of the third forum, the Secretary observed that there is common ground in our approaches. As he had said yesterday, our views differed with regard to the third forum, but perhaps that difference is not so great in terms of what is to be discussed in it.

*Gromyko* interjected that what the Secretary was calling the third forum was really the first forum, and *the Secretary* indicated that he considered the number used not important and agreed to call it the first if Gromyko wished.

The Secretary went on to cite the second forum which would take up strategic nuclear offensive arms, and said that the subjects and objectives for that forum appear reasonable to us, and we agree. He noted that in this forum the U.S. is prepared to discuss trade-offs in whatever areas either the U.S. or the USSR has an advantage. This is in recognition of the fact that if we are to reach a reasonable agreement it will be most unlikely for it to be a mere mirror image of the force structures of the two parties. After all, we want to come out with a situation which reflects genuine equality.

Turning to the third forum, the Secretary noted that it concerns intermediate-range, or what the Soviets call medium-range, nuclear forces; either term is acceptable to us. The subject and objectives involved a problem that can be talked about. It seemed to him that in both cases Gromyko was looking to reductions, perhaps radical reductions. We agree with this. He added that Gromyko

was familiar with our principles and ideas. We are prepared to discuss different approaches toward working out an agreement within equal global ceilings.

Turning to the first forum, Secretary Shultz said that in some respects this is where the most difficult issues lie. At the same time, it seemed to him, as he had already said, that it might not be all that difficult to determine the subject matter of that forum. He had offered Gromyko an explanation in response to his perceptive question, and he had some further remarks.

Gromyko had suggested, Secretary Shultz continued, that the subject be non-militarization or demilitarization of space. (Gromyko interjected that he had not referred to demilitarization, but rather non-militarization.) The Secretary thought that such statements involved an overly narrow definition. There is no lack of willingness on our part to talk about and negotiate matters regarding space arms. But the Soviet definition is too narrow. What happens in space is a kind of abstraction, the result of something done with respect to offensive or defensive arms. He cited these two categories while recognizing that offensive and defensive arms are interrelated. If Gromyko would look at the subjects listed yesterday by the Secretary, he would recognize that they are related to this forum. For example, there are categories of anti-satellite systems which, though land-based, operate in space. Thus, to repeat, the Soviet concept is too narrow. Accordingly, we believe that this forum should deal with the full range of defensive systems, regardless of their basing mode. We are also prepared to deal with space arms questions as proposed by the Soviet Union.

The Secretary added that we had taken into account the concerns voiced by Gromyko several times last September

concerning nuclear arms and nuclear explosions in space. Thus we believe it would be appropriate if the discussions in this forum were to focus particularly on nuclear defensive systems, including existing systems. While he agreed with Gromyko that the ultimate goal should be the elimination of nuclear arms, he thought that this forum should include all such arms, whether offensive or defensive. We certainly agree that the elimination of the entire category of nuclear arms is desirable.

The Secretary continued by pointing out that the Soviet Union has the world's only operational ASAT system, and as he understood it—had conducted some twenty tests of that system. Moreover, while this system is land-based, the original launchers intended for it could launch other systems. Since the ASAT system operates in space, this could be considered to be militarization of space. The U.S., in contrast, has not deployed ASATs and has yet to test the system it has under development against satellites. Thus, we are far behind the Soviet Union in this area. On the Soviet side, in contrast, we see something that exists. Beyond that he could mention a number of systems that are in space and have military uses, such as satellites for verifying compliance with agreements, for communications purposes and various other uses. To a very considerable extent we would not want to dispense with these systems because they are useful. Thus, the Secretary pointed out, "demilitarization" in one final sweep is not practical or verifiable. In looking through the record he had found, back at the ASAT talks in 1978 and 1979, a statement on this point made by the head of the Soviet delegation, Ambassador Khlestov, which ran as follows:

As for the concept of a 'comprehensive agreement,' the more we analyze it, the more doubts it causes us . . From a purely technical point of view, it is

practically impossible to single out, with sufficient precision, from the whole complex of systems and services which we call space technology, only those systems which would be designed exclusively for countering satellites . . . we propose that in the future we continue to concentrate our efforts on the tasks which both sides recognize as realistic and feasible.<sup>3</sup>

The Secretary then turned to the matter of a space-based missile defense system, to which the Soviet Union had directed great attention, reviewing some thoughts he had tried to advance yesterday.

—First, U.S. scientists say that these systems are years off. He did not know what Soviet scientists have to say on the basis of their own research. One can never say what a "hot research group" might come up with. The Secretary had personal experience with many such research groups at the University of Chicago, at Stanford and at MIT. And though none of those research groups focussed on the subject under discussion here, he knew that it was impossible to tell in what direction such research efforts might lead. This effort, therefore, is long-term by its very nature.

—Second, deployment of these systems is covered by a number of existing treaties. The Limited Test Ban Treaty prohibits nuclear detonations in space, the Outer Space Treaty bans the deployment of nuclear weapons in space, while the ABM Treaty prohibits systems that are space-based, sea-based, air-based or mobile land-based. Thus, there is a whole body of treaty language that has been agreed upon in this area.

—Third, regarding research as such, the Secretary had two points. One, that an agreement on research, as we see it, is virtually impossible to verify for a variety of reasons. Much

relevant research stems from objectives unrelated to the question at hand. As an example he could point to advances in computational ability. We are both engaged in such research and this is impossible to stop. Beyond that—and this was his second point—we think that, in the end, if there is the possibility of defense, it would offer a more comfortable and secure form of strategic stability than the one now existing.

The Secretary recognized that Gromyko disagreed, but expressed the hope that the Soviets would study our thinking. There is much time to talk about this matter and to digest it. It seems to us that if it is possible ultimately to determine a basis where a major element of deterrence would be defensive, in contrast to preponderantly offensive elements of deterrence we have now, this might offer a more comfortable and more secure form of strategic stability. If this can be accomplished it is potentially desirable. Perhaps we will not be able to find a way to do so. Therefore, for both these reasons the U.S. believes that research should continue and in fact will continue. Even if we were to agree on some limitation, it would be impossible to verify it. If it should turn out that a particular technology seems feasible, the U.S. would undertake more direct discussions, as provided by the ABM Treaty. At any rate, this is a matter for the future.

The Secretary said that this brought him back to a point in connection with the first forum. The U.S. is fully prepared to discuss and negotiate matters involving space arms and to take up whatever proposals the USSR may make in this area. As he had said yesterday, we are prepared to take up space arms questions in either of the other two fora, if they are related to the context of discussions there. As Gromyko had said yesterday, the world is changing. Perhaps as the negotiations continue, even on familiar subjects, we may

want to approach them in different ways. Regarding further details and potential content of discussions in the first forum, the Secretary referred Gromyko to his comments on this subject the day before.

Finally, the Secretary returned to the question of structuring the negotiations. He recalled that Gromyko had said that they would appoint leaders for the three negotiating groups, and that, most likely, one would be named chairman of the overall delegation. Gromyko had also invited us to do as we wished in this regard. The Secretary observed that Gromyko's suggestion concerning the structure was novel. We had not heard such a suggestion previously and therefore we were still thinking about it. He did not know at this point where we would come out in terms of personnel appointments. To some extent he thought this would be a reflection of who would be "Mr. One," "Mr. Two" and "Mr. Three." Thus, this matter remained open so far as the U.S. is concerned.

The Secretary then said that his delegation had prepared a statement describing its proposals regarding the subjects and objectives of the whole complex of negotiations. This text could serve as a basis for discussion. He could give it to Gromyko now, or perhaps Gromyko preferred to make some comments before looking at the U.S. text.

Gromyko responded that indeed he had some comments. He was gratified to hear that certain aspects of the Soviet proposal regarding the structure of possible negotiations are acceptable to the U.S. On some other aspects of the Soviet proposal, the Secretary had voiced some doubts or reservations. He hoped that the Secretary would give added thought to these matters. It is good that the Secretary recognized the interconnection among the questions to be negotiated in the three groups.

Nevertheless, there is a difference in the Soviet and American understanding of this interrelationship. The U.S. should be aware of this.

In dealing with this concept, Gromyko observed, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the subject ("material") of the negotiations compels us to consider the subject matter of the three groups as interrelated. That is why he had said yesterday that the problems must be solved in comprehensive fashion. In particular, he had explained why it would be impossible to make progress on some issues without agreement on space, more precisely on the non-militarization of space. He had also referred to a different interrelationship, namely that between strategic arms and medium-range nuclear arms.

When the Secretary referred to interrelationship, Gromyko continued, he was talking about a different kind of interrelationship—that of offensive and defensive weapons. The Soviet Union cannot accept this if for no other reason than because the USSR did not recognize the category which the U.S. called defensive systems. He had said clearly that these systems, these concepts and this U.S. program were offensive systems, offensive concepts and an offensive program. They are a component part of a whole. One had to look at things from the standpoint of their ultimate logic. He did not wish to repeat what it would mean if the U.S. proceeded to implement its plan.

The Secretary observed that Gromyko had made himself very clear yesterday.

*Gromyko* continued that accordingly, we are speaking different languages when we refer to an interrelationship. Nevertheless, the very idea of an interrelationship does exist and that in itself is a positive element. Still, the two

sides attached different meanings to it and this must be kept in mind.

The Secretary responded that, in practical terms, the question would present itself in terms of what would happen if, for example, we reached some kind of understanding in forum three or forum two. Would it be converted into a formal agreement or not? Under one interpretation of the interrelationship, the answer would be "no." Under a different interpretation the answer would be "yes."

Gromyko replied that this would not necessarily be the case. The point is that there are different interpretations of the concept of interrelationship. When we go beyond concrete specifics and relate these matters to high policy, we have to recognize that the foundations of your plan and our plan are different. Naturally, this is of major importance. Everything said and written in the U.S. attributes defensive aims to your program—as if everything in it is good and nothing bad. Even here in Geneva, though perhaps in a more restrained fashion, this has been the U.S. position. He, however, had told the Secretary that this is not the case, that the objective of the U.S. program is just the opposite. He had said this yesterday.

Gromyko then turned to the question of what agreements could be concluded in the absence of an overall agreement. As he had explained the day before, there are two groups of questions on which agreement is possible in the absence of an overall agreement. He did not preclude the possibility that it might be possible to reach agreement on individual questions in one of these groups which did not bear critically on the interrelationship. The number of such questions would be small. In this instance, there would be no need to await resolution of the other questions with

which the groups would be dealing. The other category involved those questions which could be resolved and agreed upon entirely independent of progress on any other issue or group of issues. He had cited examples such as a comprehensive nuclear test ban. This type of question could be singled out, agreed upon, and an accord signed and brought into force. There were also two agreements that had been negotiated in the past, but had not entered into force. They were part of the same category that Gromyko was talking about.

The Secretary said he understood.

Gromyko noted that he had listed them yesterday. He wanted to provide additional clarification on one point because he felt that the Secretary had not clearly understood the matter. Let us assume that significant progress had been made in one or more of the groups. As they saw it, it would not be necessary to wait for the other groups to finish their work before discussing the overall picture. The whole delegation should meet from time to time to review their progress. It would be good if everything could be completed at the same time, but this can hardly be expected. There should be a periodic overall analysis, and this would provide an organic connection of the work by all three groups.

For example, Gromyko continued, let us assume that group "x" had conducted ten meetings. At that point the delegation as a whole could meet to see how things were going. This should be standard practice. There would be one delegation that is split into three groups. Thus, there would inevitably have to be consideration of the interrelationship the ministers had talked about—provided, of course, both sides understood the meaning of the interrelationship in the same way. One should not rely

exclusively on the literal meaning of the word, and one should not impose a kind of law on the groups under which they had to finish their work and wash their hands before a decision is made how to proceed further.

Gromyko said he hoped this explanation would be useful. He offered it because he suspected that the Secretary had not fully understood the Soviet concept.

The Secretary replied that this was an important clarification which he found very interesting.

*Gromyko* then noted the U.S. concern over the concept of non-militarization of space. Of course, one could invent some kind of symbol to replace this word, but Gromyko did not believe that it would be helpful to resort to algebraic techniques. If anything, that could be harmful. He added that the Secretary knows what the Soviet side means in this regard, and the Soviet side knows what the U.S. has in mind. Gromyko reiterated that he was convinced that the U.S. and USSR can prevent the militarization of space. If such militarization were to occur, the USSR, the U.S. and mankind as a whole will be pushed further toward the abyss toward which we have been moving. This is what will happen unless we find a way to halt such movement. Thus, even though the U.S. might not like the term militarization and may on occasion scorn it, he would urge honesty and precision in dealing with this subject.

Secretary Shultz's statements, Gromyko continued, had been reminiscent of those appearing in the U.S. press to the effect that it is wrong to raise the question of the militarization of space because space is already militarized. There are no scales which would measure the falsity of this thesis. We all understand that this is not the case. If we look at steps taken by both countries, there are things we

can learn. For example, look at the U.S. space shuttle. If viewed in terms of its potential, one could conclude that under certain circumstances it could be used in ways in which no Soviet system can be used, and therefore that space is already militarized. But this would be an oversimplification. He did not want us to take this path since it would only make it harder to reach the goals before us.

Gromyko then reiterated what he had said the day before regarding space arms, or more precisely the nonmilitarization of space. The latter implies that there should be a ban on the development, testing and deployment of attack (or strike) space arms, accompanied by the destruction of existing systems of this kind. If such an approach is followed, far-reaching solutions to other issues would become possible as well. In order not to dilute the question of space arms by tangential issues, the Soviet side has proposed to talk about attack (strike) space arms. By attack space arms the Soviet Union means space arms based on any physical principle, regardless of basing mode, which can strike objects in space and which can strike objects on land, sea or in the air, that is on the planet earth, from space. Of course, this would include relevant antimissile and ASAT systems.

Gromyko then said that, in referring to what he termed the U.S. defensive system, Secretary Shultz had spoken at length about research and about the difficulty in verifying a ban on research. To a considerable degree what the Secretary said about verifying a research ban is true. But let us assume that all this preparatory research should demonstrate that such systems can indeed be developed. The U.S. position is "if it's possible, then let's do it." The Soviet position is to exclude this possibility since it would be a boon to mankind if this system is never developed.

Gromyko continued that this situation reminded him of the story of two men visiting Monaco. One of them suggests going to the casino in the hope of winning something; the other one refuses since he does not want to risk losing what he has. This illustrates the difference between the U.S. and Soviet positions. The Soviets feel the wiser course is not to risk losing everything. This is not just the unanimous view of the Soviet leadership but is also shared by people everywhere. People instinctively feel that this path should not be pursued because it would generate a very great threat to peace and would intensify the arms race. Nothing would do more to enhance U.S. prestige than a decision to rule out that option. That was the way to reduce nuclear arms, a goal mentioned by the Secretary, the President, as well as the leadership of the Soviet Union. Specifically, General Secretary Chernenko had said this on numerous occasions and it had been repeated by Gromyko at this very table. Nuclear arms should be reduced down to their complete elimination from the arsenals of nations.

In the U.S., Gromyko continued, there is presently a popular thesis to the effect that one should switch the character and nature of deterrence and that instead of relying on strategic and medium-range nuclear systems for deterrence, one should rely on systems which the U.S. has baptized defensive systems. The Soviet Union believed that this would not serve the cause of peace, that this would increase the threat, that the threat would become awesome if the large-scale missile defense system was developed. Under such circumstances, the nuclear arms race would not be curbed by such systems but just the opposite would occur; it would acquire new momentum. The USSR can not understand how the U.S. fails to see this. It must be some kind of self-hypnosis. This plan will intensify the nuclear arms race.

Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no further comments on the substance, perhaps they should give some thought on how to conclude their meetings. Earlier, the Secretary had mentioned a draft which Gromyko assumed was a draft of a joint statement. The Soviet delegation would certainly take a look at this draft and consider it. The Soviet delegation, for its part, would present its own draft. Gromyko thought that at this point it would be advisable to have either a working break or to recess for lunch, after which they could see how to proceed with regard to the joint statement and consider where to go from there.

The Secretary replied that he liked Gromyko's procedural suggestion, but wanted to make sure he understood clearly Gromyko's description of how the set of negotiating groups in the delegation would work. Gromyko had mentioned a situation in which one of the three groups, Group X, had held ten meetings and had come up with something. It would then be appropriate—and in any event this would occur periodically—for the whole group to consider the results, and for Group X to report what it had agreed upon.

Gromyko confirmed that this was right.

The Secretary continued that he understood Gromyko had suggested that the whole group engage in a kind of summary review to judge whether this one thing that had been agreed upon could stand on its own or whether it should wait. This would be the function of such periodic meetings.

*Gromyko* again confirmed that this was correct; the overall delegation would make a judgment on how the agreement reached fits into the framework of the other questions being negotiated.

The Secretary noted that the structure proposed by Gromyko was unusual and imaginative and the Secretary would have to testify in Congress and explain how it worked. Thus, he added jokingly, he might ask Gromyko to write his testimony.

The Secretary then presented the U.S. draft text of a joint statement. (Attachment 1)

*Gromyko* simultaneously gave the Secretary the text of the Soviet draft (Attachment 2).

The Secretary suggested that they adjourn for lunch and reconvene at 2:30 P.M., which would give them the opportunity to study each other's drafts and to respond at the afternoon meeting.

The meeting adjourned at 12:00 Noon.

#### Attachment 1

### TEXT OF U.S. DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

#### Attachment 2

### TEXT OF SOVIET DRAFT OF JOINT STATEMENT

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

During the meeting they discussed the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space arms, as well as both strategic and medium-range nuclear arms; moreover, all these questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability.

The sides believe that ultimately the forthcoming negotiations, just as efforts in general to limit and reduce arms, should lead to the complete elimination of nuclear arms everywhere.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month. <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Arensburger. The meeting took place in the Soviet Mission in Geneva. <sup>2</sup> Shultz's Geneva briefing book contained a section on human rights, with talking points and background information on specific cases and individuals. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Memorandum of Conversations Pertaining to the United States and USSR Relations, 1981-1990, Lot 93D188, Shultz-Gromyko at Geneva, January 1985) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "I took Gromyko aside and went over our human rights views with him at length. He raised both his hands as if to shield himself from me and flapped his palms to make me go away. But I kept him in a corner, and he had to listen even though he pretended not to." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, p. 516)

<sup>3</sup> The full text of Khlestov's statement was sent in telegram 4927 from Vienna, May 18, 1979. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D790226-0408)

# 361. Telegram From Secretary of State Shultz to the Department of State and the White House 1

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 1234Z

Secto 1024. For the President. Subject: Memorandum for the President on the Secretary's Third Meeting With Gromyko, Tuesday Morning, January 8, 1985.

- 1. Secret—Entire text.
- 2. We spent another two-and-a-half hours this morning going over and clarifying our positions on the structure and content of possible future negotiations. Nothing very new arose from this discussion but it gave me the chance to explain clearly our view of what the three groups might discuss. Gromyko made an interesting clarification that in effect means that any agreements coming out of the groups can be called up and approved if both sides want it that way. At the end of our session both sides tabled a text of a draft joint announcement. (These texts are contained in the last paragraph of this message.)
- 3. Before we began the morning session. I took Gromyko aside and went through privately with him all of our human rights points including specific names and cases, as well as general points on emigration, Hebrew teachers, divided families and American nationals. He listened but took the predictable position that he would not comment.
- 4. I then began the meeting with a lengthy statement designed to put on the record or restate our views on the subject matters for the three fora: strategic arms, INF, and nuclear defensive and space arms. I restated what we

expected to take place in each and recalled particularly my list of subjects for the third fora which I laid out yesterday. I recognized that we have a different approach to the third fora and wanted that clearly understood. I expressed the hope that they would come to see the advantage of looking at defense in relation to offense. His long answer amounted to a negative answer on ever being persuaded that SDI was defensive. He insisted that they would always assume it to be offensive but that did not seem to deter him from wanting to get his complex of negotiations going. He even made absolutely clear that the complicated system of joint reviews of the work of the three groups was not designed to stop all agreements from emerging.

- 5. I made crystal clear that we would not agree to any proposition that appeared to rule out or control research in the space area. He did not appear to feel that they would stop their research, but rather stated that they hoped nothing would be allowed to the development stage.
- 6. Finally, we both tabled texts (which follow) and these will be discussed at our meeting beginning at 2:30 pm.

## 7. Begin text of U.S. statement:

The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin a new complex of negotiations to address the interrelated questions of nuclear and space arms. To this end, three negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on strategic offensive nuclear arms, intermediate-range nuclear arms, and nuclear defensive and space arms. The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

#### 8. Begin text of Soviet statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space weapons was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be a complex of questions pertaining both to space weapons and nuclear arms—strategic and medium-range—with all these questions to be discussed and resolved in their interrelationship.

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space, limiting and reducing nuclear weapons, and strengthening strategic stability.

Eventually, the two sides believe, the forthcoming negotiations as, generally, efforts in the field of limiting and reducing armaments should lead to the complete elimination everywhere of nuclear weapons.

The date of the beginning of the negotiations and their venue will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month.

**Shultz** 

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/08/1985 Morning. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman; cleared by McFarlane, M. Bova (S/S), Hill, and K. Clark (S); approved by Shultz. Sent for information Priority to Moscow.

## 362. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 3:35-7:55 p.m.

## FOURTH SHULTZ-GROMYKO MEETINGGeneva, January 1985

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

U.S.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Ambassador Paul Nitze
Ambassador Arthur Hartman
Jack F. Matlock, Special Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs
Carolyn Smith, Interpreter

#### USSR

Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko Georgy M. Korniyenko, First Deputy Foreign Minister Ambassador Viktor Karpov Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin A. Bratchikov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Shultz began the meeting by saying that the two sides had reviewed each other's proposed press communiques. He had some comments to make about the Soviet draft, but as Minister Gromyko was the guest, he should have the floor first.

Gromyko responded that, frankly speaking, it would be hard for the Soviet side to accept the U.S. text. For one thing the U.S. referred to a new complex of negotiations whereas the Soviet side felt the need to discuss the problems in a complex—or comprehensive—fashion. The two concepts are not identical. The U.S. draft then speaks

of the three groups meeting in Geneva on March 5 to begin work, although the sides had not yet agreed to begin negotiations. The purpose of this meeting is to discuss the possibility of holding negotiations. He had always taken care to say that if the sides can agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, then they could talk about the date and site of the talks. He always began his remarks with the words "if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations."

The U.S. draft, Gromyko continued, then goes on to mention defensive arms. Perhaps this is good for the U.S., but it is unacceptable to the Soviet side, as he had already stated many times. The USSR has a wholly different evaluation of the arms the U.S. calls defensive. The only way to proceed here is to find mutually acceptable language, and this is a matter of principle. U.S. and Soviet assessments of the U.S. plans are diametrically opposed to each other, and this is why the sides must look in a different direction to find acceptable wording.

Gromyko then asked for the Secretary's reaction to the Soviet draft statement.

Secretary Shultz said that as far as a date and place for negotiations are concerned, he of course recognizes that this would come only after reaching an agreement on the substance of the negotiations. If agreement is reached on the substance, it would be worthwhile to set a time and place so as to be specific and leave nothing vague that could be clearly specified.

As for Gromyko's remarks about defense, the Secretary had carefully listened to everything Gromyko said yesterday and today, and he believed he completely understood what Gromyko meant. He hoped that with time he and Gromyko

would have an opportunity to continue exchanges on this subject because it represents a very deep issue.

The U.S. had identified one of the three for a agreed upon as "nuclear defensive and space arms," the Secretary continued. He recognized that Soviet attention is very much focused on space arms, as signalled by statements made here and elsewhere by Gromyko and also by Chairman Chernenko. The U.S. understands this and is prepared to discuss space arms. But, as he had mentioned this morning, the U.S. sees this issue as essentially a broader one. There should be clarity about the defensive arrangements the Soviet Union now has underway (the U.S. at least would call them defensive). In the U.S. view this Soviet program is a massive one and should be discussed. The USSR has research programs in particle beams, directed energy and lasers, and has as well a deployed ABM system that is being upgraded. It also has a massive air defense infrastructure. The United States, for its part, has done very little in defense. So it is incorrect to discuss U.S. plans and research programs without looking at the large Soviet defense program. For this reason the U.S. believes that this negotiating forum should address the question of defense broadly speaking.

The structure of the Soviet draft statement, the Secretary continued, provides a basis with which to work, and so the U.S. side has made an effort to integrate its ideas into its two drafts. The U.S. draft adopts the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet draft without change. The third paragraph of the Soviet draft was slightly changed, and the last two paragraphs dropped in favor of a U.S. text. Shultz handed over to Gromyko a copy of the following statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central

Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, Secretary of State of the USA, took place on January 7 and 8, 1985 in Geneva.

The question regarding the subject and objectives of the forthcoming Soviet-US negotiations on nuclear and space arms was discussed during the meeting.

The sides agree that the subject of the talks will be those interrelated questions pertaining to nuclear and space arms with these questions to be discussed and resolved in a complex of negotiations.

To this end, the negotiating groups will be convened in Geneva, beginning on March 5, 1985, to begin the process of negotiating agreements on nuclear defensive and space arms, strategic offensive nuclear arms and intermediate-range nuclear arms.

The objective of these negotiations shall be the reduction of nuclear arms and the enhancement of strategic stability, with the ultimate goal of the complete elimination of nuclear arms.

*Gromyko* observed that the U.S. had added the phrase "defensive arms" and this was unacceptable. He did not want to get into polemics, but all the credit ascribed by the Secretary to Soviet activity in the field of defense is not true to fact. This is not acceptable wording, and any wording that is not acceptable to both sides must be dropped.

Secretary Shultz asked whether the main problem involved the word "defensive", or was it something else?

*Gromyko* replied that "outer space" is absent from the U.S. draft as an objective of the negotiations.

The Secretary pointed out that the U.S. draft reads "negotiations on nuclear and space arms."

*Gromyko* said that the concept of outer space must not get lost here. It must be put in first place.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. does not want to lose it, but wants to discuss outer space. He read out the following alternative to the last paragraph:

The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space.

*Gromyko* objected that this means relegating space to the backyard. The U.S. could call its strategic defense plan a plan to strengthen strategic stability if it wished.

Secretary Shultz said that, just as in baseball the number four hitter is the "clean-up hitter," he was saving the best for last. The phrase "strengthening strategic stability on earth and in space" could be interpreted in the Soviet way or in the U.S. way.

*Gromyko* said there should be no room for ambiguity here. He suggested taking a 15-minute break so that both sides could look over the drafts.

Secretary Shultz agreed, and the U.S. delegation left the room at 3:05 p.m.

At 3:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned and the meeting resumed.

*Gromyko* presented the following draft of a joint statement:

As previously agreed, a meeting was held on January 7 and 8, 1985, in Geneva between Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and George P. Shultz, the U.S. Secretary of State.

In accordance with the arrangement previously reached in principle between the USSR and the USA to enter into new negotiations on nuclear and space arms, the two sides focused their attention, as had been agreed, on discussing the question of the subject and specific objectives of these negotiations. The discussions were useful.

Both sides agreed that the ultimate objective of these negotiations, in the course of which all questions will be considered and resolved in their interrelationship as generally the two sides' efforts in the field of arms limitation and reduction, should be the gradual exclusion of nuclear weapons from the military arsenals of states until they are completely eliminated.

The exchange of views will be continued and the sides will seek to elaborate as early as possible an agreed approach to resolving the questions under question at this meeting.

Andrei A. Gromyko and George P. Shultz agreed to continue the exchange of views, for which purpose

they will meet again in early March. The date and venue of the meeting will be agreed additionally.

Secretary Shultz remarked that there was one place in the third paragraph that was unclear linguistically, but he did not disagree with the meaning of the sentence.

*Gromyko* explained that the Soviet side was referring to the ultimate goal of the negotiations and all actions taken to achieve that goal.

The Secretary said he wished to discuss this, but first he had a few questions. At this morning's meeting the two of them had discussed at length the Soviet proposal for structuring the negotiations in three groups. He thought they had made quite a bit of headway in discussing it. Essentially they were struggling with the description of one of the three fora, but now it seemed that the Soviet side was withdrawing this idea. He did not object, and in fact looked forward to another meeting with Gromyko, but why did Gromyko not now want to go ahead with this idea? The Soviet side had proposed and the U.S. had accepted the basic notion of a related complex of three negotiations.

Gromyko complained that he now had to repeat himself once again. He did not understand why the Secretary was not paying attention to him. He had stated the Soviet views on how to structure the negotiations, provided agreement was reached to hold them. Every time he mentions this, he makes this reservation because the two sides have not yet agreed on this. If we agreed when to meet next time to discuss the subject and objectives of the talks, he said, then everything he said about the structure would still be valid. He was not taking back a single word of what he had said.

The Secretary observed that there is a difference of view in how the sides interpret research on defensive measures. He doubted there would be any change in these views by early March, and he doubted it could be resolved by then. It was more likely to be resolved through the process of negotiations.

*Gromyko* said he did not wish to single out any one question. He would suggest just continuing these talks and see what the outcome would be. They had come to no final result here yet, and he would suggest continuing these conversations, if the Secretary found this acceptable.

*Secretary Shultz* suggested that the two delegations separate for a few minutes in order to caucus and look at the direction in which they were going.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 3:42 p.m.

At 4:28 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

*Gromyko* joked that he hadn't expected to see the Secretary again until the second crow of the rooster.

Secretary Shultz replied that if today had been Sunday, the U.S. delegation would have been busy watching football in the other room. He said he was puzzled and could not figure out what was causing Gromyko to draw back from what had already been agreed upon. Certainly the two sides disagree on how to characterize what seem to the U.S. to be defensive systems, and which the Soviet Union feels are offensive. He expected that if we met six months or a year from now they might well still disagree, although there would be time for reflection. Although they disagree on what to call these arms, they do not disagree that it is important to discuss them. The U.S. is prepared to discuss them and Gromyko has indicated the same. The Secretary

had developed in one of his presentations the sense in which technology is making certain distinctions in the ABM Treaty difficult to establish, and therefore there is a need to examine a variety of technologies.

The Secretary noted that he had already pointed out that the deployed Soviet ABM system depends on nuclear explosions in the upper atmosphere or space. And so the U.S. had tried to define the subject matter of the first working group or forum so as to include what the Soviets want to talk about in space as well as things on the ground that seem relevant or important to the U.S. If we do not agree on the content, that is one problem. But if we do agree on the content—and the U.S. has excluded nothing then we should be able to find the words to express this. If Gromyko's problem concerns the word "defensive," the Secretary could suggest some alternative wording. But perhaps this is not the problem. The Secretary thought that if they could capitalize on the extensive discussions that have taken place here, they certainly should. He had other language to suggest, but observed that perhaps Gromyko was not interested and had already decided to back away from the direction in which he had been going.

"Don't try to pretend that you don't understand us," *Gromyko* rejoined. He categorically rejected the reproach that he had retreated from his position. Each word he had spoken was valid. "Have we reached agreement on the subject and aims of the negotiations?" he asked rhetorically. Each time he had spoken of the structure of the possible negotiations, he had said, "when and if we agree on the subject and objectives of the negotiations, this is the structure we envision." He had spoken of one delegation divided into three groups. Of course, the negotiations would deal with the subjects for discussion in each group. These three groups would take stock of their

progress and present reports on their work. This is how the Soviet side sees this issue. Let us talk seriously now. There would be one single negotiation made up of three groups working in three directions. Unfortunately, agreement has not yet been reached on this. Tell us, Gromyko asked the Secretary, if this proposal is unacceptable.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had again raised the subject of Soviet ABM systems and certain other issues. If the Secretary insisted on this, Gromyko would have to repeat all that he had already said. Is it really necessary to do so? If we could reach agreement on these questions, we could name the date for the negotiations to begin, i.e., March 1 or April 1, although the latter was not a very good date. But we are not in a position to do that now.

Secretary Shultz inquired what precisely was the essence of their disagreement. He thought it boiled down to the subject or way of describing the first group. If this is the problem, he had a proposal, but perhaps this is not the problem.

Gromyko responded that this is indeed the main issue. "You don't want to accept our proposal to deal with the militarization of space," he added. Whenever he had raised this question, the Secretary began to speak of research, U.S. plans and so forth. The Soviet side does not share the U.S. view that it is essential to carry out this research. This is the first stage of implementing the U.S. plan. The Soviet side proposes to continue discussing this important question, but here there is absolutely no agreement on it. They had touched on other important questions as well, but this is the main one. If they had reached agreement on questions related to space, they could now set the time and place of the new negotiations, but they have no such agreement now. If you think we cannot exist without a new

round of talks, then your idea is far from the truth. Such an exchange is in the interest of both sides. If this does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us and we will not speak of it again. This was his short reply to the Secretary's remarks. He noted that time was running out and the sides should be brief.

The Secretary said he wanted to make sure he understood. Was Gromyko saying that they would establish these negotiating fora whenever the U.S. says that it will cease its research program on strategic defense?

Gromyko replied that he would not discuss that now. He proposed it for subsequent discussion. He wanted to discuss a whole series of questions by way of continuing the conversation here, but this would take several days. The Secretary certainly must understand, said Gromyko, that the Soviet side cannot accept the U.S. concept, point of view or policy on outer space. The U.S. must clearly understand the Soviet position on this. However, the Soviets are prepared to continue discussing all these issues. If a continued exchange does not suit you, Gromyko said, tell us. This is a proposal, not a request.

*The Secretary* replied that the U.S. would not stop its research program.

Gromyko commented that the Secretary had already said this. Secretary Shultz had said that if the essence is that the Soviet Union is waiting for the U.S. to stop its research program, this was useless because the U.S. would not stop. Gromyko repeated that the Secretary had already said this. He said that the Soviet assessment of the U.S. concept on space would not change, but the Soviet side is nonetheless prepared to continue the discussion.

The Secretary said he thought Gromyko had proposed that such a discussion take place in the first working group. This was implied by the draft joint statement Gromyko had presented at the morning meeting. This negotiating group would discuss the questions the two sides agree upon, but the U.S. wants it to discuss other questions too. This is what the sides should work toward, but this may not be acceptable to the Soviet side.

*Gromyko* replied that this problem would be discussed in one of the three groups.

Secretary Shultz said he agreed.

However, *Gromyko* continued, we have not yet cleared the way for the beginning of negotiations. If, for example, we agree now that this working group would meet on March 1, it would have the same problems at its first meeting that we are having here. What kind of negotiations would those be? At least one working group, or perhaps the whole delegation, would have to discuss this problem, and he thought it was better to discuss it at the ministerial level. It is not a question for a working group, but for a higher, more fundamental, level.

The Secretary remarked that he had given Gromyko a list of what he considered to be appropriate subject matter for this group, and it was a meaty set of material. Gromyko could see this in his notes. The Secretary thought this area is important to both sides and is negotiable.

*Gromyko* said it is not possible to begin discussing the work program of the working groups now. First they must agree on the objectives of the working group and when the negotiations would begin.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko felt that further discussion of this question now would be fruitless.

Gromyko replied that he was not saying that; there was plenty of time left before tomorrow morning and of course they could sit here until then, but he thought it was hardly necessary to repeat what had already been said. There was no one but himself and the Secretary to discuss these questions. Their leaders had charged them with discussing them. Did he understand the Secretary to say that the idea of the two of them continuing their discussions was unsuitable? If so, one mode of action was indicated, but if not so, another mode of action was indicated.

The Secretary replied, "No, it is not unsuitable." But it is also suitable to get the negotiations going as soon as possible. As he had said, he thought that the negotiations, once begun, should be closely followed and discussed at a high political level. The two sides have much to discuss. He was striving to understand the reason Gromyko did not wish to begin the negotiating process. Gromyko had handed him a proposed communique announcing the beginning of negotiations. Although no date was set, the objective of the talks was stated. And now, apparently Gromyko did not want this to happen.

[At this point, Korniyenko remarked to Gromyko in Russian, "Then they should take our text."]

Gromyko said that they want the negotiations to begin. But, he said, it is impossible to agree on the timing because there is as yet no agreed understanding on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. We are speaking of a common objective: both sides agree to the goal of completely eliminating nuclear arms. But this is the only thing we agree on, and therefore it is too early now to talk

about a date for beginning the negotiations. He did not know whether at the next meeting they would be able to agree upon these questions and so he proposed to meet again in order to continue this discussion.

He said that the Secretary tried to interpret the fact that he would not agree to set a date for negotiations to mean that the Soviet side had changed its position and did not want to have negotiations. But Gromyko had said all along that they could not agree upon the date if they had not agreed on the subject and objectives of the negotiations. Don't try to pressure us, Gromyko warned, first of all, because we don't like it, and second, because it is hardly in either of our interests for our delegations to meet at the talks and immediately find themselves at an impasse so that the negotiations fall apart. This would be advantageous to neither side. Would it not be better to hold negotiations on a more reliable basis?

The Secretary noted that questions may arise over what is meant in the final sentence of the Soviet draft statement, which reads as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed through diplomatic channels within one month."

Gromyko replied that he considered this normal. The sides could specify the month in which the talks would begin if the U.S. side feels this is important. They would not name a date, but would specify a month, or the 15th of a certain month. Gromyko had no desire to create any vagueness or uncertainty.

*Korniyenko* asked whether the U.S. accepts the subject and definition of the negotiations.

The Secretary replied that the U.S. could not accept the Soviet draft but could use it as a basis for discussion.

*Gromyko* suggested that instead of a date we could say that a meeting and exchange of views would take place in March. If it is so important we could specify the first half of March. February would not be convenient for him for several reasons and March would be better.

The Secretary replied that he was trying to find a sense of direction, not to pin down a date. The Soviet draft implies that we agree there will be negotiations and that perhaps Hartman and Korniyenko or Dobrynin and he would discuss the time and place.

Gromyko asked whether this would be later on.

The Secretary said yes. If the date were to be in March, this would be settled by discussion between them. This was his understanding.

*Gromyko* rejoined that it would not be hard to agree to meet in March. It would, in any case, be easier than climbing Mont Blanc.

The Secretary concurred that it would be no problem to find a time and place. The problem was to work together and come up with a joint text of a statement.

*Gromyko* replied that they had drafted their text taking account of the U.S. position and the views the Secretary had expressed here. If the two of them are to work out an agreed text, everything in it must be acceptable to both sides since it will be made public.

The Secretary said that if the statement is made public, it would imply that the date and place of the negotiations

would be agreed upon through diplomatic channels. The two delegations would then meet and, having the benefit of our discussions, divide into three groups and get down to work. This is how Shultz understood the statement.

*Gromyko* said that if at the next meeting they reached a degree of mutual understanding that warranted beginning negotiations, they could agree on the date. They could name the month if this suits the Secretary more. If they agree to another meeting, it makes no sense to draw things out.

The Secretary said that Gromyko was in effect changing the Soviet text to read as follows: "The date of the beginning of the negotiations and the site of these negotiations will be agreed at the next meeting of foreign ministers in early March."

*Gromyko* replied that it is one thing to begin the negotiations and another thing to mention the date of another ministerial meeting. Either version would be all right with him. One version concerns the next meeting between himself and Secretary Shultz, and the other concerns the date on which negotiations would begin, although a month is not specified. Perhaps after the next meeting they would be in a position to specify the date and place of the negotiations. Alternatively they could set the date through diplomatic channels. He saw no big problem here, especially with the next ministerial meeting. This should be a simple matter and he asked Shultz to believe him that he had no tricks up his sleeve. He assumed that the most recent Soviet draft is acceptable to the U.S. side. It mentions the negotiations and the date of the next ministerial meeting, though no date is set for the negotiations. To state things more simply, two versions are on the table. Which is more acceptable to the U.S. side?

The Secretary answered that both versions are acceptable in the sense that it is important to get the negotiations underway if we can structure them properly. It is also important for the two of them to continue to talk, not only directly as during these two days, but also in March or whenever. They could be in touch through diplomatic channels in the meantime. The question now was whether to announce the beginning of negotiations or to announce another ministerial meeting. In response to Gromyko's question of which he prefers, he would answer in typical Washington fashion that he prefers both. He wished to point out that for the U.S. the beginning of negotiations involves many complications. The U.S. must decide upon a leader of the delegation. Under the structure proposed by the Soviets, who would be the leader of the leaders? The U.S. choice would be affected by what is intended for the negotiations. On the question of intermediate-range forces, Ambassador Nitze, who led similar negotiations in the past, prefers not to continue in this duty, although he had promised to stay on as the Secretary's left or right-hand man [Ambassador Nitze was sitting to the Secretary's left]. So another person must be found to take his place. The U.S. must prepare itself for the negotiations because they are new and embody changes. This cannot be done instantly because a position must be developed in order to be ready for the talks. The Secretary thought that early March might be a little too early. All this must be taken into account if the talks are to begin, and it is best to say so now. This merely emphasizes the importance of further discussions at the ministerial level.

*Gromyko* said that a clear statement is needed to resolve these questions, yet the Secretary had not yet made such a statement. Does he accept that the date of negotiations will be settled through diplomatic channels? This afternoon the Secretary had remarked that he was puzzled by the Soviet draft. What in it was puzzling?

The Secretary replied that he was perplexed by the second Soviet draft, not the first. He was prepared to take the first draft as a framework and work through it. He was prepared to say that the time and place of negotiations will be agreed by diplomatic channels, although if we can set it ourselves, this would be preferable. He thought a few things in the draft could be changed or added to. At the same time, he thought the statement could say that he and Gromyko had agreed to another meeting in March.

Gromyko said that Shultz had still not expressed himself clearly. The Soviet draft was drawn up taking account of the U.S. position, and if it is accepted, the question of a ministerial meeting is no longer urgent. The Soviet side had put a reference to another ministerial meeting in the second text because the U.S. had not agreed to their morning text. Reference to the ministerial meeting could be pigeon-holed. Gromyko understood that the Secretary was hesitating between the two texts. In one text the idea is clearly stated that negotiations will begin. If another meeting between them should be necessary, there would be no problem—they can meet. World public opinion would be favorable to such a meeting. In fact, if such a meeting were announced, the U.S. delegation would probably be met with flags at the airport when it returned home.

The Secretary replied that first we must accomplish this between us and then the world could learn about it. He said he liked the implication in the first text that we have agreed to begin negotiations. While the structure of the Soviet text is acceptable to the U.S., there are a few aspects we wish to change. Although he could not accept the text in its present form, it deserves discussion. At the

same time, with or without this text, a further meeting between the ministers would be useful because there is much to discuss, and not only questions related to arms.

*Gromyko* said he was alarmed by the Secretary's statement that he wished to make some changes.

The Secretary asked if Gromyko really expected him to accept the Soviet text without comment.

*Gromyko* replied that the text had been drafted after yesterday's meeting, taking into account the remarks Secretary Shultz had made.

The Secretary said that his delegation had also drafted its text taking into account what Gromyko had said both yesterday and during his trip to Washington. They had tried to reflect in its text the views Gromyko had expressed.

*Gromyko* stated that everything he had said is based on the text the Soviet side had drawn up. He did not know what the Secretary might suggest now; perhaps the Secretary would make him want to hang the whole thing up.

The Secretary asked whether Gromyko was interested in discussing this or not. He would assume that he was. He suggested going through the text to determine what could be done to make it acceptable to the U.S.

*Gromyko* suggested that the two delegations part for a few minutes to review the text.

The Secretary agreed and the U.S. delegation left the room at 5:50 p.m.

At 6:25 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

The Secretary explained that the first and second paragraphs of the Soviet text are acceptable as they stand. In the third paragraph the U.S. wishes to drop the reference to strategic and medium-range arms. It proposes a paragraph reading as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning nuclear and space arms, with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Secretary Shultz proposed several additions to the fourth paragraph, which would read as follows: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements by a delegation divided into three negotiating groups, aimed at preventing an arms race on earth and in space, limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and strengthening strategic stability." He explained that here he had added a reference to the three groups, and clarified that the arms race meant on earth as well as in space.

Secretary Shultz said that the fifth paragraph of the Soviet draft would remain unchanged, although linguistically speaking, it did not read smoothly. He thought this was not worth arguing over. The final paragraph was acceptable as written. He thought if the sides could agree to fix the time and place of the negotiations, this would be desirable, but he would not insist on it.

*Gromyko* requested another break in order to examine the proposed U.S. changes.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 6:35 p.m.

At 7:00 p.m. the U.S. delegation returned.

*Gromyko* remarked that some of the suggested changes were acceptable and some were not. The first paragraph

was as solid as granite, and the second paragraph was also unchanged. He proposed that the third paragraph read as follows: "The sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms—both strategic and medium-range—with all these questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship."

Gromyko also proposed an amended version of the fourth paragraph: "The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms, and at strengthening strategic stability. The negotiations will be conducted by a delegation from each side divided into three groups."

By way of explanation, Gromyko said that we could not prevent an arms race on earth because there already is one, and therefore we must say that we will try to terminate it. Since there is as yet no arms race in space, we can say we will try to prevent one there. He said the Soviet side accepts the U.S. idea of referring to a delegation made up of three groups, but it prefers to say this in another sentence. The last two paragraphs of the statement stand unchanged.

The Secretary said this version of the text sounds reasonable, but he would like to caucus once again to look it over.

The U.S. delegation left the room at 7:10 p.m. On his way out, Mr. McFarlane had a brief exchange with Ambassador Karpov about the meaning of space arms (reported below).

The U.S. delegation returned at 7:22 p.m.

The Secretary asked Mr. McFarlane to repeat the exchange he had had with Karpov so that he could make sure it represented the Soviet view.

Mr. McFarlane quoted paragraph three of the proposed Soviet text, which states that "the sides agree that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms." When referring to space arms, McFarlane inquired, does the Soviet side include land-based systems that attack targets in space, as well as space-based systems that attack targets on earth?

Gromyko said that he had stated this clearly yesterday. When referring to space strike arms, the Soviet side means space weapons of any mode of action or basing mode that are designed to attack space objects or attack from outer space objects in the air, land or sea. In the text at hand, this is what is meant, although it is expressed more economically. Gromyko added that this of course extends to ASAT systems and corresponding ABM systems.

*McFarlane* said that land-based systems that attack space objects include weapons which attack ballistic missile systems. Do the "corresponding ABM systems" to which Gromyko had referred include those ABM systems covered by the ABM Treaty?

*Gromyko* replied that this applies not only to the systems permitted by the ABM Treaty.

*McFarlane* asked whether Gromyko calls space arms those weapons which are within this meaning.

*Gromyko* answered: "It is exactly as I said—I cannot add or subtract anything else."

*McFarlane* said in that case the ABM system around Moscow is a space weapon.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for this clarification. He then made a suggestion for the third paragraph that would stress this concept. He proposed to add to the phrase "space arms" a clarifying phrase, "wherever based or targeted." The rest of the paragraph would read as it stands.

*Gromyko* objected to this, saying that this would lead them into a jungle. Why mention targeting and why complicate the issue? What is unclear about this sentence? Why complicate an already clear sentence?

The Secretary wished to clarify another point. This paragraph also contains a reference to medium-range arms. As he understood it, the Soviet draft would say "medium-range arms" and the U.S. draft would say "intermediate-range arms."

Gromyko confirmed this, saying it was fine with him. Both the U.S. and Soviet sides are accustomed to certain specific parameters agreed on long ago. These parameters define those arms that are considered strategic, as well as where tactical arms end and medium-range arms begin. Everything here is mathematically precise.

The Secretary repeated that the U.S. would say "intermediate-range" and the Soviet side would say "medium-range." He had one more point to bring up. The U.S. side suggests that the fourth paragraph of the text be amended to read "agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on earth by limiting and reducing nuclear arms." The word "by" is the change suggested here.

*Gromyko* objected that this would worsen the paragraph and change its meaning. Neither side needed this change.

The Secretary replied that it was not a big point, but it did explain how the sides would end the arms race—by limiting and reducing nuclear arms.

*Gromyko* again objected that this was a worse solution, and Secretary Shultz agreed to drop it. Although he believed his wording made the point more powerful, he would agree to leave the paragraph as it stands.

*Gromyko* wondered if the Secretary had found any other "heresy" in the Soviet draft.

The Secretary replied that he had found no heresy he was willing to disclose to Gromyko. He would now have a clean copy of the text typed up in English.

While the text was being typed, there was discussion of the time the joint statement would be released.

Gromyko asked that it be released at midnight Geneva time because of the time difference between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The announcement would not get into Soviet media until tomorrow, but it would make the news in the U.S. today. Gromyko said that Shultz would have something to announce even if he did not read the statement—he could announce that a statement had been agreed upon.

Secretary Shultz said that he would appear at a press conference this evening, and that he would be too sleepy to answer questions if he waited until midnight. He thought even 10:00 P.M. was late. It is possible to embargo the announcement, but on such a big story he doubted the embargo would be observed.

*Gromyko* pressed Shultz repeatedly not to make the announcement before midnight.

Secretary Shultz suggested a compromise of 11 p.m. Gromyko accepted, saying that the U.S. side wants the Soviet side to meet it more than half way. Shultz replied that Gromyko drives a very hard bargain.

When the clean copy of the joint statement arrived, the Secretary gave it to Gromyko.

Before departing, *Gromyko* expressed his satisfaction with the frank and business-like atmosphere that had prevailed at these discussions.

Secretary Shultz, in his turn, thanked Gromyko for his kind words and said he appreciated the cordial discussions that had taken place. Gromyko had used the word "useful" in earlier remarks, and Shultz thought this word could be applied here too.

The meeting ended at 7:55 p.m.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (2/4). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Matlock and Smith. This meeting took place in the U.S. Mission in Geneva. The memorandum of conversation mistakenly identified the end time of the meeting as 6:55 p.m. Brackets are in the original.

<sup>2</sup> See Document 360.

## 363. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Geneva, January 8, 1985, 9 p.m.

The Secretary's Telephone Call to the President at 2100 January 8, 1985 from Geneva $^2$ 

The Secretary: I am here in Geneva with Bud McFarlane. I can report to you that we have reached agreement with the Soviet Union to begin new negotiations on the questions we came here to discuss; nuclear and space arms. We will announce this at 11:00 pm here which is 5:00 pm your time. We agreed to a set of points that are consistent with and supportive of your instructions. I think this is an opportunity for a good beginning. There is a wide difference of opinion on important topics and the negotiations will be long and tumultuous. It will require patience but we have an agreement.

The President: When will the talks start?

The Secretary: We agreed that we would work through diplomatic channels to set a time and a site within one month. We will drive for Geneva and I doubt that that will be a problem. We will start probably in March or April.

The President: Congratulations. It sounds great.

The Secretary: Well, it's a relief to have it over with.

The President: Congratulations to everybody on the delegation. Well done. We have gone over a real hurdle.

The Secretary: A few hours ago, I was not sure we would make it. I want to tell you that this big delegation worked

very well. Everybody was included and everybody made comments on all of the drafts. This afternoon we had the whole delegation set up in the room next to where we were meeting and we went back and forth. They all signed off on this agreement. We have come out with a unified delegation that represents everyone's point of view. The JCS had Admiral Moreau here. Richard Perle told me tonight that he wanted to go out and tell the press that we are unified and that he fully supports the agreement. So the broad participation that you and Bud engineered paid off. I would like to read the statement to you.

I want to report to the press that I spoke to you and gave you the agreed statement.

(Note: Secretary reads text of statement) $\frac{3}{2}$ 

The Secretary: We tip our hat to you, Mr. President. It's your positions and your mandate that got us here. I want to put Bud on the phone now.

Bud McFarlane: Mr. President, you know what you can thank for this? You have got an iron-ass Secretary of State. He has done a marvelous job. This is as unified as this community of people has been in four years time. We appreciate your support. Your victory in the election has made an impression on Moscow, that's for sure.

The Secretary: I will be back tomorrow by about 1:00 pm. I hope to see you and give you a personal report. We will send a suggested statement for your press conference on Wednesday. You will also have the transcript of my press conference tonight and Q's and A's and briefing material.  $\frac{6}{3}$ 

The President: This sounds great. You all have my congratulations.  $\overline{2}$ 

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 22A, 1985 Arms Control, Geneva. No classification marking.
- <sup>2</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan spoke with Shultz from 3:04 to 3:20 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his January 8 diary entry, Reagan wrote: "I was in the family theatre briefing for tomorrow nites press conf. when I was called upstairs to take a call from George S. on the secure phone. The meetings in Geneva are over & the Soviets have agreed to enter negotiations on nuclear weapons etc. Within the month a time & place will be agreed upon." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 414)
- <sup>3</sup> The joint statement was released on January 8. It reads in part: "The sides agreed that the subject of the negotiations will be a complex of questions concerning space and nuclear arms, both strategic and intermediate-range, with all the questions considered and resolved in their interrelationship. The objective of the negotiations will be to work out effective agreements aimed at preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth, at limiting and reducing nuclear arms and at strengthening strategic stability." (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, p. 30) The text was also printed widely in the press.
- <sup>4</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz on January 9 privately from 1:50 to 2:05 p.m. The two men then went into the White House library where they were joined by Bush and Poindexter. The meeting concluded at 2:38 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Reagan wrote in his diary on January 9: "George S. is back & thing are better than I'd thought & I thought they were pretty good." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 414)

<sup>5</sup> A draft statement was sent in telegram Secto 1038 from Shultz to the White House, January 9. (Reagan Library, Robert McFarlane Files, Subject File, Geneva Talks Shultz-McFarlane Trip, Vol. III, 01/05/1985-01/08/1985) Reagan held a press conference on January 9. His statement and the transcript of his press conference are in *Public Papers: Reagan*, 1985, Book I, pp. 23-30.

<sup>6</sup> The transcript of Shultz's press conference is in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 1985, pp. 30–32.

<sup>2</sup> On January 16, Reagan met with Shultz, Weinberger, and members of the U.S. delegation. According to his statement released after the meeting: "I invited our team members to the White House so that I could personally express to them my recognition of their extremely hard work and my gratitude for the successful outcome." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985*, Book I, pp. 42-43)

# January 1985-March 1985 "The principal menace to our security?": Reagan and the Ambiguities of Soviet Leadership

364. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, January 10, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.

365. Editorial Note

366. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's

## **Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)**

Washington, January 18, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985-01/08/1985 (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Lehman, Matlock, Kraemer, Linhard, and Steiner.

## 367. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, January 22, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. The January 23 covering memorandum to McFarlane from Matlock is printed as Document 368.

# 368. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, January 23, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Thanks Jack."

#### 369. National Security Decision Directive 160

Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Preparation for New Negotiations I 01/15/1985:NSDD 160 01/25/1985. Secret. Reagan initialed his approval of the NSDD on an attached January 24 memorandum from McFarlane. A January 22 memorandum to McFarlane from Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman, also attached but not printed, indicates they drafted the NSDD and McFarlane's memorandum to Reagan.

# 370. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 1, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1985-02/03/1985); NLR-775-13-7-6-4. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon; Sensitive. Drafted by D. Graves on January 31. Abramowitz signed "Mort A" above his name in the "From" line. Abramowitz wrote Shultz a note on the last page: [text not declassified].

# 371. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, February 8, 1985

Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 02/85. Drafted by Rodman. A notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. In a covering note to Murphy, Shultz wrote: "—this looks to me like a good basic paper and source of talking points for the meeting—share with the NSC as soon as you are satisfied with it."

## 372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan

Washington, February 13, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum to Shultz on another copy, it was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Ibid.)

## 373. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, February 27, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984–June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on February 27.

## 374. Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, February 27, 1985

Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, January-February 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow, Pifer, S. Coffey (PM/TMP), D. Schwartz (PM/SNP), and Dunkerley; cleared by O. Grobel (PM/TMP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), J.H. Hawes/J. Gordon (PM), Dobbins/Palmer, Courtney, Timbie, and E.M. Ifft (PM/DEL). Vershbow initialed for all drafting and clearing officials. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on a February 1 draft of this paper, Burt, Chain, and Nitze explained: "Mr. Secretary: The attached paper outlines our views on the substance of our positions on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces reductions, and defense and space arms. We would like to discuss these ideas with you at an early opportunity, in order that we might have your guidance on how we should proceed in the interagency process underway." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985—Geneva)

## 375. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, March 4, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. The editor transcribed Kraemer's handwritten notes of the NSC meeting specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E. No formal notes of the meeting were found. In a February 28 memorandum to Kimmitt, Linhard and Kraemer forwarded papers on Defense and Space, INF, and START in preparation for the March 4 NSC meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111–No. 112]) These three papers correlate closely with topics covered in Kraemer's notes of the meeting (see annotation below). In his diary on March 4,

Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talk Leaders looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It's very complicated business. I urged one decision on them—that we open the talks with a concession—surprise! Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told our people to open by saying we would accept their goal." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 431)

# 376. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 5, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A copy was sent to Bush.

# 377. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State (Dam)

Washington, March 7, 1985

Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on March 11. In his March 5 entry, Dam also noted: "In the evening I went to the Capital Centre for

a hockey game. The purpose of the hockey game was the invitation by Armand Hammer to the Soviet Congressional Delegation, which is here headed by Shcherbitskiy, a member of the Politburo. Not too much conversation was carried on, and on the whole, it didn't quite meet the objective of providing a quiet informal basis for conversation with the Soviets." (Ibid.)

#### 378. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 7, 1985, 3-4 p.m.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared on March 8. A covering memorandum from Matlock to McFarlane suggests that the memorandum of conversation was drafted by Matlock. Brackets are in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Reagan wrote in his diary: "Big event was meeting with Polit bureau [Politburo] member (Soviet) Sheherbitsky [Shcherbitsky]. He had Ambas. Dobrynin & a couple of others with him. I had George S., Bud, Don Regan & a couple of others with me. He & I went round & round. His was the usual diatribe that we are the destablasing [destabilizing] force, threatening them. It was almost a repeat of the Gromyko debate except that we got right down to arguing. I think he'll go home knowing that we are ready for negotiations but we d—n well aren't going to let our guard down or hold still while they continue to build up their offensive forces." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 433; brackets are in the original)

# 379. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.44-No.46]. Secret. Sent for action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.

#### 380. National Security Decision Directive 165

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985 Geneva. Secret. In a March 8 covering memorandum to multiple addressees, McFarlane noted: "The President has decided upon the following instructions for the first round of US/Soviet negotiations set to begin in Geneva on March 12, 1985."

# 381. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)

Washington, March 8, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Chernenko's Death—Miscellaneous 03/10/1985. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

## 382. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State Shultz

Washington, March 10, 1985

Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chron (03/09/1985–03/13/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Pascoe initialed for Kelly. The memorandum is stamped "Treat As Original."

#### 383. Editorial Note

## 364. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armacost) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 10, 1985

SUBJECT
Gorbachev Visit to the U.S.

[less than 1 line not declassified] on Tuesday, while you were in Geneva, Dwayne Andreas was informed that the Politburo was still considering whether a Gorbachev visit to the U.S. was desirable. The Politburo was leaning to May rather than March. (You'll recall that the Supreme Soviet delegation is coming here March 3-9 at Tip O'Neill's invitation, and that Tom Foley has made a pitch to Dobrynin for Gorbachev to head the Soviet delegation.) [less than 1 line not declassified] the Politburo preferred that Gorbachev come rather than Tikhonov, because Gorbachev had shown polish in the U.K.4

This indication that the Soviets have not decided yet on a Gorbachev trip is consistent with Gromyko's prickly reaction when you raised the matter. Chernenko may still be bristling about his rival's growing prominence, and Gromyko probably resists Gorbachev's increasingly active foreign role.

Jim Giffen confirmed to me that Andreas invited Gorbachev to the U.S. during the "planting or harvest" season, and indicated that the Soviets had been told that the planting season here is in April and May. Giffen promised to send me a copy of Andreas' letter of invitation to Gorbachev.<sup>6</sup>

#### Michael H. Armacost<sup>7</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, January 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Not for the System.
- <sup>2</sup> January 8.
- $\frac{3}{2}$  See <u>Document 350</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> Regarding Gorbachev's visit to the U.K., see <u>Documents</u> 337 and 341.
- <sup>5</sup> In his memoir, Shultz wrote that after the last session in Geneva on January 8: "I told Gromyko that we would welcome meeting Mr. Gorbachev when he came to the United States. The vice president would issue the invitation, and the president and I would be sure to meet with him. Gromyko replied, 'Nonsense! This is total invention, total invention!' I didn't know what Gromyko was driving at, but he clearly was not in favor of a Gorbachev visit to Washington. I dropped the subject." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 519) <sup>6</sup> Armacost forwarded a copy of Andreas's letter to Shultz on January 14. (Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S, Executive Secretariat Special Caption Documents, 1979–1989, Lot 92D630, Not for the System Documents, 1985) <sup>7</sup> Armacost initialed "MA" above his typed signature.

#### 365. Editorial Note

On January 18, 1985, Secretary of State George Shultz held a press conference at 3 p.m. in the White House Briefing Room to announce the U.S. delegation to the Nuclear and Space Talks with the Soviet Union, set to begin in Geneva on March 12. Shultz read the following Presidential statement: "Today I have asked three highly capable Americans to be the head negotiators of each of the three groups making up the U.S. delegation to the negotiations on nuclear and space arms. These negotiations will take place in accordance with the agreement reached at Geneva on January 8 between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko of the Soviet Union. Senator John Tower of Texas will be nominated to serve as U.S. negotiator on strategic nuclear arms. Ambassador Maynard W. Glitman, a minister-counselor of the Foreign Service of the United States, will be nominated as the U.S. negotiator on intermediate-range nuclear arms. Ambassador Max M. Kampelman will be nominated as U.S. negotiator on space and defensive arms. Ambassador Kampelman will also serve as Head of the U.S. delegation. Ambassador Paul H. Nitze and Ambassador Edward L. Rowny will serve as special advisers to the President and to the Secretary of State on arms reduction negotiations. I am pleased that these distinguished Americans have agreed to serve in these positions of great importance to the United States." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985,* Book I, pages 51-52) Shultz later recalled the formation of the delegations in his memoir: "We now had to pick a negotiator who would head the entire unified delegation and the three subheads. Nitze's wife was ill, and he was not able to move once again to Geneva, and anyway, I wanted to keep him close to me in Washington as my principal idea man. I favored Max Kampelman and told Cap so. Cap said he would prefer

Edward Teller: no one else could be trusted to be totally committed to SDI. It was not a real struggle because Max Kampelman was so deeply respected. Within a few days, Bud, Cap, Casey, and even Richard Perle all accepted Max. We also decided that in addition to being overall head, Max would lead the space and defense talks." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 521) In a memorandum to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert McFarlane on January 14, Jack Matlock, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European and Soviet Affairs in the NSC Staff, wrote: "I don't know whether, as rumored, Max Kampelman is the leading candidate, but I believe that he would be an excellent choice, despite his lack of extensive experience in the arms control area. He learns very quickly, is a superb and tough negotiator, has good political backing in and out of Congress and is solid on SDI." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting-Geneva Records 01/08/1985-01/09/1985 (2)) In his memorandum, Matlock also discussed the composition of the three negotiating groups. On the START delegation, he wrote: "I presume we will probably retain Rowny's team for this one. If, however, a change is desired for any reason (or Ed prefers not to continue), I would recommend that thought be given to Jim Goodby. A strong case can also be made for a prominent specialist from outside the government, given the key importance of this forum politically, but I have no particular suggestions to make on that score—except that if Brent Scowcroft would take it, he would add a lot of clout to this negotiation." However, Rowny was designated to serve, along with Paul Nitze, as special adviser to Reagan and Shultz on arms control negotiations. In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "Rowny, when I contacted him, could not bear the idea that the START talks, which he had headed for the United States and which had ended with a Soviet walkout in 1983, were now to be

reorganized in a new form under Tower. Rowny resented that I was the one to bring him this news: 'You are not high ranking enough to tell me this,' he said. 'I want to speak to the president alone.' He had the right, I felt, to make his case, so I took him over for his moment with the president." (Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, page 521) In his personal diary entry on January 18, Reagan wrote: "Met with George S.—we have a problem with General Ed Rowny (retired). We've named the 3 chief negotiators in the arms talks but we want Ed—who headed up the last negotiations to stay here as a special advisor to me & George. He sees this as a demotion. I met with him & did my best to convince it was nothing of the kind—that we need him & his expertise right here when these talks begin again. I'm not sure I convinced him." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 417)

# 366. Memorandum From William Stearman of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 18, 1985

SUBJECT Soviet Positions Post Geneva

Gromyko's remarkable candid January 13 TV interview<sup>2</sup> and post Geneva Soviet commentaries provide us with a somewhat clearer, but not surprising, view of Soviet arms control and foreign policy positions:

#### Arms Control Negotiations

Space: Agreement (or even real progress) on START and INF will definitely be held hostage to reaching "an accord on preventing the militarization of outer space." Thwarting U.S. military space programs will continue to be the prime Soviet arms control objective, with START and INF remaining of second priority. As Gromyko stated: "If accords in this area (space) become clear, then it would be possible to move forward also on questions of strategic armaments." He also noted that the "single delegation" (with 3 "sub-groups") format should ensure that "a situation does not arise here in which an accord begins to take shape in one group independently of the second and of the third."

START/INF: Probably after considerable internal debate, the Soviets seemed to have finally opted for a merging of START and INF. As Gromyko put it: "These two problems of

strategic armaments and medium-range weapons can only be examined jointly." As he previously noted: "for the Soviet Union, medium-range weapons are also strategic weapons."

Not surprisingly, he insisted that British and French INF systems "must be taken into account," but he also stated that in INF discussions the Soviets will raise all 15 U.S. carriers instead of just 6 as before. It looks as if the Soviets will push hard for a freeze in U.S. INF deployments and will try to convince the West Europeans (and us) that continued deployments will jeopardize the upcoming negotiations.

As to be expected, the Soviets will do little in START talks to alter their present strategic force structure—especially in regard to heavy missiles—because this would run counter to the principle of "equality and equal security." Gromyko implied that we can keep our bombers and they will keep their heavy missiles.

Test Bans, Nuclear Freeze, No First Use: These, according to Gromyko, are all issues which could be negotiated and resolved independent of the three main fields of discussion. As the main talks stall, we could well see a Soviet push for talks on a comprehensive test ban and for putting into effect signed U.S.-Soviet agreements on threshold tests and peaceful use. "Freezing nuclear arsenals" will probably be a continuing proposal for propaganda purposes.

I suspect that, in reply to our continued insistence on adequate verification, we will hear more of Gromyko's "universal and total monitoring." The Soviets no doubt have in mind something akin to the 1973–1975 International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) for Vietnam or the old 1954–1973 International Control Commissions (ICC) for Indochina which were both hamstrung and

rendered totally ineffective by virtue of being "international" (i.e., having Communist members with a veto).

#### General Foreign Policy

U.S. Soviet Bilateral Negotiations: Gromyko made clear that the Soviets would like to resuscitate past ("more than ten") agreements which have been cancelled by us or allowed to languish. We will certainly see increased Soviet efforts to promote bilateral agreements both for practical reasons (they have, says Gromyko, been of "benefit to both countries") and to recreate a spirit of detente in promotion of larger objectives—especially in arms control.

*Nicaragua and Cuba:* In devoting some time to condemning U.S. policy towards these two countries, Gromyko sought to state that the USSR will continue to maintain a considerable interest in this region, whether we like it or not.

Current Situation: When asked if the world was moving towards peace or war, Gromyko replied: "The situation now is very complicated, and at times dangerous." This statement is in stark contrast with the past Cassandra-like statements from Moscow which for nearly four years sought to conjure up an ever present danger of war.

"Public Diplomacy": The Soviets have certainly not given up on the peace movement in Western Europe and here. Governments and legislative bodies will be prime targets of a growing propaganda campaign designed to freeze INF deployments, reduce defense expenditures and force levels and to pressure us into making concessions in the arms control negotiations. As the negotiations get underway, we will hear a great deal about how our resistance to an

accord on space is sabotaging the negotiations. Of course, as Gromyko indicated, the Soviets will also continue to fully exploit the UN General Assembly to promote their peaceable image and to attack our positions.

BMD Blackmail Potential: In a mirror image approach to ballistic missile defense, Gromyko stated: "If it (the U.S.) had a protective shield . . . would this really not be used for pressure, for blackmail? Of course it would." Since we have never used strategic systems to blackmail the Soviets (even during the Cuban missile crisis), while, on the other hand, the Soviets have done so several times, this statement gives us a good idea of how the Soviets intend to exploit their nationwide BMD when it is finally deployed.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Geneva Meeting: Shultz/Gromyko 01/07/1985-01/08/1985 (2). Confidential. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Lehman, Matlock, Kraemer, Linhard, and Steiner.

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 567 from Moscow, January 14, the Embassy reported that on January 13 Gromyko appeared in a 2-hour long television interview, answering questions from four Soviet journalists: "in his January 13 interview Gromyko used a Soviet-style 'Meet the Press' format to respond forcefully to administration statements on the Geneva outcome and prospects for arms control." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850028–0149) For the transcript of the interview, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1985*, pp. 11–26.

### 367. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, January 22, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting with Dobrynin January 22

Dobrynin came in at his request for about 45 minutes this afternoon, mainly to present some Soviet proposals on joint commemorative events for V-E Day this spring.

The Soviets are suggesting several possibilities, he said:

- —exchanging letters "at the highest level;"
- —sending an official US delegation to the Soviet anniversary event in Moscow, and receiving a Soviet delegation here if we had a comparable event; and
- —exchanging delegations of veterans' groups.

He added that the Soviets are also thinking of honoring distinguished men, such as Averell Harriman, who played a crucial role in US-Soviet relations during World War II.

I said I would get back to him concerning these suggestions, but I also gave him the flavor of our thinking on what the approach to the anniversary should be. The themes should be peace, reconciliation and looking to the future rather than the past. I said we have been disturbed by the Soviet campaign against the FRG. As a friend and ally, we would stand with the West Germans, and V-E Day events should not be directed against them. For them V-E Day represented a new beginning. Dobrynin responded that

Soviet criticism of revanchism in the FRG has nothing to do with V-E Day. They see revanchist activities like meetings of ex-SS men and emigre groups that are tolerated by the government, watch them carefully and criticize them.

Dobrynin noted that they owed us an answer on the date and location of our arms control negotiations and the composition of their delegation. The Politburo had not yet passed on these matters, but he expected to have a reply this week or next.

Dobrynin asked how our preparations for negotiation were shaping up. I said I thought we had had good, serious, substantive exchanges in Geneva; he said Gromyko and the Politburo felt the same way. I said I felt we have a good opportunity to move forward. The new US negotiating team is a strong one, you and I are fully engaged on the issues, and we have an improved internal structure for dealing with them. Dobrynin noted that both sides are using much the same language about engaging in a long and difficult process. I said we should not be afraid to make rapid progress, but history showed these things often take time. We will have to see if it is possible to reach mutually agreeable accords, but for our part we intend to give it a good try.

We agreed that it would be useful to get together in a week or two to review the overall relationship area by area.

Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980-1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. The January 23 covering memorandum to McFarlane from Matlock is printed as <u>Document 368</u>.
 In a January 17 memorandum to McFarlane, Matlock reported on Burt's January 16 meeting with Isakov: "Rick

proposed that arms control negotiations begin in Geneva in early March, reiterated our proposal for a joint space rescue mission, proposed consultations on the Middle East to be held in Washington February 19–20, protested the Soviet demarche to Mobutu, rejected Soviet preconditions for further discussions on southern Africa and expressed our opposition to Soviet efforts to arrange for an affiliation of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War with the World Health Organization." (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4))

# 368. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, January 23, 1985

SUBJECT Shultz-Dobrynin Meeting, January 22, 1985

Secretary Shultz has submitted a Memorandum to the President reporting on his meeting with Dobrynin January 22.<sup>2</sup>

Dobrynin had asked for the meeting for the purpose of discussing Soviet proposals for observing V-E Day. Shultz took them under advisement and expressed concern about the Soviet policy of using the occasion to attack German "revanchism."

At the same meeting, Dobrynin acknowledged that the Soviets owe us a reply regarding the arms control negotiations, and said he expected one this week or next. He indicated that the delay is caused by the necessity of the Politburo passing on the arrangements.

Comment: I continue to be annoyed at the way State has failed to come up with a unified and detailed Allied position regarding observance of the V-E anniversary—but maybe these Soviet proposals will galvanize their activity. Off hand, I see no great problem with exchanging open letters—provided we can negotiate the content of both in advance. As for delegations, this will require more careful thought, consultation with the British and French—as well as the Germans, of course.

Dobrynin's excuse for the Soviet delay in setting the specifics for the negotiations rings true: these things doubtless require Politburo approval. In this regard, it is interesting to note that there seems to have been no Politburo meeting last week—at least none was announced, and announcements have been routine for the last couple of years. This adds to the circumstantial evidence that Chernenko's health has taken a nose-dive. If this is the case, the Soviet leadership will be utterly preoccupied with the question of succession. Even so, I would expect them to find a way to approve the arrangements fairly soon.

#### Recommendation:

That you send the attached memorandum to the President.4

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron January 1985 (3/4). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. McFarlane wrote in the margin: "Thanks Jack."
- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 367</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> Since mid-January, several cables and reports speculated on Chernenko's illness. Telegram 740 from Moscow, January 17, reported: "According to the French Embassy here, Central Committee International Department First Deputy Chief Zagladin acknowledged to a visiting French Minister of State on January 16 that Chernenko's poor state of health had been the reason for the postponement of the Warsaw Pact Summit." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850037-0738) Telegram 805 from Moscow, January 18, reported: "Two more senior Soviet officials have admitted privately that General Secretary Chernenko is ill." (Department of State,

Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850040-0519)

<sup>4</sup> McFarlane did not mark the Approve or Disapprove option; however, a handwritten note dated January 28 in an unknown hand noted: "Per RCM—Shultz reported this to the President orally." According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office on January 23 from 1:41 to approximately 2:10 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) Tab I, an undated covering memorandum from McFarlane to the President, is attached but not printed. Tab A, Shultz's memorandum, is attached and printed as <a href="Document 367">Document 367</a>.

#### 369. National Security Decision Directive 1601

Washington, January 24, 1985

### PREPARING FOR NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION (S)

The success of the U.S. delegation at the recent Geneva meetings in gaining Soviet agreement to join us in renewed negotiations demonstrates the soundness of the basic U.S. approach to arms reductions.<sup>2</sup> The U.S. delegation, building upon the work of many over the last four years, has provided us an opportunity to pursue, once again, our national security objectives through direct, bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union. I want to ensure that the United States is in a position to capitalize fully on this opportunity. (C)

Organization of the U.S. Delegation. Senator John Tower will take charge of the negotiations on strategic nuclear arms. Ambassador Maynard Glitman will have responsibility for negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces. Ambassador Max Kampelman will lead the overall U.S. delegation and also the U.S. side in the negotiations on Defense and Space.<sup>3</sup> (U)

Developing U.S. Positions. The Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) will coordinate the development of the general U.S. approach to the negotiations, the specific U.S. positions in each of the three substantive areas of negotiation, and the instructions to the U.S. delegation for the upcoming round of talks. The SACG will be supported by the existing Interagency Groups on START, INF and ASAT issues. The responsibilities of the ASAT IG will be expanded to address

the full extent of the Defense and Space issues associated with the upcoming negotiations. The SACG will provide draft instructions to the U.S. delegation for my review and approval no later than March 8, 1985. (S)

In the START and INF areas, the majority of the work needed to support the upcoming round of negotiations has already been accomplished. The SACG should draw upon that work in completing its preparations in these areas. In the area of Defense and Space issues, more preparation is necessary. Appropriate priority should be given to ensuring that the U.S. position in this substantive area is finalized and thoroughly vetted in a timely manner. (S)

Support for the Delegation. Once negotiations begin, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency will chair an interagency backstopping group here in Washington to provide support for the U.S. delegation in implementing its instructions on a day-to-day basis. Should issues arise that cannot be resolved within the backstopping group or by the appropriate Interdepartmental Group, they will be referred to the Senior Arms Control Group and through the SACG to me as needed for resolution. (C)

Special Advisors. Ambassadors Ed Rowny and Paul Nitze have already made a major contribution to the U.S. effort to achieve equitable and verifiable agreements which would lead to equal and reduced levels of both U.S. and Soviet nuclear offensive forces. Their experience and judgment are a unique asset to me and to the nation. As we move into the next phase of negotiations, their advice and counsel on our broader range of issues under active negotiation will be greatly needed. Therefore, I have asked Ambassador Rowny and Ambassador Nitze to continue their long and distinguished records of service to this nation with the

titles of Special Advisor to the President and Secretary of State on Arms Control Matters. (U)

In their new capacities, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will provide advice and counsel on the arms control policy decision making process in general, on the development, formulation, and implementation of negotiations on the full range of nuclear, conventional, defense and space issues, as well as on the integration of arms control policy into U.S. national security strategy. To support their charter, Ambassadors Rowny and Nitze will be provided the information relevant to these subjects, attend NSC, NSPG and SACG meetings on these areas, and, have access to me, through the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor, to discuss these matters. (C)

Military Sufficiency. As we start this next phase of negotiations, I wish to reaffirm the guidance initially issued in NSSD 3-82 (March 3, 1982)<sup>5</sup> to the effect that any approach or alternative approaches recommended for my approval should, as a minimum, permit the United States to develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to that allowed to the Soviet Union to execute U.S. national military strategy with reasonable assurance of success. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to comply with this guidance and submit their timely assessments of approach(es) under consideration in terms of this criterion to the Senior Arms Control Group and Interdepartmental Groups as appropriate for use in developing and refining U.S. arms control positions. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will certify to the military sufficiency of any approach submitted to me for my approval. (S)

*Verification*. The national security of the United States also requires the effective verification of arms control agreements. The Director of Central Intelligence, the

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and other senior officials, have expressed concern about the process by which verification considerations are factored into the development of U.S. arms control policy and specific U.S. positions. In consideration of the above, it is directed that the following actions be taken:

—As the instructions for the upcoming negotiating round are developed, and subsequently as U.S. arms control positions are considered, the SACG will assure that comprehensive assessments are made of verification issues associated with U.S. negotiating proposals. The Arms Control Verification Committee and the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups will support the SACG in this effort. These assessments should address the overall effectiveness of verification, U.S. monitoring capability (to include Soviet cheating scenarios), and the possibility of safeguards. The Arms Control Verification Committee will work with the appropriate Interdepartmental Groups and advise the SACG on the verifiability of the general approaches and the specific positions recommended to me by the SACG for approval as part of the instructions to the U.S. delegation.

—Additionally, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, working with other Departments and Agencies as appropriate, are requested to forward to the National Security Advisor a report providing: (1) a more detailed assessment of the handling of verification issues in the policy development process; and, (2) specific recommendations as to how the process can be strengthened. This report should be available for my review by March 15. (S)

#### **Ronald Reagan**

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Robert Linhard Files, Arms Control Chron, Preparation for New Negotiations I 01/15/1985:NSDD 160 01/25/1985. Secret. Reagan initialed his approval of the NSDD on an attached January 24 memorandum from McFarlane. A January 22 memorandum to McFarlane from Linhard, Kraemer, and Lehman, also attached but not printed, indicates they drafted the NSDD and McFarlane's memorandum to Reagan.
- $^{2}$  See <u>Documents 355</u>, <u>357</u>, <u>360</u>, and <u>362</u>.
- 3 See Document 365.
- <sup>4</sup> See <u>Document 365</u>.
- <sup>5</sup> NSSD 3-82, which "establishes the Terms of Reference for completing the review of U.S. policy and the development of a negotiating position for the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)," is in <u>Foreign Relations</u>, 1981-1988, vol. XI, START I, <u>Document 6</u> . ■
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 346</u>.

## 370. Information Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Abramowitz) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 1, 1985

**SUBJECT** 

CIA Report of Chernenko's Retirement In Favor of Gorbachev

[less than 1 line not declassified] the Politburo has already selected Gorbachev to be the next party leader. Although plausible, the report cannot be confirmed.

This report and two others highlight Gorbachev's interest in meeting the President (or visiting the US). [ $1\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified]

#### Parallel To London Sunday Times Story

The report (Tab A) $^2$  indirectly ascribes [ $1\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified]—the statement that the Politburo has already decided that Gorbachev should succeed Chernenko even before he dies. $^3$ 

—The report parallels the London press report of January 27 that Chernenko will soon retire in favor of Gorbachev because he could never recover from his present illness. It would have been weightier corroboration had the information in the CIA report been dated before rather than after the newspaper story.

—[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

#### Gorbachev's Interest in a Summit

The report that Gorbachev will soon replace Chernenko is the latest in a series. It says that Gorbachev, once he has consolidated his new position, would like to meet the President, perhaps in Vienna. The President's May trip to Europe would be too early, however.

Two other reports (Tab B)<sup>5</sup> detail continuing efforts by US businessmen to invite Gorbachev to visit the US. The more recent information continues to assert Gorbachev's interest in a visit, but says that a May date is out because of Chernenko's poor health.

It appears from these reports that the businessmen are continuing to pursue the idea of inviting Gorbachev to visit the US. The Soviets seem to be putting them off, but not discouraging the idea in principle.

We are, however, leery of taking all of the rhetoric in these reports literally. [ $2\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified]

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive (02/01/1985-02/03/1985); NLR-775-13-7-6-4. Secret; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon; Sensitive. Drafted by D. Graves on January 31. Abramowitz signed "Mort A" above his name in the "From" line. Abramowitz wrote Shultz a note on the last page: [text not declassified].
- $\frac{2}{2}$  Dated January 29; the report is attached but not printed.
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>footnote 3, Document 368</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> On May 1, Reagan, accompanied by Shultz, arrived in Bonn for the G-7 Economic Summit and a State visit. He attended V-E Day ceremonies, including a visit to the Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. The trip was most

notably remembered for the controversial visit to the Bitburg cemetery. Reagan then traveled to Madrid, Strasbourg, and Lisbon before returning to Washington on May 10.

 $\frac{5}{2}$  Dated January 29; the report is attached but not printed. For an earlier report, see <u>Document 364</u>.

## 371. Information Memorandum From the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rodman) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 8, 1985

SUBJECT

The Soviet Role in the Middle East

As we head into US-Soviet discussions on the Middle East, it would be useful to review what the Soviet role has been and what our objectives should be in these talks.<sup>2</sup>

#### Why the Soviets Have Been Excluded

There are many reasons why we have not wanted a major Soviet role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, but the essence of it is that we doubt the Soviets have a real interest in a peaceful solution as we conceive it.

The Soviet Union has an interest in avoiding a war—since its clients usually lose, it has to replace vast losses of equipment, and it usually ends up in mutual recriminations with its clients over whose fault it was that the Soviet equipment didn't produce success. But the Soviet interest in avoiding war has never translated into a serious willingness to contribute to peace—even though the Soviets are committed to UNSC Resolution 242 and have no trouble endorsing Israel's right to exist.

Our strategic interest is in a settlement that strengthens moderates—that vindicates the policies of pro-Western Arabs like Mubarak, Hussein, and moderate Palestinians; that dampens the forces of radicalism and strengthens the US position in the region. In conditions of successful peace diplomacy, our economic and political relations in the Arab world flourish and resentments over the Palestinian problem diminish. The Soviets can hardly be expected to exert themselves for such an outcome. By choice or otherwise, they have thrown in their lot with Syria. The military relationship cements this tie (though the Syrians basically despise the Soviets and certainly do not follow Soviet dictates). Whatever their differences with Syria on other issues, the Soviets have been comfortable with the Syrian policy of frustrating the Arab moderates and blocking US diplomacy.

Thus we have grounds for suspecting that bringing the Soviets into a major role in the diplomacy would do no more than put them in a better position to obstruct. They have never been willing to spend political capital to put pressure on their clients for moderation the way we are expected to squeeze Israel. In this sense, they have excluded *themselves* from a useful role in peace diplomacy. Their impotence in the face of the Syrian assault on the PLO suggests that they are unable or unwilling to exert real pressure on the Syrians. It also suggests that the Syrians, not the Soviets, are the decisive factor in the region that needs to be neutralized.

Proposals to bring the Soviets into the game are a recurring feature whenever our own diplomacy seems to be going nowhere. Precisely for this reason it is dangerous: It would symbolize US failure; it would further demoralize Arab states who have long sided with us *against* the Soviets and would legitimize the trend of growing ties between these Arabs and the Soviets; it could feed Arab illusions that some deus ex machina will relieve them of the need to make their own hard decisions; it would convey a signal of flagging US resolve to the Syrians, bolstering their

determination to wait us out. *Especially* when our diplomacy is not making progress, we have an incentive to keep demonstrating that end-runs around us won't work. The fact is, the Soviets cannot deliver Arab land and cannot even take the initiative away from us when we stumble. It has long been a cardinal principle of US policy to demonstrate to the Arabs that the Soviet connection gets them nowhere and that they have to come to us. This remains the best strategy for us.

Some Arabs may see value in a Soviet role, not for its own sake but as a means of putting additional pressure on *us*. The theory is that the United States will be spurred to greater effort (i.e., pressure on Israel) out of fear of the Soviets. This explains part of the Arab flirtation with an international conference. Clearly, we have a general strategic interest in showing that using this Soviet card against us doesn't work either. Otherwise we send a message around the world that the Soviets (not the Americans) are the pivotal factor.

#### Our Objectives in US-Soviet Talks

A number of conclusions follow from this.

- 1. The main value of bilateral US-Soviet talks is as a *substitute* for a greater Soviet role in Mideast diplomacy. The Soviets are sensitive to considerations of status, and such a dialogue will be somewhat of a political boost to them. This might be a useful card to play in US-Soviet relations. For the reasons stated above, however, it is in our interest to downplay its regional significance.
- 2. At the same time, it never hurts to have a chance to explain to the Soviets candidly *why* we have not welcomed

a greater role for them. These meetings are an opportunity to put the onus on them and to read the bill of particulars of what we want them to do: restore diplomatic relations with Israel; put pressure on the Syrians to permit a West Bank negotiation; stop siding with the rejectionists who are obstructing the chances for peace, etcetera.

The only risk of making these points to them is the risk that they may do something along these lines (e.g., diplomatic relations with Israel) and then claim their right to a greater role—a claim that it would be harder for us to block. We might conceivably be better off the way things are. On the other hand, while restoring relations with Israel would strengthen their claim to a greater role, it would also complicate their relations with all the Arabs: It would protect Egypt's flank as Israel's peace partner; it would infuriate the Syrians; it would provide an excuse for a number of African states to restore their relations with Israel. It would even vindicate Israel's decision to take the risks of accepting VOA/RL facilities.

But for precisely these reasons, the Soviets are unlikely to do it. (The KGB may also have an internal-security concern about an Israeli Embassy in Moscow stirring up Soviet Jewry—not to mention a Mossad station.) If they continue to be too paralyzed by their own immobilism to make these positive moves, then the onus is clearly on them for their continuing exclusion.

3. Perhaps the most useful message to convey is to warn the Soviets of the risks of war. This, as noted at the beginning, is their point of weakness and their main incentive to behave constructively. Our theme should be that Lebanon is still a powder keg, that Syria is acting irresponsibly, and that Israel's military prowess and strength of will should not be underestimated. The Israelis

are confident they can handle Syria; the question is whether Syria, with all its new Soviet equipment, will be tempted into some reckless move. Soviet nervousness on this score would be healthy, and it could, on the margin, turn the Soviet-Syrian connection into a factor for restraint on the Syrians.

- 4. The Iran-Iraq war, of course, is another useful topic to discuss. Had the crisis last year necessitated US intervention, we probably would have wanted to talk to the Soviets to make clear we were not threatening Soviet interests. In the present context, discussions on this subject could be a way of deflecting their approaches to us for a role in Arab-Israeli diplomacy, and also a way of testing their bona fides: A serious Soviet effort to restrict East-bloc arms sales to Iran would be in the general interest; if they fail to make such an effort, we need not be shy about playing this back to Iraq and the other Arabs.
- 5. As a general matter, on either the peace process or the Gulf war, it is *not* our objective to reassure the Soviets too much. Certainly we can tell them that our policies are not hostile to Soviet interests. At the same time, their incentives for restraint come from their fear that the United States (and Israel) would be dealing from strength in any crisis; assuring them of our goodwill and self-restraint would only confirm that their nonconstructive behavior runs no risks. Our talking points should be fashioned with this in mind—emphasizing risks, not reassurances.
- 6. As noted, it is in our interest to downplay the importance of these talks. We should slow them down, in the sense of not scheduling another discussion of the Middle East for a long while. At the same time, we might make the Middle East talks seem more routine by scheduling other talks at

some point on other regional subjects (e.g., Southern Africa). We want no communiqué from these talks, no joint action, and no joint follow-up. Indeed it is not clear we want any outcome, except to be able to reassure all our friends that nothing harmful resulted.

7. The Soviets, too, will have nervous clients to reassure. We should be alert for opportunities to sow discord between the Soviets and the Arabs. Any signs of Soviet willingness to improve relations with Israel, to move toward more even-handed positions, to restrain the Arabs, etc., should be played back to the Arabs—just as any Soviet waffling on the Iran-Iraq war could be used to complicate Soviet relations with Iraq or Iran as the case may be. The Soviets are likely to do the same to us if they get the chance.

Just think what we might be doing to each other if this constructive dialogue on regional issues were not taking place!

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, S/P, Memoranda/Correspondence from the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Lot 89D149, S/P Chrons PW 02/85. Drafted by Rodman. A notation reading "GPS" appears on the memorandum, indicating Shultz saw it. In a covering note to Murphy, Shultz wrote: "—this looks to me like a good basic paper and source of talking points for the meeting—share with the NSC as soon as you are satisfied with it."
- <sup>2</sup> In telegram 44264 to all Near Eastern and South Asian posts and copied to Moscow, February 13, the Department informed the posts: "We have reached agreement with the Soviets to hold experts' talks on the Middle East in Vienna on February 19–20. Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy

will lead the U.S. delegation. We have been informed that the Soviet interlocutor will be Vladimir Polyakov, Head of the Near East Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry. In view of considerable speculation that these talks would represent a process of negotiation with the Soviets, we believe it important that our friends in the region and allies be assured that the talks will be held within the context of our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union and will consist of an exchange of views on regional issues, rather than negotiations. We would like to allay both fears and expectations that we intend to enter into a joint effort with the Soviets to seek a solution to the Arab-Israeli dispute. We also want to make clear that our focus is bilateral, and that significant results are not to be expected from this dialogue." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850101-0073)

<sup>3</sup> Background and information on these talks are in the following telegrams to Near Eastern and South Asian posts: telegram 48445, February 15, and telegram 49273, February 16. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850109-0850 and D850111-0487) Analysis after the conclusion of the talks is in telegram 52867, February 22, and telegram 55542, February 23. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850120-0886 and D850124-0488)

### 372. Memorandum From Secretary of State Shultz to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, February 13, 1985

SUBJECT

My Meeting Today with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

I called in Dobrynin today for an extended session to take stock of the overall US-Soviet agenda. My purpose was to emphasize to the Soviets that we expect progress on all aspects of the relationship in the months ahead and to warn them of some possible stumbling blocks.

Arms Control: To lead off the discussion, I stressed that you are pleased talks are to begin in Geneva and have been saying so publicly, and that our approach is serious. I noted that we have a strong new delegation and are taking a fresh look at the issues. I chided Dobrynin on Soviet reports that question US seriousness in the negotiations. Dobrynin replied that the Soviets also want the negotiations to be successful, but insist on strict adherence to the terms of the January communique, a line approved by the Politburo at a meeting he said he had attended. He complained about US statements that some things are not negotiable. I also told Dobrynin I hoped we would see some serious movement in the on-going arms control talks in Stockholm and Vienna.

Regional Issues: Referring to the February 19–20 talks in Vienna between Dick Murphy and his Soviet counterpart, I said we would want to talk about Iran-Iraq, Lebanon, Arab-Israeli issues, and Afghanistan. I expressed concern that the Afghanistan war might be broadened by actions against

Pakistan, and reaffirmed our support for the UN peace efforts. Dobrynin said they were prepared to discuss all Mideast issues in Vienna, but that they "did not intend" to talk about Afghanistan since it did not fall under their man Polyakov's area of responsibility. I am sure he understands we will make our Afghanistan points in the meeting regardless of whether they choose to respond. He had nothing new on Iran-Iraq or the Mideast other than to say that they believe the Vienna talks can be useful.

I reviewed with Dobrynin our concerns over their support for Vietnamese actions in Cambodia. He excused the Vietnamese, as usual, by referring to the past abuses by the Khmer Rouge. I responded that I did not believe the people of Cambodia wanted either the Khmer Rouge or the Vietnamese, that a way needs to be found for them to make their own choice, and that the ASEAN proposals have merit. Turning to Ethiopia, I sketched out the tragedy of three million starving people in contested areas and urged the Soviets to persuade the Ethiopians to allow food into these areas. Dobrynin agreed that the humanitarian issues were beset with political complications, but he said that the distribution was a purely Ethiopian issue and we should discuss the problems directly with the Ethiopian government.

Bilateral Issues: I told Dobrynin that we were pleased with the Shcherbitskiy visit to the United States and would work to make the trip a success. The visit offered an excellent opportunity to move on new consulates in Shcherbitskiy's Kiev base and in New York. Dobrynin agreed that we should discuss the Kiev Consulate with Shcherbitskiy, but then reiterated the Soviet line that the Soviets had no interest in a New York consulate unless Aeroflot was giving it some visitors to deal with. I responded that we needed to resolve the issues that had led to Aeroflot suspension.

Indicating he understood the linkage, Dobrynin noted that we have proposed that talks on Northern Pacific safety measures begin February 26,<sup>9</sup> and hoped this would help clear the way. We both agreed that the exchanges negotiations should move ahead rapidly, and I gave him our views on several economic issues including fishing and the unacceptability of Soviet whaling practices.

I reiterated US interest in your space rescue proposal<sup>10</sup> and the possibility of joint commemoration this July of the Tenth Anniversary of the linkup of Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft. Dobrynin was interested if we had anything on their proposals for the V-E Day anniversary, but I put him off for the present.<sup>11</sup> I also used the session to get Dobrynin's attention on our strong opposition to a new payroll scheme they are attempting to institute for Soviet employees of foreign embassies in Moscow.

Human Rights: I took the time to once again underline our deep concern over the human rights situation in the Soviet Union. I encouraged movement on Shcharanskiy and Sakharov, deplored the recent wave of arrests of Hebrew teachers and the increase in anti-Semitism in the USSR, and told him we expected some progress on the emigration of people with a claim to American citizenship and the Soviet spouses of Americans.

In closing, we both agreed that the US-Soviet relationship was better than a year or two ago, but that it still has a long way to go.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, US-Soviet Diplomatic Contacts 8/8. Secret; Sensitive. According to a covering memorandum to

- Shultz on another copy, it was drafted by Pascoe and cleared by Simons and Palmer. (Ibid.)
- <sup>2</sup> On January 26, the White House formally announced "The United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to begin negotiations on nuclear and space arms on March 12, 1985, in Geneva, Switzerland." (*Public Papers: Reagan, 1985, Book I, p. 74*)
- <sup>3</sup> See Document 365.
- <sup>4</sup> In telegram 688 from Moscow, January 16, the Embassy reported: "Following up Gromyko's TV interview on the Geneva arms control agreement," (see <u>Document 366</u>) "Pravda carries a front page editorial on the subject January 16. The editorial reiterates many of Gromyko's points, and directly questions US seriousness in the upcoming talks." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850034-0792)
- <sup>5</sup> The communiqué concluded the January 7-8 Geneva meetings between Shultz and Gromyko. See <u>footnote 3</u>, <u>Document 363</u>.
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Document 371</u>.
- <sup>7</sup> A Soviet delegation, headed by Politburo member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, was scheduled to visit Washington and met with President Reagan on March 7. This was a reciprocal invitation issued by Congressmen Tom Foley and Dick Cheney who were in Moscow in the summer of 1983. For the meeting between Reagan and Shcherbitsky, see Document 378.
- <sup>8</sup> Since April 1983, talks regarding consulates in Kiev and New York were ongoing (see <u>Document 36</u>). After the KAL shootdown and suspension of Aeroflot flights, the consulate talks became linked to ICAO discussion on air safety and resumption of Aeroflot flights. In telegram 493 from Moscow, January 11, the Embassy reported on a January 7 meeting on civilian air issues: "The Soviet official broached the issue of Aeroflot service to the U.S., and was reminded

- of U.S. requirements on North Pacific safety measures, and of the need for equitable treatment of any U.S. carrier operating in the U.S.-USSR market. The Soviets continue to be interested in contacts with Pan Am on commercial questions related to U.S.-USSR air service." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850024–0434)
- $\frac{9}{2}$  In telegram 63798/Tosec 40089 to Moscow, March 2, the Department reported: "Following the tragedy of the Korean Air Lines Flight 007 the United States and Japan jointly proposed to the Soviet Union that technical measures be instituted to improve air safety in the Northern Pacific. These proposals provide for, among other things, the designation of a single point of contact between U.S., Soviet and Japanese air traffic control services, a direct communications link between Japanese and Soviet air control centers and the publication by the U.S.S.R. of nondirectional radio beacons to provide for a cross check for aircraft flying international routes over the Northern Pacific. The proposals were given to the Soviet ICAO representative in Montreal in February 1984. US, Soviet, and Japanese negotiators began meeting in Washington on February 26." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850144-0003)
- <sup>10</sup> See <u>footnote 5</u>, <u>Document 352</u>. During a January 16 meeting, Burt informed Isakov that the President wanted to renew "the US offer to undertake joint space rescue mission with the Soviet Union. Burt made the following points:
- "—The US does not view or seek to make space an arena of competition between our two countries.
- "—There have been notable cooperative efforts between us, for example, the instrumentation developed by US scientists now carried aboard your Vega space probe.

- "—The President has asked us to reiterate the offer we made to you last January for a joint US-Soviet manned mission to develop space rescue techniques.
- "—Such a mission would be relatively easy to set up from a technical view, and would benefit both our manned space programs.
- "—In your response last March to our offer, you said that we needed first to address the problems of the 'militarization of space.'
- "—Now that we have agreed to begin negotiations on space as a part of our new arms control dialogue, we urge you to reconsider our suggestion on space rescue." (Telegram 17209 to Moscow, January 18; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850001–0484) On February 19, during a meeting with Burt, Sokolov reaffirmed "the essentially negative Soviet response last year (March 13, 1984), tying agreement in this instance to progress in Geneva and on not turning space 'into an arena for military competition.'" (Telegram 50737 to Moscow, February 20; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850002–0585)
- The approaching 40th anniversary of V-E Day posed some diplomatic problems for the United States. In his memoir, Shultz wrote: "By the end of 1984, anxiety was growing about the upcoming fortieth anniversary of the Allied victory in Europe and about how V-E Day would be commemorated. The German government was particularly concerned that Allied, or even U.S.-Soviet, ceremonies would project the image of wartime victors in sharp relief against the vanquished Germanies. These fears made the Germans seem uncharacteristically wary of U.S.-Soviet commemorative steps, even though they might contribute

to positive movement in East-West relations, a goal they otherwise strongly supported. Any step, I could see, that would be interpreted as once again consigning West Germany to outcast status was undesirable." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, p. 540)

# 373. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State $(Dam)^{1}$

Washington, February 27, 1985

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

I attended the Secretary's meeting with the arms control negotiators this afternoon. The discussions were basically procedural up to the end when we got into a very interesting discussion of what will be the central problem, not only in negotiations with the Soviets but also in explaining our position here at home: How do we square the emphasis on SDI in our programs with the argument that we are trying for deep reductions? There are various fancy theories as to how that is so, but this is obviously a difficult point in our own thinking. The fact of the matter is that SDI and deep reductions are both articles of faith with the President, and the question of how they are presented in a consistent way is being left to an interagency process which is simply unable to confront basic questions of this nature. Fortunately Paul Nitze is with us, and he has been doing some rather interesting thinking about how the future might evolve such that we could move on both fronts simultaneously. The Soviets are doing everything they can to argue that the two goals are inconsistent and that, if SDI goes forward, they will have to build up, rather than reduce, their intercontinental ballistic missile force.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot

85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on February 27.

## 374. Paper Prepared in the Department of State 1

Washington, February 27, 1985

THE GENEVA TALKS: STATE DEPARTMENT POSITIONS

#### Introduction

Our priority goal in the upcoming Geneva talks is to move toward radical reductions in the numbers and destructive power of nuclear arms and the establishment of a more stable balance in which the incentives for either side to strike first are substantially diminished. These objectives are integral to the long-range goal of the Strategic Defense Initiative—to shift away from "mutual assured destruction" to a transition phase in which both we and the Soviets rely more on defense as the basis for deterrence, and to lay the groundwork for an ultimate phase in which we might accomplish our objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons.

In the near term, however, the Soviets will attempt to exploit the tension between our objectives in offensive arms reductions and strategic defense. They have linked progress on nuclear arms reductions to progress on "demilitarizing" space, and can be expected to resist substantial reductions—both to hedge their bets against future US defenses, and to put pressure on us to be more forthcoming on space arms limits. For our part, we are not now prepared to negotiate restrictions beyond those contained in the ABM and Outer Space treaties that would significantly impede SDI research or foreclose future

defensive deployment options. (We are, however, prepared now to discuss the implications of possible new defensive technologies, and ways in which defenses might be cooperatively introduced into force structures.)

Our objective at Geneva will be to defeat the Soviet attempt to assert a rigid linkage between offensive reductions and SDI, and to insist on the necessity and possibility of agreements providing for significant offensive force reductions in the near term, even while the future of SDI remains uncertain. We will need to counter Soviet attempts to achieve leverage through their massive propaganda campaign against SDI. Further, we will have to demonstrate that Soviet arguments against offensive arms reductions are unfounded and damaging to mutual security.

A strong and credible US negotiating position on offensive nuclear arms, one that demonstrates convincingly that militarily meaningful and mutually beneficial agreements are achievable, would put the onus on the Soviets to weaken the link they have established between space and nuclear arms. It would also help fend off near-term public, Allied and Congressional pressures to accept broad-gauged restrictions on space weapons that would impede the SDI research program. Thus, in the first round of negotiations, we should:

- —lay out basic concerns and objectives, and present our long-term strategic concept, elaborating on the Secretary's presentation to Gromyko in Geneva;
- —introduce concrete proposals for reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms, while seeking to gain a sense of the Soviet position in both areas; and

—begin a more detailed discussion of the offensedefense relationship in the defensive and space forum.

#### Interrelationships at Geneva

In conceptual terms, the US has taken the view that the three negotiating areas at Geneva are inherently interrelated. Indeed, from the beginning of the US-Soviet strategic arms dialogue in the late 1960s, we have maintained that the nature of the relationship between offensive nuclear and defensive systems has a direct bearing on the stability of the strategic balance. Our goal in the near term—to reverse the erosion that has occurred since 1972 in the existing offense-dominant regime—does not require any direct linkage between our negotiating approaches in the offensive and defense/space areas. If new defensive technologies should prove feasible and we decide to move toward a more defense-reliant posture, however, careful management of offensive arms reductions and concurrent deployment of non-nuclear defensive systems would be necessary to ensure that deterrence were not undermined at any point during the transition phase.

In addition to the offense-defense relationship, the US has maintained that there is a relationship between strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces. Soviet intermediate-range systems constitute a strategic threat to our European and East Asian allies; US LRINF deployments are intended as a mechanism for "coupling" the US strategic deterrent to the defense of NATO. The 1979 NATO decision stated, moreover, that arms control talks on INF would take place within the strategic arms control framework. In this case as well, however, we and our allies have agreed that we should avoid formally linking these

issues in the negotiations, and that it is more practical to pursue reductions in strategic forces and INF in separate fora.

While the US has emphasized the conceptual rather than negotiating relationship among all these issues, it is the Soviets who have made clear their intention firmly to link the three areas in negotiating terms. However, Gromyko's proposal for three separate groups within a single "complex" suggests that the Soviets have a circumscribed notion of the interrelationships in negotiating terms as well: although they reserve the right to hold potential agreements in individual areas hostage to agreement in all three (in particular, to link offensive arms reductions to US concessions on space, as well as their long-standing linkage of strategic forces to INF), there is no evidence that they are planning to propose explicit trade-offs among systems that cut across the three groups.

Interrelationships at Geneva, therefore, will most likely be a factor underlying the sides' efforts in the three areas rather than an issue central to the give-and-take of the negotiating process. In procedural terms, we expect the Delegations will meet periodically in joint session; these joint meetings will provide an opportunity for US negotiators to set forth our overall conceptual approach to the strategic relationship and to explain how our proposals in the individual areas reinforce one another in moving toward radical reductions in, and ultimately total elimination of, nuclear arms. In the meetings of the three separate groups, we would also tie our specific proposals to our long-term strategic concept, but make clear that we oppose artificial linkages among the groups that would deny us the possibility of moving toward agreements in individual areas where possible, and that we do not (at

least in the initial stages of the talks) envisage any crosscutting trade-offs.

As the negotiations evolve, of course, we will want to consider whether there may be linkages or trade-offs which would be consistent with our fundamental objectives, and which might help to break logjams in the talks. For example:

—In the offensive arms area, we may want to consider shifting Backfire from the strategic to the INF agenda in exchange for Soviet flexibility on an issue of importance to us (such as exclusion of B-52s that have been retired from their nuclear role). Some believe that we could conceivably consider a similar shift of nuclear-armed SLCMs from the strategic to the INF category, in view of the multiple roles they perform on both sides—although this would run counter to US statements to our Allies emphasizing SLCM's primarily non-theater role, and risk suggesting that SLCMs are an acceptable substitute for land-based INF. In the longer term, we may want to consider more closely relating limits on intercontinental- and intermediate-range systems.

—With regard to possible offense-defense or offense-space linkages, the Soviets may well hold firm in resisting a long-term commitment to substantial reductions in offensive arms absent a similarly long-term US commitment to eschew testing and deployment of new strategic defensive systems. The positions below take this eventuality into account.

Although Soviet rhetoric would suggest that their offensedefense linkage will be the most troublesome, in the longer term the strategic-INF linkage may prove to be equally difficult for us to manage. As noted, strong and credible US positions on strategic and INF systems could lead the Soviets to conclude that self-denying linkages run counter to their interest in constraining US offensive forces, and induce them either to drop the space linkage or settle for more modest measures in the defense/space area. In the case of the strategic-INF linkage, the Soviets have for more than a decade harped on the "strategic" threat posed by US "forward-based systems." While Moscow eventually backed down in SALT (claiming that their unilateral right to heavy ICBMs represented compensation for FBS), US LRINF do, in fact, represent an increased US forward-based capability; in addition, the number of UK and French warheads will increase fourfold by the late 1990s. Thus, progress toward strategic arms reductions may depend on movement toward some satisfactory solution of the INF problem.

### Substance of the US Approach in the Three Areas

The remainder of this paper sets forth the Department's views on the approach the US should take in each of the three negotiating groups during the first round of talks beginning March 12, followed by a discussion of the relationship of these approaches to our long-term strategic concept.

#### Strategic Arms Reductions

Although the formal US and Soviet positions at the end of the START negotiations remained far apart, the concept of trade-offs provided a promising basis for a solution that would reconcile the US objective of substantial reductions in the most destabilizing categories of ballistic missile warheads with Soviet concerns about avoiding a fundamental restructuring of their strategic forces. NSDD-153 stated that we will be prepared to explore a variety of potential trade-offs, including "different aggregation of the elements" of an agreement and "asymmetrical limits." The Secretary told Gromyko that we will be prepared to go beyond where we left off in the final round of START.

The common framework represents the most promising means of implementing the concept of trade-offs. It would be politically advantageous in that it incorporates elements of both sides' previous positions in START. In substantive terms, it provides a mechanism for achieving real reductions in overall strategic warheads and in the categories we consider most destabilizing (warheads on MIRVed ballistic missiles, heavy ICBMs), while allowing some asymmetry in the structure of the two sides' forces.

The framework allows for a wide range of opening positions in terms of the scope and pace of reductions in warheads and throw-weight. Under the approach we recommend, the US would propose an agreement of long or even unlimited duration, providing for early reductions to equal levels in warheads and SNDVs, after which the sides would be obliged to carry out annual reductions in warheads to progressively lower levels. Initial reductions to equal levels would be implemented over the first 2–4 years. Illustrative levels would be:

8000 warheads on ballistic missiles and  $ALCMs^3$ 

6000 warheads on MIRVed ballistic

missiles

1800 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers)

200 heavy ICBMs.

After the initial equal levels were established, the ceiling on ballistic missile warheads plus ALCMs and the subceiling on MIRVed missile warheads would be reduced annually by an agreed percentage (e.g. 4–5% per year) or an absolute amount (e.g. 300–400 total warheads per year, and 250–350 MIRVed missile warheads per year); we would also seek a further reduction in the permitted level of heavy ICBMs (e.g. 25 per year). The overall ceiling on SNDVs, however, would be held constant, to encourage a shift away from highly-MIRVed systems and to permit deployment of sizeable numbers of single-RV ICBMs. In the longer term, as warhead levels reached substantially lower levels, we would propose some reduction in SNDVs as well, albeit at a slower rate than warheads.

We would propose that the annual reductions scheme be open-ended in terms of duration, consistent with our goal of eventually eliminating all nuclear weapons. We would, however, propose that there be a mechanism for periodic review at agreed intervals (e.g. every 5 years), to provide the sides a means of amending or halting the reductions schedule. The review mechanism would be an effort to deal with the Soviets' certain reluctance to commit themselves to a long-term schedule for deep reductions without restrictions on SDI. For our part, the review mechanism would ensure that we had the opportunity ten years hence—when we might be ready to begin the transition period toward a more defense-reliant balance—to reassess the offensive nuclear arms regime in light of the decisions we have taken flowing out of SDI.

Tactically, we could either table specific levels for the ceilings and subceilings, or propose the framework concept with many or all levels left blank (thereby deferring negotiation on numbers until the Soviets evidenced interest in the structure). Either way, the framework has the

advantage of permitting genuine bargaining on levels within the terms of its basic structure.

In order to minimize Soviet breakout potential, ensure greater reductions in throw-weight, and increase ICBM survivability over the long term, we would propose constraints on the weight of RVs on future types of ballistic missiles and a minimum ratio of RV weight to throw-weight (this would prevent deployment of new types of heavy missiles with artificially low numbers of RVs). We would also seek to limit the number of warheads that can be tested or deployed on each type of ballistic missile. Finally, we would express a willingness in principle to place limits on nuclear-armed SLCMs if it proves possible to resolve the enormous verification problems.

Apart from the foregoing, modernization of strategic forces would be permitted without constraint within the quantitative ceilings. We would seek to ensure that the agreement did not impede new ICBM deployment concepts that enhance survivability, including superhardening, closely-spaced basing, multiple protective shelters, or the introduction of fixed or mobile single-RV ICBMs. We would avoid constraints on missile characteristics that cannot be monitored effectively when the Soviets encrypt most of their telemetry, as they are doing now.

At a later stage in the negotiations, we will need to come up with concrete proposals on SLCMs and other difficult issues such as verification of mobile ICBM deployments. We will also have to revisit problematic elements of our previous START position, such as the limits on non-deployed missiles (which may no longer be in our net interest) and treatment of Backfire. We should avoid discussion of these issues in the first round, however, and focus on the basic question of a framework for reductions.

Likely Soviet Reaction: This approach provides a basis for strategic arms reductions that the Soviets could live with, while meeting basic US criteria: it recognizes asymmetries in force structures and offers the prospect of real reductions in US systems in exchange for commensurate reductions in Soviet systems of principal concern to us. The Soviets have, however, resisted deep reductions in the past, and this position is likely to be reinforced by the prospect of future US strategic defenses. Even with a periodic review mechanism, they may well refuse to commit themselves to reductions in strategic forces for a longer period than we are prepared to commit ourselves to adhere to the ABM Treaty unamended. Moreover, as noted above, they are likely to continue to link reductions in strategic forces to a solution in INF.

#### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Of the three general areas, INF is the one in which an early US move might be the easiest to accomplish:

- —we can move in INF without prejudging how we will want larger offense/defense issues to come out;
- —there are steps available which should not require debilitating interagency battles, but which would be a tangible demonstration of flexibility;
- —it would do much to reassure the Allies that their interests will not be neglected in any new US-Soviet negotiations (while at the same time, it could put pressure on Moscow vis-à-vis its own East European allies eager for agreement in this area); and finally,
- —the Soviets are unlikely to make any serious moves on strategic forces in the absence of some sense of

how the LRINF missile issue might be resolved.

By the same token, it is possible that the Soviets will indicate a readiness to accept an INF deal on terms favorable to the West, and then seek to hold the accord hostage to US concessions on SDI.

In crafting a 50-percent reduction offer, we could use either warheads or launchers as the basis for reductions—with end results that would likely have much in common. Based on the Secretary's guidance, we have adopted the latter.

The US would propose that the Soviets halve the existing global total of operationally deployed SS-20 launchers as of a certain date—for example, some 400 launchers with 1200 warheads). They would also halve their European and Asian levels as well (to about 120 and 80 launchers respectively).

The Soviets would not be allowed to change the relative allocation of SS-20s between Europe and Asia, i.e., they would be permitted no more than 120 launchers (with 360 warheads) in Europe and no more than 80 launchers (with 240 warheads) in Asia. For purposes of delineating Europe from Asia, we would accept the Soviets' 80 degrees east longitude line, as modified during the course of the INF talks (SS-20s based in the area around Novosibirsk would thus count under the Asian subceiling).

For its part, the US would be prepared to halve its planned total of 224 operational LRINF launchers (with 572 warheads) to 112. The US LRINF warhead level in Europe would depend on the mix between P-II (one warhead per launcher) and GLCM (four warheads per launcher) that we chose to deploy. Were only GLCM deployed, the US warhead level in Europe would be 448; were only P-II deployed, the US warhead level would be 112; were a mix

of P-II and GLCM deployed in the proportion now planned for the entire force, the US warhead level would be 286; and were a mix of 36 P-IIs (one battalion) and 76 GLCM launchers (19 flights) deployed, the US warhead level would be 340, roughly equal to the Soviet level after they halved their force in Europe.

In any event, the US would retain the right to make LRINF deployments outside of Europe so as to match the global total of Soviet SS-20 warheads. We have no current plans to deploy outside of Europe or the continental US, and could so indicate to the Soviets (as was done informally in the fall 1983 INF round). The primary limitation of this proposal would be the global ceiling of 600 warheads for each side.

Since an INF move will require thorough and visible Alliance consultations, we may need to decide upon such a move in advance of determining our opening position in the other two areas and begin the process of alerting key Allies to the direction of our thinking early on.

The possibility has been raised of having a draft treaty ready to table during the first round. This would demonstrate our readiness to press ahead quickly on INF and could be a vehicle to force resolution within the USG of a number of outstanding secondary substantive issues. However, some of these issues—such as treatment of aircraft—are likely to be very contentious within the USG, and focusing on them during the first round could hamper our efforts to move toward agreement on the central issue of equal percentage reductions.

Likely Soviet Reaction: Judging from Gromyko's remarks in Geneva and his January "interview" on Soviet television, $\frac{4}{}$  we do not expect the Soviets to come to the talks with a

new INF proposal acceptable to the US. At the same time, Gromyko's formulation at Geneva was ambiguous on whether the Soviets could eventually accept some level of US deployments in exchange for reductions from our planned total.

The proposal outlined above would be designed to display flexibility within established INF criteria and to test Soviet willingness to accept some US deployments. A 50 percent equal reductions proposal could serve as the basis for negotiating a final agreement that would grant the Soviets a *de facto* global warhead advantage, while preserving a US *de jure* right to match the Soviet global total. At the same time, the Soviets are likely to resist accepting an offer that makes substantial reductions in *existing* Soviet systems with no commensurate reduction in *existing* (versus planned) US systems. Moreover, it does not directly address Soviet demands for compensation for UK/French systems.

#### Defense and Space Arms

The defense and space arms forum may be the most difficult and contentious of the three. We will want to address the more general issue of the overall offense-defense relationship; the Soviets, by contrast, will likely come in with specific but sweeping proposals to ban "space-attack" weapons.

We should elaborate on our views of the offense-defense relationship, in terms of both current problems and how—should new defensive technologies prove feasible and cost-effective—we would like to see it evolve in the future, i.e., toward a more defense-reliant balance and, ultimately, the elimination of nuclear weapons. This would be an expanded

version of the Secretary's presentation to Gromyko in Geneva.

With regard to the near term, we would raise our concern about the erosion of the ABM Treaty regime, citing issues such as the Krasnoyarsk radar. We would raise these more as political concerns than as issues for negotiation in this forum. Technical compliance issues would be left to the SCC, and we would indicate that we look to the Soviets to come forward with solutions. We would not in the near term suggest amending the ABM Treaty; doing so could prompt charges that we were trying to dismantle it or, conversely, Soviet proposals designed to inhibit SDI. (This would not, however, preclude the SCC from working out additional understandings to alleviate ambiguities in the Treaty.)

Given the need to protect SDI until we know what is and is not feasible with new defensive technologies, there is little of significance that we can offer or accept in the way of new limits on defense and space arms. It may be somewhat awkward in a tactical sense to have no concrete proposals, but we are not the demandeurs on space; it is logical for us to be in a listening mode, prepared to hear out and discuss Soviet proposals. Combined with credible proposals on offensive nuclear arms reductions, this approach should suffice to keep us off the defensive—at least for the first round.

While offering no proposals initially, we should be prepared to state, if pressed by the Soviets on the meaning of previous US statements regarding "mutual restraints" on ASATs, that we might consider areas of mutual restraint in the context of a broader range of agreements providing for stabilizing offensive arms reductions (per NSDD-153). We should not wholly preclude the possibility of negotiating

some limits in this area in future rounds. Whether or not we do so should depend in part on the price the Soviets offer in terms of offensive arms cuts, and on the public, Allied and Congressional pressures we may come under to show forthcomingness. (We do not expect that Soviet offers or public, Allied and Congressional pressures will be such that we need consider concrete space arms proposals for round one.)

In later rounds, we might propose a reaffirmation of our adherence to the basic provisions of the ABM Treaty and/or a statement that we would not seek to amend the ABM Treaty for SDI purposes for X years. We may also want to consider other measures as the negotiations develop.

Likely Soviet Reaction: The Soviets will not be prepared for a serious discussion of the offense-defense relationship and its possible evolution. Consistent with their propaganda campaign to force us to abort our SDI and ASAT programs, we anticipate they will instead introduce sweeping proposals to ban "space-attack" weapons and for the "non-militarization" of space; they may also press for a termination of SDI research.

After we have completed our own presentations in the defense and space forum, we could react to and point out the problems in their position. In response to the likely attack on SDI, we will want to emphasize its research nature, and our belief that any transition—which could not begin for some years—should be a cooperative effort, e.g., we would consult with the Soviets before taking steps not permitted by existing limitations.

Long-term Considerations

Each of these positions must be seen in a broader context, namely, the strategic concept outlined in NSDD-153 which guides our long-term planning in these negotiations. We must have a way of relating the immediate positions we take into the talks to our mid-term goal—should defensive technologies prove feasible—of a transition to a more defense-reliant strategic relationship, as well as to our long-term objective of eliminating nuclear weapons. The attached chart outlines an illustrative scheme for relating the three fora over the longer term, based on our central objectives. <sup>6</sup>

In the near term, if the Soviets were to accept our concept and proposals, we would envisage reductions in offensive strategic forces down to a level of, say, 8000 RVs and ALCMs over a period of 2-4 years, and to about 5000 by the middle of the next decade. In INF, 50 percent launcher/warhead reductions would also occur during this timeframe. Finally, we would use this period to explore with the Soviets possible mechanisms by which we can make a stable transition to a defense-dominant strategic relationship.

As SDI proceeds, we will face decisions on whether to amend the ABM Treaty to permit, first, testing of new defensive technologies and, ultimately, deployment of defensive systems. If defensive technologies prove feasible and we move into the transitional period, we would continue to seek to reduce strategic offensive forces within the established framework. At the same time, we would have to recognize that reductions to very low levels could not be undertaken without the involvement in some manner of other nuclear powers. We would also want to begin consideration of limits on other nuclear weapons not dealt with in our initial proposals, including in particular shorterrange systems in Europe of special interest to NATO.

In the final, long-term, stage, we envisage bringing nuclear forces of all types—offensive and defensive—down to zero, under a regime in which effective, stable non-nuclear defenses serve as the ultimate guarantor of deterrence.

It should be clear, however, that such a plan can only be illustrative. Indeed, many questions cannot be answered for many years. For example, we do not know how our research program in SDI will affect our near-term ability to reach agreements on offensive nuclear force reductions. Nor do we know how we will deal with the many verification problems which will become increasingly important as we move to reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. However, keeping this general scheme in mind as we move through these negotiations will be essential for maintaining an overall rationale for our efforts.

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Paul Nitze Files, 1953, 1972-1989, Lot 90D397, January-February 1985. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vershbow, Pifer, S. Coffey (PM/TMP), D. Schwartz (PM/SNP), and Dunkerley; cleared by O. Grobel (PM/TMP), R. Davis (PM/SNP), J.H. Hawes/J. Gordon (PM), Dobbins/Palmer, Courtney, Timbie, and E.M. Ifft (PM/DEL). Vershbow initialed for all drafting and clearing officials. In a covering memorandum to Shultz on a February 1 draft of this paper, Burt, Chain, and Nitze explained: "Mr. Secretary: The attached paper outlines our views on the substance of our positions on strategic arms reductions, intermediate-range nuclear forces reductions, and defense and space arms. We would like to discuss these ideas with you at an early opportunity, in order that we might have your guidance on how we should proceed in the interagency process underway." (Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985—Geneva)

- <sup>2</sup> See <u>Document 348</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> We would condition this framework on Soviet agreement to ALCM counting rules that preserved sufficient flexibility for structuring our heavy bomber/ALCM force. [Footnote is in the original.]
- <sup>4</sup> See Document 366.
- <sup>5</sup> See <u>footnote 3, Document 355</u>.
- $^{\underline{6}}$  The chart, attached but not printed, describes reductions in the "Near-Term," "Transitional Period," and "Long-Term" in each of the three negotiating fora.

# 375. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting 1

Washington, March 4, 1985

#### NSC MTG Mar 4 85

Bud

A lot to cover, result of a year of analysis today put it all in one presentation, so you can ponder in next few days instructions to delegation which leaves on Friday 3 areas

Space & Defense—advisors consensus re relationship, not to propose limitation at this point Face a military problem represented in Sov [Soviet] adv [advantage] in most every measure of mil [military] power AC [arms control] may be one means of infl [influence], or may not be e.g. ICBM warheads—have 3:1 adv & disadv [disadvantage] in crisis situations may be worse as intel [intelligence] exercises have effect —try arms control to get them to reduce

—US increases—MX, Midg [Midget] M [Man], D-5, B-1 may be more diff[icult] to increase our ICM

—look at US compensate imbalance via SDI

Today see after 5 rounds START & INF see whether can get closer I. Space & Def [Defense]

No one proposes tabling new line now bec [because]: — need look at 10 yr period to reduce

—transition period to inten [intensify] def & further red [reduce] in off [offense]

Devote session to explain

- -11 generic areas<sup>2</sup>
- —Strat [strategic] Sit [situation]<sup>3</sup>
- —Strat concept<sup>4</sup>
- —Sov actions
- —undermine AB[M] Treaty
- —appearance of [unclear]
- —go over each area in which undermining ABM
- -Kras [Krasnoyarsk] radar
- -transportability

upgrade

concurrent ops [operations]

A very solid record that they have undermined existing doctr [doctrine] of deter [deterrence]

—compl [compliance] problem undermines in each of AC

[compliance] at heart of any prospect or if no change in Sov record can't expect AC to/will remain viable instrument of diplom [diplomacy]

—Emerging Technologies

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In coming months [unclear—owe?] further
-what initiatives/restriction might be [unclear-fair?]
haven't found any yet
—what CBMs might take for better [unclear]
—[what] US [unclear—mil?] in [unclear—Am?] Def
-3 or 4 others
Comment? Max?
Kampelman-
—yes ok
—agreement throughout gvt [government]
we're not demandeur
—Our plan to suggest a less long session about a month—
look over & come back to recommend —exchange, inform,
explain concerns, hear Nitze——SDI=research program
not to be limited
-Begin discuss transition phase
INF
Current balance
Sov have 10:1 warhead adv
2 options
1. Current<sup>5</sup>
```

Zero Zero, INF agreem [agreement]

Sept 83—aircraft, global geog [geographic] scope, P [Pershing] II, 420 global is really an infinite number of [unclear—positions?]

eg 0-572 eg 420

is not a take it or leave it posit[ion]-

meet criteria

—eg verify, not export to Asia

excl Fr Brit

Comments

Weinb—footnote re 27 systems in transit

—probl [problem] re Dutch

Adelman—shows probl of any non zero-zero

- 1) very diff to verify—low degree
- 2) repres coming prob re mobile land based eg Sov [SS-]24 & [SS-]25 rail/road mobile 2. Equal %  $Red^6$

Works only under very narrowly defined point in time & even then conceding Sov INF [unclear] in Asia from 400 (Sov) launchers to about 200 (50% red) 120 in Eur, 80 in East From US [launchers] to 112 launchers in Eur (warhead [unclear—range?] of 112-448) Comments Weinb—strongly opposed

-= % red not = equals

- —Mobility means can rapidly move from East—easily [unclear] therefore not useful or safe distinct [distinction]
- —get away from simple easy expl

Shultz—Cap's mobility concern applies to all —% red not principle we want to endorse but might make it negotiable Weinb—but 200: 112 launchers = Sov adv & West/East distinction meaningless Sh—merely = variant of Option 1

Nitze—change chart to show US global r[ight] to 200

Pres—Verific? [verification?]

Pick spot in world to which deliver missiles for dismantling by intern[ational] team Adel—not know if all exist [existing] missiles delivered there Pres—at least this way we'd know

Casey—can now observe dest [?] [destruction?]

Weinb—all non zero=hard find

all have [unclear] problem

Glitman

- —either option can be worked with
- —could be used in sequence
- —should have treaty with =  $\underline{\text{warheads}}$  (?)<sup>7</sup>

Weinb—is launchers, not warheads

[unclear—so?] dangerous move away from one warhead [unclear—focus?]

Sh—if Opt 1 again, Sovs accept, but seek make more specific & propose Opt 2 within framework of Opt 1

Opt 2 is an illustration of 1 which may not work as balance changes W—can't say Opt 2 = illust of Opt 1 when 1 = global equal Sh—need add sec[tion] re US right to 200 globally Bud—all agree & to <u>same warhead</u> Weinb—moves us away from = launchers therefore [unclear]

—Opt 2 = increase, not reductions therefore back to SALT
II [unclear—treaty?]

Bud—Gen Vessey

Vessey—must limit all so Sovs can't move to Eur.

#### **START**

Balance Current U.S. 1250, 5000, 400, 2.5 mil KG

Trade offs

Alt 18

1250, 5000, 350

Alt  $2^9$  (ALMs lim to 4,000)

1800 launchers—Sov category & [unclear—desire?]—we'd meet ½ way but we'd still try reduce heavy ICBMs from 308 to 200 and if want add ALCMs would need reduce 200 further RVs—6,500 in 95 [25% below current 8,300]<sup>10</sup> instead of 5,000 proposal today Rowny—this is end game after Sovs have reduced heavies Alt 3<sup>11</sup>—Adds ALM (1500–2000)—1800 SNDVs, Aggregate 4500 MIRVd missiles & 1500 ALCM

[ $^{12}$  35% reduct [reduction] in Sov MIRVd miss [missile] [unclear—warheads?]] & 25% cut in Sov Shultz—most rad [radical] reduct in most threat system Alt  $^{413}$ 

Bud—premised on what is militarily essential to target (that's my pers [personal] opinion re its advantage) — aggregates to 1800 launchers add sublimits to restrain Sovs —permits US 700 Midgetman

—price = 9700 warheads = very high of which 7,000 ballistic in '95

—20% fewer SNDVs than S[ALT] II & roughly double SII reds 33% MIRVd ball miss warhead cut

Vessey—right, permits US to modernize

-also needs look at SDI & Def/Sp

—prob [probably] closer to what Sovs want therefore risk them OKing, then press on SDI Pres—relatively cut? how perceived

Ves—big cut in destabilizing [things?]

### Alt 514

Goes to heart of reducing—most impt [important] reasons—warheads & TW [Throw Weight]—by 50% in power & not dictate Sov force restructuring eg 5,300 MIRV RVs, TW & heavy bombers trade-offs specific re bombers Weinb—bomber diff [differential] recogn we need more bomber bec of Sov air defenses—also recogn [unclear—great?] diff in TW/much narrower US/Sov imbal than other [unclear—of?]

-"Radical red" per Sov vocab

-Simple, 50%

—Per Vessey, may not give us all weaps for all [unclear] but reduct in #s, TW & compensat [compensation] for air def = impt  $\underline{\text{Alt } 6^{15}}$ 

Inspired by your Sept speech on Roadmap in 20 yrs  $horizon^{16}$ 

Therefore, 20 yrs instead of just 10 yr horizon Proposes we discuss outcomes at end of day but not as demanding re dictating how get there, replace etc <u>'95 benchmarks</u> — 5,000 warheads

-3½ MKG Sov (25% red)

-400 US 320 Sov

Adelman—give negot view of 1st Round set of [unclear—outcomes?]

-RV ball, TW & bombers

all consid most impt factors

—lays out factors without partic adornment —<u>not</u> include SNDV limit that not a service to US, if Scowcroft can —not include ALCM limit Sov are demandeur Bud

You asked JCS address mil sufficiency

Chiefs have addressed alter [alternatives]

Vessey—most impt = <u>assumptions</u> 1. one assumption = we'll be able to complete own mod progr some of these damage but you must assess our mod vs. pol [policy] re [recommendations]

none of these proposals OK, unless we mod 2. you must pick a point in time when we can check US & Sov force structure We've picked 1995.

—All of these [unclear] OK at '95

some far better re US mod

[ditto] re Sov

MIRVd mobile land based missiles extremely threatening [therefore] should add provis [provisions] to all opts <u>for ban</u> 3. how affects other negotiations

Rowny —all proposals should be kept simple

—we ought to talk trade offs home in on Sov ICBMs vs US bombers —need offensive vs offensive deal otherwise Sovs will accept [unclear] deal & zero in on SDI —[therefore] go back to off vs off capab

Tower —not known whether Sovs are serious

- -I'm reluctant reward their walk out
- —I'd prefer build on current position

they've not even discussed it & it was new —We need discuss trade-offs, can [unclear—codify?]

—Prefer to probe, report back on our findings seek flexibility to probe

keep our moral posture on 5,000 warhead line & maybe pkg with sublimits

Pres—Sovs have talked re goal of total elim —Shouldn't we pick that up

Nitze-agree

repeat goal & set path toward it

Shultz—Gromyko not answer in Geneva

Pres-but since Geneva

Bud-

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva— NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. The editor transcribed Kraemer's handwritten notes of the NSC meeting specifically for this volume. An image of the notes is Appendix E. No formal notes of the meeting were found. In a February 28 memorandum to Kimmitt, Linhard and Kraemer forwarded papers on Defense and Space, INF, and START in preparation for the March 4 NSC meeting. (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) These three papers correlate closely with topics covered in Kraemer's notes of the meeting (see annotation below). In his diary on March 4, Reagan wrote: "We had an N.S.C. meeting with our Arms Talk Leaders looking at various options for how we wanted to deal with the Soviets. It's very complicated business. I urged one decision on them—that we open the talks with a concession—surprise! Since they have publicly stated they want to see nuclear weapons eliminated entirely, I told our people to open by saying we would accept their goal." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, vol. I, January 1981-October 1985, p. 431)  $\frac{2}{3}$  Although this phrase is unclear, it seemingly correlates to the "Areas of Agreement" section of the briefing paper on Defense and Space. This section lists 12 "approaches" for the first round of talks.

- <sup>3</sup> In the briefing paper on Defense and Space, Section II. "Areas of Agreement," subsection A. "Current Strategic Situation," stated that "both sides have certain incentives to act quickly and decisively with their military power, both nuclear and conventional. This creates an unstable situation that could make crises more difficult to manage and, if conflict breaks out, makes rapid, perhaps immediate, escalation to high levels of destruction more likely. This is a dangerous situation. It is one the US and the Soviet Union must address both together and unilaterally. The political and military measures necessary to do so will be difficult for both sides. But we must tackle this problem; the danger must be diffused."
- <sup>4</sup> In the briefing paper on Defense and Space, Section II. "Areas of Agreement," subsection B. "Strategic Concept," stated: "We should present our views on correcting these dangers and moving toward a more stable strategic relationship, highlighting the benefits that effective limitations on nuclear arms and moving toward a posture more reliant on defense would have on enhancing the stability of our strategic relationship."
- <sup>5</sup> In the INF briefing paper under "INF Policy Options," Option 1 to "Resubmit Previous US Proposals" stated: "The US would resubmit the position on LRINF missile limitations embodied in its two draft treaties, recalling NSDD 153's statement that 'an agreement is possible on the basis of the September 1983 US proposals.' In doing so, we could emphasize that we are willing to consider any other alternatives which could lead to an INF agreement meeting our basic standards."

<sup>6</sup> In the INF briefing paper under "INF Policy Options," Option 2, "Equal Warhead Levels in Europe," stated that the "US could add specificity to previous proposals such as "—a commitment not to deploy in Europe more than 210 to

280 warheads (one-half to two-thirds of 420) if the Soviets deployed the same number within range of Europe. The US would retain the right to deploy additional warheads, up to the global ceiling of 420 outside of Europe; and "—a commitment to deploy no more than 42 to 56 P-IIs in Europe (one-fifth of 210 to 280, roughly the existing ratio).

"The USG could also consider proposing a separate Asian subceiling to limit the SS-20 deployments in the eastern USSR." (Ibid.)

<sup>7</sup> The parenthetical question mark is in the handwritten text. It is unclear if Kraemer was questioning Glitman's statement or if the statement was unclear. <sup>8</sup> In the START briefing paper, six alternatives were presented, and all were discussed during this NSC meeting. "Alternative 1: 1983 US START Proposal with Trade-Offs" proposed a reduction to 5,000 deployed ballistic missile warheads for each side, "equal ceilings of 400 heavy bombers," and "deep reductions in Soviet throwweight" to the "internal US goal of 2.5 Mkg." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) <sup>9</sup> The START paper continued with "Alternative 2: SNDV Aggregate; Heavy Missiles/AHB Sublimit; No Weapons Aggregation." This alternative "accepts some elements of the Soviet proposal, e.g. an aggregate of 1800 SNDVs," and would "establish a ceiling of 6000-7000 ballistic missile warheads; that is, 1000-2000 more than our current position but still as much as a 25 percent reduction from current US and Soviet levels." Alternative 2, "a combined subceiling, limiting each side to 200-250 ALCM-carrying heavy bombers (AHBs) and heavy ballistic missiles, would establish a de facto trade-off between the sides' areas of relative advantage while permitting *de jure* equality." (Ibid.) 10 These brackets are in the original.

<sup>11</sup> "Alternative 3: SNDV Aggregate; Heavy ICBM Sublimit; RV/ALCM Aggregate; MIRV RV Sublimit" proposed "progressively stringent constraints on US and Soviet strategic forces" that would "put into place a framework for achieving our ultimate objective of eliminating nuclear weapons." This alternative "would adopt a single combined limit on missiles and bombers, with a sublimit on heavy ICBMs; and a parallel combined limit on missile warheads and ALCMs, with a sublimit on MIRV RVs." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112])  $\frac{12}{12}$  Left bracket is in the original text. 13 Alternative 4 in the START paper, "SNDV Aggregate: RV/ALCM Aggregate: Nested SNDV and Weapon Sublimits," proposed the adoption of "an aggregate limit on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers and a parallel limit that aggregates ballistic missile RVs and ALCMs. The SNDV aggregate contains nested sublimits on heavy ICBMs (150), MIRVed ICBMs (550), total MIRVed ballistic missiles (960), and ALCM heavy bombers (1080). The RV/ALCM aggregate places similar sublimits on MIRVed ICBM RVs (4500), MIRVed ballistic missile RVs (7000), and total RVs and ALCMs (9000)." (Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, December Chron File: [No. 111-No. 112]) 14 "Alternative 5: Direct Throw-Weight and Warhead Limits" went beyond the current U.S. "START position in terms of requiring deep reductions from existing levels in the most destabilizing systems, namely ballistic missile warheads and throwweight. It would also compensate for the existence of massive, unconstrained Soviet air defenses." It proposed a reduction in ballistic missiles to 4,000 with "throw-weight to 2.0 million kilograms. There would be no direct limits on the number of deployed missiles, since we wish to encourage movement toward single-warhead missiles." It would reduce heavy bombers to a "separate limit of 400 for the US and 200 for the USSR, with Backfire included in this total. This asymmetry would compensate for the massive Soviet air defense system." (Ibid.) <sup>15</sup> "Alternative 6: Bomber and Missile Destructive Capability Limits" proposed to distinguish "between the destructive potential of missiles and bombers in relation to the size and numbers of weapons they can carry to intercontinental range—and permits an explicit trade-off by negotiation of missiles and bomber destructive capacity. (RVs and possibly ALCMs would also be limited directly.)" (Ibid.) <sup>16</sup> A reference to Reagan's September 1984 UNGA speech. See <u>footnote 7</u>, Document 267.

# 376. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 5, 1985

SUBJECT

Politburo Member Shcherbitsky's Visit to the U.S.

You will be meeting Thursday with Soviet Politburo Member Vladimir Shcherbitsky, who is in the U.S. this week as head of a Soviet "parliamentary" delegation.<sup>2</sup> I will be forwarding suggested talking points shortly,<sup>3</sup> but thought that you might want to have some information in advance regarding how this visit fits into the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations.

#### Background

The Soviets responded a few weeks ago to an invitation issued in Tip O'Neill's name by Tom Foley and Dick Cheney when they visited Moscow the summer of 1983. (You will recall that they briefed you on their trip following their return to Washington.)<sup>4</sup> Therefore, the Soviets picked the time for the visit, and also decided that it would be, in Soviet terms, a high-level one by selecting a full Politburo member to head it.

The Soviet decision to send the delegation to the U.S. at this time was an important one. Several factors probably entered into this decision:

(1) A desire to symbolize the intensification of contacts with the U.S., following the "freeze" of much

#### of last year;

- (2) A desire to influence American public opinion, and especially Congress, as negotiations at Geneva are about to begin and as Congress debates our defense modernization program;
- (3) The felt need for a political "reconnaissance mission" at a high level and outside formal Foreign Ministry channels; and
- (4) Perhaps—on the part of some Soviet officials—a desire to expose one of their more provincial and reputedly hard-line Politburo members to realities in the United States.

The fact that this decision was made despite ongoing leadership uncertainty in Moscow is interesting in itself. Given Chernenko's parlous health, full Politburo members, aside from Gromyko who must continue to function as Foreign Minister, might be expected to limit their foreign travel unless the question of succession has been decided in principle. I would consider the decision to send Shcherbitsky here for ten days as tending to corroborate reports that a decision has been made on the succession—or that medical advice is that Chernenko is likely to hang on for at least a month or so.

#### Discussion

Although one of the Soviet objectives is doubtless to influence Congress and our public opinion, I do not believe that this group will be notably effective on that score. Shcherbitsky has none of the charm and PR skill that Gorbachev used to such good advantage in the UK last December.<sup>5</sup>

I believe that we can make best use of this visit by seeing to it that Shcherbitsky receives an accurate impression of our strength and resolve, and at the same time, of our desire to move decisively to reduce offensive nuclear weapons and to forge a better working relationship with the Soviets. The visits the Congressional hosts have planned for the delegation to California and Texas should do a lot to impress the provincial Shcherbitsky with our basic economic, social and political health. No Soviet official comes back from such exposure to the U.S. without being shaken by the palpable evidence of U.S. strength and well being.

This being the case, I believe that you should devote the thirty minutes you have available for your meeting with Shcherbitsky to driving home some of the points you made to Gromyko last September. Specifically, I believe you should concentrate on the following themes:

- —Your desire to move toward a radical reduction in offensive nuclear weapons;
- —Your determination to keep U.S. defenses adequate and specifically to continue present programs until there is a fair agreement to limit them;
- —The fallacy of the Soviet attack on SDI research, making plain that the current Soviet ploy will fail;
- —The reasons we are concerned with the Soviet military build-up and in particular with the problem posed by their prompt hard-target kill capability, which suggests a first-strike strategy; and
- —The necessity for improvements in the human rights situation if relations in general are to improve.

I will soon be sending you suggested talking points along these lines, but in the meantime you may wish to scan the CIA study "What to Expect from Shcherbitsky" at Tab A, and the biography of Shcherbitsky at Tab B.

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (3). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Prepared by Matlock. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it. A copy was sent to Bush.
- <sup>2</sup> March 7. See <u>Document 378</u>.
- $\frac{3}{2}$  The talking points were not found.
- <sup>4</sup> On July 25 1983, Reagan met with Foley, Cheney, Bush, Shultz, Baker, Clark, Duberstein, and Matlock to discuss Foley and Cheney's trip to the Soviet Union. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In a July 23 memorandum to Clark, Hill noted that the delegation was in the Soviet Union from July 4 to 9, traveling to Moscow, Leningrad, and Yerevan. (Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Country File, Europe and Soviet Union, USSR (7/23/83-7/29/83))
- $^{5}$  See Documents 337 and 341.
- <sup>6</sup> See <u>Documents 284</u> and <u>288</u>.
- Not attached. A copy is attached to an unsigned draft of this memorandum. (Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Meetings with USSR Officials, Reagan-Shcherbitsky Meeting 03/07/1985 (2))
- <sup>8</sup> Not found.

## 377. Personal Note Prepared by the Deputy Secretary of State $(Dam)^{1}$

Washington, March 7, 1985

I ate three meals for my country today. In the morning I attended a breakfast for Congressmen on MX in the Old Family Dining Room in the White House. I never got to give my pitch, because the President, who did not actually eat with us, came in before I had a chance to rise to speak, in order to give his own pitch. At lunch I joined the Secretary's luncheon in honor of Politburo Member Shcherbitskiy. I sat at a separate table next to Mr. Alkhimov, Chairman of the Soviet State Bank, and at the same table with Mr. Chervov, who is the Soviets' leading internal figure on arms control. He sits on the general staff and plays a coordinating role similar to Bud McFarlane's role in arms control. I got into quite an argument with Chervov over the Strategic Defense Initiative. I provoked him somewhat by asking whether the Soviets were going to propose prohibiting all anti-ballistic missile research in the Geneva talks. At first he didn't seem to want to talk about it, but then he came back very strongly explaining the Soviet position. I found him an extremely articulate and strong personality.

In the evening I attended a dinner given by Congressman Foley for Shcherbitskiy and sat next to him. It was a very interesting occasion in view of the fact that Shcherbitskiy is a Politburo member. We had a free-flowing discussion, but at only one point in the evening did we actually discuss foreign policy substance. Earlier I had gone to a reception given at the Soviet Embassy to pull Shcherbitskiy aside to protest an attack on one of our Marine Guards in the

Intourist hotel in Moscow.<sup>2</sup> I pointed out to Shcherbitskiy that it had all the appearances of an official act by security guards, and that we knew from the presence of a Canadian witness that there was no provocation. I pointed out that if he (unlike the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) were to investigate, he would find out the truth. Shcherbitskiy had little to say in reply other than to point out that people got into fights through drinking or over women.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

<sup>1</sup> Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat, S/S-I Records, Deputy Secretary Dam's Official Files: Lot 85D308, Personal Notes of Deputy Secretary—Kenneth W. Dam—Oct. 1984-June 1985. No classification marking. Dictated by Dam on March 11. In his March 5 entry, Dam also noted: "In the evening I went to the Capital Centre for a hockey game. The purpose of the hockey game was the invitation by Armand Hammer to the Soviet Congressional Delegation, which is here headed by Shcherbitskiy, a member of the Politburo. Not too much conversation was carried on, and on the whole, it didn't quite meet the objective of providing a quiet informal basis for conversation with the Soviets." (Ibid.)

<sup>2</sup> In telegram 2899 from Moscow, March 7, the Embassy reported: "At approximately 0230 hours on March 6, 1985, Marine Corporal Jon Hildreth was brutally assaulted by two unidentified Soviets inside the Intourist Hotel in Moscow. Only after suffering a series of blows which resulted in abrasions to his head, neck, left arm, and chest, did Hildreth manage to break free of his attackers, escape the hotel, and return to the Embassy. A subsequent Embassy investigation of this incident could determine no plausible

reason for the assault." (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850155-0371)

### 378. Memorandum of Conversation 1

Washington, March 7, 1985, 3-4 p.m.

#### SUBJECT

Meeting with Vladimir Shcherbitsky of the Soviet Union

#### **PARTICIPANTS**

#### **UNITED STATES**

The President

Secretary of State George Shultz

Mr. Donald Regan, Chief of Staff

Mr. Michael K. Deaver, Deputy Chief of Staff

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Admiral Daniel J. Murphy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President

Mr. Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State

Mr. Jack F. Matlock, NSC

Mr. Dimitri Zarechnak, Interpreter

#### USSR

Vladimir Shcherbitsky, Member of Soviet Politburo Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin Boris I. Stukalin, Department Head, Central Committee Aleksandr A. Bessmertnykh, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Oleg A. Krokhalev, Interpreter

The President opened the meeting by saying that he supposed the question uppermost on both their minds was the negotiations to open next week in Geneva. He said he had read the words by Chernenko and Gromyko recently expressing a hope to eliminate nuclear weapons, and he agreed with these words completely. (C)

Shcherbitsky confirmed that this is Soviet policy. (C)

The President added that he knew it is a complicated question, but if both countries feel that way, we should move ahead toward accomplishing the goal. It, of course,

cannot be done all at once, but we can establish phases of reductions to move in that direction. (C)

Shcherbitsky said he had the impression that our goals coincide. But to bring them into effect we need patience, and also need to exhibit less emotion in the dialogue. He pointed out that we have so far been able to accomplish some small-scale things, such as increased exchanges in the cultural and environmental protection areas, but we must be more ambitious. (C)

He continued by saying that you say you have no aggressive intent toward us and we say the same, that we have no aggressive intent toward you. You are determined to defend your allies and we are committed to defend ours. So in this respect our policies are the same. But there is an excess of arms. We have enough to destroy the world many times over, and to what point? People are surprised by this situation and think their governments are not acting in a sensible fashion. (C)

He then recalled that he had been in public service for many years and had worked under various Soviet leaders who differed in many ways. He was a student in Stalin's time, then was in the Army during the war, and after that in various party and government positions. The Soviet leaders differed in their approaches on many things: Stalin took decisions alone; Khrushchev, who had both positive and negative qualities, did as well. The others consulted their colleagues. He worked for Brezhnev for many years, with Andropov for a period which proved unfortunately short, and now with Chernenko. But through all this period there was not a single meeting of the Politburo where any plans were developed to attack the U.S. or impose on the U.S. (S)

We think of our countries as far apart, he continued parenthetically, but in fact our borders are very close in the Bering Sea. The Diomede Islands, one of which is Soviet and one American, lie only a few miles apart. But the fact is, whether we are distant or close, such questions as aggressive acts against the U.S. are simply not discussed by the Soviet leadership. (S)

The Soviet people had learned a bitter lesson in World War II and are determined not to repeat the experience. They saw U.S. bases all around the Soviet Union created by the U.S. after the war, so the question was not that of threatening the U.S. but of not lagging behind the U.S. And what he had said of discussions among the Soviet leadership was equally true of discussions and plans made by their military people and scientists. (S)

So the picture is different in our two countries, he continued; you kept up an arms race while we kept up with you. (C)

As for the Geneva negotiations, he referred to Chernenko's recent letters to the President and stated that the principled positions set forth in them had not changed. He could reaffirm the policy Chernenko had described. His government has been working hard on the instructions for their delegation to Geneva. He believes we can reach a mutual understanding there if we approach the negotiations in the spirit of mutual concessions. Referring to the treaties and agreements signed between 1972 and 1974, and to the Declaration of Principles of 1972, he said that this experience demonstrated that we can reach agreement by a series of compromises. (S)

However, Shcherbitsky continued, if you continue your plans for an ABM system with elements based in space, then this will be contrary to the ABM Treaty. That treaty bans development, testing and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM's. He recognized that the President had said the U.S. program is limited to research, but wondered what the point of the research could be if the results are not tested. (S)

The President said he would like to speak to that. Research is not banned by the ABM Treaty and all we propose is research. He had stated publicly that if this research proves that defensive weapons are possible, we will sit down and talk about how they can be integrated into a more stable deterrent system. We must try to move toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, and defensive systems could help. The Soviet Union has defensive systems today, including ABM's which the U.S. does not have. (S)

Regarding suspicion of each other, the President pointed out that there was no ground for Soviet fear of the U.S. At the end of World War II, the U.S. was the only one of the wartime allies which emerged with its industry intact, and the only one with nuclear weapons. If our intentions had been aggressive, we could not have been stopped. But instead of threatening others with our nuclear weapons, we proposed that atomic energy be placed under international control and that the military devices be dismantled. The Soviet Union rejected this and proceeded to undertake what was probably the greatest military buildup in the history of the world. Soviet leaders also made statements declaring their intent to expand their control in the world. So the U.S. had no choice. (S)

The U.S. has tried unilateral disarmament, the President continued, but the Soviet buildup continued. Our intentions are peaceful, but we cannot sit still when there is an

imbalance of forces. The U.S. must act to make sure the balance is not upset. (S)

As for the Geneva negotiations, the President stated, we must either achieve reductions of nuclear weapons—and we want their total elimination—or else, until we have agreements and these are honored, the U.S. must build sufficient force to match the Soviet force. He pointed out that Gromyko had spoken of the mountains of weapons we are sitting on. We want to reduce them, just as Gromyko said he did, but we will not stand by and see ourselves inferior. (S)

The President then pointed out that we have some important things in common. We have the power to start a war, but we also have the power to bring peace to the world. That is where our efforts must be directed. (C)

*Shcherbitsky* said he agreed that it would be good to pursue joint efforts in this direction. He also had some comments on some of the President's earlier remarks. (C)

As for the President's mention of U.S. restraint after World War II when it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, Shcherbitsky said that the Soviet Union had ten million men under arms and could have swept across Europe if it had so chosen. Nevertheless, they observed the wartime agreements, which illustrated their restraint and lack of aggressive intent. (S)

Regarding strategic defense, he would not agree that the U.S. program is purely research. Assistant Secretary Perle had stated that there could be testing within four years, and General Abrahamson had spoken of tests within two years. (S)

Regarding compliance, Shcherbitsky said that he had read the U.S. memorandum and had consulted with Soviet military experts in regard to the 19 allegations. He believes the Soviet Union has not violated any treaties, but that there have been violations by the U.S. It is true that they have ABM's around Moscow, but this is permitted by the treaty. As for the radar near Krasnoyarsk, it is a system to be used for tracking civilian satellites, communication satellites. He suggested that we have our specialists discuss these matters. If we do so, many doubts might be dispelled. (S)

Shcherbitsky then asked why the U.S. refuses to commit itself not to use nuclear weapons first. He understands the U.S. position that it is because the Warsaw Pact has more conventional weapons than NATO. But we have been holding negotiations in Vienna for 12 years on this question and the Soviet Union has agreed to equal levels. They are willing to withdraw troops and their equipment in accord with an agreement, and are willing to have verification. And the Soviets are willing to ban the first use of any type of force. He wondered whether an agreement in the MBFR forum would not make it possible to proceed to a no-first-use of nuclear weapons commitment. (S)

He then turned to the question of chemical weapons, alleging that the U.S. has a campaign to stockpile chemical weapons. This gives the Soviets great concern. He has talked to many Soviet citizens, and many have the impression that the U.S. is preparing for war against the Soviet Union. When they hear threatening statements by U.S. political figures they feel that war is close. (C)

Nevertheless, Shcherbitsky asserted, Soviet citizens have maintained a warm attitude toward Americans since World War II. They know of American achievements and the high standard of living here. Soviet media do, Shcherbitsky added, show examples of poverty and the "barbaric treatment of Negroes," but they know that this is not the whole story. In short, the U.S. is respected in the Soviet Union and the Soviet people want only peace. (S)

The President agreed that the Soviet people, like the American people, want peace. Americans feel great friendship for Russians also. As he had said many times, people don't start wars, governments do. And the problem is that the Soviet people do not have much to say about what their government does. [Shcherbitsky interjected, "Why do you say this?] We want the people in both countries to live in peace, the President continued. (S)

The President then explained why we are concerned about Soviet intentions, recalling statements by Lenin and other leaders to the effect that they would take Asia, then Europe and eventually the U.S. would fall into their hands like ripe fruit. He also recalled, as an example of Soviet official hostility, the Soviet refusal for a long time during World War II to allow U.S. bombers on missions over Germany to land on Soviet territory. The Cuban missile crisis was another example; the Soviets removed their missiles, but we had superiority at the time. Many Soviet activities today give us concern, such as their preponderance of heavy missiles and their continually expanding blue water navy. (S)

The President then observed that deterrence based entirely on offensive weapons is undesirable. All we have now to deter war is a system of mutual threats against innocent civilians. History records a whole series of international agreements designed to protect civilians in wartime, and we must not ignore that experience or that moral principle. We need to see if defensive weapons can be developed so

that we can return to a more acceptable means of avoiding war than threatening civilian populations. (C)

*Shcherbitsky* asked which country had encircled the other with bases. (S)

The President replied that we had dismantled some of these bases, and we began to deploy missiles in Allied countries which could strike the Soviet Union only when our Allies asked for protection from the threat of Soviet SS-20's. Even then, we offered the zero option, but the Soviet answer was that they would reduce by half but NATO could have nothing. So it was a half zero option—half for them and nothing for us. (S)

Shcherbitsky remarked that they could argue endlessly on these points, but would point out that when the U.S. refused to count British and French missiles, there was no way the Soviet Union could agree. Now U.S. missiles are in Europe, and the President should try to understand how the Soviets feel. (S)

*The President* pointed out that Soviet SS-20's are there too. (S)

*Shcherbitsky* said that they cannot strike the U.S., and that the Soviets must take measures to counter them. And if the U.S. is to pursue SDI, why does it need the MX and a new bomber? (S)

The President said that the MX is in response to four new Soviet systems. It has the same capability of the SS-18, but the Soviets have many more of these than the hundred MX's which the U.S. intends to deploy. (S)

Shcherbitsky alluded to the research done on the possibility of a nuclear winter if a nuclear war should be

fought. In light of this possibility, he wondered why we keep creating more weapons. We can destroy mankind only once, and we already have the means to do so many times over. (C)

The President said that if Shcherbitsky wished to negotiate, he would have a deal. We can start eliminating nuclear weapons right now. If our two countries could cooperate in this, we could make sure that no one else uses these weapons. We must do this to preserve peace for our children and grandchildren. (S)

Shcherbitsky said that the prospect of space weapons is particularly frightening. People would feel that destruction is poised above their heads. To have weapons on earth and on and under the water is one thing, but something which is poised in space above your head all the time is enough to drive people crazy. (S)

The President pointed out the desirability of having a nonnuclear weapon which could be used against nuclear ones. This would be particularly important if nuclear weapons ever came into the hands of a madman. Madmen exist, but if the nuclear weapons could be destroyed, then we could deal with that problem. (S)

The President then reiterated that if we ever find a way to build such a weapon, we would internationalize the question and work for agreement on how to use it as a means for eliminating nuclear weapons. (S)

Shcherbitsky replied that, in that case, the U.S. would begin dealing with the Soviets as if they were children. And what is the Soviet Union to do until it has such a weapon? Their only choice would be to increase their offensive weapons. (S) The President asked why they would not be willing to reduce their nuclear weaponry. (S)

Shcherbitsky claimed that we have parity, an approximate parity, of nuclear weapons now. U.S. claims that the Soviets have superiority are without foundation. This parity must not be disturbed. But the main problem is distrust. (S)

The President agreed that distrust is a problem. (C)

Shcherbitsky then said that if the U.S. proceeds with SDI, the Soviets will have to spend much more on new weapons. This will be painful. The U.S. is richer. But although the Soviet people have on average 3% fewer calories to consume each day and do not live as well as Americans in general, no army in the world defends its country better then theirs. If necessary, they will tighten their belts, but this will mean another spiral in the arms race. (S)

As for the Geneva negotiations, the Soviets are ready for a sensible compromise, he said, and noted that he understood that some members of Congress intended to go to Geneva for the opening of the talks. He said that this is up to the U.S., but if Soviet legislators wished to attend the talks, he would not think that this is a good idea. (S)

The President returned to some of Shcherbitsky's earlier comments and pointed out that there is no evidence that the U.S. has embarked on expansionism. The U.S. is not in Africa and is not injecting its forces into local disputes. He added, however, that it seems to us that the Soviets have an expansionist program, and this gives us concern. (S)

Shcherbitsky inquired, "What do you mean by an expansionist program?" (S)

The President answered citing Afghanistan and proxy forces in Angola and Kampuchea, for a start. (S)

Shcherbitsky inquired about Kampuchea, and the President said he was referring to the North Vietnamese, who are backed by the Soviets. (S)

Shcherbitsky protested that Soviet troops were not involved here. As for Afghanistan, Soviet troops were there at the request of the government. The request had been made several times and the Politburo had considered the request several times before finally granting it. He then asked about the American action in Grenada. (S)

The President explained that we have no troops in Grenada, and the island has been returned to the control of its people. He pointed out that we had found documents and weapons there which had made the earlier Soviet involvement and intentions quite clear. (S)

Shcherbitsky observed that Afghanistan is a much larger country and therefore presents a much more formidable military problem. Noting that they were already over the scheduled time, he expressed the hope that the negotiations in Geneva would be fruitful. (S)

The President said that he also hoped for good results and wished Shcherbitsky and his delegation a pleasant trip to Texas and California. (U)

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, Chronological File, 1980–1986, Matlock Chron March 1985 (4/4). Secret; Sensitive. Prepared on March 8. A covering memorandum from Matlock to McFarlane suggests that the memorandum of conversation was drafted by Matlock. Brackets are in the

original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Reagan wrote in his diary: "Big event was meeting with Polit bureau [Politburo] member (Soviet) Sheherbitsky [Shcherbitsky]. He had Ambas. Dobrynin & a couple of others with him. I had George S., Bud, Don Regan & a couple of others with me. He & I went round & round. His was the usual diatribe that we are the destablasing [destabilizing] force, threatening them. It was almost a repeat of the Gromyko debate except that we got right down to arguing. I think he'll go home knowing that we are ready for negotiations but we d—n well aren't going to let our guard down or hold still while they continue to build up their offensive forces." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, vol. I, January 1981–October 1985, p. 433; brackets are in the original)

<sup>2</sup> The Nuclear and Space Talks between the United States and USSR were set to open in Geneva on March 12.

<sup>3</sup> On February 1, Reagan submitted to Congress a report on "Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements." For the text of Reagan's message to Congress and this report, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1985, pp. 29–34. Soviet non-compliance was also addressed by the administration in NSDD 161, February 6, which is planned for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1981–1988, vol. XLIII, National Security Policy, 1981–1984. <sup>a</sup>

# 379. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane) to President Reagan<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT

Principals' Views on Geneva Options

Secretaries George Shultz and Cap Weinberger and ACDA Director Kenneth Adelman have sent separate memoranda to you forwarding their views on preferred options for the Geneva negotiators.

Secretary Shultz's memorandum (Tab A)<sup>2</sup> endorses START Option 3, arguing that while this option permits more ballistic missile warheads than our current START proposal (i.e., far more than 5,000), it seeks to cut the most destabilizing categories (i.e., warheads on MIRVed missiles and heavy ICBMs) and would set important numericals limit on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) by aggregating these with ballistic missile warheads. For INF, Shultz argues in favor of a new initiative incorporated in Option 2 that, in his view, properly amplifies previous positions while sustaining US and Allied public opinion. On Defense and Space, he states that to avoid focus on SDI as an obstacle, the US must avoid being perceived as standing pat on START and INF.

Secretary Weinberger's memorandum (Tab B) $^3$  cautions against moving too rapidly on START and INF as time is needed to build support for SDI and as rapid progress in START and INF would build pressure for US concessions on SDI. Concerning START, Weinberger endorses Option 5 as

simplifying constraints to two measures (warheads and throwweight) as opening with a proposal for truly deep reductions to 4,000 warheads after 12 years, and as thus taking the Soviets at their word on favoring "radical reductions," while offering substantial flexibility on various tradeoffs during the course of the negotiations. For INF, Weinberger endorses Option 1, and strongly criticizes Option 2's "equal percentage reduction" concept as moving us far from our current concept of zero-zero and of global equality and as leaving more Soviet than US missiles in place.

ACDA Director Adelman's memorandum (Tab C) $^4$  is silent on INF and Defense/Space issues, but endorses START Option 6 as an elaboration of our current position (Option 1) and as providing a long-term "road map" outlining a path to our long-term goal, without tying our negotiators to a specific tactic.

In addition, Senator Tower has sent a memorandum (Tab D) $^5$  to NSC Staff outlining his views as to how Option 1 (our current position), which he favors, can be enhanced to make it more dynamic. We are drawing on several of his suggestions.

#### Recommendation

That you review the attachments together with the proposed National Security Decision Memorandum draft which is being provided in a separate package.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.44-No.46]. Secret. Sent for

- action. Prepared by Kraemer and Linhard. Reagan initialed the memorandum, indicating he saw it.
- <sup>2</sup> Shultz's memorandum is not attached, but an unsigned copy, dated March 6, is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21-No.25].
- <sup>3</sup> Weinberger's memorandum is not attached, but an undated, unsigned copy is in the Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Chrons, March 1985 Chron File: [No.21-No.25].
- <sup>4</sup> Adelman's memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is ibid.
- <sup>5</sup> Tower's memorandum is not attached, but a copy, dated March 6, is ibid.
- <sup>6</sup> Reagan did not indicate his approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

## 380. National Security Decision Directive 1651

Washington, March 8, 1985

## INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE FIRST ROUND OF US/SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA (U)

Our nation faces a number of challenges to its national security. Each of these imposes demands and presents opportunities. To achieve our national goals, we will have to apply all the instruments at our disposal in a coherent and complementary way. (U)

The Soviet Union remains the principal menace to our security and that of our allies. As a part of a larger effort to improve its overall military capability, the Soviet Union's improvement of its ballistic missile force, providing increased prompt, hard target kill capability, has increasingly threatened the fundamental survivability of our land-based retaliatory forces and the leadership structure that commands them. At the same time, the Soviet Union has continued to pursue strategic advantage through the development of active defenses with increased capability to counter surviving U.S. retaliatory forces. It is spending significant resources on passive defensive measures aimed at improving the survivability of its own forces, military command structure, and national leadership—ranging from providing mobility for its latest generation of ICBMs, to constructing a network of superhard bunkers to protect its leadership—thus further eroding the effectiveness of our existing offensive deterrent. Finally, the problem of Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, is a cause of increasing concern. $^{2}$  (S)

In response to this long-term pattern of Soviet activity, the United States is compelled to take certain immediate actions designed both to maintain security and stability in the near-term and to ensure security and stability in the future. We must act in three areas. (C)

First, we must modernize our offensive nuclear retaliatory forces. This is necessary to reestablish and maintain the balance in the near-term, and to create the strategic conditions that will permit us to pursue effectively the other options I will mention. The Administration's comprehensive strategic modernization program permits us to implement this option. (C)

However, over the long run, this path alone cannot fully assure U.S. national security interests. As noted in NSDD 153,<sup>3</sup> the trends set in motion by the pattern of Soviet activity, and the Soviets' persistence in that pattern of activity, indicate that continued long-term U.S. dependence on offensive forces alone for deterrence is likely to lead to a steady erosion of stability to the strategic disadvantage of the United States and its allies. In fact, should these trends be permitted to continue and the Soviet investment in both offensive and defensive capability proceed unrestrained and unanswered, the resultant condition will destroy the foundation on which deterrence has rested for a generation. (C)

Secondly, we must take those steps necessary to provide a future option for changing the basis upon which deterrence and stability rest and to do so in a way that allows us both to negate the destabilizing growth of Soviet offensive forces and to channel Soviet defensive activity toward mutually beneficial ends. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is specifically aimed towards this goal. (U)

In the near term, the SDI program directly responds to the ongoing and extensive Soviet anti-ballistic missile effort, including the existing deployments permitted under the ABM Treaty. The SDI research program provides a necessary and powerful deterrent to any Soviet near-term decision to expand rapidly its anti-ballistic missile capability beyond that contemplated by the ABM Treaty. This, in itself, is a critical task. However, the overriding, long-term importance of SDI to the United States is that it offers the possibility of radically altering the dangerous military trends cited above by moving to a better, more stable basis for deterrence, and by providing new and compelling incentives to the Soviet Union for seriously negotiating reductions in existing nuclear arsenals. (U)

The Soviet Union is correct in recognizing the potential of advanced defense concepts—especially those involving boost, post-boost, and mid-course defenses—to change existing, and increasingly destabilizing, aspects of the strategic situation. In investigating the potential of these systems, we do not seek to establish a unilateral advantage. However, if the promise of SDI is fulfilled, the destabilizing Soviet advantage accumulated over the past ten years at great cost can be redressed. And, in the process, we will have enhanced deterrence significantly by turning to a greater reliance upon defensive systems—systems which threaten no one. (C)

Third, we have to use negotiation and diplomacy to complement our force modernization and SDI programs and help us address the challenge we face both in the near term and as we seek to transition into a more stable and secure future. In this effort, we will continue our pursuit of equitable and verifiable agreements that lead to significant reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals and will also seek resolution of our serious compliance concerns. At

the same time, the specific details of the agreements we seek must provide for our security and that of our allies and must enhance stability. (C)

The U.S. Approach to Negotiations. As previously indicated in NSDD 153, the thrust of the U.S. effort for the foreseeable future will be as follows. (U)

- 1. We will continue to pursue vigorously the negotiation of equitable and verifiable agreements leading to significant reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. As we do, we will continue to exercise flexibility concerning the mechanisms used to achieve these reductions, but judging these mechanisms on their ability to maintain the security of the United States and our allies, to enhance stability, and to reduce the risk of war. (S)
- 2. As we do so, we will protect the promise offered by the US ASAT and SDI research program to alter the adverse, long-term prospects we now face and to provide a basis for a more stable deterrent at some future time. This specifically involves protecting those SDI technologies that may permit a layered defense, including boost, post-boost, and mid-course elements. (S)
- 3. To prepare for the day that promise may be realized, we will immediately begin the process of bilateral discussion needed to lay the foundation for the cooperative integration of advanced defenses into the forces of both sides at such time as the state of the art and other considerations make it sensible to do so. (S)

4. Complementing this, we will also protect the U.S. strategic modernization program which is needed to maintain existing deterrence, to restore the balance of offensive forces, and to provide incentives for negotiating real reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals. (S)

In addition, as noted above, we will continue to raise our compliance concerns with the Soviet Union, seeking their resolution as fundamental to the prospect of genuine arms control. (U)

Characterizing the U.S. Approach. The guidance provided in NSDD 153 with respect to characterizing the US approach to the Soviet Union, the Congress, our Allies, and Western publics is reaffirmed. The basic, central concept that the U.S. is pursuing should be characterized as follows. (C)

"During the next ten years, the U.S. objective is a radical reduction in the power of existing and planned offensive nuclear arms, as well as the stabilization of the relationship between offensive and defense nuclear arms, whether on earth or in space. We are even now looking forward to a period of transition to a more stable world, with greatly reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based upon the increasing contribution of non-nuclear defenses against offensive nuclear arms. This period of transition could lead to the eventual elimination of all nuclear arms, both offensive and defensive. A world free of nuclear arms is an ultimate objective to which we, the Soviet Union, and all other nations can agree." (U)

General Guidance to the U.S. Delegation. In implementing the above, the additional general guidance provided in the draft instructions cable developed by the Senior Arms Control Group (SACG) and the U.S. Delegation is approved. This cable should be redrafted to reference this directive as appropriate and be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to release. (U)

Instructions for the Defense and Space Negotiating Group. The additional guidance provided in the draft instructions cable for the INF Defense and Space Negotiating Group developed by the Senior Arms Control Group and the U.S. Delegation is also approved. This cable should also be redrafted to reference this directive as appropriate and be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to its release. (U)

*Instructions for the INF Negotiating Group.* The primary U.S. objective in this area is to press for early progress on INF consistent with the criteria for agreement previously enunciated. The U.S. INF negotiating group should make clear that the U.S. believes that an agreement is possible on the basis of the September 1983 U.S. proposals which signalled flexibility and a willingness to consider a variety of ways to reach the goal of equal global limits on LRINF. The negotiating group should point out that the U.S. proposals provide for an equal global limit under which the United States would consider not deploying its full global allotment in Europe. They also indicate that the United States also is willing to consider reductions in Pershing II missile deployments and limitations on aircraft, two major concerns of the Soviet Union. The negotiating group should stress that within our basic principles, the U.S. remains prepared and ready to show considerable flexibility. (C)

The U.S. INF negotiating group should probe the Soviets for any signs of corresponding flexibility on their part. While doing so, the INF negotiating group is authorized to explore Soviet interest in equal global entitlements at levels other than those previously proposed. Findings as a result of the above actions should be reported back to Washington, including recommendations for future U.S. actions. (C)

The U.S. INF negotiating group will not introduce the concept of equal percentage reductions. Should the Soviets raise this approach, the U.S. side will reject it. In doing so, the U.S. side should point out that we could envision how such an approach, if applied under appropriate conditions, could yield a very limited set of outcomes that could be of interest to both sides. For example, the U.S. can imagine an approach through which equal warhead levels could be reached through a specific equal percentage reduction of launchers on both sides (i.e., the U.S. reducing from its planned levels of deployment—224 GLCM and Pershing II launchers carrying 572 missiles/warheads). An approach leading to such an outcome, under the proper conditions, could perhaps be crafted in such a way to be of mutual interest. However, this is the exception rather than the general rule. Therefore, the U.S. feels that the range of acceptable outcomes likely to result by the application of this concept is so narrow, compared to the range of unacceptable outcomes, that it invalidates the equal percentage reductions concept as an acceptable operative principle to serve as the basis for a mutually acceptable agreement. (S)

In addition to the above, the additional guidance provided in the draft instructions cable for the INF Negotiating Group developed by the Senior Arms Control Group and the U.S. Delegation is approved. This cable should also be redrafted to incorporate the guidance provided by this directive and reference it as appropriate. The redrafted cable should be promptly resubmitted in final form for clearance prior to its release. (U)

Instructions for the START Negotiating Group. In the area of strategic forces, the primary focus must remain on achieving significant reductions in the most destabilizing forces, ballistic missiles, and especially MIRVed, land-based ICBMs. In doing so, the U.S. will continue to place its emphasis on reducing the numbers of warheads and the level of destructive capacity and potential associated with these systems. (C)

The U.S. certainly recognizes the Soviet interest in dealing with Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles (SNDVs). The U.S. is prepared to entertain Soviet alternatives to our own position in this area. However, we remain convinced that appropriate reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and destructive capacity and potential are the central issues that we must mutually address. (C)

The outcome that the U.S. continues to seek remains a reduction for the period of this agreement to an equal limit of 5,000 ballistic missile warheads which applies to the forces of both sides. During the past year, we have studied a number of ways to reach this point. Some involve relatively fast reductions. Others would move more slowly to accommodate normal force planning and an improved confidence in the reduction activity over time. The mechanism finally chosen to accomplish the reduction must provide for the national security of the U.S. and its allies. It must also enhance stability. But, given these conditions, it is the outcome that is of primary importance. (S)

With respect to ballistic missile destructive capability, the U.S. remains flexible on how reductions in ballistic missile destructive capability are achieved (i.e., through direct or indirect limitations) as long as an appropriate outcome results. However, of equal importance to reductions in the number of ballistic missile warheads and ballistic missile destructive capability, is the quality of stability that results from the specific reductions. In that context, the U.S. continues to believe that moving away from high concentrations of land-based MIRVed ballistic missiles is in everyone's interest. (C)

The U.S. is prepared to explore trade-offs between areas of relative U.S. advantage and areas of relative Soviet advantage. The U.S. feels that the relative U.S. advantage in bomber forces and the relative Soviet advantage in land-based ballistic missile forces offers the grounds for such a potential trade-off. (C)

The above builds upon U.S. proposals previously made and constitutes the foundation of the U.S. position. The START negotiating group should draw upon the above as appropriate in presenting the U.S. position to the Soviet side. (C)

The START negotiating group should probe in the areas of potential trade-offs, the pace of reductions, and methods of addressing ballistic missile destructive potential. It should listen to Soviet views on alternative SNDV limits. Findings should be reported to Washington, including recommendations for future U.S. actions. (C)

The START negotiator is also authorized the following contingent authority. As a function of the degree of Soviet interest in making early progress as reflected by specific Soviet proposals, or as a result of significant exploratory conversation, you are authorized to state that: (U)

—The U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which involve associated limitations on ballistic missile warheads and Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCMs), so long as the resulting outcome would result in significant reductions in ballistic missile warheads, improved overall stability, and equality in the aggregate. Any specific aggregate numbers proposed by the Soviet Union should be referred to Washington. However, in accordance with the criteria stated, any levels proposed that would not result in a reduction in the number of Soviet ballistic missile warheads should be rejected at the time proposed. (S)

—In the context of an agreement in which U.S. concerns about the destructive capacity and potential of ballistic missiles were met, the U.S. is willing to consider Soviet proposals which could involve associated limits on ballistic missiles and bombers with the total of both in the range previously proposed by the Soviet Union (i.e., around 1800). (S)

The previously submitted draft cable of instructions submitted in this area should be promptly redrafted to reflect the guidance provided above. This revised cable should be submitted as a draft in final message form for final clearance prior to its release.  $^{7}$  (C)

#### **Ronald Reagan**

<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 3, 1985 Geneva. Secret. In a March 8 covering memorandum

to multiple addressees, McFarlane noted: "The President has decided upon the following instructions for the first round of US/Soviet negotiations set to begin in Geneva on March 12, 1985."

- <sup>2</sup> See <u>footnote 3, Document 378</u>.
- <sup>3</sup> See <u>Document 348</u>.
- <sup>4</sup> In telegram 72682 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department provided general guidance for the first round of talks. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, [no D number])
- <sup>5</sup> In telegram 72686 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department sent instructions for the Defense and Space group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, N850003-0458)
- <sup>6</sup> In telegram 72685 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department sent instructions for the INF group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850194-0128)
- <sup>7</sup> In telegram 72684 to USDel NST Geneva, March 10, the Department provided instructions for the START group. (Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850194–0129)

# 381. Memorandum From Jack Matlock of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (McFarlane)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 8, 1985

SUBJECT Report of Chernenko Death

You will have seen the report<sup>2</sup> [less than 1 line not declassified] indicating that, [ $1\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] Chernenko had died but the news was being withheld until after the holiday (International Women's Day). (The motivation cited is plausible, since this is a big holiday in the Soviet Union and is considered a joyful one.)

There is, however, no other indication that Chernenko has died, except for an alert originating with BBC, which could have been asked to monitor broadcasts by the UK government on the basis of the same report that we have. If the Soviets have decided to withhold the information for a day, however, one would not expect to see indications in the media, and as of noon today there have been no signs of unusual programming. More significant perhaps is the report that the Shcherbitsky delegation here has done nothing to alter their travel plans. (It is virtually inconceivable that Shcherbitsky would not be notified if Chernenko had in fact died.)

Fritz Ermarth, the Agency's NIO for the Soviet Union, believes that there is no more than a 50/50 chance that the report of Chernenko's death is correct, and I concur.

However that may be, this report serves as a reminder that we may very well be faced with Chernenko's death without advance notice. Therefore, the question of whether or not the President attends the funeral will arise once again. While we cannot anticipate all the particulars which may be relevant at the time the event occurs, it would probably be prudent to discuss the matter with the President.

It seems to me that arguments for and against the President's attendance are fairly evenly balanced, and I would not be inclined to come down hard on either side. On the positive side one can say that our relations started to be more civil under Chernenko than under his predecessors, and also that without a KGB background Chernenko is marginally more savory than Andropov was. This makes it somewhat easier for the President to be seen honoring him. The President's attendance at the funeral would also disarm those critics who accuse him of not doing enough to communicate with the Soviet leaders.

On the other hand, there are no strong substantive reasons for him to go. The precedent has already been established for the Vice President to do this duty, and there will certainly be no offense if he goes once again. Any conversation the President would have with a successor would necessarily be short, and there are arguments for waiting until a more substantive summit can be arranged.

If the President is interested in considering attendance at the funeral, we should give some thought to how the trip and announcement should be handled in order to maximize the advantages. Obviously, we should do so in the most discreet fashion.

#### Recommendation:

That you encourage the President to consider what his position should be in regard to attending Chernenko's funeral, and if he is inclined to go this time to let you know so some very discreet contingency planning can be done.<sup>4</sup>

- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Jack Matlock Files, USSR Subject File, Chernenko's Death—Miscellaneous 03/10/1985. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
- <sup>2</sup> Attached but not printed.
- <sup>3</sup> After meeting with Reagan on March 7 (see <u>Document</u> 378), Shcherbitsky traveled to Texas and then California.
- 4 McFarlane initialed his approval of the recommendation.

# 382. Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs (Kelly) to Secretary of State Shultz<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 10, 1985

SUBJECT

Shcherbitskiy's Hurry-Up Departure and the Chernenko Succession

Dobrynin's No. 2 Oleg Sokolov called Mark Palmer in midafternoon to request that we arrange an early departure from San Francisco to Moscow for Shcherbitskiy and his party, two days ahead of schedule. He said he was unable to tell us the reason for this request. However, the party cancelled out San Francisco events they would still have been able to attend, and a Central Committee staffer with the party told an accompanying State Department official that "we have a custom that for 24 hours after a death there is no public announcement." Other officials in the party including Arbatov are disclaiming any knowledge of the reason for the departure but say they "assume" it means Chernenko is dead. By 7:30 pm our time, FBIS was reporting somber music on Soviet radio.

In the course of the afternoon plans shifted from a night departure from Andrews to New York's Kennedy Airport and then to a Kennedy departure at 3:00 p.m. tomorrow, all with no reasons given. Mark worked through the afternoon and EUR/SOV until late in the evening arranging the flight clearances and other logistics needed to marry up the Shcherbitskiy party coming by US military aircraft from San Francisco with his Aeroflot special plane coming up from Havana. The Soviet confusion was clearly shown when

the Soviet aircraft departed Havana early without clearances and with a flight plan to Washington. With good cooperation from the Air Force at Andrews and the Port Authority people in New York, we made and broke arrangements at Andrews and finally arranged for the plane to land at JFK at 11:15 pm.

Concurrently, we alerted all interested Department officials, Embassy Moscow, the White House, and CIA. We have kept in close touch with Jack Matlock, and also touched base with Don Gregg in the Vice President's party in Geneva. Embassy Moscow kept in touch several times through the night as they watched for any telltale signs. Matlock was in touch with Bud McFarlane, and had the impression that he would be briefing the President when he returned to the White House late Sunday. Sunday.

During the evening we also updated the contingency briefing book we have had on hand for the last month or so. It includes suggested drafts of the appropriate condolence and congratulation messages for the outgoing and incoming General Secretaries and Gromyko, very much along the lines we used for the Brezhnev and Andropov cases. The US media already have the story that Shcherbitskiy will be departing ahead of schedule, and Department spokesmen have confirmed that he is returning tomorrow but offering no further comment. Press stories will most likely state that Chernenko has died but there will, of course, be no way to verify this until it is announced by Moscow.

Jack Matlock tells us that late last week he raised with Bud the issue of whether or not the President should go to Moscow for a Chernenko funeral instead of the Vice President, in addition to you if you decide to go this time. He did so because a number of the inhibitions to Presidential participation that were in play last time have been removed.

In Jack's view, Chernenko is not the policeman Andropov was, and we are back in arms control negotiations at Geneva, so there is no question of rewarding them for their 1983 walkout. Moreover, even though we might not know who Chernenko's successor will be before we must decide on our delegation, this succession is more critical than its two predecessors whether or not a younger man representing the new generation is chosen. The 27th CPSU Congress, which will choose a new Central Committee and pass on the 1986-1990 Five-Year Plan, is to take place late this year, and the infighting over directions and priorities which is already underway will take a quantum jump in intensity whether the third oldster in a row is chosen or Gorbachev succeeds. To the extent that the outside world figures in debate over Soviet futures, the US is the key variable.

It is conceivable that Shcherbitskiy is leaving because of some development other than the Chernenko succession, but the Soviets in the delegation have been giving the clear impression without being categoric that the reason is Chernenko's death. Assuming this is the case, we should have an announcement tomorrow. Following the Brezhnev and Andropov precedents, the announcement of a funeral committee should follow some hours later—both Andropov and Chernenko headed their predecessors' funeral committees—with the funeral itself possibly five days after the death, i.e. on Friday.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, George Shultz Papers, Box 13, Executive Secretariat Sensitive Chron (03/09/1985–03/13/1985). Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Simons and

Pascoe; cleared by Palmer. Pascoe initialed for Kelly. The memorandum is stamped "Treat As Original."

- <sup>2</sup> Bush was in Geneva for the opening of the Nuclear and Space Talks on March 12.
- <sup>3</sup> According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan was at Camp David from late afternoon on Friday, March 8, until he returned to Washington on Sunday, March 10 around 2:30 p.m. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary)
- 4 March 15.

#### 383. Editorial Note

On March 11, 1985, the Embassy in Moscow reported the death of Soviet General Secretary Konstantin Chernenko: "Chernenko's death 'after a serious illness' was announced at 1400 Moscow time on Moscow radio and television. Time of death was given as 1920 on March 10." (Telegram 2946 from Moscow, March 11; Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, Electronic Telegrams, D850163-0464) In his diary entry for March 11, President Ronald Reagan wrote: "Awakened at 4 A.M. to be told Chernenko is dead. My mind turned to whether I should attend the funeral. My gut instinct said no. Got to the office at 9. George S. had some arguments that I should—he lost. I dont think his heart was really in it. George B. is in Geneva—he'll go & George S. will join him leaving tonight." He continued: "Word has been received that Gorbachev has been named head man in the Soviet." (Brinkley, ed., The Reagan Diaries, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 434) According to the President's Daily Diary, Reagan met with Shultz in the Oval Office around 2 p.m. on March 11. (Reagan Library, President's Daily Diary) In his memoir, Shultz recalled: "A few weeks earlier, aware of Chernenko's poor health, the president had decided that the funeral delegation should be George Bush, myself, and Art Hartman." Shultz wrote that he "went to the White House to see President Reagan to go over ideas for the meeting our delegation would have with Gorbachev. There wasn't a thought in his [Reagan's] mind about going to Moscow." (Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph*, page 527)

In his diary entry for March 11, Reagan also wrote: "A Haircut & then over to the Soviet embassy to sign the grief book—this is my 3rd such trip." (Brinkley, ed., *The Reagan Diaries*, volume I, January 1981-October 1985, page 434)

Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin recalled Reagan and Shultz's visits to the Embassy that evening in his memoir: "On the very day Gorbachev was elected general secretary, we received our first hint of changes that he might expect from the Reagan administration. Shultz visited the embassy on March 11 to sign the condolence book for Chernenko, arriving twenty minutes before president Reagan to talk with me in private. Shultz told me he and the president had met in the White House earlier that day with McFarlane and Donald Regan, the new White House Chief of Staff. The president summed up by saying that a new situation with new opportunities was emerging in Soviet-American relations and it would be unforgivable not to take advantage of it, although the outcome was hardly predictable. Just as he was starting his second term as president, a new Soviet leader had taken the helm who by all appearances would manage foreign and domestic affairs energetically. Relations with Moscow would therefore be high on the president's list of priorities. With the Geneva arms control negotiations starting, Reagan added, results were crucial." "When the president arrived," Dobrynin continued, "he did not raise these questions with me, but I took note of his remark that it was his third visit to the embassy in the course of three years on the occasions of grief. 'But,' he added, 'I hope to come to the embassy next time on a happier occasion.' He also asked me to convey his personal regards to Gorbachev." (Dobrynin, In Confidence, pages 566-567)

Mikhail S. Gorbachev was elected General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 11. Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz attended Chernenko's funeral and met with Gorbachev in Moscow on March 13. For the memorandum of conversation, see *Foreign*\*Relations\*, 1981-1988\*, volume V, Soviet Union\*, March 1985-October 1986\*, Document 5.

#### **Appendix**

[Document 384]

#### A. Editorial Note

Stark deviations in assessments by the U.S. Intelligence Community of the November 1983 NATO exercise Able Archer and the Soviet "war scare" led to a much later 1990 investigation by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the George H.W. Bush administration, resulting in the report, "The Soviet 'War Scare.'" (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files; Reports to the President-War Scare Report 1990 [OA/IDCF01830-020]) The February 15, 1990, PFIAB report analyzed intelligence and reporting on the Soviet war scare, Able Archer, and other related activities. The PFIAB report stated: "During the past year, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events." (PFIAB, pages vi-vii) Although outside the normal scope of this volume, the 1990 PFIAB report and other memoranda from 1988 and 1989 are addressed in this editorial note because the documents focus upon crucial events from 1983 to 1984.

Reactions from the Intelligence Community (IC) and policymakers to the events surrounding Able Archer and the Soviet "war scare" differed significantly and evolved over time. The contemporaneous reporting in 1983–1984 from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Intelligence Council (NIC), [text not declassified] drew varied conclusions about Soviet anxieties. While some reporting assessed that "Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States" (see <a href="Document 157">Document 157</a>), another analysis presented evidence that [text not declassified].

Retrospective assessments of these events seem to conflate the NATO Able Archer exercise with the broader "war scare" talk emanating from Moscow related to INF deployments. The Soviet military unquestionably reacted to Able Archer differently than to previous NATO exercises. (See <a href="Document 134">Document 134</a>.) Whether the Soviet response was attributable to the circumstances of the time, to the "war scare" (whether real or Soviet propaganda), or to a credible belief within the Soviet military leadership or the Politburo that the United States was planning to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR, under the guise of a NATO exercise or otherwise, remains unclear on the basis of the available evidence.

After a year of research and a reassessment of the relevant intelligence and documentation, the PFIAB report stated: "We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike—perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise—were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the

possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations.

"In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) in May and August 1984, the intelligence community said: 'We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.' Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be 'propaganda.' [See <u>Documents 221</u> and <u>264</u>.]

"The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President." (PFIAB, pages vi-vii)

During November 1983, Able Archer and the Soviet responses to this exercise received little immediate attention in the U.S. Intelligence Community. (See <a href="Document 135">Document 135</a>.) However, by spring 1984, some in the intelligence communities in the United States [text not declassified] believed the Reagan administration should have recognized Soviet sensitivities and anxieties about a potential U.S. first strike. [text not declassified].

According to the PFIAB report, [text not declassified] "KGB Deputy Resident Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy, [text not declassified] had witnessed what he saw as Soviet paranoia over a US nuclear first strike; [text not declassified] As one

of the most senior KGB officers in London, [text not declassified]." (PFIAB, page 10)

In a covering memorandum [less than 1 line not declassified] to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and others, Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wrote: [text not declassified]. The PFIAB report commented that the [text not declassified] report was "not well received in the US intelligence community." (PFIAB, pages 10–11)

Another contemporaneous analysis from the CIA, the May 1984 SNIE 11–10–84/JX concluded: "We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States." (See <a href="Document 221">Document 221</a>.) The PFIAB report commented on this SNIE: "The estimate boldly declared that 'Recent Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing 'peace' pressures among various audiences abroad.' In a more piecemeal fashion, it was judged that 'Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it.' The accelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of 'long-term Soviet military objectives.'

"The Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as a 'counterexercise,' but analysts acknowledged that the 'elaborate Soviet reaction' was 'somewhat greater than usual.' [less than 1 line not declassified] prior to and during the exercise indicated that the Warsaw Pact Intelligence services, especially the KGB, were admonished 'to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a first nuclear strike,' analysts concluded that 'by confining heightened readiness to selected air units, Moscow clearly revealed that it did not, in fact, think there was a possibility

at this time of a NATO attack.' The assessment, however, was not specific about what type of defensive or precautionary Soviet activity might be expected—and detected—were they preparing for an offensive NATO move." (PFIAB, page 13)

The PFIAB report continued its critique of SNIE 11-10-84/JX: IC "analysts dismissed [less than 1 line not declassified on the war scare, including the KGB's formal tasking to its Residencies. 'This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. [See for example, Document 144.] We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict." The report contended: "Such judgments were made even though the analysis was tempered 'by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations'—which, of course, included the previous Able Archer exercise. In other words, US analysts were unsure of what the Kremlin leadership thought or how it made decisions, nor had they adequately assessed the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the estimate concluded: 'We are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade.'" (PFIAB, page 14)

The Board had similar criticisms of the August 1984 SNIE 11-9-84, "Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984" (see <u>Document 264</u>), for its "categorical and unqualified" judgments "about the likelihood of the war scare," and the

analysts' conclusions: "We strongly believe that the Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that the Soviet war talk and other actions 'mask' Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR." (PFIAB, page 19-20) The PFIAB report continued: "Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous six months had seen extraordinary, unprecedented Soviet activities. Large scale military exercise, 'anomalous behavior' during the troop rotation, withdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), new, deployed weapons systems (termed 'in response to INF deployments'), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities were noted. These events, however, were judged to be 'in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for major war.'" (PFIAB, page 19)

The PFIAB report acknowledged that its assessment and criticism of the May and August 1984 SNIEs "derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed." (PFIAB, page ix) The PFIAB report concluded: "Reasonable people can disagree about the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's. The PFIAB does disagree with many of them. More worrisome to us, however, is the process by which the estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. Although both estimates were reportedly reviewed by outside readers—and both, but particularly the first, contained alternative scenarios—strongly worded interpretations were defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with them. Consequently, both estimates

contained, in essence, single outcome forecasting based in large part on near-term anomalous behavior. Moreover, neither alerted the reader to the risks erroneously rejecting the correct scenario." (PFIAB, page 30) The PFIAB report criticized the performance of the IC in 1983–1984, showing that contemporary assessments of Soviet intentions after Able Archer did not go far enough in providing President Reagan with alternative scenarios, explaining that the anxiety from the Soviet leadership could have been real.

In criticizing contemporary estimates, the PFIAB report emphasized intelligence that had not been available to the IC during these years, principally information provided by Gordiyevskiy after he defected in 1985. Robert McFarlane's thoughts on the influence of Gordiyevskiy's information on the President are recorded in a December 16, 1988, memorandum for the record:

#### Memorandum for the Record

16 December 1988

**SUBJECT** 

[less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. McFarlane Regarding the Influence of Oleg Gordiyevskiy's Reporting on President Reagan

On 15 December [less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. ("Bud") McFarlane, formerly National Security Advisor to the President, as to the veracity of claims [less than 1 line not declassified] that the reporting of KGB officer [less than 1 line not declassified] Oleg Gordiyevskiy about the Kremlin's fear of war greatly influenced President Reagan in the mid-1980s to seek better relations with the USSR. In response, Bud made several points:

He definitely remembered the reporting associated (later) with Gordiyevskiy that conveyed the Kremlin's fear of war.

He also specifically recalled [less than 1 line not declassified] on Gordiyevskiy's assessments given to the President [less than 1 line not declassified].

He noted that he discussed this reporting with the President on several occasions. This was in the course of numerous discussions extending throughout 1983 and part of 1984 about the apparent anxieties being transmitted by Moscow through many channels, [less than 1 line not declassified].

The President, according to Bud, saw this reporting attributed to Gordiyevskiy in the larger context of a Soviet "war-scare" campaign arising from the NATO decision to deploy INF and from Reagan's hard line on defense, SDI, etc. In the President's view, either the Soviets were paranoid in strange ways we could not let bother us, or they were fabricating the appearance of fear to intimidate and sway us, which we should even more be prepared to ignore.

Often in these conversations, according to Bud, the President outlined his sustained intention to concentrate on building US strength and credibility in the first term and to move toward diplomatic reengagement in the second. The President's key speech of January 1984 [see <u>Document 158</u>] was a natural step in a long-planned shift of policy. Neither Gordiyevskiy's reporting nor the Soviet "warscare" campaign in general were responsible for the evolution of the President's policy.

Bud said he'd been queried before on this matter by [name not declassified], a journalist, who might be (or have been) writing an article on it. Against the background of the above, Bud said he discounted Gordiyevskiy's impact on the President [less than 1 line not declassified].

#### [1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

[name not declassified]

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 90T00435R: Chronological Files (1988), Box 1, Folder 12: C/NIC Chrono for December 1988)

McFarlane's recollections in this memorandum for the record correlate with a January 1984 memorandum by Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the NSC Staff, which demonstrated an awareness of potential Soviet concerns, but concluded:

- "—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;
- "—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power." (See <u>Document 157</u>.)

As mentioned in the 1988 memorandum for the record, McFarlane did recall "later" reporting to Reagan about Gordiyevskiy. The PFIAB report addressed Gordiyevskiy's situation in relation to the war scare and the 1984 SNIE assessments: "The Board found that after the 1984 assessments were issued, the intelligence community did not again address the war scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy in July, 1985. Gordiyevskiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fell under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the Soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevskiy was exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service."

The report continued: "During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Gordiyevskiy supplied a fuller report on the Soviet war hysteria. This report, complete with documentation from KGB Headquarters and entitled 'KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Nuclear Attack,' was first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October 1985. Gordiyevskiy described the extraordinary KGB collection plan, initiated in 1981, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception the US was achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin were said to believe that the US was likely to resort to nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They also were concerned the US might seek to exploit its first-strike capability outside the context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership's worries of a 'decapitating' strike from the Pershing II's, and its belief that the US could mobilize for a surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained how the London Residency responded to the requirements, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow Center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held with colleagues from Center and from the GRU. The next month, President Reagan held his first summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw." (PFIAB, pages 22-23)

The PFIAB report also cited a January 1989 "End of Tour Report Addendum" by Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, who had served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe, during the 1983 Able Archer exercise, to emphasize the potential consequences of the intelligence gap during the Able Archer exercise.

Perroots addressed Able Archer as well as Gordiyevskiy's reporting in that memorandum:

- 1. (U) In 1983, I was assigned as the DCS for Intelligence, US Air Forces, Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. The annual NATO Command and Control exercise ABLE ARCHER was scheduled to begin during the first week of November. The context of this nuclear command and control exercise was relatively benign; the scenario had been purposely chosen to be non-controversial, and the exercise itself was a routine annual event. This exercise closely followed the bombing of air defense sites in Lebanon and directly followed the invasion of Grenada. As I recall, however, there was no particular feeling of tension in the European Theater beyond that which is normal.
- 2. [portion marking not declassified] Only the fact that Soviet Intelligence collection assets (primarily low level signals intercept units) had failed to return to garrison after their normal concentrated coverage of NATO's AUTUMN FORGE exercise series could be reckoned strange at all. As the kickoff date of ABLE ARCHER neared it was clear that there was a great deal of Soviet interest in the forthcoming events. Again, this seemed nothing out of the ordinary. We knew that there was a history of intensive Soviet collection against practice Emergency Action Messages (EAM's) related to nuclear release.
- 3. [portion marking not declassified] ABLE ARCHER started in the morning of 3 November, and progressed immediately in the scenario to NATO STATE ORANGE. At 2100Z on 04 November NSA issued an electrical product report G/00/3083-83, entitled "SOVIET AIR FORCES, GSFG, PLACED ON HEIGHTENED READINESS, 2 NOVEMBER 1983." I saw this message on the morning of 5 November and discussed it with my air analysts. It stated

that as of 1900Z on 02 November the fighter-bomber divisions of the air force of Group Soviet Forces, Germany had been placed in a status of heightened alert. All divisional and regimental command posts and supporting command and control elements were to be manned around-the-clock by augmented teams.

- 4. [portion marking not declassified] In addition to the directed command and control changes the fighter-bomber divisions were also ordered to load out one squadron of aircraft in each regiment (if this order applied equally across GSFG the result would have been at least 108 fighter-bombers on alert). These aircraft were to be armed and placed at readiness 3 (30 minute alert) to "destroy first-line enemy targets." The alert aircraft were to be equipped with a self-protection jamming pod. We knew from subsequent NSA reporting that a squadron at Neuruppin, East Germany sought and was apparently granted permission to configure its aircraft without the ECM pod because of an unexpected weight and balance problem. My air analysts opined that this message meant that at least this particular squadron was loading a munitions configuration that they had never actually loaded before, i.e., a warload.
- 5. [portion marking not declassified] At this point, I spoke to CinCUSAFE, General Billy Minter. I told him we had some unusual activity in East Germany that was probably a reaction to the ongoing ABLE ARCHER. He asked if I thought we should increase the real force generation. I said that we would carefully watch the situation, but there was insufficient evidence to justify increasing our real alert posture. At this point in the exercise our forces were in a simulated posture of NATO State ORANGE and local SALTY NATION tests involving simulated generation of combat aircraft were underway at various locations including

Ramstein AB. If I had known then what I later found out I am uncertain what advice I would have given.

- 6. [portion marking not declassified] An NSA message dated 022229Z DEC 83 provided the rest of the picture as far as we knew it—at least until the reports began to surface from the British penetration of the KGB, Oleg Gordievskiy. This GAMMA message was entitled "SOVIET 4th AIR ARMY AT HEIGHTENED READINESS IN REACTION TO NATO EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER, 2-11 NOVEMBER 1983." This report stated that the alert had been ordered by the Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal Kutakhov, and that all units of the Soviet 4th Air Army were involved in the alert "which included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons." This report described activity that was contemporaneous with that reflected in East Germany, but because of the specific source of this material it was not available in near realtime. The two pieces taken together present a much more ominous picture.
- 7. [portion marking not declassified] Equally ominous in its own way was the fact that this alert was never reflected at all by the I&W system. At the time of this occurrence there was no distribution of electrically reported GAMMA material to the Tactical Fusion Center at Boerfink. I remedied that shortfall in the aftermath of this activity. Secondly, a real standdown of aircraft was secretly ordered in at least the Soviet Air Forces units facing the Central Region, and that standdown was not detected. The Soviet alert in response to ABLE ARCHER began after nightfall on Wednesday evening, there was no flying on the following two days which led to the weekend, and then the following Monday was 7 November, the revolution holiday. The absence of flying could always be explained, although a warning condition was raised finally on about the ninth of

November when overhead photography showed fully armed FLOGGER aircraft on air defense alert at a base in East Germany. When this single indicator was raised, the standdown had been underway for a week.

- 8. [portion marking not declassified] For the next six months I was on a soapbox about ABLE ARCHER whenever I could discuss it at the appropriate classification level. I spoke to the Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC), and I buttonholed a lot of people. I suggested that perhaps we should move our annual exercise away from the November 7 holiday, because it is clear to me that the conjunction of the two events causes a warning problem that can never be solved. Our problem here was that we had a couple of very highly classified bits of intelligence evidence about a potentially disastrous situation that never actually came to fruition. For decisionmakers it was always difficult to believe that there could have been any serious reaction by the Soviets to such a "benign" exercise as ABLE ARCHER. From the Soviet perspective, however, it might have appeared very different. It was difficult for all of us to grasp that, but Oleg Gordievskiy's reporting began to provide a somewhat more frightening perspective when it became available in the Fall of 1985.
- 9. (S) By the time Gordievskiy's reporting began to surface for analytical review I was the Director of DIA. Gordievskiy's initial reporting about a "war scare" in 1983 immediately caught my attention. It should be pointed out at the outset that Gordievskiy knew nothing of a military alert during ABLE ARCHER. He did, however, tell us something of a chilling story about Moscow Center's Intelligence tasking during 1983. He related that there was a project called either "RYaN" or "VRYaN," the latter probably being the full form of a Russian acronym meaning

"sudden rocket nuclear attack." There was a cadre of specialists in Moscow Center charged with, among other things, finding the evidence of planning for a western attack on the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into 1983 Gordievskiy says that this group became ever more insistent that an attack was being planned by the West. By March 1983 the KGB officers in Moscow had decided that ABLE ARCHER 83 would provide an excellent cover for the planned attack, and KGB and GRU residencies around the world were being directed to find the evidence. Gordievskiy, living in London at the time, states that he never believed there was really a threat, and that the London residency of the KGB simply ignored the collection requirements until it began to become clear that Moscow was serious. During the summer of 1983 the London residency sent some reports that, in retrospect, Gordievskiy believed might have hyped the war hysteria. He never really believed in the threat, however, and reported during his debriefing in 1985 that he thought the VRYaN hysteria might have been some kind of internal political ploy. I must reiterate again that Gordievskiy did not know about the secret military alert of November 1983.

10. [portion marking not declassified] The US intelligence community has never really closed with this analytical problem. A SNIE addressed this subject, [1½ lines not declassified]. The position has been taken again and again that had there been a real alert we would have detected more of it, but this may be whistling through the graveyard. It is not certain that we looked hard enough or broadly enough for information. For Western collectors the context was peacetime without even the most basic ripples of crisis. For the Soviets, however, the view may have looked quite different. It is uncertain how close to war we came or even if that was a possibility at all, but we know from Gordievskiy that the analysts in Moscow had predicted that

the West would launch the attack from a posture of NATO State ORANGE. What might have happened that day in November 1983 if we had begun a precautionary generation of forces rather than waiting for further information?

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988–1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The PFIAB report commented that "as his parting shot before retirement," Perroots, who served as DIA Director from 1985 to 1989, sent a January 1989 "letter outlining his disguiet over the inadequate treatment of the Soviet war scare to, among others, the DCI and this Board." The report continued: "Following the detection of the Soviet Air Forces' increased alert status, it was his [Perroots's] recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response—a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time." (PFIAB, pages 27-28) In further accord with Perroots's report, the PFIAB report concluded: "As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized the risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual alert level. But these officials acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking." (PFIAB, page x)

[name not declassified] the National Warning Staff and [name not declassified] of the Office of Soviet Analysis prepared an undated memorandum reacting to Perroots's

comments, which was distributed by Ermarth to the DCI and DDCI for consideration:

**SUBJECT** 

Comments on Memorandum of Lieutenant General Perroots

#### Summary

1. General Perroots's memorandum describes in detail a worrisome episode in which Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe assumed an abnormally high alert posture in early November 1983 in response to a routine NATO command post and communications exercise. Two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)—written in May and August 1984 respectively—treated the events described in the General's memorandum in the larger context of US-Soviet relations. Those Estimates judged that the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern in many areas of national life primarily because of the more aggressive policies of the US Administration in the early 1980s, the US strategic modernization program that included the peacekeeper ICBM and the D-5 SLBM, the actual implementation of NATO's 1979 decision for Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) modernization by deployment of the first Pershing-II missile systems to Europe, and because of the leadership instability in the USSR from the successive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985. A National Intelligence Estimate in 1988 assessed the significance of the events in 1983 with the benefit of a longer time perspective and reached the same broad conclusions. General Perroots's memorandum and its enclosure neither raises no new issues nor contains new data that change the strategic judgements already written. [portion marking not declassified]

- 2. At the tactical and theater level, however, General Perroots's memorandum surfaces a long-standing warning problem, i.e., the need for the Intelligence Community in Washington to provide more timely, discriminating, and accurate warning in support of the theater commander. Perroots, who at the time was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), describes three serious problems for which there are only partial answers. First, he believes that, despite the enormous amount of resources and energy spent in guarding against a strategic surprise attack, USAFE was not well informed in that the US warning systems did not detect in a timely fashion the extent of Soviet precautionary readiness measures undertaken in November 1983 in response to NATO exercise Able Archer. Secondly, he believes that Washington-based agencies had relevant information which was not available to the European Command when he recommended against a precautionary US alert by US Air Forces Europe in response to the detection of the increased alert status of the Soviet Air Forces. Finally, [1½ lines not declassified, General Perroots is concerned that in similar circumstances—even if there is better intelligence another officer in his position might recommend a precautionary US Air Force alert in Europe that could have serious escalatory consequences, unless there are timely, national level assessments available. [portion marking not declassified]
- 3. The dilemma that General Perroots has described is characteristic of the warning problems faced by senior US military intelligence chiefs in many past crises, in which decisions about US force posture were dependent upon threat assessments prepared rapidly and based on fragmentary and incomplete intelligence. General Perroots's memorandum reinforces two long-standing lessons of warning: warning systems are no substitute for

seasoned, professional judgment and assessments; and they require constant attention and improvement. In terms of process, however, his memorandum reinforces the requests of successive SACEURs and other US theater commanders for better ways to provide more timely national-level warning assessments to the theater intelligence staffs.

#### The Setting of Exercise Able Archer, 1983

- 4. The larger context of the period, often referred to as the "war scare," reflected increasing Soviet concern over the drift in superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority. These fears were exacerbated by planned improvements in US strategic forces, as well as by progress made by NATO to implement its 1979 decision began with NATO's deliberations in the late 1970s to modernize its theater nuclear forces by deploying Pershing-II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to Europe. By 1981, after the new US Administration was inaugurated, the Soviet concern intensified almost concurrently with General Secretary Brezhnev's decline in health [portion marking not declassified
- 5. [ $1\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] the increased Soviet concern stemmed from a fear by some Soviet leaders that the West might seek to exploit its new capability in Europe for a preemptive nuclear surprise attack against the USSR, for which the Soviets had no defense. From a national security

standpoint, this Western capability led to questions about the long-standing Soviet view that crises and other adverse developments in international affairs would precede the outbreak of war and be the basis for long-term early warning. The Soviets had concern that the West might decide to attack the USSR without warning during a time of vulnerability—such as when military transport was used to support the harvest—thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive strike at the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike. [portion marking not declassified]

- 6. From Brezhnev's death in 1982 through late 1984, the Soviets ordered a number of unusual measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the West. These included: disruption of the normal troop rotation cycle for Soviet forces in central Europe in 1984; updating civil defense procedures in the USSR from 1982 through 1984; in the spring of 1984 the first, and apparently only, time that Soviet military trucks were not sent to support the harvest since the end of World War II; and increased alert reactions even to routine NATO training from 1982 to 1984. The cumulative effect of these and other measures was to reduce the Soviet and Warsaw Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack. The abnormal Soviet reaction to NATO Exercise Able Archer in November 1983 occurred within this setting. [portion marking not declassified
- 7. Concurrent with the military dimension, [less than 1 line not declassified] other precautionary measures taken by the Soviets probably were a reflection of the political maneuvering in the Kremlin in 1982 and 1983 associated with Andropov's rise to power. In exchange for military support for his bid to become General Secretary, Andropov, then KGB Chairman, may have promised greater

allocations of resources for military industrial expansion, improved civil defense readiness, and military modernization. All of these were espoused by the Chief of the General Staff at the time, Marshal Ogarkov. Successful manipulation of threat perceptions by the KGB at Andropov's direction would have helped cultivate the strong military backing Andropov enjoyed when he came to power. In this environment, the heightened Soviet military reactions to NATO exercises would have been expected. [portion marking not declassified]

8. Finally, [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric, moderate its hostile attitudes, and begin serious business on trade and arms control. Some analysts believe that the Soviet activities, [1 line not declassified], were intended to be detected and were contrived to nudge Washington toward a more conciliatory and cooperative attitude in dealings with Moscow. [less than 1 line not declassified]

#### Intelligence Community Performance

9. Since 1983, the Intelligence Community, CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have treated the events surrounding the Able Archer episode in a number of in-house publications and national estimates. When General Perroots was Director, DIA, analysts concurred in the Community assessments in 1988 that the "war scare" period of heightened Soviet concern was triggered by the change of the US Administration and its policy decisions toward the Soviet threat; that at least some Soviet leaders concluded that a surprise nuclear attack by NATO was possible outside the context of a crisis; and that this led to a number of Soviet responses consistent with

such a conclusion, including high priority intelligence collection taskings. DIA believes, however, that the Soviet measures were primarily a function of the internal leadership instability from which Andropov emerged as General Secretary. [portion marking not declassified]

#### General Perroots's Problem

10. The events surrounding NATO Exercise Able Archer, however, all occurred some months before the first national-level assessments were written, and General Perroots was confronted with a serious choice of what recommendation to make to the Commander, US Air Forces Europe. The Department of Defense warning indicators system reflected that, [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet air units in Poland and East Germany were observed at a high state of alert, although no other Soviet strategic forces adopted such a posture. [ $2\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] Consequently, the Commander, US Air Forces Europe, was concerned whether he should exercise his discretionary authority to increase the alert posture of his force. General Perroots recommended that no precautionary US alert be instituted, despite the evidence of his own warning system. Several days later, the Soviet air forces returned to normal alert status. [portion marking not declassified]

#### 11. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

12. General Perroots's concerns about this episode are legitimate to the extent that they deal with Washington's support to the US military commands. [ $4\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] Third, national-level assessments of Soviet intentions were not available when most needed. The General's memorandum indicates the Defense Department has taken steps to correct the problems in the processing

and dissemination of intelligence. The third problem, of timely national-level support, is continuous. As Director of DIA, General Perroots himself initiated organizational and procedural changes to improve DIA's support to the commands. [portion marking not declassified]

13. Underlying all of the above, however, is the paradox that General Perroots believes he made a correct judgment, but for the wrong reasons. This is not a new problem nor is there a solution to it. General Perroots has accurately identified inherent limits of the warning systems as they now exist. His candor is a safeguard against complacency and denial that problems exist. Additionally, he raises again the need for better understanding in Washington of the problems facing intelligence in the field. [portion marking not declassified]

[name not declassified] [name not declassified]
Chief, TFD/RIG/SOVA Director, National Warning Staff

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988–1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The 1990 PFIAB report repeatedly stressed: "During the November 1983 NATO 'Able Archer' nuclear release exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert, [4 lines not declassified]."

The PFIAB report argued: "The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter

it from deploying improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an internal power struggle—for example, a contest between conservatives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats—then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality—by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own—then the 'war scare' was a cause for real concern." (PFIAB, page vi)

The PFIAB report concluded that the IC's failure to adequately report on Able Archer and the 1983–1984 Soviet war scare had important implications for the future: "In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode." (PFIAB, page ix)

[Document 385]

## B. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill) 1

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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> Declassified A/GIS/IPS Department of State EO 13526 Date:

## C. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, July 11, 1983

Dear Ten Secretary andropour I appreciate very much your letter place an," rendending commitment of the Soviet. broduship and the people of the Soviet Union to The coverse of peace, the elimination of the nuclear threat and the development of relations broad on mutual bandet and equality with all nations. Let me assure you the government of the perople of the United States are dedicated too, The course of place "and "The elimination of the mucleanthreat" It goes without boying that we also seek South no besord without les river smither benefit and equality. "Our record since we were allied in W.W.II confirms Ital. Mr. Beneral Secretary could we not begin to appearach there goods in the meetings new going on in Henera? You and I where an enormal responsibility for the preservation of stability in The world. I believe me can fulfill that som a singer elice at to at the sticher outire love of exchange than we have Acceptable but able to setablish. We have much to talk about with regard to the situation in Factorn Europe, South Osia, and particularly this famisphere as well as in Auch areas are arms control, trade between our two Countries and orther ways in which we can expand east- west contacts. thestoucally our prederasions have made better progress when communicating has been private and coudid. of you will to engage in ruch communication you will gind me ready. I

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### D. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting 1

Washington, September 2, 1983

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Declassified A/GIS/IPS Department of State EO 13526 Date:

# E. Notes of a National Security Council $Meeting \frac{1}{}$

Washington, March 4, 1985

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- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <a href="Document 27">Document 27</a>.
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <u>Document 70</u>.
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Weinberger Papers, Appointment and Diary File, Box 9, Notes Set B, 1983 #25-41. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <u>Document 91</u>.
- <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Sven Kraemer Files, Geneva—NSC Meeting, 03/04/1985. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <u>Document 375</u>. No formal notes of the meeting were found.

### A. Editorial Note

Stark deviations in assessments by the U.S. Intelligence Community of the November 1983 NATO exercise Able Archer and the Soviet "war scare" led to a much later 1990 investigation by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board during the George H.W. Bush administration, resulting in the report, "The Soviet 'War Scare.'" (George H.W. Bush Library, Bush Presidential Records, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Subject Files: Reports to the President-War Scare Report 1990 [OA/IDCF01830-020]) The February 15, 1990, PFIAB report analyzed intelligence and reporting on the Soviet war scare, Able Archer, and other related activities. The PFIAB report stated: "During the past year, the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events." (PFIAB, pages vi-vii) Although outside the normal scope of this volume, the 1990 PFIAB report and other memoranda from 1988 and 1989 are addressed in this editorial note because the documents focus upon crucial events from 1983 to 1984.

Reactions from the Intelligence Community (IC) and policymakers to the events surrounding Able Archer and

the Soviet "war scare" differed significantly and evolved over time. The contemporaneous reporting in 1983–1984 from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Intelligence Council (NIC), [text not declassified] drew varied conclusions about Soviet anxieties. While some reporting assessed that "Contrary to the impression conveyed by Soviet propaganda, Moscow does not appear to anticipate a near-term military confrontation with the United States" (see <a href="Document 157">Document 157</a>), another analysis presented evidence that [text not declassified].

Retrospective assessments of these events seem to conflate the NATO Able Archer exercise with the broader "war scare" talk emanating from Moscow related to INF deployments. The Soviet military unquestionably reacted to Able Archer differently than to previous NATO exercises. (See <a href="Document 134">Document 134</a>.) Whether the Soviet response was attributable to the circumstances of the time, to the "war scare" (whether real or Soviet propaganda), or to a credible belief within the Soviet military leadership or the Politburo that the United States was planning to launch a nuclear first strike against the USSR, under the guise of a NATO exercise or otherwise, remains unclear on the basis of the available evidence.

After a year of research and a reassessment of the relevant intelligence and documentation, the PFIAB report stated: "We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike—perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise—were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and

actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations.

"In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs) in May and August 1984, the intelligence community said: 'We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States.' Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be 'propaganda.' [See <u>Documents 221</u> and <u>264</u>.]

"The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelligence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President." (PFIAB, pages vi-vii)

During November 1983, Able Archer and the Soviet responses to this exercise received little immediate attention in the U.S. Intelligence Community. (See <a href="Document 135">Document 135</a>.) However, by spring 1984, some in the intelligence communities in the United States [text not declassified] believed the Reagan administration should have recognized Soviet sensitivities and anxieties about a potential U.S. first strike. [text not declassified].

According to the PFIAB report, [text not declassified] "KGB Deputy Resident Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy, [text not declassified] had witnessed what he saw as Soviet paranoia over a US nuclear first strike; [text not declassified] As one of the most senior KGB officers in London, [text not declassified]." (PFIAB, page 10)

In a covering memorandum [less than 1 line not declassified] to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey and others, Herbert Meyer, Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, wrote: [text not declassified]. The PFIAB report commented that the [text not declassified] report was "not well received in the US intelligence community." (PFIAB, pages 10-11)

Another contemporaneous analysis from the CIA, the May 1984 SNIE 11–10–84/JX concluded: "We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States." (See <u>Document 221</u>.) The PFIAB report commented on this SNIE: "The estimate boldly declared that 'Recent Soviet war scare propaganda . . . is aimed primarily at discrediting US policies and mobilizing 'peace' pressures among various audiences abroad.' In a more piecemeal fashion, it was judged that 'Each Soviet action has its own military or political purpose sufficient to explain it.' The accelerated tempo of Soviet live exercise activity was explained simply as a reflection of 'long-term Soviet military objectives.'

"The Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83 was dismissed as a 'counterexercise,' but analysts acknowledged that the 'elaborate Soviet reaction' was 'somewhat greater than usual.' [less than 1 line not declassified] prior to and during the exercise indicated that the Warsaw Pact Intelligence services, especially the KGB, were admonished 'to look for any indication that the United States was about to launch a first nuclear strike,' analysts concluded that 'by confining heightened readiness to selected air units, Moscow clearly revealed that it did not, in fact, think there was a possibility at this time of a NATO attack.' The assessment, however, was not specific about what type of defensive or precautionary Soviet activity might be expected—and

detected—were they preparing for an offensive NATO move." (PFIAB, page 13)

The PFIAB report continued its critique of SNIE 11-10-84/JX: IC "analysts dismissed [less than 1 line not declassified] on the war scare, including the KGB's formal tasking to its Residencies. 'This war scare propaganda has reverberated in Soviet security bureaucracies and emanated through other channels such as human sources. [See for example, Document 144.] We do not believe it reflects authentic leadership fears of imminent conflict." The report contended: "Such judgments were made even though the analysis was tempered 'by some uncertainty as to current Soviet leadership perceptions of the United States, by continued uncertainty about the Politburo decisionmaking processes, and by our inability at this point to conduct a detailed examination of how the Soviets might have assessed recent US/NATO military exercises and reconnaissance operations'—which, of course, included the previous Able Archer exercise. In other words, US analysts were unsure of what the Kremlin leadership thought or how it made decisions, nor had they adequately assessed the Soviet reaction to Able Archer 83. This notwithstanding, the estimate concluded: 'We are confident that, as of now, the Soviets see not an imminent military clash but a costly and—to some extent—more perilous strategic and political struggle over the rest of the decade." (PFIAB, page 14)

The Board had similar criticisms of the August 1984 SNIE 11-9-84, "Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984" (see <u>Document 264</u>), for its "categorical and unqualified" judgments "about the likelihood of the war scare," and the analysts' conclusions: "We strongly believe that the Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or

confrontation with the United States. Also, we do not believe that the Soviet war talk and other actions 'mask' Soviet preparations for an imminent move toward confrontation on the part of the USSR." (PFIAB, page 19-20) The PFIAB report continued: "Analysts readily acknowledged that the previous six months had seen extraordinary, unprecedented Soviet activities. Large scale military exercise, 'anomalous behavior' during the troop rotation, withdrawn military support for the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), new, deployed weapons systems (termed 'in response to INF deployments'), and heightened internal vigilance and security activities were noted. These events, however, were judged to be 'in line with long-evolving plans and patterns, rather than with sharp acceleration of preparations for major war.'" (PFIAB, page 19)

The PFIAB report acknowledged that its assessment and criticism of the May and August 1984 SNIEs "derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed." (PFIAB, page ix) The PFIAB report concluded: "Reasonable people can disagree about the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's. The PFIAB does disagree with many of them. More worrisome to us, however, is the process by which the estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. Although both estimates were reportedly reviewed by outside readers—and both, but particularly the first, contained alternative scenarios—strongly worded interpretations were defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with them. Consequently, both estimates contained, in essence, single outcome forecasting based in large part on near-term anomalous behavior. Moreover, neither alerted the reader to the risks erroneously rejecting the correct scenario." (PFIAB, page 30) The PFIAB report criticized the performance of the IC in 1983–1984, showing that contemporary assessments of Soviet intentions after Able Archer did not go far enough in providing President Reagan with alternative scenarios, explaining that the anxiety from the Soviet leadership could have been real.

In criticizing contemporary estimates, the PFIAB report emphasized intelligence that had not been available to the IC during these years, principally information provided by Gordiyevskiy after he defected in 1985. Robert McFarlane's thoughts on the influence of Gordiyevskiy's information on the President are recorded in a December 16, 1988, memorandum for the record:

#### Memorandum for the Record

16 December 1988

**SUBJECT** 

[less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. McFarlane Regarding the Influence of Oleg Gordiyevskiy's Reporting on President Reagan

On 15 December [less than 1 line not declassified] Robert F. ("Bud") McFarlane, formerly National Security Advisor to the President, as to the veracity of claims [less than 1 line not declassified] that the reporting of KGB officer [less than 1 line not declassified] Oleg Gordiyevskiy about the Kremlin's fear of war greatly influenced President Reagan in the mid-1980s to seek better relations with the USSR. In response, Bud made several points:

He definitely remembered the reporting associated (later) with Gordiyevskiy that conveyed the Kremlin's fear of war. He also specifically recalled [less than 1 line not declassified] on Gordiyevskiy's assessments given to the President [less than 1 line not declassified].

He noted that he discussed this reporting with the President on several occasions. This was in the course of numerous discussions extending throughout 1983 and part of 1984 about the apparent anxieties being transmitted by Moscow through many channels, [less than 1 line not declassified].

The President, according to Bud, saw this reporting attributed to Gordiyevskiy in the larger context of a Soviet "war-scare" campaign arising from the NATO decision to deploy INF and from Reagan's hard line on defense, SDI, etc. In the President's view, either the Soviets were paranoid in strange ways we could not let bother us, or they were fabricating the appearance of fear to intimidate and sway us, which we should even more be prepared to ignore.

Often in these conversations, according to Bud, the President outlined his sustained intention to concentrate on building US strength and credibility in the first term and to move toward diplomatic reengagement in the second. The President's key speech of January 1984 [see <u>Document 158</u>] was a natural step in a long-planned shift of policy. Neither Gordiyevskiy's reporting nor the Soviet "warscare" campaign in general were responsible for the evolution of the President's policy.

Bud said he'd been queried before on this matter by [name not declassified], a journalist, who might be (or have been) writing an article on it. Against the background of the above, Bud said he discounted Gordiyevskiy's impact on the President [less than 1 line not declassified].

[1 paragraph (8½ lines) not declassified]

[name not declassified]

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 90T00435R: Chronological Files (1988), Box 1, Folder 12: C/NIC Chrono for December 1988)

McFarlane's recollections in this memorandum for the record correlate with a January 1984 memorandum by Jack Matlock, Soviet specialist on the NSC Staff, which demonstrated an awareness of potential Soviet concerns, but concluded:

- "—The Soviet leadership is not overly nervous about the immediate prospect of armed confrontation with the U.S.;
- "—They are however very nervous about the prospects five to ten years down the road—not so much of a confrontation as such, as of a decisive shift in the balance of military power." (See <u>Document 157</u>.)

As mentioned in the 1988 memorandum for the record, McFarlane did recall "later" reporting to Reagan about Gordiyevskiy. The PFIAB report addressed Gordiyevskiy's situation in relation to the war scare and the 1984 SNIE assessments: "The Board found that after the 1984 assessments were issued, the intelligence community did not again address the war scare until after the defection to Great Britain of KGB Colonel Oleg Gordiyevskiy in July, 1985. Gordiyevskiy had achieved the rank of Acting Resident in the United Kingdom, but he fell under suspicion as a Western agent. Recalled to the Soviet Union, he was placed under house arrest and intensely interrogated. Able to flee his watchers, Gordiyevskiy was exfiltrated from Moscow by the British Secret Intelligence Service."

The report continued: "During lengthy debriefing sessions that followed, Gordiyevskiy supplied a fuller report on the Soviet war hysteria. This report, complete with

documentation from KGB Headquarters and entitled 'KGB Response to Soviet Leadership Concern over US Nuclear Attack,' was first disseminated in a restricted manner within the US intelligence community in October 1985. Gordiyevskiy described the extraordinary KGB collection plan, initiated in 1981, to look for signs that the US would conduct a surprise nuclear attack on the Soviet Union. He identified and reviewed factors driving leadership fears. Based on the perception the US was achieving a strategic advantage, those in the Kremlin were said to believe that the US was likely to resort to nuclear weapons much earlier in a crisis than previously expected. They also were concerned the US might seek to exploit its first-strike capability outside the context of a crisis, probably during a military exercise. He described the leadership's worries of a 'decapitating' strike from the Pershing II's, and its belief that the US could mobilize for a surprise attack in a mere seven to ten days. He explained how the London Residency responded to the requirements, and the effects that reporting had back at Moscow Center in reinforcing Soviet fears. He described conversations he had held with colleagues from Center and from the GRU. The next month. President Reagan held his first summit with Mikhail Gorbachev and relations began to thaw." (PFIAB, pages 22-23)

The PFIAB report also cited a January 1989 "End of Tour Report Addendum" by Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, who had served as Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe, during the 1983 Able Archer exercise, to emphasize the potential consequences of the intelligence gap during the Able Archer exercise. Perroots addressed Able Archer as well as Gordiyevskiy's reporting in that memorandum:

- 1. (U) In 1983, I was assigned as the DCS for Intelligence, US Air Forces, Europe, Ramstein AB, Germany. The annual NATO Command and Control exercise ABLE ARCHER was scheduled to begin during the first week of November. The context of this nuclear command and control exercise was relatively benign; the scenario had been purposely chosen to be non-controversial, and the exercise itself was a routine annual event. This exercise closely followed the bombing of air defense sites in Lebanon and directly followed the invasion of Grenada. As I recall, however, there was no particular feeling of tension in the European Theater beyond that which is normal.
- 2. [portion marking not declassified] Only the fact that Soviet Intelligence collection assets (primarily low level signals intercept units) had failed to return to garrison after their normal concentrated coverage of NATO's AUTUMN FORGE exercise series could be reckoned strange at all. As the kickoff date of ABLE ARCHER neared it was clear that there was a great deal of Soviet interest in the forthcoming events. Again, this seemed nothing out of the ordinary. We knew that there was a history of intensive Soviet collection against practice Emergency Action Messages (EAM's) related to nuclear release.
- 3. [portion marking not declassified] ABLE ARCHER started in the morning of 3 November, and progressed immediately in the scenario to NATO STATE ORANGE. At 2100Z on 04 November NSA issued an electrical product report G/00/3083-83, entitled "SOVIET AIR FORCES, GSFG, PLACED ON HEIGHTENED READINESS, 2 NOVEMBER 1983." I saw this message on the morning of 5 November and discussed it with my air analysts. It stated that as of 1900Z on 02 November the fighter-bomber divisions of the air force of Group Soviet Forces, Germany had been placed in a status of heightened alert. All

divisional and regimental command posts and supporting command and control elements were to be manned aroundthe-clock by augmented teams.

- 4. [portion marking not declassified] In addition to the directed command and control changes the fighter-bomber divisions were also ordered to load out one squadron of aircraft in each regiment (if this order applied equally across GSFG the result would have been at least 108 fighter-bombers on alert). These aircraft were to be armed and placed at readiness 3 (30 minute alert) to "destroy first-line enemy targets." The alert aircraft were to be equipped with a self-protection jamming pod. We knew from subsequent NSA reporting that a squadron at Neuruppin, East Germany sought and was apparently granted permission to configure its aircraft without the ECM pod because of an unexpected weight and balance problem. My air analysts opined that this message meant that at least this particular squadron was loading a munitions configuration that they had never actually loaded before, i.e., a warload.
- 5. [portion marking not declassified] At this point, I spoke to CinCUSAFE, General Billy Minter. I told him we had some unusual activity in East Germany that was probably a reaction to the ongoing ABLE ARCHER. He asked if I thought we should increase the real force generation. I said that we would carefully watch the situation, but there was insufficient evidence to justify increasing our real alert posture. At this point in the exercise our forces were in a simulated posture of NATO State ORANGE and local SALTY NATION tests involving simulated generation of combat aircraft were underway at various locations including Ramstein AB. If I had known then what I later found out I am uncertain what advice I would have given.

- 6. [portion marking not declassified] An NSA message dated 022229Z DEC 83 provided the rest of the picture as far as we knew it—at least until the reports began to surface from the British penetration of the KGB, Oleg Gordievskiy. This GAMMA message was entitled "SOVIET 4th AIR ARMY AT HEIGHTENED READINESS IN REACTION TO NATO EXERCISE ABLE ARCHER, 2-11 NOVEMBER 1983." This report stated that the alert had been ordered by the Chief of the Soviet Air Forces, Marshal Kutakhov, and that all units of the Soviet 4th Air Army were involved in the alert "which included preparations for immediate use of nuclear weapons." This report described activity that was contemporaneous with that reflected in East Germany, but because of the specific source of this material it was not available in near realtime. The two pieces taken together present a much more ominous picture.
- 7. [portion marking not declassified] Equally ominous in its own way was the fact that this alert was never reflected at all by the I&W system. At the time of this occurrence there was no distribution of electrically reported GAMMA material to the Tactical Fusion Center at Boerfink. I remedied that shortfall in the aftermath of this activity. Secondly, a real standdown of aircraft was secretly ordered in at least the Soviet Air Forces units facing the Central Region, and that standdown was not detected. The Soviet alert in response to ABLE ARCHER began after nightfall on Wednesday evening, there was no flying on the following two days which led to the weekend, and then the following Monday was 7 November, the revolution holiday. The absence of flying could always be explained, although a warning condition was raised finally on about the ninth of November when overhead photography showed fully armed FLOGGER aircraft on air defense alert at a base in East

Germany. When this single indicator was raised, the standdown had been underway for a week.

- 8. [portion marking not declassified] For the next six months I was on a soapbox about ABLE ARCHER whenever I could discuss it at the appropriate classification level. I spoke to the Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC), and I buttonholed a lot of people. I suggested that perhaps we should move our annual exercise away from the November 7 holiday, because it is clear to me that the conjunction of the two events causes a warning problem that can never be solved. Our problem here was that we had a couple of very highly classified bits of intelligence evidence about a potentially disastrous situation that never actually came to fruition. For decisionmakers it was always difficult to believe that there could have been any serious reaction by the Soviets to such a "benign" exercise as ABLE ARCHER. From the Soviet perspective, however, it might have appeared very different. It was difficult for all of us to grasp that, but Oleg Gordievskiy's reporting began to provide a somewhat more frightening perspective when it became available in the Fall of 1985.
- 9. (S) By the time Gordievskiy's reporting began to surface for analytical review I was the Director of DIA. Gordievskiy's initial reporting about a "war scare" in 1983 immediately caught my attention. It should be pointed out at the outset that Gordievskiy knew nothing of a military alert during ABLE ARCHER. He did, however, tell us something of a chilling story about Moscow Center's Intelligence tasking during 1983. He related that there was a project called either "RYaN" or "VRYaN," the latter probably being the full form of a Russian acronym meaning "sudden rocket nuclear attack." There was a cadre of specialists in Moscow Center charged with, among other

things, finding the evidence of planning for a western attack on the Soviet Union. Beginning in 1982 and continuing into 1983 Gordievskiy says that this group became ever more insistent that an attack was being planned by the West. By March 1983 the KGB officers in Moscow had decided that ABLE ARCHER 83 would provide an excellent cover for the planned attack, and KGB and GRU residencies around the world were being directed to find the evidence. Gordievskiy, living in London at the time, states that he never believed there was really a threat, and that the London residency of the KGB simply ignored the collection requirements until it began to become clear that Moscow was serious. During the summer of 1983 the London residency sent some reports that, in retrospect, Gordievskiy believed might have hyped the war hysteria. He never really believed in the threat, however, and reported during his debriefing in 1985 that he thought the VRYaN hysteria might have been some kind of internal political ploy. I must reiterate again that Gordievskiy did not know about the secret military alert of November 1983.

10. [portion marking not declassified] The US intelligence community has never really closed with this analytical problem. A SNIE addressed this subject, [1½ lines not declassified]. The position has been taken again and again that had there been a real alert we would have detected more of it, but this may be whistling through the graveyard. It is not certain that we looked hard enough or broadly enough for information. For Western collectors the context was peacetime without even the most basic ripples of crisis. For the Soviets, however, the view may have looked quite different. It is uncertain how close to war we came or even if that was a possibility at all, but we know from Gordievskiy that the analysts in Moscow had predicted that the West would launch the attack from a posture of NATO State ORANGE. What might have happened that day in

November 1983 if we had begun a precautionary generation of forces rather than waiting for further information?

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988–1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The PFIAB report commented that "as his parting shot before retirement," Perroots, who served as DIA Director from 1985 to 1989, sent a January 1989 "letter outlining his disquiet over the inadequate treatment of the Soviet war scare to, among others, the DCI and this Board." The report continued: "Following the detection of the Soviet Air Forces' increased alert status, it was his [Perroots's] recommendation, made in ignorance, not to raise US readiness in response—a fortuitous, if ill-informed, decision given the changed political environment at the time." (PFIAB, pages 27-28) In further accord with Perroots's report, the PFIAB report concluded: "As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized the risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual alert level. But these officials acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking." (PFIAB, page x)

[name not declassified] the National Warning Staff and [name not declassified] of the Office of Soviet Analysis prepared an undated memorandum reacting to Perroots's comments, which was distributed by Ermarth to the DCI and DDCI for consideration:

Comments on Memorandum of Lieutenant General Perroots

## Summary

- 1. General Perroots's memorandum describes in detail a worrisome episode in which Soviet Air Forces in Central Europe assumed an abnormally high alert posture in early November 1983 in response to a routine NATO command post and communications exercise. Two Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIEs)—written in May and August 1984 respectively—treated the events described in the General's memorandum in the larger context of US-Soviet relations. Those Estimates judged that the Soviets displayed a heightened sense of concern in many areas of national life primarily because of the more aggressive policies of the US Administration in the early 1980s, the US strategic modernization program that included the peacekeeper ICBM and the D-5 SLBM, the actual implementation of NATO's 1979 decision for Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) modernization by deployment of the first Pershing-II missile systems to Europe, and because of the leadership instability in the USSR from the successive deaths of three general secretaries between 1981 and 1985. A National Intelligence Estimate in 1988 assessed the significance of the events in 1983 with the benefit of a longer time perspective and reached the same broad conclusions. General Perroots's memorandum and its enclosure neither raises no new issues nor contains new data that change the strategic judgements already written. [portion marking not declassified]
- 2. At the tactical and theater level, however, General Perroots's memorandum surfaces a long-standing warning problem, i.e., the need for the Intelligence Community in Washington to provide more timely, discriminating, and

accurate warning in support of the theater commander. Perroots, who at the time was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, US Air Forces Europe (USAFE), describes three serious problems for which there are only partial answers. First, he believes that, despite the enormous amount of resources and energy spent in guarding against a strategic surprise attack, USAFE was not well informed in that the US warning systems did not detect in a timely fashion the extent of Soviet precautionary readiness measures undertaken in November 1983 in response to NATO exercise Able Archer. Secondly, he believes that Washington-based agencies had relevant information which was not available to the European Command when he recommended against a precautionary US alert by US Air Forces Europe in response to the detection of the increased alert status of the Soviet Air Forces. Finally, [1½ lines not declassified. General Perroots is concerned that in similar circumstances—even if there is better intelligence another officer in his position might recommend a precautionary US Air Force alert in Europe that could have serious escalatory consequences, unless there are timely, national level assessments available. [portion marking not declassified

3. The dilemma that General Perroots has described is characteristic of the warning problems faced by senior US military intelligence chiefs in many past crises, in which decisions about US force posture were dependent upon threat assessments prepared rapidly and based on fragmentary and incomplete intelligence. General Perroots's memorandum reinforces two long-standing lessons of warning: warning systems are no substitute for seasoned, professional judgment and assessments; and they require constant attention and improvement. In terms of process, however, his memorandum reinforces the requests of successive SACEURs and other US theater

commanders for better ways to provide more timely national-level warning assessments to the theater intelligence staffs.

## The Setting of Exercise Able Archer, 1983

- 4. The larger context of the period, often referred to as the "war scare," reflected increasing Soviet concern over the drift in superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority. These fears were exacerbated by planned improvements in US strategic forces, as well as by progress made by NATO to implement its 1979 decision began with NATO's deliberations in the late 1970s to modernize its theater nuclear forces by deploying Pershing-II missiles and Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCMs) to Europe. By 1981, after the new US Administration was inaugurated, the Soviet concern intensified almost concurrently with General Secretary Brezhnev's decline in health [portion marking not declassified)
- 5. [1½ lines not declassified] the increased Soviet concern stemmed from a fear by some Soviet leaders that the West might seek to exploit its new capability in Europe for a preemptive nuclear surprise attack against the USSR, for which the Soviets had no defense. From a national security standpoint, this Western capability led to questions about the long-standing Soviet view that crises and other adverse developments in international affairs would precede the outbreak of war and be the basis for long-term early

warning. The Soviets had concern that the West might decide to attack the USSR without warning during a time of vulnerability—such as when military transport was used to support the harvest—thus compelling the Soviets to consider a preemptive strike at the first sign of US preparations for a nuclear strike. [portion marking not declassified]

- 6. From Brezhnev's death in 1982 through late 1984, the Soviets ordered a number of unusual measures not previously detected except during periods of crisis with the West. These included: disruption of the normal troop rotation cycle for Soviet forces in central Europe in 1984; updating civil defense procedures in the USSR from 1982 through 1984; in the spring of 1984 the first, and apparently only, time that Soviet military trucks were not sent to support the harvest since the end of World War II; and increased alert reactions even to routine NATO training from 1982 to 1984. The cumulative effect of these and other measures was to reduce the Soviet and Warsaw Pact vulnerability to a surprise attack. The abnormal Soviet reaction to NATO Exercise Able Archer in November 1983 occurred within this setting. [portion marking not declassified
- 7. Concurrent with the military dimension, [less than 1 line not declassified] other precautionary measures taken by the Soviets probably were a reflection of the political maneuvering in the Kremlin in 1982 and 1983 associated with Andropov's rise to power. In exchange for military support for his bid to become General Secretary, Andropov, then KGB Chairman, may have promised greater allocations of resources for military industrial expansion, improved civil defense readiness, and military modernization. All of these were espoused by the Chief of the General Staff at the time, Marshal Ogarkov. Successful

manipulation of threat perceptions by the KGB at Andropov's direction would have helped cultivate the strong military backing Andropov enjoyed when he came to power. In this environment, the heightened Soviet military reactions to NATO exercises would have been expected. [portion marking not declassified]

8. Finally, [less than 1 line not declassified] the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to tone down its anti-Soviet rhetoric, moderate its hostile attitudes, and begin serious business on trade and arms control. Some analysts believe that the Soviet activities, [1 line not declassified], were intended to be detected and were contrived to nudge Washington toward a more conciliatory and cooperative attitude in dealings with Moscow. [less than 1 line not declassified]

### Intelligence Community Performance

9. Since 1983, the Intelligence Community, CIA's Office of Soviet Analysis, and the Defense Intelligence Agency have treated the events surrounding the Able Archer episode in a number of in-house publications and national estimates. When General Perroots was Director, DIA, analysts concurred in the Community assessments in 1988 that the "war scare" period of heightened Soviet concern was triggered by the change of the US Administration and its policy decisions toward the Soviet threat; that at least some Soviet leaders concluded that a surprise nuclear attack by NATO was possible outside the context of a crisis; and that this led to a number of Soviet responses consistent with such a conclusion, including high priority intelligence collection taskings. DIA believes, however, that the Soviet measures were primarily a function of the internal

leadership instability from which Andropov emerged as General Secretary. [portion marking not declassified]

### General Perroots's Problem

10. The events surrounding NATO Exercise Able Archer, however, all occurred some months before the first national-level assessments were written, and General Perroots was confronted with a serious choice of what recommendation to make to the Commander. US Air Forces Europe. The Department of Defense warning indicators system reflected that, [less than 1 line not declassified] Soviet air units in Poland and East Germany were observed at a high state of alert, although no other Soviet strategic forces adopted such a posture. [ $2\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] Consequently, the Commander, US Air Forces Europe, was concerned whether he should exercise his discretionary authority to increase the alert posture of his force. General Perroots recommended that no precautionary US alert be instituted, despite the evidence of his own warning system. Several days later, the Soviet air forces returned to normal alert status. [portion marking not declassified]

### 11. [1 paragraph (10 lines) not declassified]

12. General Perroots's concerns about this episode are legitimate to the extent that they deal with Washington's support to the US military commands. [ $4\frac{1}{2}$  lines not declassified] Third, national-level assessments of Soviet intentions were not available when most needed. The General's memorandum indicates the Defense Department has taken steps to correct the problems in the processing and dissemination of intelligence. The third problem, of timely national-level support, is continuous. As Director of DIA, General Perroots himself initiated organizational and

procedural changes to improve DIA's support to the commands. [portion marking not declassified]

13. Underlying all of the above, however, is the paradox that General Perroots believes he made a correct judgment, but for the wrong reasons. This is not a new problem nor is there a solution to it. General Perroots has accurately identified inherent limits of the warning systems as they now exist. His candor is a safeguard against complacency and denial that problems exist. Additionally, he raises again the need for better understanding in Washington of the problems facing intelligence in the field. [portion marking not declassified]

[name not declassified] [name not declassified]
Chief, TFD/RIG/SOVA Director, National Warning Staff

(Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 91B00551: Speeches, Lectures, Briefing Files (1988–1989), Box 1, Folder 2: C/NIC (Ermarth) Chrons March 1989)

The 1990 PFIAB report repeatedly stressed: "During the November 1983 NATO 'Able Archer' nuclear release exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland on heightened alert, [4 lines not declassified]."

The PFIAB report argued: "The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply part of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the US, deter it from deploying improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an

internal power struggle—for example, a contest between conservatives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats—then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality—by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own—then the 'war scare' was a cause for real concern." (PFIAB, page vi)

The PFIAB report concluded that the IC's failure to adequately report on Able Archer and the 1983-1984 Soviet war scare had important implications for the future: "In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode." (PFIAB, page ix)

# B. Note of a Meeting Between President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz by the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Hill)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, March 25, 1983

[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

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<sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Charles Hill Papers, Charles Hill Notebooks, Entry for March 25, 1983. No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <a href="Document 27">Document 27</a>.

### C. Letter From President Reagan to Soviet General Secretary Andropov<sup>1</sup>

Washington, July 11, 1983

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Coolassified A/GIS/IPS Department of State E/GI3526 <sup>1</sup> Source: Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, NSC Head of State File, U.S.S.R.: General Secretary Andropov (8290913, 8391028, 8391032). No classification marking. For the transcribed text of the note, see <u>Document 70</u>.

## D. Notes by Secretary of Defense Weinberger of a National Security Planning Group Meeting $\frac{1}{2}$

Washington, September 2, 1983

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### E. Notes of a National Security Council Meeting 1

Washington, March 4, 1985

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